Judgment :- 1. Two questions arise in this appeal and they are:-(1) Has the respondent sufficient service qualifying for pension; and (2) if the answer to the 1st question is: no,-are the appellants estopped from contending that weightage included in the standard rate of pension is to be excluded in determining his pension entitlement at the end of 20 years for reckoning his pro rata pension. 2. The first question is to be examined with reference to the Navy (Pension) Regulations, 1964 made under S.184 of Navy Act, 1957. Regulation.18 to 20, 22 and 23 are the material provisions. Regulation.18 to 20 are as follows: "18. Admissibility. An officer who is permitted to retire from service may be granted service pension in accordance with these regulations. 19. Minimum service. The minimum period of service qualifying for pension shall be fifteen years in the case of late entrants and twenty years in other cases. 20. Service qualifying for pension. The periods of service of officers in the general list and in the branch list which quality for pension under these regulations shall be as specified in Appendix III. We also quote the relevant portions of Regulation.22 and 23 hereunder: "22. Rates of pension. An officer who at the time of retirement has held a substantive rank specified in column 1 of the Table below and who has rendered qualifying service for a period not less than that specified in the corresponding entry in column 2 of that Table may be granted service pension at the rate specified in the corresponding entry in column 3 of the said Table. Provided that the service pension of an officer who at the time of retirement held the substantive rank of Lieutenant Commander may, if the conditions specified in Appendix IV are fulfilled, be assessed on the paid acting rank held by him at the time of retirement. (Table omitted) 23. Deficiency in service. Where an officer has rendered service for a period less than that specified in Regulation.22 for his rank, the amount of service pension payable to him shall be the rate prescribed for that rank reduced by one deduction at the rates specified below for each year or part thereof of the deficiency in service: (Table omitted) Provided that each successive deduction shall be at the rate appropriate to the amount remaining after the proceeding deduction." 3. Admittedly the respondent is not a 'late entrant' as defined in Regulation.13 (a) and has no twenty years service as specified in Appendix III mentioned in Regulation.20 he has only 19 years and 33 days service. Therefore, the appellants contend that the respondent has no minimum period of service qualifying for pension required under Regulation.19. 4. The respondent relies on Regulation.22 and 23. The argument runs as follows:- he was at the time of his retirement holding the substantive rank of Lieutenant; under the table mentioned in Regulation.22, had be the minimum length of qualifying service of 20 years, he would have been entitled to a pension of Rs. 575/-per mensem (this is so); however, he has service only for a period less than 20 years; therefore, he is governed by Regulation.23; thereunder the pension payable to him has to be reckoned at the rate prescribed for Lieutenant, i.e. Rs.575/-,reduced by one deduction at the rate specified in the table under Regulation.23 for each year or part thereof of the deficiency in service; the deficiency in service so far as the respondent is concerned is less than a year; the rate of one deduction specified in that table is Rs. 15 in the case of those who but for such deficiency in service would be entitled to a monthly pension of Rs. 401 to Rs. 600 (that is so); making one deduction, i. e. Rs. 15 from Rs. 575. for the deficiency in service of less than an year, be is entitled to a pension of Rs. 560/-per mensem. 5. The above argument found favour with the learned Single Judge. The appellants challenge this. They do so mainly, as submitted at the bar, on principle since this is not a solitary case where this question will arise. 6. An officer who is permitted to retire would be qualified for pension only if he has qualifying service, which under Regulation.19 is 15 years service so far as late entrants are concerned, and 20 years service in other cases. This is the minimum service required for entitlement for pension. What kind of service or service of what nature? Regulation.20 read with Appendix III specify the nature or type of service that is to be reckoned for computation of qualifying service. This is the minimum service required for entitlement for pension. What kind of service or service of what nature? Regulation.20 read with Appendix III specify the nature or type of service that is to be reckoned for computation of qualifying service. Regulation.22 specify the rates of maximum pension with reference to the period of qualifying service an officer has to his credit and to the substantive rank (determined according to Regulation.21) ha was holding at the time of his retirement. Under the Table given in Regulation.22 an officer who at the time of his retirement was holding the substantive rank of Lientenant would be entitled to