D.L MEHTA, J.—The petitioner has filed this writ petition against the Respondent Railway Shramik Sahakari Bank, Bikaner Limited, Bikaner and prayed therein that by writ, order or direction, the resolution dated 30. 9. 1981 be declared invalid and the Respondent Bank may be directed to keep the petitioner in service till he is mentally and physically fit. Counsel for the Respondent has submitted that the Respondent Society is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He has submitted that under Article 12 of the Constitution the Respondent Society does not fulfil the requirements of the State and also cannot be considered as other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. Before examining whether the Respondent Society falls within the purview of Article 12 and can be treated as other authorities or not, it is necessary to consider the provisions of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, hereinafter to be referred as the Act of 1965. Learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasized that under the Act itself there are numerous provisions by which it can be said that the Society falls within the perview of the definition of other authority. He has invited my attention to sec. 8 of the Act of 1965 and submitted that sec 8 provides that under what circumstances the Registrar can register the society. His submission is that the application must comply with the provisions of this Act and the Rules. He further submits that the object of the proposed society must be in accordance with section 4. He further submitted that the aims of the society cannot be inconsistent with the principles of justice, cooperation and public morality and that they must facilitate the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society. Under Article 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India it has been provided the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political inform all the institutions of the national life. Under clause (2) which has been added by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978 it has been provided that the societies are created in particular to strive to minimise the inequality in income and endeavour to eliminate the inequalities in status and facilities and opportunities. Under clause (2) which has been added by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978 it has been provided that the societies are created in particular to strive to minimise the inequality in income and endeavour to eliminate the inequalities in status and facilities and opportunities. He has invited my attention to Article 39 and has submitted that under clause (b) of Article 39 of the ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub-serve the common good: clause (c) further provides that the operation of economic protection does not result in concentration of wealth and means of production to common detriment. His main submission is chat the societies have been constituted in different parts of the State to achieve the objects provided under Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution and the registration is not a mere formality just like a registration under the Partnership Act or the registration of the private limited company but is an Act which has to be performed by the Registrar to achieve the objects enumerated in section 4 of the Act. Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to the Act of 1961 provides under sections 3 to 8 the provisions relating to the Registration. Section 8 of the Act of 1961 is to a great extent similar to the provisions of section 8 of the Act of 1965. Sec. 16 of the Act of 1965 provides for the amalgamation, transfer of assets and liability and division of Cooperative Societies Section 17 of the Act of 1965 provides that the Registrar on being satisfied that it is essential in the public interest or in the interest of cooperative movement or for the purpose of securing proper management of any cooperative society that two or more cooperative societies may be amalgamated. The provision further provides that cooperative society may be divided to form two or more societies or should be reorganised now-withstanding anything contained in section 16 but subject to the provisions of this section the Registrar may by order provide for the amalgamation, division or reorganisation of this society into a single society, or into society with such constitution, proper rights, interest and purpose and such liabilities, tax and obligation as may be specified in the order. His contention is that the Registrar has the power to control the functioning of the societies even if he is satisfied that the society is not running in public interest or in the interest of cooperative movement. Thus he wants to emphasize that the society is under the direct control of the State Government. Under the Act of 1961 section 13 is similar to a great extent to sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1965. Section 19 of the Act of 1965 provides that who can be admitted as the members of the Society. To a great extent similar provisions have been made in the Act of 1965, under S. 15 of the said Act. Learned counsel for the Respondent has further invited my attention to S. 30 relating to the annual general meeting which is to a great extent similar to S. 24 and S. 25 of the Act of 1961. He has further emphasized and drew my attention to clause (2) of S. 31 and submitted that if a special general meeting of the Cooperative Society is not called in accordance with the requisition referred to in sub-section(l) the Registrar or any other person authorised by him in this behalf shall have the power to call such meeting and that meeting shall be deemed to be a meeting called by the committee. Clause (3) of the said section further provides that the Registrar shall have the power to order that the expenditure incurred in calling the meeting under sub-section (1) shall be paid out of the funds of the society. He has referred section 35 and submitted that the Government nominees may be on the committee. He has further submitted that the Registrar has a power to remove the committee or member thereof and has further power to appoint the Government servant or any public man as an Administrator to manage the affairs of the society. His contention is that it is not necessary under S. 36 that the person so appointed should be the member of the society. Any stranger can be appointed Administrator. His contention is that it is not necessary