Judgment :- 1. The scope of R.67(1) and (8) of Chapter XIV(A) of the Kerala Education Rules (for short, the Rules) falls for decision in this writ petition. Narendran J., understood the scope of this rule as follows in Kammaran Gurukkal v. The Assistant Educational Officer (1975 (1) ILR. Kerala 286 at 294): "In the matter of giving that permission, R.67(1) is the provision which has to be kept in mind. When R.67(1) is complied with, the Educational Officer cannot refuse permission to the Manager under R.67(8) to keep the teacher under suspension beyond 15 days. The necessity to keep the teacher under suspension further or the apprehension whether the records will be tampered with or it will become impossible to conduct an impartial enquiry into the matter if the teacher was reinstated, are not all considerations which are relevant in passing an order under R.678)" Chandrasekhara Menon J. felt that this decision had to be considered by a Division Bench and it is on a reference by the learned judge that this writ petition comes before us for hearing On an earlier occasion the identical decision fell to be considered by Poti J. (as he then was) in O.P. No. 5037 of 1976. The learned judge quoted the relevant portion of the judgment and made the following reference order; reported in 1978 KLT. SN. 25: "This would mean that the Educational Officer will have no power even when he finds the action of the Manager to be mala fide or the attitude perverse or unreasonable to cancel the suspension and order reinstatement of a teacher. I do not think that there is any intention indicated in this rule, to place a fetter on the powers of the Educational Officer under the Kerala Education Act or Rules. Since I feet considerable doubt about the correctness of the decision of my learned brother I am referring this case for decision by a Division bench of this Court." The petition was then heard by a Division Bench. The Division Bench did not decide the point referred but dismissed the petition directing the petitioner to his statutory remedy under R.92 Chapter XIV(A), to move the Government in revision. Now the facts. 2. The petitioner is the Manager of S.N.V. High School for Girls. Paravoor. The Division Bench did not decide the point referred but dismissed the petition directing the petitioner to his statutory remedy under R.92 Chapter XIV(A), to move the Government in revision. Now the facts. 2. The petitioner is the Manager of S.N.V. High School for Girls. Paravoor. The 3rd respondent, while functioning as the Headmistress of the school, was placed under suspension by the petitioner as per Ext. P1 order dated 30-3-1981, with effect from that date on being satisfied of certain objectionable conduct on her part on the basis of a complaint received against her. The petitioner sent a report to the 2nd respondent about the order of suspension. The 2nd respondent, the Deputy Director, Education, Quilon, made enquiries and passed Ext. P2 order on 10-4-1981 ratifying the action of the petitioner suspending the 3rd respondent for 15 days from 30-3-1981 and directing him to finalise the disciplinary proceedings as expeditiously as possible. The petitioner forwarded Ext. P3 memo of charges dated 15-4-1981 to the 3rd respondent. Subsequent to this, the petitioner received Ext. P4 dated 14-5-1981 directing the petitioner to reinstate the 3rd respondent with effect from 14-5-1981 The petitioner filed Ext. P5 revision against the order Ext P4 before the 1st respondent, State of Kerala. Ext P4 order was stayed by Ext. P7. During the pendency of this revision petition, the petitioner received Ext. P6 order dated 2-6-1981 passed by the 2nd respondent declaring that the 3rd respondent would be deemed to have been on duty with effect from 14-4-1981. Later, the revision was dismissed by Ext. P10 order. Hence this petition to quash Exts. P4, P6 and P10 orders and for a mandamus to respondents 1 and 2 to give permission to the petitioner to place the 3rd respondent under suspension till the disciplinary proceedings against her are over. 3. The petitioner seeks to sustain his prayers on the following grounds: (1) The Petitioner is the appointing authority and as such has the power to suspend the 3rd respondent He can suspend the 3rd respondent for 15 days without obtaining previous permission from any one. 3. The petitioner seeks to sustain his prayers on the following grounds: (1) The Petitioner is the appointing authority and as such has the power to suspend the 3rd respondent He can suspend the 3rd respondent for 15 days without obtaining previous permission from any one. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the 3rd respondent are pending and therefore the petitioner should be given permission to place her under continued suspension; (2) After finding in Ext P2 that there were valid grounds for suspension, the only alternative left to the 2nd respondent was to give permission to the petitioner to keep the respondent under continued suspension beyond 15 days till the disciplinary proceedings are finalised. The 2nd respondent failed to exercise his jurisdiction under R.67 (8) of the rules in not permitting suspension beyond 15 days; (3) The enquiry conducted by the 2nd respondent before passing Ext. P4 order subsequent to the preliminary enquiry resulting in Ext. P2 order was not contemplated by the rules and is beyond his competence. Ext. P4 order is bad for this reason; (4) The educational authority has no power to direct reinstatement when disciplinary proceedings are pending. 