JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant's first appeal from a decree of the court of the Additional Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar decreeing the plaintiff-respondent's suit for recovery of Rs. 10,000/- as dower, Rs. 450/- as maintenance for the period of Iddat, maintenance allowance for the minor son at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month from 1st April, 1972 until he attains the age of seven years, and for recovery of ornaments given at the foot of the plaint or in the alternative for recovery of Rs. 6065/- as their price. The decree for pendente lite and future maintenance of the child was made subject to payment of additional fee and since the suit was allowed to be filed and proceeded with in forms pauperis, a copy of the decree was directed to be sent to Collector, Muzaffarnagar for recovery of the court fees in accordance with law. The relief for dissolution of marriage was also sought by the plaintiff-respondent but the defendant-appellant having asserted in his written statement that he had already divorced the plaintiff respondent and also made a statement before the trial court vide paper No. 32-Ka on 25th July, 1975 that he had divorced the plaintiff-respondent about two and a half years ago, and having followed up these pleas in his statement on oath by stating that he had divorced the plaintiff-respondent by saying 'Talaq' to her three times, the trial court held it established that the defendant appellant had divorced the plaintiff. respondent some times in the end of November or in the beginning of December, 1972. Although the plaintiff-respondent had not in her statement on oath as P.W. 5 accepted this fact and had claimed a decree for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty, the point no longer survives for the plaintiff respondent has not appealed from the dismissal of the claim of dissolution of marriage, and the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff-respondent had been divorced by the defendant-appellant has become final and has not been canvassed before me. The two questions which survive for consideration in this appeal are whether the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to recover Rs. 10,000/- for the dower debt to her and whether she is entitled to a decree for the return of ornaments, and in case they are not returned, to recover Rs. 6065/- as their price. The two questions which survive for consideration in this appeal are whether the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to recover Rs. 10,000/- for the dower debt to her and whether she is entitled to a decree for the return of ornaments, and in case they are not returned, to recover Rs. 6065/- as their price. The decree for recovery of Rs. 450/- as maintenance for the wife and Rs. 50/- per month from 1st April, 1972 till he attains the age of seven years for the child has not been challenged before me. 2. One rather peculiar feature of this case was that according to the appellant husband's case in his written statement, he was hardly about 6 or 7 years of age on 12th May, 1960 when he was married to the respondent wife, who was said to be much older than him. According to their respective ages given by the appellant husband and the respondent wife in their statement on oath, the age of the appellant-husband works out to about 9 years and that of the respondent-wife to about 14 years at the time of marriage. Although the husband stated that his age was about 7 years at the time of marriage and that of the wife was about 14 years at the time of marriage, in his statement on oath, his age must have been between 8-9 years and that of the wife about 14 years. It is undisputed that the parties did not start living together immediately after the marriage. Rukhsati or the departure of the wife for the husband's place, took place about 7 years after the marriage. On these facts the inference is irresistable that the appellant husband had not attained puberty when he was married to the respondent-wife, the acre of puberty according to Muslim Law being 15 years. The wife also could not be said to have attained puberty because, according to the husband's own statement, her age was about 14 years, at the time of marriage. They were undoubtedly minors and even according to Muslim Law they could not have lawfully given the consent for their marriage. The wife also could not be said to have attained puberty because, according to the husband's own statement, her age was about 14 years, at the time of marriage. They were undoubtedly minors and even according to Muslim Law they could not have lawfully given the consent for their marriage. Even so, Muslim Law as interpreted in India permits the marriage of minors, that is, of a boy and a girl who have not attained puberty, with the consent of their respective guardians and the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 although it applies to all citizens of India does not render a child marriage invalid, it only makes it punishable. The validity of the marriage was not in question in the present case and one must proceed on the assumption that the consent for the marriage was given by the respective guardians in marriage of the two parties. The contract for dower, if any, must have also been arrived at between them. Since the amount of dower, which was claimed by the wife of have been fixed at Rs. 10,000/- was specifically disputed by the appellant-husband, who claimed that it was only Rs. 27/4/-, the burden of proving that the amount of dower contracted for between the parents of the parties was Rs. 10,000/- lay primarily on the respondent-wife, but her father did not appear in the witness-box, and she claimed that while she was aged about 15 or 16 years at the time of marriage and that was the reason why the Rukhsati took place after 6 years, the age of the appellant-husband was about 18 years at the time of marriage, for and not 7 years only. It is not possible to believe this part of her statement for, if she was 15 or 16 years of age at the time, of marriage and the appellant, husband was 18 years