JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. - This writ petition has been filed by Cotton and Woollen Textile Workers' Union, Colonelganj, Kanpur, representing some thirty-four workers against the award of the Labour Court, Agra, dated 20 December 1975, arising out of Adjudication Case No. 274 of 1972. 2. Dulare Singh and thirty-three other petitioners were employees working at Kamla Retreat, Kanpur, as gardeners, bearers, cleaners, wireman, fitter, mason and coolies. Kamla Retreat, Kanpur, according to the respondents, is a guest house of some of the J. K. (Juggilal Kamlapat) Group of Industries. These employees claim parity with the employees of the other J. K. Group of Industries. They alleged that they receive very low wages, no dearness allowance as admissible to other workmen employed by the J. K. Group of Industries and were deprived of the benefits of provident fund, gratuity, employees' State insurance, pay and weekly holidays. Further two workmen, Nasir and Ram Ratan, had been dismissed illegally. A conciliation proceeding was initiated but failed. The State Government thereafter referred a matter for adjudication under Section 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by its order, dated 12 September 1972, before the Labour Court, Agra. Before the Labour Court the workmen prayed that they be treated as workmen of J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company, Ltd., Kanpur, or of J. K. Synthetic, Ltd., Kanpur, and they should be allowed facilities of provident fund, gratuity, employees' State insurance, payment of wages including dear food allowance, leave with full facilities along with Sunday rest which were admissible to the workmen engaged at the mills with effect from 1 April 1971. The workmen also prayed to the Tribunal that it should hold that Nasir and Ram Ratan, whose services had been terminated illegally and unjustifiably, be entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service and full wages for the intervening periods or be given a direction to J. K. Synthetic, Ltd. Kanpur, to reinstate these workmen. Written statements were filed by J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company, Ltd., Kanpur and J. K. Synthetic, Ltd., Kanpur. The workmen also filed their written statement. 3. The questions referred to the Labour Court for adjudication were : Firstly, whether the workmen were entitled to the benefits admissible to the workers of other concerns ? If so, from what date and with what benefits. The workmen also filed their written statement. 3. The questions referred to the Labour Court for adjudication were : Firstly, whether the workmen were entitled to the benefits admissible to the workers of other concerns ? If so, from what date and with what benefits. Secondly, whether the action of the employers in dismissing Nasir and Ram Ratan was proper and legal and if so, to what benefits they were entitled and who was liable to pay the same. Subsequently, on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 an application was moved seeking amendment of the written statement and praying for framing of preliminary issue. After contest this application was allowed and three additional issues were framed. These were:- (i) Whether the Cotton and Woollen Textile Workers' Union were competent to raise the matter of dispute as the workers in the instant dispute were not its members ? If so, its effect ? (ii) Whether the matter of dispute is an industrial dispute as the workers in the concern do not have an interest in the dispute and the dispute itself has not been raised properly by its workmen nor the union ? If so, its effect? (iii) Whether the order, dated 12 September 1972, as mentioned in the written statement of management is bad in law ? If so, its effect ? 4. The plea on behalf of the respondent, J. K. Cotton and Spinning Mills (hereinafter referred to as the Cotton Mills) was that Kamla Retreat does not run any industry and as such the workers of Cotton and Woollen Textile Workers' Union were not competent to raise a dispute on behalf of the workmen concerned. There was no relationship of master and servant between the Cotton Mill and the concerned workers the matter in dispute was not an industrial dispute as the workmen concerned were not the workmen of the Cotton Mills and the question of services of Nasir and Ram Ratan being dismissed by the Cotton Mills did not arise. Similar pleas were raised on behalf of J. K. Synthetic (hereinafter referred to as Synthetic Mills). 5. Similar pleas were raised on behalf of J. K. Synthetic (hereinafter referred to as Synthetic Mills). 