4. Exts. P6 and P10 orders are assailed on the ground that they are tainted with the same illegality that Ext. P4 suffers from. 5. In the counter-affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent it is stated that the 2nd respondent visited the school on 9-4-1981 for investigation into the incident. Some of the senior teachers were not present. He made enquiries with the peons, clerks and one of the teachers alone. According to her, some of the teachers were inimically disposed to her and the order of suspension was as a result of political influence brought to bear upon the petitioner. The order Ext P4 is a valid one passed strictly in accordance with R.67(8). The educational authority is perfectly justified, in appropriate cases, in rejecting the request for extension of suspension beyond 15 days and the said authority can in such cases direct reinstatement of the suspended teacher. id the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner what happened subsequently is detailed. The subsequent developments related to the conduct of the 3rd respondent in not handing over the charge and since they are not strictly relevant for disposal of this writ petition, we refrain from adverting to them in detail. 6. id the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner what happened subsequently is detailed. The subsequent developments related to the conduct of the 3rd respondent in not handing over the charge and since they are not strictly relevant for disposal of this writ petition, we refrain from adverting to them in detail. 6. To sum up the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the question to be decided ultimately boils down to this. Once the educational authority concerned finds that the order of suspension originally made by the petitioner was on valid grounds, he has no option but to permit extension of suspension till the disciplinary proceedings are over. In other words, extension of suspension when the original order of suspension is on valid grounds is a necessary consequence mandated by the Rules and failure to grant extension can be corrected by this Court by the issuance of an appropriate direction. The petitioner's counsel made bold to make this submission perhaps armed with the observations contained in the decision reported in ILR.1975 (1) Kerala 286. In that case also, the Manager was the petitioner. He suspended the 2nd respondent, a teacher of an aided school, pending enquiry into certain charges against him. The 1st respondent, the Assistant Educational Officer, conducted a preliminary investigation and directed the petitioner to reinstate the teacher forthwith. It was this order that was challenged before the learned judge. In the course of the discussion, the learned judge made the following observations: "Under R.67(1) it is clear beyond a shadow of doubt that the Manager can place a teacher under suspension when disciplinary proceedings against the teacher are contemplated or are pending As per R.67(8), the Manager has to report the suspension with reasons for the same to the Educational Officer and the Educational Officer is to make a preliminary investigation into the grounds of suspension. The rule further empowers the Educational Officer to direct the Manager to reinstate the teacher if in the preliminary investigation it is found that there were no valid grounds for suspension. So, the direction for reinstatement can be given only if it was found in the preliminary investigation that there were no valid grounds for suspension. The rule further empowers the Educational Officer to direct the Manager to reinstate the teacher if in the preliminary investigation it is found that there were no valid grounds for suspension. So, the direction for reinstatement can be given only if it was found in the preliminary investigation that there were no valid grounds for suspension. Whether there were valid grounds for suspension or not is to be decided with reference to R.67 (1) which empowers the Manager to order a suspension pending enquiry So, in every case where disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or are pending, the Manager has got the power to suspend a teacher. If that power is there, as long as the disciplinary proceedings are pending, the Educational Officer cannot give a direction under R.67(8) to reinstate a teacher because it cannot be said that there were no valid grounds for suspension." These observations would indicate that the Educational authority concerned had no discretion to decline the request of the Manager for continued suspension beyond 15 days if disciplinary proceedings were contemplated or were pending, once the said authority found that there were valid grounds for suspension. This statement of law would also indicate that the examination whether there were valid grounds or not should be restricted to the only condition whether disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or are pending, as provided in R.67 (1). 7. It is not disputed that the Manager is the authority initially vested with the power of suspension since he is the appointing authority. S.11 of the Kerala Education Act provides that teachers of aided schools shall be appointed by the Managers of such schools from among persons who possess the qualifications prescribed under S.10. This power is, of course, subject to the rules and conditions laid down by the Act. This section read along with S.15 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act makes it clear that the Manager as the appointing authority has the power of suspension also. S.12 deals with conditions of service of aided school teachers. This power is, of course, subject to the rules and conditions laid down by the Act. This section read along with S.15 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act makes it clear that the Manager as the appointing authority has the power of suspension also. S.12 deals with conditions of service of aided school teachers. S.12 (2) contains a restriction in the power, which reads: "12(1) (2) No teacher of