the maximum pension of Rs. 575/- provided he has 20 years qualifying service which is the same as would entitle him for pension. But this is not so in all cases mentioned in the Table. For example a Lieutenant Commander would be entitled to the maximum or full pension only if he has 22 years qualifying service; a Commander, only if he has 24 years qualifying service; and a Rear Admiral, a Vice Admiral or an Admiral, only on his having 30 years qualifying service. In other words, the period of qualifying service required for entitlement of pension is one thing; and the period of qualifying service required for entitlement of full pension is another; though, no doubt, in the case of a Lieutenant like the respondent such period is the same, viz. 20 years, for both purposes. 7. Regulation.23 has to be read in the backdrop of what we have said in the preceding paragraph. Thereunder where an officer has not to his credit that much qualifying service as would entitle him for full or maximum pension, but has the minimum qualifying service entitling him for pension as prescribed in Regulation.19, then, and only then, he would be entitled to a portion of the full pension admissible to his rank. How to reckon this portion? Regulation.23 provides for that contingency. This Regulation says that the pension payable to such an officer shall be the rate prescribed for that rank (i.e. the full pension) reduced by one deduction at the rate specified (in the table in that Regulation) for each year or part thereof of the deficiency in service. How to reckon this portion? Regulation.23 provides for that contingency. This Regulation says that the pension payable to such an officer shall be the rate prescribed for that rank (i.e. the full pension) reduced by one deduction at the rate specified (in the table in that Regulation) for each year or part thereof of the deficiency in service. This Regulation will not be attracted to a case where an officer has not to his credit the minimum period of qualifying service which is necessary to entitle him for pension. To construe Regulation.23 as entitling such an officer to pro rata pension computed in the manner provided for in that Regulation would render Regulation.19 and 20 otiose. Rule of harmonious construction of Regulation.18 to 23 (inclusive) compel us to differ from the view taken by our learned brother in the judgment under appeal and to hold that Regulation.22 and 23 are of no avail to the respondent. 8. We answer the first question formulated in the beginning of this judgment in the negative. 9. The President of India sanctioned the petitioner's deputation (with effect from 1-4-1974) to the Cochin Shipyard Ltd. Consequently he was struck off the strength of the Naval Establishment on the terms and conditions stipulated in Ext. P1 letter of the Government of India, the Ist appellant, to the Chief of the Naval Staff, the 2nd appellant. This deputation was on 'foreign service terms' as is seen from Ext. PI (a) corrigendum of Ext. P1. On 16-1-1975 the Cochin Shipyard Ltd. wrote to the Chief of the Naval Staff (Ext. P2) intimating him that the Shipyard proposes to absorb the petitioner in the Shipyard in public interest and pursuant to its general policy and Government Orders regarding absorption of deputationist in Public Sector Undertakings. The Chief of Naval Staff was informed that the petitioner 'who was offered absorption has accepted the same and has also submitted a request addressed to you to relieve him from the post under the Indian Navy with effect from 1-4-1975, and to allow him terminal benefits as admissible under the rules'. So stating as per Ext. P2 the Shipyard sought the concurrence of the Chief of the Naval Staff to the absorption of the petitioner in the Shipyard in public interest with effect from 1-4-1975. 10. A copy of the request of the petitioner which was sent along with Ext. So stating as per Ext. P2 the Shipyard sought the concurrence of the Chief of the Naval Staff to the absorption of the petitioner in the Shipyard in public interest with effect from 1-4-1975. 10. A copy of the request of the petitioner which was sent along with Ext. P2 letter to the Chief of the Naval Staff is Ext. P3. The material portion thereof is: "Since my absorption in the service of the Cochin Shipyard Limited is in public interest, I request that the terminal benefits pertaining to pension, gratuity, leave etc. in respect of the service rendered by me in Indian Navy may kindly be sanctioned to me as per relevant orders of the Government of India on the subject, for deputationist, absorbed in public sector undertakings in public interest." 11. Pursuant to Ext. P2 letter, the petitioner (and another) was allowed premature retirement from the Navy service as per Ext. P4 order dated 24-3-1975 of the Chief of the Naval Staff. Para.5 thereof is relevant and we quote it hereunder: "With a view to ensuring expeditious finalisation of pension, the officers may be asked to forward the names of the Government Treasuries (and not banks) through which the payment of pension is desired, to the CDA (Pensions; Allahabad and the CDA (Navy) Bombay, under intimation to Naval Headquarters/ AD (Pensions)." Note, the Petitioner was not entitled to any pension since he had no minimum qualifying service, as contended by the appellants, which contention we have already upheld. 