M. D. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is the revision, preferred by the Dealer, against the order passed by the judicial authority under section, 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, confirming the Collectorts order of confiscation of seven quintals of sugar from the Dealers shop under section 6 (a) ibid. ( 2 ) ON surprise check of the present applicant firm Kirana-shop by the Food Inspector on 30-10-79, seven quintals of sugar was found stored for sale. There was no licence for the same and the storage was in excess of the quantity permissible. Hence, for breach of the provisions of the M. P. Sugar Dealers Licencing Order, 1963, the seven quintals of sugar was seized. Show-cause notice was issued to the applicant, who filed his reply to the same. The Collector, claiming to have followed the prescribed procedure in the matter of show-cause notice, ordered the confiscation of the seized sugar. Appeal was preferred against the same before the judicial authority who dismissed the same, affirming the Collectorts order of confiscation. Hence, now the present revision. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant-dealer has urged, in the first place that the show-cause notice issued to the applicant-dealer, by an officer of the Collectorate and not by the Collector himself, was bad in law in the absence of any delegation of powers in this regard. It is urged in this very connection that the Collector was not competent to further delegate his own delegated powers. The notice being, thus, invalid, the whole confiscation-proceedings is vitiated, deserving to be quashed. It is, next, urged that the seized bags of sugar having not been produced before the Collector as enjoined by section 6 (a) of the Act, confiscation proceedings were liable to be quashed on this ground as well. It has also been canvassed that there being no material on record to establish expediencytt, the order of confiscation could not have been passed without any specific reasons in this regard. Furthermore, in the absence of any opportunity afforded to the application for personal hearing, confiscation as ordered was illegal. In the same strain, it has been argued that there was no justification for confiscating the whole seven quintals of sugar instead of confiscating the quantity of sugar in excess of the permissible quantity. Furthermore, in the absence of any opportunity afforded to the application for personal hearing, confiscation as ordered was illegal. In the same strain, it has been argued that there was no justification for confiscating the whole seven quintals of sugar instead of confiscating the quantity of sugar in excess of the permissible quantity. Lastly, it has been pressed that the order of confiscation, as passed by the Collector, was without any application of mind on his pad and without any proof or any material, evidencing the applicants mens-rea. ( 4 ) I have considered the arguments on both sides. The first argument, advanced by the learned counsel is that the seized essential commodity should have been produced for inspection before the Collector, as enjoined by Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), before the latter could proceed to confiscate the commodity on being satisfied. Regarding contravention of the M. P. Sugar Dealers Licencing Order, 1963. This contention is obviously without any merit. Section 6-A of the Act merely lays down that the goods seized may be produced. It does not say that it must be producedt before proceedings for confiscation are started (See Narendra Kumar v. State of Bihar1. Apart from this, it may be observed in the instant case that the seized bags of sugar had been kept in the custody i. e. supratama of the Food Inspector himself, who had seized these bags. The Food Inspector, who had obviously the power to make the seizure, was an officer under the anigis of the Collector. It is not necessary, in every case, that the production may be actual. It could, well be symbolic in nature as is the situation in the instant case where the seized essential commodity viz, the sugar has been kept in custody with the State Governments own official functioning under the Act. It is not necessary, in every case, that the production may be actual. It could, well be symbolic in nature as is the situation in the instant case where the seized essential commodity viz, the sugar has been kept in custody with the State Governments own official functioning under the Act. There is also another angle of this aspect of the matter, which would be clear from the relevant portion of section 6-A (l), which reads as under:the Collector, may if he thinks it expedient so to do, direct the essential commodity so seized to be produced for inspection before him and if he is satisfied that there has been a contravention of the order, may order confiscation of ( 5 ) THE bare reading of the above would show, in the first place, that any direction for production of the seized commodity is only a matter of discretion with the Collector and, in the second place, he can direct the production of the commodity only if he thinks it expedient so to do. This expediency on the part of the Collector is necessary for consideration. Only when, he purports to exercise his discretion for production of the commodity and since the Collector had not got the commodity produced, there was no question of considering the expediency in this regard, and as such, to give any reasons in the matter of expediency. The word expediencyt postulates application of mind or thinking over the matter with deliberation and care which terms can, well, be appreciated from the observation of the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Limited v. A. J. Rana2, Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampthus Chetty3, wherein the terms application of mind consider it necessary and the reasons to believe have been explained in the relevant appropriate context. Therefore, it is obvious that in the present case, there is no question of recording, any note by the Collector for not exercising the discretion of getting the essential