JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - The petitioners challenge the validity of the results declared by the Allahabad University upon revaluation of some of the papers relating to various examinations conducted by the said University. As the principal point urged in these petitions is the same, they are being disposed of by a common judgment. The point canvassed was that the University ought to have applied the relevant Ordinances pertaining to revaluation as they existed prior to 6-5-1980, the date on which the old Ordinances were replaced by new Ordinances, laying down a different standard for determining the results of the candidates applying for revaluation. 2. The various petitioners appeared at different examinations conducted by the Ailahaabd University. When the results were declared all the petitioners except Gopalji Shukla (petitioner of Writ Petition No. 14859 of 1981) were declared passed. It appears that the petitioners were not satisfied with the marks which had been awarded to them. Consequently, they applied for revaluation of their papers, which was permissible at all material times. According to the applicable Ordinances those papers in which the petitioners applied for revaluation were referred to two different examiners. The mean of the marks awarded to the candidate by the two examiners was regarded as the marks of the candidate upon revaluation. According to the University, the applicable Ordinances to the cases of the petitioners were those which were passed by the Executive Council of the University on 6-5-1980. These Ordinances provided that if the difference between the marks originally awarded to the candidate and those awarded upon revaluation was at least 10 per cent of the maximum marks in that subject, the result of the candidate would be liable to be redetermined in accordance with the marks awarded to the candidate upon revaluation. If, on the other hand, the difference was less than 10 per cent, the original marks awarded to the candidate were to remain unaffected. 3. The case of the respondent University is that the aforesaid difference in the case of the petitioners was, in each case, more than 10 per cent and the consequence was that their results were redetermined in accordance with the marks awarded to them upon revaluation, as a result of which the petitioners were found to have secured less than the minimum pass marks. They were therefore declared failed. The petitioners knowing this legal position had applied for revaluation. They were therefore declared failed. The petitioners knowing this legal position had applied for revaluation. They can, hence, have no legitimate grievance or cause of action on that score. 4. The petitioners assailed the stand taken by the University broadly on the grounds : - 1. The University was in error in applying the new Ordinances made on 6-5-1980. The examinations in question have been held prior to 6-5-1980. Therefore, the Ordinances which were in force on the date of the examination ought to have been applied. If those Ordinances had been applied, the petitioners' results as originally announced would not have been disturbed. 2. The petitioners in point of fact had not applied for revaluation. They are hence not bound by the exercise of revaluation undertaken by the University or the results founded thereon (this point was urged only in some of the petitions which would be referred to later in this judgment and not in the others). 5. We will take up the first point first. In order to appreciate the controversy, it will be necessary to have the relevant Ordinance as it stood prior to 6-5-1980 extracted here. The Ordinance pertaining to revaluation of papers approved by the Executive Council in its meeting held on 2nd of Nov., 1974, which was replaced by the new Ordinances on 6-5-1980, reads as follows : - "8. Ordinance For Revaluation of Scripts - (a) In case an examinee is not satisfied with the marks obtained by him or her, he or she may apply to the Vice-Chancellor for revaluation of his or her scripts within 30 days of the declaration of the result and pay a fee of Rs. 20/- per paper. The prescribed form is to be obtained from the office of the Registrar and the fee is to be deposited in the University pay office. (b) An examinee may also apply for revaluation of his or her script in relation to the marks obtained by the script of any other candidate or candidates, (c) If the difference between the marks after revaluation and the original marks is less than 15% of the maximum marks carried by that paper the original marks shall stand. (d) In case the award after revaluation is higher than the original award by 15% (or more) of the maximum marks carried by the paper, the award shall be modified. (d) In case the award after revaluation is higher than the original award by 15% (or more) of the maximum marks carried by the paper, the award shall be modified. However, in case the mean marks after revaluation are less than 15% but sufficient to enable the applicant to get pass marks or improve his division, the original marks obtained by him