12. From 1-4-1975 the respondent retired from Naval service From that day he was absorbed in the Shipyard Service. He had as on that day only 19 years and 33 days service which would count for eligibility for pension. This was not sufficient to make him eligible for any pension. However, the Accounts Officer (Pension) informed the respondent as per Ext P5 letter of 3-6-1978 that his 'title to a retiring pension of Rs 369/- per mensem with effect from 1-4-1975 been established'. This, as averred in the counter-affidavit sworn on behalf of the appellant", was on the basis of Ext. However, the Accounts Officer (Pension) informed the respondent as per Ext P5 letter of 3-6-1978 that his 'title to a retiring pension of Rs 369/- per mensem with effect from 1-4-1975 been established'. This, as averred in the counter-affidavit sworn on behalf of the appellant", was on the basis of Ext. RI Ministry of Defence Office Memorandum dated 23-8-1975 and Ministry of Defence letter of 10-4-1978 both of which are not germane so far as the question of estoppel under consideration is concerned, which is to be decided with reference to the circumstances obtained on the eve of 1-4-1975, when the respondent made up his mind to retire from Naval Service and to be absorbed in the Shipyard Service 'in public interest'. 13. As on the date of his premature retirement the position (as revealed by Ext. P2) is: the respondent has accepted the proposal of the Shipyard to absorb him in the Shipyard but subject to the request (as is seen from Exts P2 and P3) that 'the terminal benefits pertaining to pension, gratuity, leave etc. in respect of services rendered' by him 'in Indian Navy may kindly be sanctioned to' him 'as per relevant orders of the Government of Indian on the subject, for deputationist, absorbed in public sector undertakings in public interest'. This request may have reference to the Ministry of Finance (BPE) Office Memorandum No 2 (57)/68- BPE (GM) dated 3rd January 1970 and their Office Memorandum No. 2(208)/71- BPE (GM dated 6th April 1972 mentioned in Ext. Rl. Under these Office Memoranda (as stated in Ext. R1): "the Defence Service Officers absorbed in the Defence Public Sector Undertakings, are eligible to draw the pay of the post in the Public Sector Enterprises in addition to their pro rata pension, on permanent absorption in the Public Sector Enterprises, subject to fulfilment of the eligibility conditions for this purpose, as laid down in the corrected office memoranda of the B P. E. regarding the period of option etc." (Emphasis supplied) Ext. RI proceeds to mention that officers with less than 20 years service were not eligible for the pro rata pension as per the above mentioned Memoranda and to them also that benefit is being extended by it but subject to the condition that'in determining the pension entitlement at the end of 20 years service, the weightage included in the standard rate of pension should be excluded' It is common case that but for this condition the respondent would be entitled to a pension of Rs. 560/- per mensem. 14. Therefore, what the petitioner requested as per Ext. P3 was the application of the two Memoranda of 3rd January, 1970 and 6th April 1972 referred to in the preceding paragraph which, no doubt, were inapplicable to him as the Shipyard is not a Defence Public Sector Undertaking and to sanction'the terminal benefits pertaining to pension, gratuity, leave etc.' on that basis. The 2nd appellant did not demur. On the other hand, by Ext. P4 the respondent was directed to 'forward the names of the Government Treasury through which payment of pension is desired' in order to ensure 'expeditious finalisation of pension' 15. Firstly, it falls to be decided as to whether 2nd appellant was under a legal duty to reply to Ext. P4 request. We think that he was not only morally but also legally bound to give the respondent an answer to Ext. P4, if it were his view that Ext. P4 request cannot be acceded to, for whatsoever reason it may be. It was of vital importance to the respondent to know whether his request stands allowed or not, for be had to shape his course of action depending upon the answer thereto. The respondent would have become eligible for pension (as at the material time) in another 11 months' time. He was to exercise an option to have premature retirement disentitling him to pension altogether, or not. He was to weigh between public interest (his proposed absorption in the Shipyard was in public interest) and his own interest. He wanted to further public interest without any prejudice to his own interest. Had he been told that his request cannot be granted, he could have refused to accept the proposed absorption in the Shipyard and opted to continue in the Navy Service. By not answering Exf.P3 request and by sending Ext. He wanted to further public interest without any prejudice to his own interest. Had he been told that his request cannot be granted, he could have refused to accept the proposed absorption in the Shipyard and opted to continue in the Navy Service. By not answering Exf.P3 request and by sending Ext. P4 communication he was led to believe that he would get pension in accordance with the then extant orders, notwithstanding that they were inapplicable to him. The second appellant so represented by his silence. 