JUDGMENT Sohani, J. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The material facts giving rise to this petition briefly are as follows :- Petitioner No. 1 is a Trade Union of employees employed in the Public Motor Transport Industry and is registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Petitioner No. 2 is a Trade Union worker working at Ujjain. Section 13(1) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), provides for recognition of a Union as a Representative Union in respect of any industry in a local area. Prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act No. 56 of 1976, "Local Area" was defined by section 2 (23) of the Act to mean any area notified as a local area for any industry and the State Government had notified the area comprised in each of the revenue districts of the State as a local area for the Public Motor Transport Industry. Petitioner No. 1 was recognised as a representative union for the local area comprising the revenue district of Ujjain. There were six other recognised representative unions for the local areas comprising the revenue districts of Gwalior, Morena, Shivpuri, Rewa, Dhar. Balaghat and Jabalpur. Respondent No. 3 was recognised as a representative union for the local areas comprising revenue districts of Balaghat and Jabalpur. By the amending Act No. 56 of 1976, section 2 (23) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, which defines "local area", was amended as follows :- 2 (23) "Local area" means any area notified as a local area for any or all industries and for all or any of the purposes of this Act: Provided that such area shall not comprise of more than one revenue district. Provided further that such area may, for reasons to be recorded in writing comprise of more than one revenue district including the entire state. Thereafter, the entire State was designated as a local area for the Public Motor Transport Industry, vide notification dated 19th September, 1980, issued by the State Government and published in the M. P. Government Gazette dated 17th October, 1980. Thereafter, the entire State was designated as a local area for the Public Motor Transport Industry, vide notification dated 19th September, 1980, issued by the State Government and published in the M. P. Government Gazette dated 17th October, 1980. Respondent No. 2, who was at the material time appointed as a Registrar of Representative Unions under section 5 of the Act, wrote a letter dated 10th November 1980 to petitioner No. 1 informing it that in view of the aforesaid notification, petitioner No. 1 had ceased to be the Representative Union and called upon petitioner No. 1 to return the certificate of Recognition granted to it under section 13 (2) of the Act as a Representative Union. Petitioner No. 1 returned the certificate on 17th December, 1980 but represented that it had a right to function as a representative Union till some other union was recognised as a representative union for the entire State. Petitioner No. 1 also demanded, by its letter dated 13th November 1981, the return of the certificate after incorporating the change in its name effected by resolution dated 30th July 1981. On 11th December 1981, respondent No. 2 incorporated the change in the name of petitioner No. 1 as desired, and returned the certificate of recognition as a representative union to petitioner No. I. In the meanwhile, respondent No. 3 had submitted an application under section 13 (1) of the Act for recognition as a representative Union for the entire State, which was the local area for the Public Motor Transport Industry by virtue of the notification dated 19th September, 1980. As required by rule 13 (1) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), a notice was put up at the notice board of the Head Office of M. P. Road Transport Corporation at Bhopal and Luckey Bharat Garage, Raipur, and 2nd June 1981 and 16th August 1981 respectively inviting objections to the recognition of the respondent No. 3 as a representative union. Petitioner No. 1 filed objections. On behalf of the petitioner No. 1 it was urged by the petitioner No. 2 that notices, as required by rule 13 (1) of the Rules were not put up on the notice board of all the depots of Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation situated at various places in the State. Petitioner No. 1 filed objections. On behalf of the petitioner No. 1 it was urged by the petitioner No. 2 that notices, as required by rule 13 (1) of the Rules were not put up on the notice board of all the depots of Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation situated at various places in the State. Enquiry was thereafter conducted by respondent No. 2 from time to time but before any final order could be passed by respondent No. 2 he was retired by the State Government with effect from 31st March 1982 on attaining the age of superannuation. By an order dated 10th June, 1981 respondent No. 2 was reappointed for a period of one year with effect from the date of taking over charge. Respondent No. 2 thereafter passed an order on 1st July 1982 recognising respondent No. 3 as the representative union for the Public Motor Transport Industry for the entire State which was the 'local area' for that industry. Thereafter by a letter dated 13th July 1982, respondent No. 2 informed petitioner No. 1 that in view of recognition of respondent No. 3 as the representative union for Public Motor Transport Industry for the entire State, the certificate of recognition as a representative Union granted to petitioner No. 1 was no longer operative and petitioner No. 1 should, therefore arrange to return the said certificate. Aggrieved by that order and the order dated 1st July 1982 passed by respondent No. 2 recognising respondent No. 3 as the representative union, the petitioners have filed this petition. Shri Chaphekar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that once a Trade Union was recognised as a Representative Union under section 13 of the Act, then the recognition of such Union as a Representative Union could not be cancelled except in accordance with the provisions of section 16 or 17 of the Act. It was further urged that after his retirement from the office, respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction to act as a Registrar, because