under S. 36 that the person so appointed should be the member of the society. Any stranger can be appointed Administrator. S. 27 of the Act of 1961 provides that if in the opinion of the Registrar a committee or any member of the committee persistently defaults or is negligent in performance of the duties imposed on him by this Act or the reference or bye laws made thereunder or commits any act which is prejudicial to the society and also on number of other grounds the Registrar may remove the committee and appoint a Government servant as an Administrator to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding one year as may be specified in the order. S. 27 of the Act of 1961 and S. 36 of the Act of 1965 though similar to a great extent but materially differ on some important aspects, namely, that under S. 27 the time limit is fixed; that the Registrar can appoint the Administrator for a period of one year; whereas under S. 36 no time limit has been fixed. Similarly under S. 27 only the Government Officer can be appointed as an Administrator whereas the scope of S. 36 has been widened and even a public man can be appointed as an Administrator. Thus Sec. 36 of the Act of 1965 gives more power to Registrar compared to Sec. 27 of the Act of 1961. Learned counsel has further invited my attention that under Chapter V of the Act of 1965 special privileges have been given to the society which cannot be given to an individual, from and even to the companies registered under the Companies Act. Under the Act of 1961, to a great exent, similar provisions have been provided under Chapter V of the Act of 1961. Learned counsel for the Respondents has further invited my attention towards Sections 68, 70, 71, 74, 118, 130, 131, 141 and 148. Similar sections have been provided under Chapter V1I1 and Chapter X, Xa and Chapter XII of the Act of 1961. There is a great similarity between the two but there are some distinguishing features also in the same. Learned counsel for the Respondents has further invited my attention towards Sections 68, 70, 71, 74, 118, 130, 131, 141 and 148. Similar sections have been provided under Chapter V1I1 and Chapter X, Xa and Chapter XII of the Act of 1961. There is a great similarity between the two but there are some distinguishing features also in the same. Under the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Rules of 1956 Rule 41 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the bye laws of the society on Cooperative Society shall appoint any person as it is paid officer or employee in any category of service, unless he possesses the qualification and furnishes the security if-so specified by the Registrar from time to time for such categorical service in the society or for the class of the society to which it belongs. His condition of service of the employees of the society shall be as specified by the Registrar. The learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention towards the case G.P. Gopi Nath Nayyar V. the State (1). Their Lordships held that there may be rarely instances in which the introduction of such uniform condition of service may temporarily given rise to hardship but that will be no grounds for invalidating the prescription of any service conditions made under the Act. These powers are comparative wider in scope than the provisions of Punjab Cooperative Law. Considerations of individual hardship will have to subserve more important considerations relating to the attainment of common welfare of the larger batch of employees of different class of Cooperative Society in general. Thus he emphasized that the societies are not free even to appoint the persons to their choice to carry on the business of the society, but they have to act under the control and command of the Registrar. 2. Before examining the various provisions of the Act and the Rules referred above to find out whether the Registrar acts as a Government servant and controls the societies under the provisions referred to above acts as a guide, philosopher and a tribunal or in administrative capacity as authority. We will have to consider the concept of the cooperative movement in general and its implementation in the State of Rajasthan through the Act of 1965 and the Rules of 1966 in particular. We will have to consider the concept of the cooperative movement in general and its implementation in the State of Rajasthan through the Act of 1965 and the Rules of 1966 in particular. Counsel for both the parties have invited my attention to the number of citations which will be referred hereafter and have submitted that it is necessary to consider the relevant pravisions referred above for arriving at the decision whether the society falls within the purview of the other authority or not. Before referring to the citations I will also like to refer the bye laws of the society which the counsel for the respondent has produced before me today and its genuineness is not under challenge. Under bye laws 11 it has been provided that who can be the members of the society Under the present bye law only the railway employee working within the area can become the member of the society who fulfils the requisite qualification mentioned therein and even if a member who ceases to be the employee of the railway ceases to be the member of the society. Under bye laws 24 it has been provided : ¼1½ insu v/;{k e.My izcU/kd mRrj jsYos chdkusj ¼2½ insu v/;{k e.My jsy lsok vf/kdkjh mRrj jsYos Other persons of the Board are elected from different secs, of the Railway, Under bye law 28 clause (4) President/Chairman has no power to vote excep. exercising the casting vote. Under bye law 24 clause (2) reference has been made about the powers of the Vice President/Vice Chairman. This society has been established in the year 1925 and has also been registered as Cooperative Society. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the society does not fall within the purview of "other authorities. The interpretation given to the word other authorities is changing fast and the scope narrowed down earlier has been broadened by the recent decision of the Supreme Court. In Somprakash vs. Union of India (2), it has been held : "If a statutory corporation body or other authority is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it would be an "authority" and therefore "State" within the meaning of the expression in Article 12, and is subject to the same constitutional limitations as Government. In Somprakash vs. Union of India (2), it has been held : "If a statutory corporation body or other authority is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it would be an "authority" and therefore "State" within the meaning of the expression in Article 12, and is subject to the same constitutional limitations as Government. The preponderant considerations for pronouncing an entity as State agency or instrumentality are (i) financial resources of the State being the Chief funding source (ii) functional character being governmental in essence (iii) plenary control residing in Government (iv) prior history of the same activity having been carried on by Government and made over to the new body and (v) some claimant of authority or command. Whether the legal person is a corporation created by a statute, as distinguished from under a statue, is not an important criterion although it may been indictum. A careful study of the features of the Airport Authority and a Government company covered by Secs. 7, 9, 10 and 12 of Burma Shell (Acquisition of Under takings in India) Act (1976) discloses a close parallel except that the Airport Authority is created by a statute while Bharat Petroleum (notified under section 7 of the Act) is recognised by and clothed with rights and duties by the statute. Applying the constellation of criteria collected from Airport Authority AIR 1979 SC 1628 on a cumulative basis, to the given case, there is enough material to hold that the Bharat Petroleum Corporation is "State" within the enlarged meaning of Article 12. The common sense signification of the express other authorities" under the control of the Government of India is plain and there is no reason to make any exclusion on sophisticated grounds such as that the legal person must be a statutory corporation, must have power to make laws, must be created by and not under a statute and so on." In Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib (3), their Lordships have held : "It is immaterial for determining whether a Corporation is an authority whether the Corporation is created by a statute or under the statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or "agency of the Government" and not as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born, but why it has been brought into existence. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or "agency of the Government" and not as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born, but why it has been brought into existence. The Corporation may be a statutory corporation created by statute or it may be a Government company or a company formed under the Companies Act or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or any other similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute but it equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the relevant factor, whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression "authority" in Article 12. A juristic entity which may be "State" for the purpose of Part XIV or any other provision of the Constitution." In Ajay Hasias case (supra) the college is established and its administration and management are carried on by society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act of 1898. Their Lordships held that having regard to the memorandum of association and the Rules of the society a society is an instrumentality or the agency of the State and the Central Government and it is an authority within the meaning of Art. 12. The composition of the society is dominated by the representatives appointed by the Central Government and the Governments of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh with the approval of the Government. The money is required for running the college is provided entirely by the Central Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and even if any other monies are to be received by the society it can be done only with the approval of the State and the Central Government. The money is required for running the college is provided entirely by the Central Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and even if any other monies are to be received by the society it can be done only with the approval of the State and the Central Government. The Rules to be made by the society are also required to have the prior approval of the State and the Central Government. The society has also to comply with all such directions as may be issued by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government in respect of any matters dealt with in the report of the Reviewing Committee. 3. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner further invited my attention to a case Pritam Singh Gill petitioner vs. State of Rajasthan (4). Their Lordships have discussed the various propositions and came to a conclusion— "To conclude on this aspect we would answer the question posed at the very outset in the affirmative and hold that where a society is registered under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act and is in essence an instrumentality or agency of the State it would become amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the same manner as the State itself is." The learned counsel for the petit oner has frankly conceded before me that far from reviewing on any particular part of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act and making the requisite pleadings therefor, every reference to section was altogether missing in the whole of the writ petition. Never-the-less a matter of fact, on special consideration I allow the learned counsels prayer to make the submission on the basis of the provisions of the Act of 1965 as well as the Rules of 1966, if this can ipso facto tend to defend his case. Their Lordships of the Punjab High Court while considering the provisions of sec. 26 of the Act of 1961 made a special reference to the provisions of secs. 26 (1-E), 26(1-F) and 26(2). The relevant provisions referred above are reproduced as under :- "(1-E) The provisions of sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of section 27 shall apply to the administrator appointed under sub-section (1-D) as if the administrator had been appointed under that section. 26 (1-E), 26(1-F) and 26(2). The relevant provisions referred above are reproduced as under :- "(1-E) The provisions of sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of section 27 shall apply to the administrator appointed under sub-section (1-D) as if the administrator had been appointed under that section. (1-F) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where the bye-laws of a society so provide the first committee may be nominated by the authority mentioned in those bye-laws. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)- (a) where the Government have subscribed to the share capital of a Cooperative Society or has guaranteed the repayment of the principal of and payment of interest on debentures issued for loans raised by a Cooperative Society, the Government or any person authorised by it in this behalf shall have the right to nominate on the committee such number of person, not exceeding three or one-third of the total number of members thereof, whichever is less, as the Government may determine : Provided that where the Government have subscribed to the share capital of a Cooperative Society to the extent of twenty lacs of rupees or more, the Government may, no:withstanding anything contained in the bye-laws of the society,- (a) appoint one of the members nominated in the aforesaid manner as Chairman of the Committee of such society; or (b) nominate another member in addition to those nominated in the aforesaid manner and appoint him as Managing Director : Provided further that no person shall be appointed to act as Managing Director unless he is a member of the Indian Administrative Service, Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) or a Deputy Registrar, a Joint Registrar or an Additional Registrar, Cooperative Societies. (c) where the Industrial Finance Corporation, the State Finance Corporation or any other financing institution notified in this behalf by the Government has provided finance to a Cooperative Society, the Industrial Finance Corporation State Finance Corporation or other finance institution as the case may be shall have the right to nominate the person on the committee. (2A)........................" After considering the relevant provisions their Lordships have held in pare 42 that it would be manifest from the above that to successfully invoke the mandamus jurisdiction the petitioner has not only to show a clear public or statutory duty laid on the respondent but equally clear legal right to enforce the same. (2A)........................" After considering the relevant provisions their Lordships have held in pare 42 that it would be manifest from the above that to successfully invoke the mandamus jurisdiction the petitioner has not only to show a clear public or statutory duty laid on the respondent but equally clear legal right to enforce the same. Their Lordships further held that to sum up it is held that when society is registered under the said Cooperative Societies Act is in essence an instrumentality or agency of the State; it would become amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the same manner as the State itself. The ratio of the earlier Full Bench case in Amersingh vs. Registrar Cooperative Societies, Punjab (5) is elaborated or equified to the extent aforesaid. Their Lordships further held that the Punjab Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank Limited (Respondent No. 3) is not an instrumentality or a projection of the State. Applying the principles laid down in case of Pritamsingh (supra) paras 42, 44 and 45 are very relevant and their Lordships have neither decided that any society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction nor they have decided that other Cooperative Society registered under the Societies Act is amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The decision is based purely after looking into the laws relating to Punjab Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd. and their Lordships have held that Punjab Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank is not an instrumentality or the projection of the State so the ratio of the case is that when a society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act is an instrumentality or an agency of the State then it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction otherwise it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. 4. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner has also referred the case of Chandhra Patel vs. Samsangha Services Cooperative Societies Ltd. (6). Their Lordships in para 5 have held that Cooperative Society which is a society within the meaning of s. 2 (k) of Orissa Cooperative Societies Act is not State within the meaning of Article 12. Their Lordships were considering in this case the termination order which was passed against the petitioner in the said writ petition. Their Lordships in para 5 have held that Cooperative Society which is a society within the meaning of s. 2 (k) of Orissa Cooperative Societies Act is not State within the meaning of Article 12. Their Lordships were considering in this case the termination order which was passed against the petitioner in the said writ petition. Their Lordships held "admittedly petitioner by Annexure 1 was served with a set of charges the action of the President was ratified by the Board and the Board directed Extension Officer to inquire into the matter. Annexure 3 produced by the petitioner in clear terms calls for explanation of show cause. It is not a case of the petitioner that he did not have the knowledge of resolution of the Board or direction in Annexure 3 for showing cause. It is the specific case of the parties that no cause was shown by the petitioners and in the absence of refutation to the charges, the inquiry officer was of the view that the charges were admitted. There is no foundation in this contention that the Board-the employer had abdicated its powers to the Cooperative Extension Officer or to the Assistant Registrar. The Board had decided on 16.12.1978 to remove the Secretary as he had failed to show cause against the charges and the Board felt that the charges, in the circumstances were on good foundation. The Assistant Registrar directed the society in terms of Board resolution dated 16. 12. 1978 to terminate the services of the petitioner." Thus in this case even there was a direction of the Assistant Registrar but in the instant case there is no such direction as such from any of the authorities of the Cooperative Dept. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred the case of J.S. Giri Roy v. Hind Kusth Nivaran Sangh (7). Their Lordships were considering whether the Songh falls within the definition of the State or other authorities under Art. 12. In the said case the approximate yearly budget of the Sangh was stated to be of four lacs and the Govt of India gave about twenty five thousand rupees per annum, for specific purpose of Journal only. Under Rule 1 the President of India is the President of the Sangh. There is no over all control and exercise of the power by the State. Under Rule 1 the President of India is the President of the Sangh. There is no over all control and exercise of the power by the State. Their Lordships held that the Sangh does not fall within the purview of Article 12 though the case does not relate to the Cooperative Society, yet it has to be looked into for the purpose of Rule 1 as well as financial aid granted by the Central Government. In the instant case the President and Vice President are the persons who have been referred earlier and they are having no over all control over the society. Even the President has no ordinary right of voting except the casting vote: whereas in the case of J.S. Giri Roy (supra) the President is the Chairman of the said Sangh. Their Lordships held that the Indian Leprosy Association does not fall within the purview of Art. 12 and as such is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. In the case of G. Chendra Shekharan vs. Tool Room and Training Centre (8). It has been held that "applying the test laid down in Ajay Hasias case (Supra)it was held that when the entire funds of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 do not come from the Govt. and where such a society does not enjoy any monopoly status and where the function cannot be said to be closely related to the Government functions and the entire administration of the society vests in the Government Council and when the society is neither a department of the Government nor is connected with any specific ministry the society itself is having an authority to do all acts, matters, things and deeds which may be necessary or expedient for its purpose including the powers to appoint officers and other staff for conducting its affairs, then the case of such a society is squarely covered by the ratio in the case of Sabhajit Tiwari (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1325) and is not affected by the latter decision. 6. Mr. Mridul appearing on behalf of the petitioner has vehemently argued that the respondent society falls within the purview of the State" or "other authority". He has submitted that the society registered under the Act of 1965 is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 6. Mr. Mridul appearing on behalf of the petitioner has vehemently argued that the respondent society falls within the purview of the State" or "other authority". He has submitted that the society registered under the Act of 1965 is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Firstly, he has pointed out the various provisions of the Act of 1965 and the Rules of 1966 referred above and thereafter submitted that the society should be deemed to be under the control of the State of Rajasthan and its subordinate officers. The learned counsel invited my attention to Mohindersingh V. Union of India (9). Originally the school was owned, controlled and managed by the Government of India. On June 26, 1952 the Government passed a resolution for carrying on the administration of the school through a society to be formed under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Their Lordships considered the relevant provisions and held that the society could be regarded as the State under Article 12 of the Constitution being an authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government. The School Rules were contended to be the statutory rules in character having been framed as required by section 1 of the Act and, therefore, to be covered by the definition of law as given in Article 13 sub-clause (3) of the Constitution. This society controlling and administering the school has been regarded as an authority created under the statute on whom such powers are conferred by law. Mr. Mridul has further referred the case of Madan Mohan Sen Gupta V. The State of West Bengal (10). Their Lordships held that the management of the affairs and the activities of such societies are entirely controlled by the Cooperative Societies who is a public authority. Such affairs cannot be private affairs. It is not necessary that a body in order to be a public body must always be constituted by a statute though its powers and duties are created by the Acts or the Rules.. The control of which the State Government and the Registrar have over such Cooperative Society is one of the main distinguishing features for the maintainability of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted the case of Dukhooram Gupta Hariprasad Gupta V. Cooperative Agricultural Association (11). The control of which the State Government and the Registrar have over such Cooperative Society is one of the main distinguishing features for the maintainability of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted the case of Dukhooram Gupta Hariprasad Gupta V. Cooperative Agricultural Association (11). Their Lordships held "A Cooperative Society bearing the power to make bye laws is not an individual in the context of administration of the bye laws. Statutory Rules and bye laws differ in important aspect. A rule framed under the statute is a part of the statute while bye laws are not so. Their Lordships further held that bye laws can be impugned on the ground of unreasonableness. All the more, bye laws are also framed under the authority of law and cannot be treated as mere contracts. The learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to a case of Satya Narain B. V. State of Andhra Pradesh (12) in which their Lordships have held that the Andhra Pradesh Organisation Development Corporation and Andhra Pradesh Leather Industries Development Corporation falls within the purview of the State under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships while considering the case of Som Prakash Rekhi (supra)held that (i) every Govt. Company cannot be called an instrumentality or agency of the State, (ii) it is not necessary that all the test pointed out in the case of Som Prakash Rekhi(supra) should be satisfied. It would be a question to be determined in a given case on aggregate of the relevant circumstances. For instance if a Corporation is created and the functions of the existing department of the Government are transferred to it, would no doubt be a strong fact supporting the conclusion of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of the