commodities produced, since he had not thought it expedient so to do. ( 6 ) NOW, comes the main grievance of the applicant to the effect that the show-cause notice as issued, was illegal, in as much as, it was not issued by the Collector but by the District Food Officer, not proved to have been authorized by the Collector for issuance of such notice. ( 6 ) NOW, comes the main grievance of the applicant to the effect that the show-cause notice as issued, was illegal, in as much as, it was not issued by the Collector but by the District Food Officer, not proved to have been authorized by the Collector for issuance of such notice. In this very context, it is urged that the delegated power, which the Collector had, in this regard, could not be further delegated. It is, no doubt, true that power vested in the Collector could not be delegated by him to any officer or authority subordinate to him prior to the amendment of section 2 by Act 92 of 1976 by which Clause (ii) has been inserted defining the word Collector for the purpose of the Act as including an Additional Collector and such other officer, not below the rank of Sub-Divisional Officer, as may be authorized by the Collector to perform the functions and exercise the powers of the Collector under this Act. It may, at first, be observed that the intention of providing the issuance of any show-cause notice under section 6-B is with a definite purpose; the purpose being to enable the authority to see as to whether there has been a contravention of any order made under section 3 of the Act or not, and with that end in view, a regular representation and hearing has been provided for. This section follows the principles of natural justice and good conscience and contemplates three fold opportunity to be given to the owner of the seized articles or conveyances or the person from whom they are seized before making an order of confiscation under Section 6-A. It lays down that the person concerned must be given (i) a notice in writing specifying the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the articles; (ii) an opportunity to make a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscations; and (iii) a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. Vijay Pal Gupta v. State4, cited by the applicants learned counsel has no application to the present case, inasmuch as, in that case, no notice, whatsoever, was given to the delinquent concerned; and that the latter had made his appearance before the Collector suo moto by somehow, coming to know of certain proceedings, pending against him. Vijay Pal Gupta v. State4, cited by the applicants learned counsel has no application to the present case, inasmuch as, in that case, no notice, whatsoever, was given to the delinquent concerned; and that the latter had made his appearance before the Collector suo moto by somehow, coming to know of certain proceedings, pending against him. Likewise and other ruling cited viz. P. Appabu Counder v. Collector5, can not also be pressed into service in the present case, since that was a case where, an officer not only authorized by the Collector had, on his own, issued the notice, purporting to act for the. Collector, Pree Nathu Mall v. Collector6, was also a case where confiscation order was passed without any notice, whatsoever, on the suo moto appearance of the delinquent. ( 7 ) FACTS and circumstances in the present case, with regard to the issuance of the notice, are completely at variance with those as existed in the rulings, cited above, what has happened in the present case is that that Collector bad actually duly signed the notice detaining stating therein the alleged breaches of the particular clauses of the Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963 and the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, and calling upon the delinquent viz, the present applicant to show cause against the proposed confiscation. The office copies of the notice, with signatures of the Collector, are found to be on record. Of the Collectors relevant file concerning the proceedings, in question. This record, equally, shows that repealed attempt twice over had been made for serving this notice, which was duly staged by the Collector, but since these attempts has failed, the Food Officer, acting for and on behalf of the Collector is found to have been given a notice again to the applicant, who had duly received the same on 14-5-1980. This notice is actually the verbatum re-production of the Collectors earlier notice, whose office-copy is on record. This notice is actually the verbatum re-production of the Collectors earlier notice, whose office-copy is on record. Moreover, what is important to observe is the fact that although in this notice, the Collector is not found to have signed but it has been specifically mentioned at the foot of the notice that this notice hadbeen delay approved by the Collector and it was for and on behalf of the Collector that the proto-type notice in the very wordings, in which the Collectors original notice was couched, had been issued and served on the applicant. The date as mentioned in this notice was 7-11-1979 only which existed on the Collectors initial notice and its office-copy. Therefore, it is clear that the Food Officer had done nothing else but to serve on the applicant, the copy of the Collectorts notice, which the latter had initially signed and whose office copy, to the same effect, was already on, record. What is more important to notice is the fact that the Collector, vide his endorsement dated 10-4-1980 in the office note-sheet dated 7-4-1980, had given his approval in writing, under his own signature, for issuance of fresh copies of the notice for service on the appellant-delinquent. All these circumstances manifest beyond any shadow of doubt that the Collector had not further delegated his powers in that of the notice. It was his notice whose copies had been got served on the applicant-delinquent. The whole legislative intent and purpose for issuance of the show-cause notice by no less an officer than the Collector is obviously this that a senior and