an aided school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by the Manager without the previous sanction of the officer authorised by the Government in this behalf, or placed under suspension by the Manager for a continuous period exceeding fifteen days without such previous sanction." As per this section, the Manager has the power to place a teacher under suspension for a period of 15 days and has to get previous sanction to extend the period of suspension beyond this 15 days. According to us, the power of suspension available to the Manager is kept in tact by this section also All that this section does is to hedge in this power with a restriction as to the obtaining of a previous sanction by the appropriate authority. A Full Bench of this Court in Assistant Educational Officer v. P. R. Mammoo (1968 KLT. 556) recognised and conceded to the Managers the right of appointment and the resultant rights of suspension, dismissal etc. relying upon S.11 of the Act read with S.15 of the General Clauses Act, 1125. In Narayana Menon v State of Kerala (1974 KLT 714 FB.) also this power was conceded to the Managers and it was observed: "The power of appointment and the power to take disciplinary action is vested in the Manager under the provisions of the Act notwithstanding that that power is hedged in by regulations and restrictions embodied in the Act and as detailed in the Rules that have been framed under the Act. Nevertheless the Act recognises the fact that discipline is a matter which is primarily the concern of the Manager" (see page 718). In view of this, we find it difficult with great respect, to endorse the view expressed by Raman Nayar J., (as he then was), in Rev. Fr. K. T. Zachariah v. R. D O. P. I. Ernakulam (1962 KLT. In view of this, we find it difficult with great respect, to endorse the view expressed by Raman Nayar J., (as he then was), in Rev. Fr. K. T. Zachariah v. R. D O. P. I. Ernakulam (1962 KLT. 878), that S 12 (2) cannot be read as to give a Manager a power of suspension up to 15 days but as to deny him any power to suspend for more than 15 days without previous sanction. This is how the learned judge expressed himself: "For, I do not read S.12(2) as giving a Manager a power of suspension up to 15 days. What it does is to deny him any power to suspend for more than 15 days without previous sanction, and a rule which says that even suspension for a period not exceeding 15 days is subject to regulation by departmental officers is by no means inconsistent with the section." According to us, the power of suspension is with the Manager; an absolute power for the initial 15 days; a regulated power beyond 15 days; power all the same but regulated by a statutory provision. 8. With this background, we will approach the scope of R.67(8) of Chapter XIV (A) R.67 (1) enables the Manager to place a teacher under suspension, among other things, when disciplinary proceedings against him are contemplated or are pending. It is not disputed that at the time Ext P1 order was passed disciplinary proceedings against the 3rd respondent were contemplated. Therefore, R.67 (1) is satisfied. It is not disputed nor can it be disputed that the Manager can place a teacher under suspension without the previous permission of any educational authority only for a period of 15 days. Under R.67 (8) where the order of suspension is made by the Manager he has necessarily to report the matter on the same date together with reasons for the suspension to the authority mentioned therein In this case, the Manager complied with this mandate under the rule. When the educational authority in this case the Deputy Director receives the report from the Manager he has to make a preliminary investigation into the grounds of suspension. It was after such a preliminary investigation that Ext. P2 order was passed It is from this stage that the controversy in this writ petition originates. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after Ext. It was after such a preliminary investigation that Ext. P2 order was passed It is from this stage that the controversy in this writ petition originates. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after Ext. P2 was passed the 2nd respondent had no powers under the Act or the Rules to make a further investigation and to alter the order already passed. According to him, Ext. P4 order was passed by the 2nd respondent after a detailed investigation contrary to the rule and had directed reinstatement of the 3rd respondent, which power he did not possess under the Rules. In Ext. P2 the 2nd respondent found that there were valid grounds for suspension. According to him, the necessary and legal consequence is to permit the petitioner to extend the suspension till the disciplinary proceedings are over. The ratification of suspension for 15 days by the 2nd respondent is a surplusage because even without such ratification the manager has power to suspend for 15 days. Once the 2nd respondent found that the order of suspension was on valid grounds he had necessarily to permit extension of suspension. We will examine these submissions presently. 