of age at the time of marriage, both of them must have attained puberty and there did not appear to be any valid reason for postponing the Rukhsati. The truth seems to have been, as alleged by the appellant husband that he was about 6 years younger to the respondent-wife and had not attained puberty. From her statement on oath it appears that the father of the respondent-wife is alive and she is living with him. The truth seems to have been, as alleged by the appellant husband that he was about 6 years younger to the respondent-wife and had not attained puberty. From her statement on oath it appears that the father of the respondent-wife is alive and she is living with him. Even so the father did not appear, as a witness, either to prove the amount of the dower, or the ornaments and other articles of Dahez, said to have been given to her, at the time of Rukhsati. The witnesses for the respondent-wife on the issue about the amount of dower were Asharaf (P.W. 3) and Rurha (P.W. 4). Asharaf P.W. 3 stated that the marriage took place about 15 or 16 years ago, his statement having been recorded on 28th October, 1976, that the wife was 15 or 16 years and the husband was 18 or 20 years of age. He participated in the marriage. The marriage was performed by the Mulla of Bilaspur mosque whose name he did not know. Rurlta was the Vakil. He and Nasibu were witnesses. The amount of dower settled was Rs. 10,000/-. He further stated that the amount of dower was not recorded in the register and the amount of dower was settled by the fathers of the two parties. Rurha stated that the respondent-wife was his own brother's daughter and he looked after and managed the entire affairs of the respondent-wife's father's household. He was also examined on 28th October, 1976 and stated that the marriage took place about 15 or 16 years ago. The dower settled was Rs. 10,000/-. He was the Vakil. Asharaf and Nasibu were the witnesses. 11'asib of the mosque had performed the marriage. He is dead. Cross-examined, he stated that the amount of dower was settled by the fathers of the parties and by him, but the amount was not recorded. It was settled that it could be demanded whenever the wife liked. He also said that the appellant-husband was 17 or 18 years and the respondent-wife was about 15 years at the time of marriage. The respondent wife stated that the amount of dower settled was Rs. 10,000/- and she could demand it whenever she liked. Rurha was the Vakil and Asharaf and Nasibu were the witnesses of the marriage. Rukhsati took place after 6 or 7 years after the marriage. The respondent wife stated that the amount of dower settled was Rs. 10,000/- and she could demand it whenever she liked. Rurha was the Vakil and Asharaf and Nasibu were the witnesses of the marriage. Rukhsati took place after 6 or 7 years after the marriage. It was wrong to say that the amount of dower settled was only Rs. 27/4/-, Rs. 10,000/- was the amount of dower settled. Cross examined, she said that she had told the appellant-husband that she would give consent to the marriage if he agreed to Rs. 10,0110/- otherwise not, when upon the appellant-husband agreed. She then stated that she was too young at the time of marriage, that is why Rukhsati took place after 6 years.Then she added that she was 15 or 16 years of age while the husband was 18 years of age and not 7 years at the time of marriage. He was 2 years older than her. Further cross examined she stated that it was wrong to say that the amount of dower settled was Rs. 27/4/- or that, that was the customary amount of dower in the community. She also denied that she was older in age than the appellant-husband, although in her statement on oath she gave her age to be 30 years on 28th October, 1976 and the appellant-husband gave his age to be 25 years on 9th November, 1976. I may as well refer to the statement of Ali Hasan P.W. 2 who gave his age to be 30-35 years on 28th October, 1976 and said that he was aged about 16 years at the time of the respondent-wife's marriage and the appellant-husband was 6-7 years younger to him. Another witness produced by the plaintiff was Lakhrnire, P.W. 1. He said that he had joined the marriage and the appellant-husband was 15 or 16 years of age and not 5 or 6 years of age at the time of marriage. He did not know the name of the person who performed the marriage but said that the amount of dower was not,recorded in the register and further that the amount of dower was settled between the appellant-husband and respondent-wife themselves personally. Having read this evidence, I find it impossible to say that the respondent- wife has proved that the amount of dower settled was Rs. 10,000/-. Having read this evidence, I find it impossible to say that the respondent- wife has proved that the amount of dower settled was Rs. 10,000/-. It could not possibly have been settled between the parties themselves because of the tender age of the appellant husband, who could not have been more then 9 years at the time of marriage. The respondent wife's father who would have been the best witness on the point about the amount of dower settled, did not appear as a witness. The inference is inescapable that he was not prepared to come forward and make a wrong statement on oath in support of the wife's case. I find it impossible to concur with the finding of the trial court on this point. It was not for the appellant husband to affirmatively disprove that the amount of dower settled was Rs. 10,000/- of to affirmatively prove that it was only Rs. 27.25 P. It was primarily for the respondent-wife to affirmatively prove that the amount of dower was Rs. 10,000/-. In view of the minority of the parties at any rate the minority of the appellant husband at the time of marriage, the amount of dower could not have been consented to or agreed to by the husband himself at the time of marriage. The statement of the respondent-wife on the point cannot, therefore, be accepted. It is highly probable that the amount of dower was settled between the parents of the parties. None of them appeared in the witness-box to state as to what the amount of dower settled was. The trial court has wrongly tried to explain away the statement of Asharaf, P.W. 3 that the amount of dower settled was Rs. 10000/- only, by saying that he must have said so under some mistake. That is not easily believable, for, if that were so, the plaintiff ought to have either re-examined him or declared him hostile. He also stated that it was the parties parents who had settled the amount of dower. 