JUDGMENT T. R. Handa, J.—This appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, hereinafter called the Act arises out of a claims petition filed by one Ajit Singh under Section 110-A (I) (a) of the Act claiming compensation in the sum of Rs. 50,000 for the bodily injuries alleged to have been sustained by him in a motor accident which occurred on 4-7-1973 involving the jeep of the claimant Ajit Singh and the truck of respondent No. 1. In addition to compensation for bodily injuries as mentioned above, the claimant had further claimed a sum of Rs. 1,600 on account of damage caused to his jeep in the said accident. This claims petition was filed on 2 1-1974. 2. During the pendency of the aforesaid claims petition, the claimant Ajit Singh died on 10-2-1975, This fact was revealed before the Tribunal below on 1-3-1975 by the counsel for the deceased who further prayed before the Tribunal for an adjournment to enable him to make a suitable application for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased claimant. The learned Tribunal allowed that prayer and adjourned the case to 5-4-1975. 3. Thereafter the present appellants in their capacity as legal repesentatives of the deceased claimant moved an application under Order XIII, Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Tribunal praying that they be brought on the record as claimants in place of Ajit Singh deceased so as to prosecute the claims petition earlier filed by the deceased. It looks pertinent to point out at this stage that there was no allegation made in the application under Order XXII, Rule 3 read with Section J 51 CPC that the death of Ajit Singh claimant was in any manner connected with the injuries sufferred by him in the motor accident in respect of which the deceased had filed the claims petition. 4. The respondents contested the claim of the appellants that they were entitled to be brought on the record in place of the deceased claimant. In their replies filed to the application the respondents raised a common objection that the claim made by the deceased being in respect of personal injuries, the cause of action did not survive the death of the claimant and the claims petition had, therefore, abated. 5. In their replies filed to the application the respondents raised a common objection that the claim made by the deceased being in respect of personal injuries, the cause of action did not survive the death of the claimant and the claims petition had, therefore, abated. 5. The appellants then filed a rejoinder on 7-8-1975 wherein they inter alia asserted that the deceased had died as a result of the injuries suffered by him in the motor accident in question and in respect of which he had filed the claims petition. In these circumstances, the contention of the appellants was that the claims petition could not be treated as abated. 6. Subsequently on 25-8-1975 the appellants moved yet another application purporting to be under Order VI, Rule 17 C. P. C. In substance the prayer made in this amendment application was that the appellants be permitted to convert the earlier application of the deceased filed under Section 110-A (1) (a) into an independent application of the appellants under Section 110-A (1)(b)of the Act for claiming a net compensation of rupees two lacs on account of the death of the deceased besides Rs. 1,600 on account of damage caused to the jeep. This amendment application was accompanied by a duly stamped petition under Section 110-A (1) (b) of the Act. 7. The respondents contested this application also. Their main contention was that the appellants had no locus standi to apply for amendment of the claims petition to which they had not been impleaded as a party and in any case the prayer for amendment deserved to be disallowed for the short reason that in the garb of this amendment the appellants wanted to introduce their own claims petition under Section 110-A (1) (b) of the Act after the expiry of the period of limitation, 8. The learned Claims Tribunal vide his common order dated 9-12-1976 dismissed both the aforesaid applications of the appellants, namely, the one made under Order XXII, Rule 3 read with Section 151 C.P.C. and the other made under Order VI, Rule 17 C.P.C. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed. 9. The learned Tribunal observed in the impugned order that the proceedings had not abated on the death of the claimant Ajit Singh. 9. The learned Tribunal observed in the impugned order that the proceedings had not abated on the death of the claimant Ajit Singh. He further observed that though there was no express provision making the provisions of Order XXII C.P.C. applicable to the proceedings under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, there was no express bar either and that the Tribunal could make use of such provisions in exercise of its inherent powers to do justice between the parties. After making such observations, however, the learned Tribunal dismissed both the applications on the ground that they were belated and the delay in making the same had not been satisfactorily explained by the appellants. 10. The conclusion of the learned Tribunal that the proceedings had not abated on the death of Ajit Singh claimant is apparently a nasty one and cannot be sustained at this stage. In a later part of his order the learned Tribunal further observed "it is to be seen whether the death of Shri Ajit Singh was due to the accident or it was a natural death because the accident took place on 4-3-1973 at 10 A.M. and the deceased died on 10-2-1975 after such a long span of time". Thereafter the learned Tribunal made no reference whatsoever about the cause of the death of the deceased whether the same had any connection with the injuries suffered by him in the motor accident in question. 11. Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act reads: "306. Demands and rights of action of or against deceased survive to and against executor or administrator.— All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against executors or administrators ; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party ; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory." This section is based on the English Maxim octio aersonalis moritur cum persona. This maxim means that personal right of action dies with the person or to put in more clear words, the right to sue for tort is extinguished by the death of the person aggrieved. Section 306 reproduced above, however, recognizes this English maxim only in a qualified sense. Whereas this provision expressly lays down that a right to prosecute an action for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party would not survive to the legal representatives of the aggrieved party, it does provide by necessary implication that in case of action based on persona! Injuries causing the death of the party, the right to prosecute the action does survive to the legal representatives of the aggrieved person. The term personal injuries normally implies wrongs to the person which do not necessarily cause damage to the estate of the person wrong In so far as the expression other personal injuries not causing the death of the party", used in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act is concerned, this must include bodily or physical injuries as well or else the words "causing the death of the party" would be meaningless. These words would justify their used only if the expression personal injuries is interpreted to include physical and bodily injuries as well. The only logical interpretation of the provisions of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act appears to be that in case of an action brought on the basis of personal injuries which ultimately result in the death of the party bringing that action, the cause of action would survive to the legal representatives of the deceased party. On the other hand if a person after bringing an action for personal physical injuries suffered by him dies a natural death unconnected with such injuries, the cause of action brought by him for personal injuries would not survive to his legal representatives and the action would abate. In all such cases, therefore, where a person after bringing an action for personal injuries dies, the question whether the cause of action survives to the legal representatives of the deceased or the proceedings abate, would depend upon that fact whether the deceased had died .s a result of the injuries suffered by him and in respect of which he had brought the action or if he had died a natural death unconnected with such injuries. Before a finding can be given whether an action of this type abates or surves to the legal representatives of the deceased claimant, it is, therefore, necessary to determine whether the death of the deceased was on account of the personal injuries forming subject-matter of the action or whether the death was independent of an unconnected with such injuries. In other words it is not possible to decide whether a particular action of the instant type has abated or not without returning a finding with respect to the cause of the death of the deceased. 12. In the instant case as already observed the appellants had made an allegation that the deceased had died on account of the injuries suffered by him in the motor accident in question. This allegation had been made only in the rejoinder filed by the appellants to the replies filed by the respondents to the application under Order XXII, Rule 3 read with Section 151 C. P. C The respondents, however, were not afforded any opportunity to admit or deny that fact Nor did the Tribunal conduct any enquiry into this matter and record its own independent finding whether the death of the deceased was actually due to the injuries suffered by the deceased in the accident in question. In these circumstances there was no justification for the learned Tribunal to hive come to the conclusion that the proceedings had not abated on the death of Ajit Singh claimant. 13. At the same time I am unable to appreciate the view expressed by the learned Tribunal that although the proceedings had not abated, the application of the appellants for being brought on the record as legal representatives of the deceased deserved to be rejected on grounds of delay. As already observed there is no dispute that the death of Ajit Singh had occurred on 10-2-1975 and the application under Order XXII, Rule 3 read with Sec. 151 C. P. C. had been moved by the present appellants on 5-4-1975, that is within 55 days. It may be observed that the Claims Tribunals have been established under the Act for the purpose of adjudicating upon the claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of the motor vehicles or damage to any property of a third party so arising or both. It may be observed that the Claims Tribunals have been established under the Act for the purpose of adjudicating upon the claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of the motor vehicles or damage to any property of a third party so arising or both. Such Claims Tribunals have been established under Section 110 of the Act which was