9. The contention that a detailed investigation to find out whether suspension is valid or not is bad is attempted to be supported relying upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Sreedharan v. State of Kerala (1977 K.L.T. 222). In that case by an order dated 5-6-1976 the Manager placed the Headmaster of that school under suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. The Manager submitted a report regarding the action taken and the grounds for that and the suspended Headmaster put in a representation questioning the justifiability of the suspension The Regional Dy Director of Public Instruction on receipt of the report conducted a detailed enquiry into the charges including the calling of witnesses and recording their testimony and passed an elaborate order entering findings on the merits of the charges of misconduct levelled against the teacher. The Division Bench held that such a procedure was not warranted by sub-rule (8) of R.67 of Chapter XIV(A) of the Rules, and that the officer concerned had travelled very much outside the scope of her legitimate functions under the said sub-rule in conducting such a detailed enquiry and in recording final findings on the charges at that stage We are in respectful agreement with the principle of law settled thus. Unfortunately, for the petitioner, the said principle is inapplicable to the case on hand. Ext.P2 order was passed after a preliminary investigation He has no quarrel with this investigation. His quarrel is with the further enquiry conducted by the 2nd respondent before passing Ext P4 order. On the facts of this case, we find that the second enquiry conducted by the 2nd respondent is not an investigation which was deprecated by the Division Bench in the above case nor was it an investigation under R.67 (8). The reason for so holding is given below. 10. The relevant portion of R.67 (8) for this purpose is extracted below: "It on such investigations the authority is satisfied that there was no valid grounds for the suspension he may direct the Manager to reinstate the teacher with effect from the date of suspension, and thereupon the teacher shall forthwith be reinstated by the Manager. If the teacher is not actually reinstated the teacher shall be deemed to have been on duty. It shall then be open to the Department to disburse the pay and allowances to the teacher as if be were not suspended and recover the amount so disbursed from the Manager. If on such investigation it is found that there are valid grounds for such suspension permission may be given to the Manager to place the teacher under suspension beyond 15 days, if necessary. The authority mentioned above shall pass orders permitting the suspension or otherwise within the said 15 days". Under this rule the authority can direct the Manager to reinstate the teacher with effect from the date of suspension if on preliminary investigation be is satisfied that there were no valid grounds for suspension. On failure to reinstate the teacher, the necessary consequences under the rule will follow But if the officer finds that there are valid grounds for suspension he can permit the Manager to place the teacher under suspension beyond 15 days. On failure to reinstate the teacher, the necessary consequences under the rule will follow But if the officer finds that there are valid grounds for suspension he can permit the Manager to place the teacher under suspension beyond 15 days. The latter part of the section contains two in-built safeguards. If the authority finds that there were valid grounds for suspension initially, a discretion is given to him to permit the Manager to keep the teacher under suspension beyond 15 days This discretion is manifest from the use of the words 'if necessary'. In other words, a close reading of this portion of the rule clearly brings out the intention of the rule making authority that the Educational authority exercising powers under R.67 (8) has the power to decide, in a given case, having regard to the circumstances and facts brought to its notice, either to allow extension beyond 15 days or not. It is also significant to note that the order under R.67 (8) has to be passed within the original 15 days, the period during which the Manager has the power to suspend without permission. Any order passed beyond 15 days therefore will not be an order under R.67 (8). If we understand this rule thus, it would be clear that the authority is invested with the power either to grant or refuse permission to extend the period of suspension. To say, that once the authority finds that there were grounds for suspension, he has necessarily to extend suspension or to say that if disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or are pending and suspension is justified with reference to R.67 (1), the officer has no alternative but to extend suspension, is to misread the rule. By ratifying the suspension to the extent of 15 days from 30-3-1981 by Ext. P2 order, the 2nd respondent has acted strictly in accordance with R.67 (8). The submission made by the petitioner's counsel that a ratification for this period is not necessary may be correct in one sense. By ratifying the suspension to the extent of 15 days from 30-3-1981 by Ext. P2 order, the 2nd respondent has acted strictly in accordance with R.67 (8). The submission made by the petitioner's counsel that a ratification for this period is not necessary may be correct in one sense. However, we feel that the 2nd respondent only meant that despite the fact that he was satisfied of the existence of the valid grounds for suspension when Ext P2 order was passed, he was not inclined to extend the suspension beyond 15 days and it is to inform the Manager of this that he expressed himself by observing that the suspension is ratified for 15 days. Ext. P2 order dated 10-4-1981 is within 15 days as contemplated in R.67 (8). 