10000/- only, by saying that he must have said so under some mistake. That is not easily believable, for, if that were so, the plaintiff ought to have either re-examined him or declared him hostile. He also stated that it was the parties parents who had settled the amount of dower. Rurha P.W. 4 was on his own admission a highly interested person and in order to give credence to his statement he said that the amount of dower was settled by the parents and by him but his statement that the age of the appellant-husband was 17 or 18 years at the time of marriage was apparently in correct and I find it impossible to place any reliance on his statement. 3. According to the appellant husband's case, the amount of dower settled was Rs. 27.25 P. and further that it had already been paid by him to the defendant. The trial court has disbelieved the appellant husband on both the points. So far as the amount of dower is concerned, I am of the view that it has not been proved by the respondent wife that it was Rs. 10,000/-. It, therefore, follows that it was Rs. 27/4/- only. About the appellant-husband's allegation that the dower was paid at the time of Rukhsati, the trial court has disbelieved that by saying that there was no occasion for the payment of dower at that time as there was no dispute between the parties and their relations were most cordial. But that is not the point. The entire amount of the dower was, according to the respondent-wife herself, payable on demand whenever she liked, that is, to say it was prompt. Under the circumstances she could have very well demanded the amount of dower before consummation. Obviously consummation of the marriage must have been after Rukhsati. There is, however, not much point in pursuing this matter for once it has been found that the amount of dower settled was Rs. 27.25 P. and not Rs. 10,000/- the question whether it was paid or not loses all significance for the recovery of the amount of Rs. 27.25 P. will not be worth all the trouble involved and once it has been held that the respondent wife's case about the amount of dower settled was incorrect, her case has to be rejected as a whole. 4. 10,000/- the question whether it was paid or not loses all significance for the recovery of the amount of Rs. 27.25 P. will not be worth all the trouble involved and once it has been held that the respondent wife's case about the amount of dower settled was incorrect, her case has to be rejected as a whole. 4. As regards the recovery of the articles of Dahez the first thing which struck me at the out set of the hearing was that the claim was barred by limitation and that on the merits also the claim was liable to be dismissed on the allegations of the plaintiff-respondent herself. According the plaint allegation the marriage was performed on 12th May, 1960. The date of the Rukhsati is not specified in the plaint. It has been found above the Rukhsati took place about 7 years after the marriage, that is, to say some times in the year 1967. The articles of Dahez valued at Rs. 10,465/- according to the schedule at the foot of the plaint, were said to have been presented to the plaintiff-respondent by her father at the time of Rukhsati and all those things were entrusted to the defendant husband and the members of his family. The troubles are said to have begun 2 years thereafter and it is said that while the plaintiff-respondent was much harassed by the treatment melted out to her by her mother-in-law, the defendant told her that he wanted to buy a lorry and after buying it, he would take the plaintiff with him to live with him at Muzaffarnagar, but he was short of funds and that the plaintiff may accordingly give her ornaments to him to enable him to buy the lorry. The plaintiff respondent's ornaments were taken from her on that excuse, and that on the expiry of three years after the same, the plaintiff demanded the return of her ornaments peremptorily and created a scene. The defendant did not return the ornaments whereupon she came to know that the defendant was addicated to gambling and had lost all her ornaments. This was followed by the allegation that the scene created by the plaintiff demanding the return of her ornaments led to further trouble and the defendant started beating her and all that, on the basis of which the decree for dissolution of the marriage was claimed. This was followed by the allegation that the scene created by the plaintiff demanding the return of her ornaments led to further trouble and the defendant started beating her and all that, on the basis of which the decree for dissolution of the marriage was claimed. The date of the cause of action as specified in paragraph 21 of the plaint fixes the date of the giving of the ornaments as sometimes in the year 1969 and the date of the demand for return of the same is specified as 30th April, 1972. The decree passed by the lower court is for the recovery of the ornaments and in the alternative for the recovery of Rs. 6065/- as the price of the ornaments. On the plaintiff's own allegations the ornaments had been lost and wasted away by the defendant in gambling. Obviously he could not have returned them. The list at the foot of the plaint shows that the price of the ornaments was Rs. 6065/-. The remaining amount of Rs. 4000/- was the price of other articles of Dahez. They were obviously consumable articles and must have been used up by the parties during the course of about 7 years during which they lived together, and since no decree for recovery of the same has been passed. I need say nothing more about the same. The only articles of Dahez for the recovery of which the decree has been passed, are the ornaments. Having looked at the items