ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings which were instituted by filing a suit for eviction and for arrears of rent and damages by the landlords against the tenant. The facts, in brief, are these : The petitioner is the tenant and the suit was filed against him by respondents 3 to 8 as the landlords of the accommodation in question. The suit was entirely decreed by the trial Court and thereafter the revision under S. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, also failed. 2. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri S. S. Joshi. In opposition, the learned counsel for the landlords has made his submissions. The only controversy is whether in the instant case the requirements of S. 39 were complied. The petitioner's contention is that he had complied with the conditions laid down in S. 39 of the U. P.. Act 13 of 1972. The Courts below held that there was non-compliance of S. 39 of the Act because interest had not been paid as required under the said provision. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that no interest was payable because on the date when the Act became applicable to the accommodation in question, no rent or damages were due inasmuch as the entire amount had been deposited in the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following cases : - (l) Trilok Chand v. 2nd Addl. District Judge (1980 All Rent Cas 308) (2) Bhopal Singh v. District Judge, (1981 (U. P.) RCC 636): (3) D. D. R. N. v. G. Lal (1975 All LJ 1); (4) Bhopal Singh v. Hardeo Sahai. (1978 U P RCC (Suppl.) 379). 3. The finding of the trial Court is that the building stood completed on 31-3-77. Both the Courts below that felt that in view of the remand order passed by this Court it was not open to them to consider the Expl. I to S. 2 (2) of the Act. Sri Bharduaj contended that the said remand order passed by this Court has become final and it is not open to the petitioner in the instant petition to question the same. I to S. 2 (2) of the Act. Sri Bharduaj contended that the said remand order passed by this Court has become final and it is not open to the petitioner in the instant petition to question the same. I need not enter into this controversy because even on the basis that the accommodation stood completed on 31-3-77, it has been clearly shown that the entire amount had been deposited under S. 39 by 30th Apr., 1977. Of course, the only controversy as stated above was about the liability to deposit the interest and in view of the aforesaid case law, it seems that the petitioner's contention is right that since he had deposited the entire amount of rent damages in arrears prior to 31-3-1977 when this Act became applicable to the accommodation in question after the expiry of the period of ten years holiday as provided in S. 2 (2) of the U. P. Act 13 of 1972, therefore, no interest was payable and hence no interest had to be deposited under S. 39 of the Act. 4. The learned counsel for the landlord respondent placed reliance on Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta. ( AIR 1975 SC 1297 ) , where it has been emphasised that the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is restricted, and it is not an appellate jurisdiction which is exercised by the Court under these provisions. This proposition of law is well established and I am not exercising any appellate jurisdiction in the instant case. A pure legal aspect of the matter has found favour with me. The established case law of this Court is that there is no question of any interest being paid when the arrears of rent stood paid up on the eve of the commencement of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. I have already held that even according to the finding given by both the Courts below, the Act could be applicable to the accommodation in question on 1-4-1977. In this view of the matter, it has been clearly stated even in revisional Court's judgment, that the amount which was paid, was full except that according to the said Court the interest also had to be paid. In this view of the matter, it has been clearly stated even in revisional Court's judgment, that the amount which was paid, was full except that according to the said Court the interest also had to be paid. This finding is bad in law because the interest was not (sic) inasmuch as the tenant was not in arrears of rent as the entire amount had been paid by him by 31st Mar., 1977. The learned counsel for the landlord next contended that the Full Bench Decision of this Court reported in (1981 (U P) RCC 221) Satya Narain v. Addl. District Judge has not yet become final inasmuch as the controversy is still pending in the Supreme Court. He, therefore, prayed that this Court should not decide the instant petition till the Supreme Court pronounces the final verdict. In my view, the contention of the learned counsel is misconceived. In Ratan Lal Shinghal v. Smt. Murti Debi (1979 (UP) RCC 623) : (1980 All L J 1136) (SC) Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer expressed the view that the provision contained in the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 regarding 10 years holiday was prospective. A perusal of the said judgment would clearly show that the view of the Court was that all the tenants were entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Act except those who were tenants of buildings which were constructed after the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and the provision exempting the buildings for a period of 10 years from the applicability of the Act would be applicable to such buildings which were constructed after the commencement of the said Act. If this view were held to be correct law, the landlord will be in worse position because, as I have stated, that Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer was of the view that the Act gave protection to all the tenants of all buildings save those which were constructed after the commencement of the Act. That this interpretation of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer's judgment is clear, will also be clear from the following observations made in the aforesaid Full Bench decision in Gopal Kishan v. 5th Addl. That this interpretation of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer's judgment is clear, will also be clear from the following observations made in the aforesaid Full Bench decision in Gopal Kishan v. 5th Addl. District Judge, (1981 (U P) RCC 256 : (1981 All L J 710) (Para 3) :- "Before the learned single Judge, the question was that the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 applied to all the buildings constructed before 15th July, 1972 and, as such, the decree for ejectment granted against the petitioner was illegal. The submission made further was that the exemption provided for in sub-s. (2) of S. 2 applied only to buildings which had been constructed after the coming into force of U. P. Act of 1972. Hence, the disputed building having been constructed in 1971, the suit of the plaintiff respondent was liable to fail." 5. The Full Bench decision reported in Gopal Kishan's case (1981 All L J 710) also held that the said view of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer stood overruled by the subsequent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ram Swarup Rai v. Smt. Leelawati Devi 1980 (UP) RCC 419 ; (1980 All LJ 651). 6. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the judgments of the trial Court and the revisional Court shall stand modified in the manner that the suit of the plaintiff shall stand dismissed so far as the relief for eviction of the tenant is concerned. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.