Judgment :- 1. These are petitions under S.5 of the Limitation Act and S.482 of the Code of Criminal procedure for condoning the delay in filing applications for leave to appeal under sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though the respondents in the various petitions are different persons, in as much as the State figures as the petitioner in all the petitions, and the ground urged in support of the prayer for condoning the delay in all the petitions, being substantially the same, they were heard together, and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. In the affidavits in support of the petitions, it is seen stated that Sri. N. K. Sreedharan, the former Public Prosecutor, retired on 23 4-1981 on attaining the age of 60, and that his successor in office was appointed on 14-8-1981 only. This delay in appointing the Public Prosecutor is projected in all the petitions as the reason for the delay in filing the applications for leave accompanying them under sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.378 of the Cr. P.C. 3. The office of the Public Prosecutor in the High Court is one of great prestige, carrying with it considerable duties and responsibilities. We would be justified, we believe, in presuming that the State Government had known sufficiently early that Sri Sreedharan was due to retire on 23-4-1981, and that his retirement was not an event that happened suddenly to the surprise of the Government. It is mandatory under sub-section (1) of S.24 of the Code that for every High Court a Public Prosecutor shall be appointed for conducting prosecutions, appeals, or other proceedings on behalf of the State Government. The failure or delay on the part of the State Government in fulfilling this statutory obligation, for whatever reasons it might be, could not be taken advantage of by the State Government to deny or abridge the vested rights of the accused who ordinarily is entitled to claim the benefit of an order of acquittal unless an appeal against such order of acquittal was preferred within the time prescribed in that behalf. The parties have to thank themselves for their laches, and the State, which has all the resources at its command, could not be an exception to this position 4. The parties have to thank themselves for their laches, and the State, which has all the resources at its command, could not be an exception to this position 4. It looks rather strange that the State should have thought it fit to file appeals for the second time against the orders of acquittal while the appeals filed by the State earlier against the very same orders on the strength of leave granted by this court ware pending. 5. To crown everything said above, we find that none of these petitions was filed before 5-101981 (not to mention of the fact that some of them had been filed only as late as 20-10-1981). No explanation, whatsoever has been offered for the delay after 14-8-1981 in filing the petitions and the applications for leave accompanying them. No party, much less the State, could assume that delay would be condoned as a matter of course, on the mere asking for it. Delay would normally be condoned only in the interest of justice; and that would be done only on every day's delay being explained to the satisfaction of the Courts. 6. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that there is no justification for condoning the delay in filing the applications for leave to appeal against the orders of acquittal for the second time; hence the petitions are dismissed. Dismissed.