JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. 1. THIS is a plaintiff's second appeal in a suit for injunction prohibiting the defendants from preventing the plaintiff from constructing his dehliz and further prohibiting him from discharing the water of the parnalas and the mori of house No. 24 on the rasta land and from tethering his cattle on any part or portion thereof. A further relief for demolition of a Kotha, varandah and chabutara which was said to have been erected on a rasta on plot no. 25 during the pendency of the suit was added by an amendment of the plaint. The suit had undergone some vicissitudes. By judgment dated 9-12-1966, it was decreed for demolition of the construction D-1 to X 1 and X 1 and X 2 as shown in the map paper No. 47-A2, and also for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's construction of his dehliz on the land in suit. On appeal, by a judgment dated 17-2-1968, the trial court's judgment dated 9-12-1966 was set aside and the suit was remanded for a fresh trial. After remand, the suit was partly decreed by judgment dated 17-3-1969. The construction which had been ordered to be demolished by the earlier judgment was again ordered to be demolished but this time it was described as the construction on plot no. 25 shown by blue colour in the commissioner's map 86-A2. That map now forms part of the decree of the lower appellate court. The defendants appealed to the District Court from the said decree. There was a cross-objection by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's cross-objection was dismissed but the defendants' appeal was allowed and the decree for demolition of the construction on plot No. 25 was set aside. Instead, a decree was passed restraining the defendants from tying their cattle and putting their pegs on the rasta between the plaintiff's house and the constructions raised by the defendants as they then existed. 2. IN this Second Appeal by the plaintiff, the only question which survives for consideration now, is, whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the construction on the rasta shown by blue colour in the map 86-A2, which forms part of the lower appellate court's decree, should be ordered to be demolished. 2. IN this Second Appeal by the plaintiff, the only question which survives for consideration now, is, whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the construction on the rasta shown by blue colour in the map 86-A2, which forms part of the lower appellate court's decree, should be ordered to be demolished. I may here mention that the shading in blue colour on the original map 86-A2 which forms part of the lower appellate court's decree has become faint and a better copy of that man, which clearly shows the shading in blue colour is available as a part of the certified copy of the trial court's decree, based on the judgment dated 17-3-1969, which was filed with the memorandum of appeal in the lower appellate court and bears paper No. 7C-2. The lower appellate court has proceeded on the basis that the partition map was a weak kind of evidence and was not enough to establish the existence of the rasta and that the plaintiff ought to have led better evidence for establishing the existence of the rasta or for establishing his right to use that land as a passage. The plaintiff did lead oral evidence,, After disbelieving that oral evidence, the lower appellate court proceeded to observe that "the learned Munsif has remarked that the D.Ws. are not reliable witnesses, but the plaintiff has to stand on his own legs in proving his case and cannot take benefit of the laches of the opposite-parties in proving their case unless they amount to admission of the plaintiff's claim." 3. HAVING heard the learned counsel for the appellant, I find that this approach of the lower appellate court is against law. The evidence of partition papers is not such as could be brushed aside in the manner in which the lower appellate court chose to do. The partition papers clearly establish that the plot No. 25 was a rasta. There was the plaintiff's oral evidence, not of one witness, but of three witnesses, which established that the defendants had built constructions on the rasta. The defendants' evidence was found to be unreliable by the trial court and the plaintiff's evidence was believed by it. There was no such improbability about the plaintiff's case or his witnesses as to have authorised the lower appellate court to reverse the trial court's rinding on this point. The defendants' evidence was found to be unreliable by the trial court and the plaintiff's evidence was believed by it. There was no such improbability about the plaintiff's case or his witnesses as to have authorised the lower appellate court to reverse the trial court's rinding on this point. See Sarju Parshad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 . It is a civil case in which the finding have to be arrived at on a balance of the probabilities on the appraisal of the evidence on the record, and the observation of the lower appellate court quoted above that the plaintiff has to stand on his own legs etc., is not justified in law. As has been well said burden of proof looses much of its importance when evidence has been led by both the parties. The case has to be judged on consideration of the entire evidence on the record and on a preponderance of probabilities. 