5. It has, however, come in evidence before the Tribunal that different concerns belonging to J. K. Group of Industries managed the Kamla Retreat and bore its expenses in the following proportion : Per cent (i) J. K. Cotton Mills -20 (ii) J. K. Jute Mill -20 (iii) J. K. Synthetics -40 (iv) J. K. Manufacturers -10 (v) J. K. Iron and Steel -10 6. The Labour Court after considering the rival contentions and evidence came to the conclusion that the petitioner, Cotton and Woollen Textile Workers' Union was not competent to raise the dispute and they did not represent the workmen employed at Kamala Retreat and there was no industrial dispute. It was further held that there was no relationship of master and servant between the petitioner-workmen and the respondents. Lastly, it was held that the reference was bad in law. The Labour Court also held that in view of the above findings the workmen were not entitled to any relief. 7. Sri R. S. Dhavan, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the view taken by the Labour Court was patently erroneous. He contended that there was no dispute that these were workmen employed by a consortium of a group of industries controlled by the organisation known as J. K. (Juggilal Kamlapat) Group of Industries. They were thus entitled to be treated as workmen of the Cotton Mills and the Synthetic Mills or either one of them and further entitled to the same benefits as any other workmen of these mills and as such the Cotton and Woollen Textile Workers' Union was competent to raise the dispute and the workmen would be deemed to be a part of the industry of the mills. He contended that the view taken by the Labour Court that Kamla Retreat was not an industry was also incorrect and was liable to be set aside. He cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, [1978-I L. L. N. 376 and 657]. In particular he referred to the judgment of Chandrachud, J., (as he then was). 8. Chandrachud, J., in the above case observed while considering whether charitable enterprises can at all be industries in Para. 175, at page 662 : ". . In particular he referred to the judgment of Chandrachud, J., (as he then was). 8. Chandrachud, J., in the above case observed while considering whether charitable enterprises can at all be industries in Para. 175, at page 662 : ". . it seems to me to follow logically that a systematic activity which is organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged would be an industry despite the fact that it proceeds from charitable motives. It is the nature of the activity that one has to consider and it is upon the application of that test that the State's inalienable functions fall within the definition of ' industry. The very same principle must yield the result that just as the consideration as to who conducts an activity is irrelevant for determining whether the activity is an industry, so is the fact that the activity is charitable in nature or is undertaken with a charitable motive. The status or capacity, corporate or constitutional, of the employer would have, if at all, closer nexus, than his motive with the question whether the activity is an industry . . . If any principle can be said to be settled law in this vexed field it is this : the twin consideration of profit motive and capital investment is irrelevant for determining whether an activity is an industry. Therefore, activities which are dominated by charitable motives, either in the sense that they involve the rendering of free or near-free services or in the sense that the profits which they yield are diverted to charitable purposes, are not beyond the pale of the definition in Section 2 (j). It is as much beside the point to inquire who is the employer as it is to inquire why is the activity undertaken and what the employer does with his profits, if any". 9. A question was raised before the Supreme Court whether an establishment of a solicitor, lawyer, doctor, engineer, chartered accountant or even clubs came within the ambit of the word industry." He found it unable to accept the broad formulation that a solicitor's establishment could not be an industry. 9. A question was raised before the Supreme Court whether an establishment of a solicitor, lawyer, doctor, engineer, chartered accountant or even clubs came within the ambit of the word industry." He found it unable to accept the broad formulation that a solicitor's establishment could not be an industry. His Lordship observed that in the case of National Union of Commercial Employees v. M. R. Meher [A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1080], the Court held that the Legislature would find a plausible case for exempting the learned and liberal professions of lawyers, solicitors, doctors, engineers, chartered accountants and the like from the operation of industrial laws. But until that happens, it was difficult by judicial interpretation to create exemptions in favour of any particular class. In regard to the club his Lordship observed in Para. 177, at page 663 of 1978 - I. L. L. N. : "The case of the clubs, on the present definition, is weaker still ; and not only do I consider that the definition squarely covers them, except to the limited extent indicated by brother Krishna Iyer, J., in his judgment, but I see no justification for amending the law so as to exclude them from the operation of the industrial laws . . ." It was on the basis of these observations that the learned counsel based his contention that the Kamla Retreat, whether treated to be a charitable institution or even a club would not be outside the pale of the term " industry." 