Government, but it would make no difference if, instead of doing with, the State creates a corporation by contributing its total share capital while retaining control over it and by calling upon such corporation to undertake a fresh activity of a public nature and for the benefit of the public Applying the citations referred by the counsel for the parties in the instant case I will have to consider the relevant provisions referred to above of the Act of 1965 and Rules of 1966 and the bye laws of the society. From the perusal of the bye laws as well as from the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner it seems that the Government is not the share holder of the society and no finances have been advanced in one way or the other to the society to carry on the business of Banking. In fact the society is run by the members and the main source of the society is the share capital and the deposits made by the members of the society. The society accepts the deposit only from the members and advances the loan or carries on the banking business only amongst the members. The petitioner has not made any submission in the matter of finance of the society. The things would have been different if the petitioner could have succeeded in showing that the sources of the finance of the society are mainly or wholly of the Government funds. The society has been registered long before the coming into existence of Rajasthan and former Rajas-than. The society has been established in the year 1925 and the society has amended the bye laws from time to time and has also referred the Act of 1965 and Rules of 1966 for the purpose of definitions. It has been mentioned in bye law 4 sub-clause (3) that the Registrar means the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies and the persons authorised by him to exercise the powers of the Registrar. Even it has not been made the foundation of the writ petition that the by-laws of the society are the bye laws which have been approved as model bells by the Registrar. It is not ones case that the model bye laws have been adopted under compulsion. 8. At present in the instant society no Government control has been pointed out. Only the reference to the various provisions of the Act has been referred by the counsel for the petitioner to show that the powers can be exercised by the Registrar under the Act of 1965 and under the Rules of 1966. Under the Act the position of the Registrar is not like an ordinary officer of the State, but he has to exercise the powers vested in him under the provisions of Act of 1965 and Rules of 1966 like a Tribunal or statutory authority. Under the Act the position of the Registrar is not like an ordinary officer of the State, but he has to exercise the powers vested in him under the provisions of Act of 1965 and Rules of 1966 like a Tribunal or statutory authority. Even the orders passed by the Registrar are appealable as well as revisable under the provisions of the Act by the different authorities. Unless the Registrar exercises the powers in a way which may lead to the control of the Government it cannot be said that the Registrar is acting as an instrumentality or an agency of the State. In fact Registrar cannot act on the directions of the State Government but he has to act within the ambit of the powers and duties casted upon him under the Act of 1965 and the Rules of 1966. 9. It cannot be said that every society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Similarly it cannot be said that every society is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the society is registered under the Cooperative Societies Act and it is financed mainly or wholly by the State Government, it is controlled by the Officers of the State Government in their administrative capacity or by the persons nominated by the State Government in their administrative capacities, then definitely the case may be made out that the society is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As I have said earlier that this society is neither financed nor is under the administrative control of the Government It is neither instrumentality of the "State" nor agency of State. I hold that the Respondent Society does not fall under the definition of the "State" or other authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution and as such it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. It will not be out of place here to mention that the concept of cooperative movement carries with it the definite guide lines that the Registrar shall act as a best guide and philosopher and shall not act in any way just like a controlling authority. 10. It will not be out of place here to mention that the concept of cooperative movement carries with it the definite guide lines that the Registrar shall act as a best guide and philosopher and shall not act in any way just like a controlling authority. Though that concept which originally was, has crossed to a great extent because of administrative interference in the working of number of societies. May it be, but the question remains whether the present respondent society is the victim of such erosion or not and I find that the society is not a victim of such erosion and no foundation has also been made to show that Government interference has been exercised in the working, business of the society or in any manner touching with the business, management of the society. For the reasons mentioned above I hold that the non-petitioner society is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution as it is not covered either under the definition of the State or other authorities as provided under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent has raised number of other preliminary objections, that the alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under the Industrial Disputes Act. He has also submitted that the petitioner has suppressed and concealed material facts. As such the writ petition should be rejected. The question of alternative remedy as well as the suppression of the facts have been argued with full vehemence by the counsel for both the parties, but it is not necessary for me to decide the questions regarding the alternative remedy and suppression and concealment of material facts as 1 have already taken the view that the non-petitioner society is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 12. In the result, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed summarily. Parties shall bear their own costs.