responsible officer of the Administration should apply his mind before taking any steps for visiting any person with any civil or criminal consequence affecting his valuable property rights. The whole legislative intent and purpose for issuance of the show-cause notice by no less an officer than the Collector is obviously this that a senior and responsible officer of the Administration should apply his mind before taking any steps for visiting any person with any civil or criminal consequence affecting his valuable property rights. This obviously is based on the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice to be observed in proper spirit, as has been, well settled by the Supreme Court in Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Company of India Limited v. Union of India6, in the matter of issuance of the notice, thus, in the instant case, the Collector is found to have duly applied his mind by issuance of notice, proposing confiscation with detailed grounds, duly mentioned therein for the proposed action, and as such, the requirement of law, in the matter of the notice, is found to be duly satisfied with no irregularity or illegality. The Officer, who had prepared a proto-type copy of the notice for and on behalf of the Collector, and that too, fully for effecting service on the applicant-delinquent, was only a mechanical and formal process; for facilitating the due service on the applicant, and it can not be assumed in the least that the Food Officer had acted, on his own or that the Collector had delegated his delegated powers further to his own subordinate i. e. to the Food Officer. This apart another material circumstances, which cannot be over-looked, is that the applicant had appeared before the Collector not suo moto but consequent to the notice served on him. His reply dated 16- 5-1980 is on record, clearly showing that this reply was in pursuance of the notice served on him. Thus, the applicant, have any gained full knowledge of the contents of the notice and the grounds for the proposed section for confiscation from the notice, which he had received, he could not be said to have any grievance in the matter of show-cause notice. No prejudice apparently is found to have been caused to him in the matter of the notice, received by him. He can not be allowed to take undue advantage of any defects, whatsoever, in the notice by taking technical or view regarding the formalities for the procedure of the service of the notice. No prejudice apparently is found to have been caused to him in the matter of the notice, received by him. He can not be allowed to take undue advantage of any defects, whatsoever, in the notice by taking technical or view regarding the formalities for the procedure of the service of the notice. The principles of natural justice are found to be fully satisfied, so far as the legislative intent and purpose of the service of the show-cause notice is concerned. Anyway, the new provisions viz. Sub-section 3 of section 6-B, which has been added by Act No. 92 of 1976, is found to put the final seal on the applicantts any grievance, whatsoever, in the matter of any defect or illegality in the notice, inasmuch as, this subsection enjoins that no order of confiscation shall be invalid, merely by reason of any defect or irregularity in the notice, gainer under clause (a) of sub-section 1 of section 6-B of the Act. ( 8 ) THE other contention that the applicant was not given an opportunity of making his representation in writing or further, an opportunity of being heard, is equally, without any merit. He is found to have filed his representation in writing. Wherein he had bagged to be excused on the plea of want of any mala fides on his part. He was also given a personal hearing, as is clear from the Collectors order dated 10-6-1980, as found recorded in the order-sheet of the proceedings. On 15-7-1980, the applicant had appeared before the Collector and had simply said that he had no mala fide intention. Thus, the procedure, as enjoined by section 6-B of the Act is found to be faithfully and fully followed by the Collector, before he proceeded to pass the order for confiscation. ( 9 ) SO far as the argument regarding mens rea is concerned, the law is, well settled that mens rea is a necessary element to be proved before confiscation could be ordered. (See Madhav v. State of Maharashtra7, Nathulal v. State of M. P. 8 and Kishorilal v. Additional Collector, Kanpur9. ( 10 ) IN the present case, the Collector, before passing the order of confiscation, is duly found to have applied his mind and to have considered not only the representation of the applicant but also, what the applicant had to say, at the time of personal hearing. ( 10 ) IN the present case, the Collector, before passing the order of confiscation, is duly found to have applied his mind and to have considered not only the representation of the applicant but also, what the applicant had to say, at the time of personal hearing. The applicant bagged to be excused on the ground of mistake i. e. his ignorance about the provisions of the M. P. Sugar Dealers Licensing Orders, 1963. Admittedly, the applicant did not have a licence. He was found to have stored the sugar for sale in excess of the permissible limit and he cannot be heard to plead ignorance about the legal provisions. The applicant is a firm, doing Kirana business. The applicants coo duct clearly shows his mens rea, in the matter of contravention of the provisions of the aforesaid Licensing Order. This clement for consideration is obviously found to be present in the mind of the Collector at the time of the passing of the order, and as such, his order regarding confiscation in exercise of his discretion, can not be interfered with. It was, equally, his discretion to confiscate or not the whole of the seized bags of sugar. Anyway, it is his discretion too, which is found to be judiciously exercised. 12. The revision, being, thus, without any merit, is dismissed and the impugned order of the learned authority confirming the Collectorts order of confiscation is maintained in to do. Revision dismissed. .