10. Learned counsel for the respondents, Sri V. B. Bahuguna and Sri V. B. Singh, contended that the award of the Labour Court was in accordance with law. Kamla Retreat was not an industry. The finding that respondents 2 and 3 (Cotton Mills and Synthetic Mills) were not the employers was a correct one. Being a finding of fact it could not be reviewed in this writ petition. The finding of the Labour Court was that the owner of Kamla Retreat was the firm Juggilal Kamlapat. As such neither the Cotton Mills nor the synthetic mills was the employer. Consequently, the reference was had and no relief could be granted to the petitioners as against the respondents. It was further contended that the salary was being paid by firm and not by the Cotton Mills and the Synthetic Mill and these findings of fact have not been shown to be perverse. Consequently, the reference was had and no relief could be granted to the petitioners as against the respondents. It was further contended that the salary was being paid by firm and not by the Cotton Mills and the Synthetic Mill and these findings of fact have not been shown to be perverse. Lastly, it was contended that the State Government should have formed an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute existed and then should have found out as to who the employers were. Since this was not done, reference itself was bad in law. The award could not, therefore, be challenged. 11. Having considered the rival contention and perused the material on record I do not find any good ground to disagree with the view taken by the Labour Court. There are four matters which need to be concerned : Firstly, whether the petitioner-union could raise the dispute ; secondly, whether Kamla Retreat was an industry ; thirdly, whether respondents 2 and 3 were employers ; and lastly, whether the reference by the State Government was competent. 12. The petitioner-union represented the Cotton and Woollen Textile Workers' Union. They were competent to raise dispute on behalf of the workers of the Kamla Retreat provided they were the employees of any cotton or woollen textile unit. If the workmen employed at Kamla Retreat were in the muster-roll either of the Cotton or Synthetic mills the union would certainly be competent to represent their case. In the present case all that has been shown is that certain companies of J. K. Group of Industries contribute a certain percentage of the expenses incurred at Kamla Retreat. This contribution towards the expenses would not make them employers. The expenses were not only for the payment of the wages or the salaries of the workmen, but for the maintenance of the premises and incurring expenses for victuals and other items. Until it was established that either the workmen employed at Kamla Retreat were part of the Cotton Mills or Synthetic Mills the Cotton and Woollen Textile Workers' Union was not entitled to raise a dispute. 13. The Labour Court has also held that there were 4,000 workers in the Cotton Mills and there were 3,000 employees in the Synthetic Mills. Until it was established that either the workmen employed at Kamla Retreat were part of the Cotton Mills or Synthetic Mills the Cotton and Woollen Textile Workers' Union was not entitled to raise a dispute. 13. The Labour Court has also held that there were 4,000 workers in the Cotton Mills and there were 3,000 employees in the Synthetic Mills. It has come in evidence that only 253 workers were present at the meeting where the question of raising the dispute in regard to the workmen at Kamla Retreat was considered and approved. The Labour Court has held that this represented only 4 per cent of the total labour employed in the Cotton Mills and Synthetic Mills and it was insignificant. In the case of Sivasubrahmanyam v. State of Madras, [A.I.R. 1968 S. C. 548], that the presence of 10 per cent of the means at the meeting where the resolution for the raising of an industrial dispute was considered, was not enough. In the present case, the percentage was even lower, i.e., 4 per cent. Consequently, the Labour Court was right in holding that this was not enough to raise an industrial dispute. In my opinion, the view taken by the Labour Court in this respect cannot be said to be bad in law. 14. On the question whether Kamla Retreat was an industry or not, it is not in dispute that these thirty-four workmen were working in the premises what is known as Kamla Retreat, Kanpur. They were doing various types of work therein. Some were gardeners, some were bearers, others were fitters and even ordinary labourers. According to the judgment of Chandrachud, J., even a charitable institution or a club would not be exempt from the definition