4. LEARNED counsel for the appellant urged that the lower appellate court was right in not relying on Batwara papers and cited before me certain cases in that context. The first case cited by the learned counsel for the respondents was Sadhu Saran v, Ambika Lal, AIR 1923 Pat. 163. It was held by a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court in that case that a Batwara Khasra is not a record within the meaning of section 35 of the Evidence Act and that an entry made therein of the name of a tenant in possession is not admissible in evidence ; but the Batwara Khasra was used in that case, to show the past history of the plots long before the defendant's predecessors in interest obtained a settlement and to show that in 1866 the land was raiyati land of Bilati, and that the earlier observation that it was not admissible under section 35 was based on two cases which dealt with admissibility of Batwara Khasra only under section 35 of the Evidence Act. According to the learned Judge, there is no reason why section 13 of the Evidence Act should not apply. It was not held in that case that Batwara Khasra was not admissible in evidence. The next case cited was Benoda Chandra v. Ramani Kishore, AIR 1934 Cal. 488. According to the learned Judge, there is no reason why section 13 of the Evidence Act should not apply. It was not held in that case that Batwara Khasra was not admissible in evidence. The next case cited was Benoda Chandra v. Ramani Kishore, AIR 1934 Cal. 488. This was Division Bench decision and it clearly held that although a batwara record is not conclusive evidence, it is evidence under section 35 of the Evidence Act as an official record. The observation of the Division Bench in that case to the effect that the "batwara record is, therefore, very weak evidence of title" is referable to the earlier sentence, wherein it was observed that in that case, the land in suit was excluded from partition and it was merely referred to as so excluded. The observation does not lay down any general rule that batwara record is a very weak evidence of title. The Division Bench only found that in that case it was a weak evidence of title because the land in suit was excluded from partition and the batwara record merely referred to it as so excluded. 5. THE next case cited was that of Mahabir Mahton v. Sonmati Kuer, AIR 1964 Pat. 66 . It was held therein that a judgment other than a judgment referred to in Ss. 40 to 42 may be admissible to prove that a right was asserted or denied under Sec. 13, or to explain or introduce facts in issues or to explain the history of the case. THEre is nothing in the case to rule out the batwara papers as inadmissible in evidence. 6. THE next contention raised by Mr. A. P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents was that even if batwara papers were admissible in evidence, they were no evidence of title and, therefore, the existence of pathway had to be proved as a fact by some other evidence. 1 have been unable to appreciate the argument so raised by the learned counsel. THE plaintiff was not claiming any private right in the rasta of plot No. 25. It was a village rasta. THE batwara papers were papers of the partition of the village Abadi among the co-sharers. In the Khasra and the map plot No. 25 was shown as a rasta. THE partition was of the year 1916. THE plaintiff was not claiming any title to the land. It was a village rasta. THE batwara papers were papers of the partition of the village Abadi among the co-sharers. In the Khasra and the map plot No. 25 was shown as a rasta. THE partition was of the year 1916. THE plaintiff was not claiming any title to the land. He was claiming the existence of right of way which had been obstructed by the constructions in suit adjacent to the plaintiff's own house. THE oral evidence could only show that there was such a rasta which was in use and the oral evidence did show that. THE oral evidence was corroborated by the partition papers. I find that the lower appellate court committed an error of law in arriving at the finding which it did. THE trial court's finding was correct. THE learned counsel cited Radha Prasad v. Gajadhar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 115 , in this context and contended that the finding of the lower appellate court could not be interferred with because the appellate court had the jurisdiction to reverse the finding of the trial court on a question of fact, but there is nothing in this case from which it may be said that the Supreme Court departed from the rule of practice set down by it in Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 . I may, however, add that quite apart from the question about the credibility of the oral evidence of the parties, the judgment of the lower appellate court is vitiated by its wrong approach to the credibility and weight to be attached to the partition papers, as a matter of law. If the lower appellate court had been correctly advised on the law about the admissibility and weight to be attached to the partition papers, it could not have reversed the finding of the trial court. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the decree of the trial court founded on its judgment dated 17-3-1960 is restored. I further direct that the date which the decree of the trial court should bear is the date of judgment, viz., 17-3-1963, and not 3-4-1969 which was the date of signing the decree. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the decree of the trial court founded on its judgment dated 17-3-1960 is restored. I further direct that the date which the decree of the trial court should bear is the date of judgment, viz., 17-3-1963, and not 3-4-1969 which was the date of signing the decree. The date 3-4-1969 had only to be given under the signatures of the learned Munsif vide clause (5) of Rule 21 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this Court, and not in the clause :- "Mere hastakshar aur nyayalayaki mudra ke sahit aaj dinank 3 mas 4 san 1969 isvi ko di gai," which specifies the date of decree and which must be the date of judgment, vide Rule 7 of Or. XX of the Code of Civil Procedure. The date 3-4-1969 in this clause should be corrected by the trial court by substituting the date 17-3-1969 on its original decree and the map which forms part of the certified copy of that decree which was filed along with the appeal, in the lower appellate court and bears paper No, 7-C2 should also be made part of the original decree of the trial court. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.