11. What is the result of Ext. P2? Since the suspension had not been directed to be extended, the result of Ext P2 order is the expiry of suspension order on 14-4-1981 and a resultant automatic reinstatement of the 3rd respondent with effect from 14-4-1981. Under R.67 (8) the Educational authority can, when he finds that there are no valid grounds for suspension, direct reinstatement with effect from the date of suspension It is evident that the 2nd respondent felt that the misdemeanour committed by the 3rd respondent merited some correctional measure which justified the suspension for 15 days. To say that Ext P4 order also was passed under R.67(8) is to misread the said rule and to ignore the subsequent developments in this case. 12. Ext. P4 order was passed on 14-5-1981 after the expiry of 15 days from the date of suspension. Be it noted that an order under R.67 (8) has to be passed within 15 days mentioned therein. The first two letters read in Ext. P4 are, one dated 30-3-1981 and another dated 15-4-1981, both from the petitioner. The petitioner has not produced the second letter dated 15-4-1981. It appears from Ext. P4 that the petitioner had in an earlier letter dated 13-4-1981 requested the 2nd respondent to treat the period of suspension effective for 15 days from 9-4-1981, the date of handing overcharge by the 3rd respondent. It is seen that this request was rejected by the order of the 2nd respondent dated 28-4-1981. Neither the letter, nor the order has been produced. It is seen that this request was rejected by the order of the 2nd respondent dated 28-4-1981. Neither the letter, nor the order has been produced. By the letter dated 15-4-1981 the petitioner forwarded the memo of charges and requested permission to keep the 3rd respondent under suspension till the finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings. It is on this request that further enquiry was made by the 2nd respondent and the resultant order Ext. P4 was passed. This enquiry cannot be characterised as one which was deprecated by this Court in 1977 KLT. 222. The 2nd respondent directed reinstatement of the 3rd respondent as per this order revoking the suspension with effect from 14-4-1981 and reporting compliance immediately. This makes it clear that the 2nd respondent was alive to Ext. P2 order by which suspension was ordered to be effective for 15 days. He felt it necessary perhaps to make a further enquiry by taking written statements etc. of persons who were not present when he visited the school first, to reassure himself as to whether a continued suspension was necessary or not. He felt that continued suspension till the finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings in the circumstances of the case would not be justifiable and therefore declined to grant the same. We have no hesitation to hold that Ext. P4 order is not an order under R.67(8) for the excellent reason that it came into existence beyond the 15 days mentioned in that rule. The appropriate Educational authority may in some cases be justified to place a teacher under suspension even at a subsequent stage under R.67(1 )(c). Ext. P4 order had to be passed in reply to the request made by the petitioner at the subsequent stage. It is against this background that the decision reported in ILR 1975(1) Kerala 286 has to be considered. We have already extracted the relevant portion from that decision. With great respect, we feel that the wide observations made therein do not reflect the object of the rule nor lays down the correct law. It is against this background that the decision reported in ILR 1975(1) Kerala 286 has to be considered. We have already extracted the relevant portion from that decision. With great respect, we feel that the wide observations made therein do not reflect the object of the rule nor lays down the correct law. It is not correct to say that the direction for reinstatement can be given only if it was found in the preliminary investigation that there were no valid grounds for suspension; nor do we subscribe to the view that the question whether there were valid grounds for suspension or not is to be decided with reference to R.67(1) only, which might indicate that in all cases where disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or are pending, suspension should continue till the disposal of the disciplinary proceedings. This is how the learned judge understood the rule. He observes that as long as the disciplinary proceedings are pending the educational officer cannot give a direction under R.67(8) to reinstate a teacher because it cannot be said that there were no valid grounds for suspension. In our view, the above ruling ignores the latter part of the rule which says that if on such investigation it is found that there are valid grounds for such suspension, permission may be given beyond 15 days, if necessary. The words "if necessary" clearly show that the Educational authority has absolute discretion in the matter. The authority has to consider whether continued suspension is necessary in the circumstances of the case, even when he found that there were valid grounds for suspension originally. Therefore, to say that an order of reinstatement can be made only if there are no grounds for suspension at the time of the preliminary investigation is to ignore this in-built safeguard, deliberately enacted, giving a wide discretion to the educational authority to give, in appropriate cases, direction that suspension shall not continue even though disciplinary proceedings are pending. In our judgment, therefore, the decision in ILR.1975 (1) Kerala 286 was not correctly decided and the same is overruled. We hold that Ext. P4 order and the consequential orders Exts. P6 and P10 were properly made and the request to quash them cannot be granted. 13. In our judgment, therefore, the decision in ILR.1975 (1) Kerala 286 was not correctly decided and the same is overruled. We hold that Ext. P4 order and the consequential orders Exts. P6 and P10 were properly made and the request to quash them cannot be granted. 13. We may, however, observe that the disciplinary authority will consider and decide the accusations made by the petitioner against the 3rd respondent, on merits, uninfluenced by the findings, if any, entered in Exts. P4, P6 and P10. In the result, we dismiss this petition and direct the parties to bear their costs.