of the word " industry " and would be squarely covered by it. Kamla Retreat, as the name signifies, is a place for rest and relaxation for those who control the J. K. Group of Industries and their guests. It could be something analogous to a club. It cannot be equated to a charitable institution. Even if Kamla Retreat did not have the constitution of a club but the very fact that it provided the basic facilities which a club offered, namely, meeting place, rest, relaxation, games, food and drinks, would, therefore, be some what analogous to a club. It could be something analogous to a club. It cannot be equated to a charitable institution. Even if Kamla Retreat did not have the constitution of a club but the very fact that it provided the basic facilities which a club offered, namely, meeting place, rest, relaxation, games, food and drinks, would, therefore, be some what analogous to a club. In this view of the matter it could be treated to be an industry. It does not appear that there was any profit motive. But then it was being run for the broad object of providing all those facilities mentioned above with those connected with the J. K. Group of Industries. It partook the nature of a club. Therefore, in my opinion, it would be covered by the definition of the word "industry." 15. But one of the adjuncts of the industry is that there must be an employer. Who was the employer of the workmen working at Kamla Retreat, Kanpur, Kamla Retreat was owned by the firm Juggilal Kamlapat. If it was being run by consortium of an industry, it was necessary that each one of them had been named as employer. This has not been done in this case. The definition of the word " employer " indicates one who besides making payment exercises the right of appointment and termination of service and taking other actions which are the rights of an employer. Merely because some one pays the salary of a workman he does not become an employer. If he does not exercise the other rights and obligations of the employer, he does not become an employer. It was thus clear that the manager did not belong to any of the two mills. In the present case, the Labour Court has held that neither of the two mills, Cotton Mills and Synthetic Mills was the employer. The manager of the Kamla Retreat was an employee of J. K. Rayon. I do not find any error much less a manifest error in the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court in the above finding. 16. The manager of the Kamla Retreat was an employee of J. K. Rayon. I do not find any error much less a manifest error in the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court in the above finding. 16. In regard to the question whether the reference by the State Government was competent or not the Labour Court has held that there was neither an industrial dispute nor was there any relationship of master and servant between respondents 2 and 3 and the petitioners and as such this was not an industrial dispute and the reference was bad in law. This conclusion by the Labour Court has to be upheld for the reasons given by it. Firstly, it has been found that there was no valid industrial dispute which could be raised by the union. If the said union had no right to raise the plea of the existence of an industrial dispute, the State Government was not competent under Section 4K to refer the matter. Secondly in the absence of a relationship of employer and employee or master and servant between respondents 2 and 3 and the petitioners-workmen the reference as such must be held to be bad in law. 17. For the reasons indicated above I find no substantiable ground to interfere with the order of the Labour Court but I cannot help making the observation that this is really an unfortunate case as far as the petitioner-workmen are concerned. They are employed at Kamla Retreat, Kanpur, but without the benefits which are due to them. The claim of theirs, it appears, is on technical grounds. They are workmen who are entitled to those benefits like provident fund, employees' State insurance, gratuity, leave benefits, day of rest, etc., as are admissible to any other workman, in an industry. Clubs also come within the purview of industry. The workmen at Kamla Retreat should not be kept out of these benefits. Merely because the property is owned by a firm and consortium of industries pay for its maintenance including the salary of the workmen employed there it does not mean that these workmen are to be deprived of what is due to them. It would be wholly illogical to deprive them of this benefits. As I have stated, the claim of theirs has failed on technicalities, but then amends can be made even now by all those who are concerned. 18. It would be wholly illogical to deprive them of this benefits. As I have stated, the claim of theirs has failed on technicalities, but then amends can be made even now by all those who are concerned. 18. In the result, therefore, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.