16. On the facts and in the circumstances stated hereinbefore, the 2nd appellant's omission to give a reply to Ext. P3 request amounts to a representation that pension and other benefits requested for in Ext. P3 shall be sanctioned to him in accordance with the Memoranda governing Defence Service officers absorbed in the Defence Public Sector Undertakings. 'It is well established that under certain conditions silence or inaction may constitute a representation, as much as positive language or conduct, for the purpose of an estoppel'-Spencer Bower and Turner on Estoppel by Representation, 2nd Edn.1966, p. 45. We are of opinion that the case on band is one such case where silence constitutes representation. 17. The case in Algar v. Middlesex County Council ((1945) 2 All E. R.243 KB) is one in point Spencer Bower succinctly sums up the facts and the ratio decidendi of that case (Footnote 3 at p. 49 of 1966 Edn.) as follows: "There an employee was being transferred from one post to the other, in which he was temporarily to occupy the position of 'interim Registrar', and he wrote a letter to his employer in which inter alia he said, I shall be glad to have the County Council's assurance that my superannuation rights are protected'. The Council made no reply, but continued to levy him for eight years with contribution to their superannuation fund. The Council made no reply, but continued to levy him for eight years with contribution to their superannuation fund. The Council was held to be estopped from averring that he was not entitled to the benefits of the scheme." That, what weighed more with the King's Bench Division, or at least with Humphreys J. was not the subsequent conduct of the Council levying the employee with contribution to the superannuation fund, but the fact of not giving a reply to the employee's request, is clear from the following passage from the judgment of Humphreys J: "To that letter there was no reply; and no reply from a public body is. I think, rightly interpreted in the old saying that silence gives consent-and it is quite clear that it was so intended by the county council, because later on the county council said in effect, in a letter to the applicant: "Your superannuation rights are protected," because they said: "You will come under the superannuation scheme; you will pay so much; so much will be deducted from your wages as contribution to the superannuation fund," and so on and so forth. But I prefer to deal (and I think it is more satisfactory to deal) with Sept. 16, 1938, as the date when that letter was written by the applicant, and not answered by the respondents. In my view, the failure to answer that letter did amount to a representation by the Middlesex County Council that the statements in it were accepted as true, including the statement that the applicant's superannuation rights will be protected the representation, that is to say, being that they will not be affected." (at p. 251). In the same case, Cassels J. said as follows: "The applicant here was concerned about his superannuation rights when he wrote the letter of Sep. 16,1938. By not answering that letter, it may be said that the respondents allowed him to think that be had their assurance that his superannuation rights would be protected." (at p. 248). Once again we quote Humphreys J.: "Was that (the representation) true? It was not. According to the argument which is now put forward, it was incorrect. The applicant, there is no doubt whatever, has certain superannuation rights. Those superannuation rights could have been protected, to use his words, in more than one way, but they were not. Once again we quote Humphreys J.: "Was that (the representation) true? It was not. According to the argument which is now put forward, it was incorrect. The applicant, there is no doubt whatever, has certain superannuation rights. Those superannuation rights could have been protected, to use his words, in more than one way, but they were not. He had rights, T think, in bis capacity as an assistant collector at that time. He had a right and was a member, if I may use that expression, of the superannuation fund, which I think was a private fund. He had superannuation rights. He lost those in fact by taking up the position which he then did on the faith of his statement being accepted by the council. He lost those rights because he ceased to be the holder of the office which entitled him to be a member of the superannuation fund." (at p. 251). 