introduced in the Act for the first time by the Amending Act 100 of 1956. Prior to the Amending Act (100 of 1956) such like claims were adjudicated upon only in Civil Courts, The idea of establishing Claims Tribunals was only to provide a cheap and speedy remedy to the persons suffering injuries in motor accidents or to the next heirs of the persons who die in such like accidents. The Act thus creates neither any new right or any new remedy but has simply changed the forum and the process for adjudicating claims for compensation arising out of motor accidents and for the benefit of the claimants The procedure to be followed by the claims Tribunal is left to its discretion subject to the rules, if any, made by the State Government under the Act. The discretion so vested in the Claims Tribunal is of course neither arbitrary nor capricious and must be guided by the well recognised principles of natural justice, good conscience and equity. The procedure must of course be such as furthers the cause and objects of the provisions to which the Claims Tribunals owe their existence Such procedure should in no case be more harsh than what was being followed by the Civil Courts in similar matters prior to1956. 14. It is true that strictly speaking the provisions of Order XXII C. P. C, have not been made applicable to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals under the Act but at the same time as observed in the impugned order the application of these provisions of the C. P. C. have not been specifically excluded either. The provisions of Order XXII CP.C. are of course based on principles of natural justice, good conscience and equity and there is no reason why the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals should not follow these provisions. The provisions of Order XXII CP.C. are of course based on principles of natural justice, good conscience and equity and there is no reason why the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals should not follow these provisions. In case the application of the provisions of Order XXII CP.C is excluded for the purposes of claims petitions filed under Section 110-A of the Act, it would certainly result in manifest injustice to the claimants for whose benefit these provisions have been enacted. This would certainly defeat the very object for which Section 110 of the Act has been introduced in its existing form. At the same time it would make the provisions of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act ineffective inasmuch as though, according to this provision, the right to prosecute such an action survives to the legal representatives of the deceased, the remedy would be barred. In my view, therefore, the provisions of Order XXII C. P. C. which were very much applicable when such like claims were being adjudicated in Civil Courts, should continue to be applicable in the claims petitions tiled under the Act as well. Since an application under Order XXII, Rule 3 C. P. C. can be made within 90 days of the death of the deceased plaintiff, on the same analogy the appellants were entitled to present their application under Order XXII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure within a period of 90 days and in any case they had legitimate reason to presume that they would be within their right to present that application within that period. The application moved by the appellants under Order XXII, Rule 3 C. P. C, therefore, could not be dismissed as belated. 15. So far as the other application made under Order VI, Rule 17 C.P C. is concerned I see no reason to interfere with the order recorded by the learned Tribunal. Under Section 110-A (1) (b) the appellants had an independent right to move an application for compensation on account of the death of Ajit Singh. They, however, did not choose that remedy and failed to file such an application. On the other hand they applied under Order VI, Rule 1 7 C.P. C. for permission to amend the claims petition filed by Ajit Singh deceased under Section 110-A (1) (a) of the Act. They, however, did not choose that remedy and failed to file such an application. On the other hand they applied under Order VI, Rule 1 7 C.P. C. for permission to amend the claims petition filed by Ajit Singh deceased under Section 110-A (1) (a) of the Act. As rightly pointed out by the learned Tribunal the appellants had no right to move this application for amendment unless and until they had been impleaded as a party to the petition of Ajit Singh deceased. 16. In the view that I have taken above, I remand this case to the learned Tribunal with the directions to hold an enquiry in respect of the allegation that Ajit Singh deceased had died as a result of the personal injuries suffered by him in the motor accident in question and in case it is so found, to allow the application of the appellants made by them under Order XXII, Rule 3 and Section 15 C. P. C. and to bring them on record in place of the deceased claimant. In case the finding is that Ajit Singh deceased met with a natural death unconnected with the personal injuries suffered by him in the motor accident in question, the application of the appellants under Order XXII, Rule 3 read with lection 151 C.P.C. for bringing them on the record would be allowed only to the extent it pertains to the claim in respect of the damage alleged to have been caused to the jeep. In that case the claim of compensation in respect of the bodily injuries shall be deemed to have abated. 17. The parties have been directed to appear before the Tribunal below on 12-4-1982. Case remanded.