Bhave J. Criminal - Jurisdiction - Section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) - Whether, order passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate was within jurisdiction - Held, jurisdiction of Magistrate to deal with application under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. was not taken away only because in meantime Civil Court had passed an order of injunction in favour of party - Sub-Divisional Magistrate could came to his own conclusion as to which of two parties was in possession of disputed property on date of preliminary order or within two months thereof - However where Receiver was appointed by Magistrate after attaching property, possibility of unsuccessful party in whose favour there was an order of injunction claiming that property was attached from its possession could not be ruled out - In such circumstances to avoid further complications property should continue in possession of receiver till decision of Civil Court - Thus party in whose favour decision of Civil Court was given might get back possession of property from receiver as also mesne profits collected by him - Hence order passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate was according to law and within jurisdiction - Petition dismissed. ORDER Chandrapal Singh, J. By this petition, Sureshchandra seeks interference with the order of the Fifth Additional Judge to the Court of Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision No. 91/81, dismissing the petitioner Sureshchandra's revision petition. The facts giving rise to this petition in short are as follows :- On 22nd June, 1981, the Police Mhow (the non-applicant No. 19) submitted a report under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mhow, alleging that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed between the petitioner Sureshchandra on the one hand and the non-applicants No. 1 to 18 on the other hand concerning agricultural lands with survey Numbers 1009, 1014, 1015, 1018, 1169, 1200, 1243, 1245, 1278, 1244, 1200/1357, 1244/1368, situated in village Gavli Palasiya, Tahsil Mhow. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate being satisfied, passed a preliminary order the same day calling upon the parties to submit the written statements of their respective claims to the property in dispute. He also passed an order under section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the attachment of the lands in dispute and appointed the non-applicant No. 20 the Tahsildar, Mhow, a receiver for them. He also passed an order under section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the attachment of the lands in dispute and appointed the non-applicant No. 20 the Tahsildar, Mhow, a receiver for them. Before these proceedings, however, Sitabai the non-applicant No. 1, on 5th May, 1980 had filed a Civil Suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Class I, Mhow against the non-applicants No. 10 to 16 and had also sought ex parte injunction preventing the non-applicants No. 10 to 16 the defendants in that case from interfering with her possession. On 20th November, 1980, the petitioner Sureshchandra also had filed a Civil Suit in the Court of Civil Judge Class II, Mhow against the non-applicants No. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and had also applied for temporary injunction for restraining them from interfering with the possession of the petitioner over the land in dispute and the Civil Judge had ordered the non-applicants No. 2 to 7 to maintain status quo regarding possession. Dissatisfied with the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate attaching the property in dispute and appointing a receiver for it, the petitioner Sureshchandra preferred a revision petition before the Fifth Additional Judge to the Court of Sessions Judge, Indore which the learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed on the ground that the impugned order was interlocutory and that he did not have inherent powers to give redress to the petitioner. This led the petitioner Sureshchandra to submit this petition. As regards the contention by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, attaching the property and appointing a receiver, was final without entering into the controversy whether it was interlocutory order or a final one, suffice to say that it was an order of the moment and hence, ordinarily it was revisable. [See : Ratanlal v. Vijaysingh 1976 MPLJ 14 and Hasmukh J. Jhaveri v. Sheila Dadlani and another 1981 Cri. LJ 958.]. The petitioner Sureshchandra, however, without exhausting the remedy which was available to him at the level of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate himself instead straightway jumped to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge. The principle of exhaustion of local remedy is so well recognized that it is extended even to Inter-National Law. It is indeed one of the basic principles of any administration-let alone administration of justice. The principle of exhaustion of local remedy is so well recognized that it is extended even to Inter-National Law. It is indeed one of the basic principles of any administration-let alone administration of justice. The petitioner Sureshchandra could have before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate himself submitted that in view of there being two civil suits, where the question of ownership and possession of the property was involved, it would not be proper for him to either attach the property under section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or appoint a receiver for it. He did not do anything of the sort, nor does he appear to have done so even before the Additional Sessions Judge, by whom, he had sought to have the order revised. The proceedings contemplated under section 145 read with section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are basically different from a suit for declaration and injunction. The conflicts of jurisdiction have of course to be avoided but where there is no likelihood of any conflict, merely the institution of a civil suit or civil suits is not a bar to the Executive Magistrate exercising his functions for preventing the breach of the peace generally and particularly with reference to sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure-the relevant sections for our purpose in this case. In Iqbal Mohammad Khan and others v. State of M. P. and others 1973 MPLJ 78 : 1973 JLJ 33 . Bhave J. held that: The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to deal with the application under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code is not taken away only because in the meantime, the Civil Court has passed an order of injunction in favour of a party. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate can come to his own conclusion as to which of the two parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the preliminary order or within two months thereof. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate can come to his own conclusion as to which of the two parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the preliminary order or within two months thereof. The only effect of the order of injunction of the Civil Court is that if the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the party in whose favour the order of injunction was issued was not, in fact, in possession of the property on the relevant date, the Magistrate cannot in pursuance of his order direct delivery of the property to the successful party if the party in whose favour the injunction order was passed has somehow managed to come in possession thereof. But where a Receiver is appointed by the Magistrate after attaching the property, the possibility of the unsuccessful party in whose favour there is an order of injunction claiming that the property was attached from its possession cannot be ruled out. In such circumstances, to avoid further complications, the property should continue in possession of the receiver till the decision of the Civil Court. The party in whose favour the decision of the Civil Court is given may get back the possession of the property from the receiver as also the mesne profits collected by him. So also in Mathnralal v. Bhawarlal and another AIR 1980 SC 242 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows : - The Magistrate's jurisdiction does not come to an end as soon as an attachment is made on the ground of emergency. Section 146 does not contemplate that regardless of the situation, consequent upon which an attachment is effected, it is the Civil Court and not the Magistrate that is to have further jurisdiction in the matter, after an attachment is effected." "Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace because of a dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. If section 146 is torn out of its setting and read independently of section 145, it is capable of being construed to mean that once an attachment is effected in any of the three situations mentioned therein, the dispute can only be resolved by a competent Court and not by the Magistrate effecting the attachment. If section 146 is torn out of its setting and read independently of section 145, it is capable of being construed to mean that once an attachment is effected in any of the three situations mentioned therein, the dispute can only be resolved by a competent Court and not by the Magistrate effecting the attachment. But section 146 cannot be so separated from section 145. It can only be read in the context of section 145. Contextual construction must surely prevail over isolationist construction. Otherwise, it may mislead." "In a case of emergency, a Magistrate may attach the property, at any time after making the preliminary order under section 145(1). There is no express stipulation in section 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment. Nor is it implied. Far from it. The obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by section 145, sub-section (4) is against any such implication. The only provision for stopping the proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in section 145(5) and it can be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of section 146(1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace". "A comparative study of sections 145 and 146 as they stood, before 1955 and after 1955 under the old Code and as they now stand under the 1973 Code, also leads to the conclusion that the Magistrate's jurisdiction does not end as soon as an attachment is made on the ground of emergency. The provisions of sections 145 and 146 of the 1973 Code are substantially the same as the corresponding provisions before the 1955 amendment of the old Code. In view of these pronouncements and particularly with reference to section 146(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code considering that no Receiver of the property had yet been appointed by the Civil Court, the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is according to law and is not liable to be set aside. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was certainly right in coming to the conclusion that he did not have inherent powers as are with the High Court (under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The learned Additional Sessions Judge was certainly right in coming to the conclusion that he did not have inherent powers as are with the High Court (under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). IN the result, there being no force in this petition it is dismissed. Petition dismissed