JUDGMENT R.S. Singh, J.- This writ petition is directed against order of the Board of Revenue dated 12-8-1977 dismissing the petitioner's Second Appeal. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that in the year 1967, Smt. Champia filed a suit for the ejectment of Pooran, father of the petitioners on the allegation that she was the hereditory tenant of the land in dispute and the defendant was her sub-tenant. The defendant was admitted as sub tenant when she was widow. Therefore, after the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as Act) she is Sirdar and the defendant is assami and is liable to be ejected. Pooran contested the suit denying the title of Smt, Champia. During the pendency of the suit Smt. Champia executed a sale deed dated 27-11-1967 in favour of Moti Ram who in his turn transferred the land in dispute in favour of the petitioners through a sale deed dated 25-9-1968. A compromise was arrived at in that suit on 29.3.1968 between Champia and Pooran wherein it was stated that she has no right and by order dated 3-4-1968 the suit was dismissed on the basis of compromise. It appears that on 20-3-1968 an application for impleadment was moved by the plaintiff respondent before the compromise was filed but by order dated 3-4-1968 it was dismissed being infructuous as the suit was disposed of before the order on this application was passed. The present suit was filed on 27-11-1968 under Section 202 of the Act by plaintiff-respondent against Pooran father of the petitioners. The suit was challenged by the defendant denying the title of Mst. Champia and also the title of the donee and vendee based on gift and sale deeds relied on by the plaintiff. It was also asserted that Smt. Champia was never the tenant and he was not her sub-tenant. He claimed to be tenant and thereafter Sirdar on the basis of long possession. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Against the decree of the trial Court the appeal was filed by the plaintiff which was allowed by the Addl. Commissioner. The defendant preferred a Second appeal, which was dismissed by the Board of Revenue. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid orders of the Board of Revenue as well as that of the Addl. Commissioner in the present writ petitioner before this Court. 3. Commissioner. The defendant preferred a Second appeal, which was dismissed by the Board of Revenue. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid orders of the Board of Revenue as well as that of the Addl. Commissioner in the present writ petitioner before this Court. 3. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the trial Court recorded a finding that Smt. Champia was never the tenant and also that the gift and the sale deed have not been legally proved. These findings were based on discussion of oral and documentary evidence on the record but the Addl. Commissioner totally ignored the oral evidence and based his finding on surmises and conjecturs. It was further contended by the learned counsel that the gift deed and the sale deed were not legally proved. Therefore, the plaintiff has no title to file the suit. Moreover, the suit filed by Smt. Champia against Pooran was already dismissed of which the plaintiff had full knowledge. Therefore, that decree could have been assailed only by filing appeal or revision or by filing suit for setting aside in the Civil Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Mst. Sitrati v. Board of Revenue, (1974 AWR 221). So long the decree dated 7-2-1974 is subsisting no ground filing the present suit is made out. 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that Smt. Champia was the hereditary tenant before the enforcement of the Act, which came into force in this area on 1-7-1965. Pooran was only sub-tenant on behalf of Smt. Champia, who was a widow. Therefore, after the date of enforcement of the Act, Pooran was only an Assami. The compromise between them in the suit under Section 202 of the Act filed on behalf of Champia was collusive and fraudulant and therefore, had no right to file the same when he had already gifted away the property. The compromise decree is also hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, the title of Smt. Champia as well as the gift and the sale deeds are fully proved and the lower appellate court have correctly decreed the suit. 5. The compromise decree is also hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, the title of Smt. Champia as well as the gift and the sale deeds are fully proved and the lower appellate court have correctly decreed the suit. 5. The controversy in this case between the parties is whether Smt. Champia was the hereditary tenant of the land in dispute and the land in dispute was let out by her when she was widow on the material date to Pooran father of petitioner's ? Gift deed and the sale deed were also denied by the appellants and the effect of the compromise decreed between Smt. Champia and Pooran in the suit under Section 202 of the Act was also a matter of consideration along with the fact whether the decree was hit by Section 52 of the transfer of Property Act. 6. From the judgment of the trial Court it is clear that the findings recorded by the trial Court were based on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record. According to the trial Court it was not proved that the land was settled with Smt. Champia by the Zamindar and she was tenant. It was also not proved that Pooran was sub tenant on her behalf when she was widow. In case Smt. Champia was tenant and Pooran was not a sub-tenant his possession as a trespasser should have been taken into consideration. The Addl. Commissioner reversed the finding of the trial court totally ignoring the oral evidence and only placing reliance on revenue entries. The tenancy and sub-tenancy can be proved by number of ways. It can be proved by oral settlement or by patta Kabuliat or by payment of rent and the revenue entries. It has been held in several cases that mere revenue entries do not create tenancy in favour of any person. In this case, the appellate Court have based their finding merely on the basis of revenue entries. They have not considered the oral evidence regarding contract of tenancy or payment of rent. A reference was made that Pooran was recorded Zaman 4, which does not prove the case of letting by Smt. Champia in favour of Pooran. 7. In this case, the appellate Court have based their finding merely on the basis of revenue entries. They have not considered the oral evidence regarding contract of tenancy or payment of rent. A reference was made that Pooran was recorded Zaman 4, which does not prove the case of letting by Smt. Champia in favour of Pooran. 7. The finding of the trial Court that the gift deed and the sale deed were not proved according to law has not been specifically set aside by the appellate Courts. As a matter of fact, the Addl. Commissioner held the title of the plaintiff on the basis of mutation orders. This can be hardly said to be correct. Mutation order cannot be a substitute for gift deed or sale deed. Moreover mutation orders are passed in summary proceedings which have no binding effect in the regular suit. The appellate Courts should have considered all the material evidence in this case to consider whether the plaintiff has title in the land in dispute or not. The appellate Courts have also not considered the effect of non-filing the appeal or revision against the compromise decree or non-assailing the decree for setting aside in Civil Court. 8. The finding of fact of the appellate Courts could be construed to be legal only when it is in accordance with law. The finding must be based on evidence which includes oral evidence as well. A finding on total ignorance of oral evidence cannot be said to be a legal and valid finding. 9. In view of what has been discussed above, the orders of the appellate Courts cannot be sustained in law but the justice will be met if the order of the Board of Revenue alone is quashed. 10. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 12-8-1977 of the Board of Revenue is hereby quashed and the Board of Revenue is directed to decide the case afresh according to law and in the light of the observations made above. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.