18. The same is the case here. According to the stand taken by the appellants and as already held, the representation was not correct. The respondent is not entitled to any pension either under the Pension Regulations or as per the memoranda governing Defence Service Officers absorbed in the Defence Public Sector Undertakings. Yet, it was represented to him that be would be given pension as if the memoranda governed him and were applicable to him. He would have acquired title to pension under the Pension Regulations bad he continued in Navy Service for another H months or less than that. He lost such benefits by putting faith on the representation that he will be entitled to pension etc as per the above said memoranda He, by reason of the representation, accepted the proposal to be absorbed in the Shipyard and agreed to have premature retirement from Navy Service As between the appellants and the respondent, the appellants are estopped from contending that the respondent is not entitled to pension benefits determined in accordance with the said memoranda, nor that these memoranda would not govern his case, though in fact they do not. 19. There is no case that under the memorandum of 3rd January, 1970 read with the memorandum of 6th April, 1972 mentioned in Ext RI there is any provision like the one contained in Ext. 19. There is no case that under the memorandum of 3rd January, 1970 read with the memorandum of 6th April, 1972 mentioned in Ext RI there is any provision like the one contained in Ext. RI to the effect that'in determining the pension entitlement at the end of 20 years' service, the weightage included in the standard rate of pension should be excluded' That there was no such provision in the above said two memoranda is clear from the averment in the affidavit (Para 13) to the effect that'the deduction of weightage element in respect of officers with less than 20 years service to their credit permanently absorbed is stipulated vide sub-para. 2 of the said memorandum of 22nd August, 1975; and that in the additional counter-affidavit (para. 3) wherein it is stated that 'the Government took a decision not to allow the benefit of the weightage element in respect of officers with ten years or more but less than 20 years service who seek premature retirement with a view to getting absorbed in Public Sector Undertaking', which was only by Ext RI which extended the benefit of pro rata pension to Defence Officers with less than 20 years' service who under the Pension Regulations are not eligible for pension in the event of their absorption in the Public Sector Undertakings. As already stated, it is common case that but for the provision to exclude weightage in determining the pension entitlement at the end of 20 years, the respondent would be entitled to a pension of Rs. 560/-per mensem. This provision which came subsequently was not in the contemplation of parties when the respondent made Ext P3 request and the 2nd appellant by his silence assented to the said request. Therefore, the appellants are estopped from contending that the respondent is not entitled to Rs. 560/-as pension per mensem. 20. On the second point, our answer is in the affirmative. 21. Our learned brother, Khalid J. rested his decision on estoppel as well. We are in agreement with that part of the judgment. Reliance was placed by him on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhim Sing and others v State of Haryana others (1981) 2 SCC. 673 and particularly on Para.3 thereof which be has extracted in his judgment. We will also with advantage extract that paragraph hereunder: "3. By virtue of Ex. Reliance was placed by him on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhim Sing and others v State of Haryana others (1981) 2 SCC. 673 and particularly on Para.3 thereof which be has extracted in his judgment. We will also with advantage extract that paragraph hereunder: "3. By virtue of Ex. P-1, the State (respondent) held out certain specific promises as an inducement for the appellants to move into a New Department (Agriculture Department). After they had gone over to the Agriculture Department, the State, by virtue of its Ex. P-3, sought to go back upon the earlier promise made in Ex. P-1. The appellants having believed the representation made by the State and having further acted thereon cannot be defeated of their hopes which have crystallised into rights, thanks to the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Therefore, it is not open to the State, according to the law laid down by this Court, to backtrack. We, therefore, direct the State to implement Ex. P-1 and confer such rights and benefits as are promised thereunder in entirety, Shri B. Dutta says that a little time may be necessary for the various departments to readjust. We allow three months' time for implementation of Ex. P-1, failing which the State will be held in breach. No costs." We fully subscribe to the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the principle of the Bhim Singh case governs the case on hand. 22. In view of our finding on the question of estoppel, this appeal should fail. Dismissed. No costs. Dismissed. Learned counsel for the appellant made an oral application under Article I34A of the Constitution for certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. We see no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arising in this case. Leave declined. Leave refused.