specified at the foot of the plaint I am not prepared to every item was given away by the wife to the husband being asked to do so, for the purpose of purchasing a lorry. Even if they were, the wife's own allegation is that she came to know, when she made a persistent demand for their return, that they had been lost and wasted by the husband in gambling. The husband did not retain the ornaments. In a way he consumed them, may be for satisfying an evil habit. Nevertheless once the wife had given away the ornaments to the husband for his use and he had consumed them may be for satisfaction of his evil habits, there could be no decree for recovery back of the ornaments or their price against the husband. In a way he consumed them, may be for satisfying an evil habit. Nevertheless once the wife had given away the ornaments to the husband for his use and he had consumed them may be for satisfaction of his evil habits, there could be no decree for recovery back of the ornaments or their price against the husband. For instance, suppose the wife had been pursuaded to give her ornaments to the husband for his use and having sold them in the market he had spent the proceeds on food and drinks or other evil habits, or had otherwise lost the ornaments by his negligence, it would have been impossible to say that he would be liable to pay compensation for having so consumed or, lost the ornaments, unless the husband's act could be said to amount to conversion.' 5. Assuming that the wife was entitled to recover compensation for the ornaments, she had to act within limitation if the husband did not make compensation on being asked to do so, and she was driven to a suit to recover the same. The limitation for suit for compensation was wrongful taking specific movable property is 3 years under of Article 31 of the schedule to the Limitation Act but that Article has two clauses. Clauses (a) governs a suit for compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining any specific movable property lost, or acquired by theft, or dishonest misappropriation or conversion". and the three years period of limitation runs from the date "when the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in whose possession it is." Clause (b) governs a suit for compensation" for wrongfully or injuring or wrongfully detaining any other specific movable property, and the limitation or injured, or when the detainer's when the property wrongfully possession becomes unlawful. Clause (a) would obviously not apply for it is alleged in the plaint itself that the ornaments had been gambling and it is apparent that the plaintiff does not know where they are. Indeed, so far as the parties are concerned the ornaments do not exist for according to the the husband. There plaint allegations they must have been sold away by fore, it is Clause (b) which applies and the limitation of 3 years has to be reckoned from the date when the property is wrongfully taken or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful. There plaint allegations they must have been sold away by fore, it is Clause (b) which applies and the limitation of 3 years has to be reckoned from the date when the property is wrongfully taken or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful. Here again this is not a case of detention. This is a case of wrongful taking of property, and since the property cannot be followed, as it might have been followed in the case dishonest misappropriation if the person in whose were known, within 3 years from the date of that knowledge, under Clause (a), the limitation of 3 years prescribed by Clause (b) would commence from the date of the wrongful taking of the ornaments by the husband which occurred The in the year 1969, when the ornaments were taken and lost in gambling. Th suit appears to have been bears under filed on or after 30th July, 1974 for that is the date which the plaint bears under the verification clause. 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent referred to and relied upon Article 68 also, but as in the case of Clause (a) of Article 91 the difficulty in applying Article 68 is that it is not known in whose possession the ornaments etc. Indeed, as observed above, there could be no question of the recovery of ornaments as such, for the plaint allegations themselves show that the ornaments are no longer within the control of the defendant husband as he had lost them in gambling. At any case, the date when the plaintiff learnt in whose were has not been specified any where in the plaint. 7. There is no escape from the conclusion that the decree for the recovered of ornaments or for compensation for their wrongful conversion by the husband to his own use could not have been passed in the present case. 8. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree for recovery of Rs. 10,000/- on account of dower, and for recovery of the ornaments or for recovery of Rs. 6065/- as their price is set aside. The finding that the defendant-husband had divorced the plaintiff wife as also the decree for recovery of Rs. 450/- as maintenance for the period of Iddat, and at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- on account of dower, and for recovery of the ornaments or for recovery of Rs. 6065/- as their price is set aside. The finding that the defendant-husband had divorced the plaintiff wife as also the decree for recovery of Rs. 450/- as maintenance for the period of Iddat, and at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month for the maintenance of the son from 1-4-1972 until he attains the age of 7 years, which he must already have attained. I must, however, add that the direction of court-fees on the amount of pendente lite and future maintenance awarded for the child, is illegal, inasmuch as the court-fees payable on a suit for maintenance by a female or minor, is worked out on the amount claimed to be payable for one year only, under Clause (ii) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, as amended in Uttar Pradesh. In the circumstances I further direct that the parties shall bear their own respective costs throughout.