will be revised irrespective of the difference between the mean marks and the original marks being less than 15% of the marks carried by the paper." On 12th Mar., 1980, the Academic Council drafted fresh Ordinances for revaluation of scripts. Those Ordinances were placed before the Executive Council at its meeting held on 15-3-1980. On 15th of Mar., 1980, the Executive Council accepted all the Ordinances proposed by the Academic Council relating to revaluation except Ordinances Nos. 8 and 9 which were referred back to the Academic Council for reconsideration. The Academic Council thereupon redrafted Ordinances Nos. 8 and 9 and submitted the same before the Executive Council for approval in its meeting scheduled to be held on 6th of May, 1980. On the 6th of May, 1980, the Executive Council approved the redrafted Ordinances. The Executive Council while approving the said Ordinances further resolved at the same meeting held on 6-5-1980 that the new Ordinances shall be effective for those examinations of 1979 and onwards in regard to which revaluation results had not been announced. We are concerned here with Ordinance No. 8 which was approved by the Executive Council. The same reads as follows : - "(8) The average of the marks awarded by the two examiners on the script revalued shall be taken to be the correct and final award for that script if this average shows a variation (as compared to the original marks secured by the candidate) of at least 10% of the maximum marks carried by the paper and the result of the candidate shall be redetermined accordingly. Provided that any variation in marks below 10% favourably affecting the result of a candidate (enabling him to get pass marks or to improve his division) shall be taken into account and the candidate's result revised. Provided further that the percentages required to determine the division in the Part II/Final examinations shall be deemed to be the percentages to determine the divisions in the respective Part I/Previous examinations also for purposes of this Ordinance". Provided further that the percentages required to determine the division in the Part II/Final examinations shall be deemed to be the percentages to determine the divisions in the respective Part I/Previous examinations also for purposes of this Ordinance". At this point we may also reproduce the resolution passed by the Executive Council at the same meeting held on 6-5-1980 with regard to the date from which the new Ordinances were to become effective. The same reads thus : - "It was also resolved that the revised Ordinances for Revaluation of Scripts be made effective for those examinations of 1979 and onwards for which revaluation result has not been announced.' 6. The above, therefore, is a brief legislative history of the relevant applicable Ordinances. The contention of the petitioners was that the right to apply for revaluation was a substantive right which vested in the examinees from the date on which the examination in question was held. At that time, the Ordinances applicable were those which were in existence prior to the enactment of the new Ordinances on 6-5-1980. That being so, the University, was in error in applying the new' Ordinances. As a corollary to this argument it was submitted that the Ordinances in question were a piece of subordinate legislation and the delegate exercising the power to make Ordinances was not competent to apply those Ordinances retrospectively. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length we find no merit in the above argument. In the first place we find no warrant for holding that there is any kind of vested right in regard to the right to apply for revaluation in the sense that it accrues from the date of the examination. If, 'however, there is a provision for applying for revaluation, the occasion for exercising that privilege or right arises earliest only upon the declaration of the results of the examination. In the second place assuming that the privilege to apply for revaluation is some kind of right in a broader sense, in our opinion, the norms or the standards or the method of revaluation and redetermination of the results can by no means be regarded as matters relating to a substantive right. These are matters pertaining to procedure and the power to make Ordinances in respect thereto can be found in S. 51 (2) (c) of the U. P. State Universities Act. These are matters pertaining to procedure and the power to make Ordinances in respect thereto can be found in S. 51 (2) (c) of the U. P. State Universities Act. The University has not, in regard to the examinations in question taken away right to apply for revaluation altogether. It has merely altered by the Ordinance enacted on 6-5-1980, the methodology for determining the results upon revaluation. 8. Thus, in either view of the matter, the submission that some kind of substantive rights of the petitioners have been affected by the change in the Ordinance has to be rejected. 9. Furthermore, under S. 52 (5) of the aforesaid Act, the Executive Council has been expressly invested with the power to determine the date with effect from which the Ordinances made by it shall have effect. Sub-s. (5) of S. 52 reads thus : - "All Ordinances made by the Executive Council shall have effect from such date as it may direct and shall be submitted as soon as may be to the Chancellor." The submission, therefore, that the executive council had no power to give the regulations a retrospective effect cannot be accepted, still further, as would be found from the facts mentioned below in most of the petitions the results of the examination themselves were announced after 6-5-1980 and therefore, as mentioned above, the occasion to apply for revaluation arose only thereafter. At that time admittedly the new Ordinances had come into existence. In one case, that of Gopalji Shukla, the examination itself was held after 6-5-1980. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Anurag Kishore Chaturvedi referred us to a decision of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Virendra Kapur v. University of Jodhpur reported in AIR 1964 Raj 161 (FB). He laid particular emphasis on paragraph 42 of the judgment. We have examined this case, but we do not find that the same is of any help to the petitioner. The learned Judges were considering the vires of the provisions of the Jodhpur University Act. The attack was inter alia, on the ground that there was an excessive delegation of the essential legislative functions. The learned Judges upheld the validity of the provisions, but on its language held that the Regulation in question had not been made either expressly or by necessary intendment retrospective in its operation. The attack was inter alia, on the ground that there was an excessive delegation of the essential legislative functions. The learned Judges upheld the validity of the provisions, but on its language held that the Regulation in question had not been made either expressly or by necessary intendment retrospective in its operation. They observed that a sub-delegate like the Vice-Chancellor was hardly competent in law to give a retrospective operation to any regulation made by him within the scope of his legitimate authority. In our opinion, in view of an express statutory power conferred upon the Executive Council investing it with the express authority to determine the date from which the Ordinances made by it shall have operation, the case cited by counsel for the petitioner becomes clearly distinguishable. 11. The result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that the first point submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. 12. We may now briefly examine the individual cases in the light of the foregoing discussion. In Writ Petition No. 14384 of 1981, the petitioner Ram Bilas had appeared at the B.A. Part II examination of 1979. The examination was held in Jan.-Feb., 1980. The results were announced on 14-5-1980. The petitioner was declared passed in the III Division. A mark-sheet was issued to the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner was not satisfied with his marks in three papers namely Ancient History I and II papers and Economics I paper. He, therefore, made an application for revaluation in all these three papers. Upon revaluation it was found that there was no change between the marks as initially allotted to him and those awarded to him after revaluation so far as the paper of Ancient History was concerned. In the II paper of Ancient History, however, the petitioner's marks decreased from 34 to 25 out of the maximum marks of 75. Likewise in Economics paper, the marks of the petitioner decreased from 30 to 19 out of the same number of maximum marks namely 75, as a result of revaluation. There was thus a difference of nine marks in the II paper of Ancient History and eleven marks in the first paper of Economics. The difference was thus clearly more than 10 per cent of the maximum marks in each of the two papers. There was thus a difference of nine marks in the II paper of Ancient History and eleven marks in the first paper of Economics. The difference was thus clearly more than 10 per cent of the maximum marks in each of the two papers. The University was, therefore, within its right in redetermining the petitioner's result in accordance with the marks awarded to him upon revaluation. As the results were announced after the coming into force of the amended Ordinances, and, as in our opinion, the occasion to apply for revaluation arose only thereafter, this petitioner cannot complain that the amended Ordinances have been applied retrospectively, in any view of the matter. 13. The case of Anurag Kishore Chaturvedi is identical with that of the petitioner Ram Bilas. He, too, had appeared at the B,A. Part II examination of 1979 held in Jan.-Feb., 1980, the results of which were announced on 14-5-1980. He was also declared passed in III division initially. His case, however, is that he never made any application for revaluation. He states that he was surprised to receive a letter dated 23-12-1980 from the Deputy Registrar of the University informing him that as a result of revaluation, he had failed at the aforesaid examination. He consequently made a representation to the Vice-Chancellor on 12-1-1981 which was rejected by the Vice-Chancellor on 28-5-1981. 14. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the University, the allegation that the petitioner had not applied for revaluation has been denied. It has been asserted that not only had the petitioner applied for revaluation by means of an application under his signature in three papers namely Economics 1 and II papers and Medieval History II paper, but he had also deposited the requisite fees of Rs. 60/-(Rs. 20/- for each paper) vide receipt No. 16808 dated 11th of June, 1980. The representation of the petitioner was considered but the University found no reason to doubt that the application for revaluation had been made by the petitioner himself. 15. Having considered the matter, we see no reason to disbelieve the version given on behalf of the University as regards the issue of fact whether or not the petitioner had made the application for revaluation. 15. Having considered the matter, we see no reason to disbelieve the version given on behalf of the University as regards the issue of fact whether or not the petitioner had made the application for revaluation. The version in the counter-affidavit that the aforesaid allegation has been made because of the fact that as a result of revaluation, the petitioner had failed, does seem to be a plausible one. As regards the complaint that the amended Ordinance has been applied retrospectively, without any legal authority, we have already made comments while discussing the case of Ram Bilas and it is not necessary to repeat them here as the facts are identical. In the case of the petitioner, the difference upon revaluation was more than 10 per cent of the maximum marks in-so-far as the paper of Economics was concerned. The result of this petitioner was, therefore, rightly redetermined according to the marks obtained by him upon revaluation. 16. We then turn to the case of Noorul Hasan. The petitioner appeared at B.A. Part I examination of 1978-79 which was held in Oct., 1979. The results were declared on 16-2-1980. By a letter dated 24-10-1980 of the Deputy Registrar of the University the petitioner was informed that as a result of revaluation he had been declared failed. The petitioner had been awarded 22 out of 75 marks in the II paper of Economics initially and 9 out of 75 on revaluation in the said paper. The difference thus was of 13 marks, which was more than 15% of the maximum marks in that subject. Thus, the petitioner was liable to be declared failed both according to the unamended Ordinance as well as the Ordinance as it stood after its amendment on 6-5-1980. In the case of this petitioner, therefore, the question whether the old Ordinance applied or the new one becomes purely academic. 17. There remains then to be considered the selfsame plea raised by this petitioner too namely that he had not applied for revaluation. The University had countered this plea by filing an affidavit in reply stating that there is on the record an application moved in the name of the petitioner signed by him and further a deposit of a sum of Rs. 20/- as fee for revaluation had also been made. The University had countered this plea by filing an affidavit in reply stating that there is on the record an application moved in the name of the petitioner signed by him and further a deposit of a sum of Rs. 20/- as fee for revaluation had also been made. Still further it has been averred that the representation of the petitioner had been duly considered and the same was rightly rejected as there was nothing to show that the petitioner had not in fact applied for revaluation nor deposited the fee for the same. We see no reason to disbelieve the version given on behalf of the University. At any rate, the issue-which is indisputably one of fact being highly disputed, we see no ground to interfere with the impugned order. 18. The fourth case is that of Jai Chandra Misra. He appeared at the LL.B., Part II examination of 1979 which was held in the year 1980. The results were announced on 2-8-1980. The petitioner was declared passed. The petitioner states that he was satisfied with his results and was, therefore, surprised to receive the communication from the University stating that as a result of revaluation of the petitioner's papers in the subjects of (1) Legal Theory and Constitutional Law, (2) Equity, Mortgages, Trust and other Fiduciary Relations, and (3) Partnership, Companies and Negotiable Instruments, the petitioner had been declared failed. The petitioner, thereafter made a representation to the Vice-Chancellor to the aforesaid effect. The petitioner received a letter dated 9-3-1981 from the Registrar of the University informing him that it was not possible to cancel the result of the petitioner. It is asserted by the petitioner that the petitioner's representation has been rejected without any proper consideration. It is also alleged that the aforesaid action of the University was actuated because of the petitioner's activities as the President of the Students' Union of the College namely, C.M.P. Degree College, Allahabad which is affiliated to the respondent University. 19. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the University the aforesaid allegations of the petitioner have been refuted. It has been asserted that an application duly signed by the petitioner was received by the respondent University. The application was also accompanied by a receipt No. 21357 dated 3 9-80 showing the deposit of revaluation fee of Rs. 60/- for revaluation of the aforesaid three papers. It has been asserted that an application duly signed by the petitioner was received by the respondent University. The application was also accompanied by a receipt No. 21357 dated 3 9-80 showing the deposit of revaluation fee of Rs. 60/- for revaluation of the aforesaid three papers. The application was in the name of the petitioner and it purported to have been signed by him. There was no reason for the University to suspect or come to the conclusion that the signature on the said application had been forged or that somebody else had made that application with a view to harming the petitioner. 20. Learned counsel vehemently contended that in the reply dated 9th of Mar., 1981 received from the Registrar of University, there was no categorical finding on the plea raised by the petitioner namely that he had not made any application. Having given the matter a careful thought we are clearly of the opinion that there is no substance in the plea raised by the petitioner that he had not made the application for revaluation or that his representation was not properly disposed of. From the facts in the counter-affidavit, it seems clear that the University had no material except the bald and unsubstantiated allegation of the petitioner that he had not made the application to conclude that the application on the record of the University which purported to have been signed by the petitioner and which was accompanied by a deposit as required by law had not been moved by or on behalf of the petitioner. We have no reason to disbelieve the version of facts as given on behalf of the University on this issue of fact. At any rate, the petitioner has failed to make out any case warranting interference by this Court as the facts are highly disputed. 21. As regards the argument that the petitioner's representation was not properly considered and that there is no categorical finding in the communication of the Registrar dated 9th of Mar., 1981, suffice it to say that the authorities were not required to give a reasoned judgment or decision. From the facts mentioned in the counter affidavit and the Registrar's letter it seems clear to us that the Vice-Chancellor was not inclined to accept the allegation of the petitioner that he had not made the application for revaluation. From the facts mentioned in the counter affidavit and the Registrar's letter it seems clear to us that the Vice-Chancellor was not inclined to accept the allegation of the petitioner that he had not made the application for revaluation. This is also implicit in the letter of the Registrar dated 9th of Mar. 1981. 22. Before passing on to the last case we may notice another submission which was made on behalf of these petitioners who were alleging that they had not made any application and they were, therefore, not bound by the results of revaluation. It was submitted that under the relevant Ordinances, the candidates were required to submit their original mark-sheet along with the application for revaluation. The original mark-sheets, however, remained with the petitioners. This clearly demonstrates that the applications for revaluation cannot have been made on behalf of the petitioners. The reply of the University in its counter affidavit in all these cases is that the University as a matter of practice had not been insisting on the original mark-sheet and that an authenticated copy of the mark sheet was also being accepted along with the applications for revaluation. This explanation of the University seems to be perfectly plausible. We accept the same. 23. The last case is that of Gopalji Shukla. He appeared at the B.A. Part II examination of 1980 which was held in 1981. The results were announced on 9-7-81. He was declared failed initially also. Thereafter, he applied for revaluation in both the papers of Psychology. Initially he had got 10/50 and 17/50 in the I and II papers of Psychology. After revaluation he was awarded 15/50 and 12/50 respectively in I and II papers. The difference was thus of 5 marks in each of the two papers which works out to 10% of the maximum marks. As the examination itself was held after 6-5-1980 indisputably the amended Regulations would apply to him. Under the amended Regulations the difference being of 10% of the maximum marks, the petitioner's result was liable to be redetermined and he was, therefore, rightly declared failed. 24. The result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that all the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed but we make no order as to costs.