after his reappointment by the order dated 10th June 1982 as a Deputy Labour Commissioner, he was not appointed to act as a Registrar of Representative Unions. It was, therefore, urged that the impugned orders passed by him were null and void being without jurisdiction. It was, therefore, urged that the impugned orders passed by him were null and void being without jurisdiction. It was also contended that before granting recognition to respondent No. 2 as the Representative Union, respondent No. 2 had failed to comply with the provisions of rule 13 of the rules and had also violated the principles of natural justice. It was, therefore, urged that the impugned orders deserved to be quashed. In reply, Shri Mathur learned Advocate General, contended that when the definition of ''local area" was amended by the Amending Act of 1976, petitioner No. 1 who was recognised as a Representative Union for the revenue district of Ujjain, ceased to function as a Representative Union for the amended local area. It was further contended that respondent No. 2 was appointed as a Registrar not by virtue of his holding the office of a Deputy Labour Commissioner and hence even after his retirement, he continued to possess jurisdiction to act as a Registrar. It was also contended that there was sufficient compliance, with the rules and the order passed by the Registrar was not vitiated on any ground whatsoever. Shri Gulab Gupta, the learned counsel for respondent No. 3, apart from supporting the contentions urged by the learned Advocate General, raised two preliminary objections. He urged that the petitioners were not aggrieved persons, as they had not submitted any application for recognition as a Representative Union after the notification dated 19th September 1980 came into force. It was further contended that in any event, they had a right to prefer an appeal under section 22 of the Act and hence they were not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Before we proceed to deal with the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners, it is necessary to consider the preliminary objections raised on behalf of respondent No. 3. The objection that the petitioner were not aggrieved persons and hence were not entitled to file the present petition, cannot be upheld. Respondent No. 2 by his order dated 1st July 1982, granted recognition to respondent No. 3 as the representative Union for the entire State and by his letter dated 13th July 1982 called upon petitioner No. 1 to return the certificate of recognition granted to it. Respondent No. 2 by his order dated 1st July 1982, granted recognition to respondent No. 3 as the representative Union for the entire State and by his letter dated 13th July 1982 called upon petitioner No. 1 to return the certificate of recognition granted to it. The Act confers rights on representative unions and as petitioner No. 1 Union was deprived of these rights and was also affected by the recognition granted to respondent No. 3 it must be held to be an aggrieved person and has in any event locus standi to file the present petition. The next preliminary objection urged on behalf of respondent No. 3 was that the petitioners had a remedy of preferring an appeal under section 22 of the Act if they were aggrieved by the impugned order and as they had not taken recourse to the alternative remedy, they were not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. In reply, Shri Chaphekar, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that section 22 of the Act provided for an appeal from an order cancelling recognition. It was urged that in the instant case, no order was passed cancelling the recognition of the petitioner union and that the petitioner union was merely informed by the Registrar by his letter dated 13th July 1981 (Annexure 'F') that in view of the fact that respondent No. 3 was recognised as a representative union for the entire State, the recognition of the petitioner as a representative Union for a district ceased to be operative. It was, therefore, contended that the remedy of an appeal was not available to the petitioners. To appreciate the contention urged on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of section 22 of the Act, which reads as under :- 22. Appeal to Industrial Court from order of Registrar cancelling recognition: (1) Any party to a proceeding before the Registrar may, within thirty days from the date of the communication of the order passed by the Registrar under this Chapter, appeal against such order to the Industrial Court. Now the heading to section 22 does indicate that it provides for an appeal from the order of the Registrar cancelling recognition. It is true that in the main body of the section, the words "any" party to a proceeding before the Registrar" are found. Now the heading to section 22 does indicate that it provides for an appeal from the order of the Registrar cancelling recognition. It is true that in the main body of the section, the words "any" party to a proceeding before the Registrar" are found. But as observed by the Supreme Court in Bhinka and others v. Charan Singh AIR 1959 SC 960 the headings prefixed to sections help to resolve any doubt in the interpretation of the words in the sections. The heading to section 22 of the Act seems to suggest that appeals are restricted to those that are directed against the order of the Registrar cancelling recognition. It is however not necessary for us in this case to deal with this aspect of the matter further because we are satisfied that in the circumstances of the case, the petitioners were justified in believing that they had no right of appeal and this petition cannot be thrown on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, as urged on behalf of respondent No.3. Turning now to the merits of the case, the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner was that even though there was a change in the local area as a result of the Government Notification dated 19th September 1980 the petitioner Union continued to be a representative union till its recognition as a representative union was cancelled by the Registrar, under section 16 or 17 of the Act. Now prior to the amendment of section 2 (23) of the Act by the Amending Act of 1976, the revenue District of Ujjain was undoubtedly a 'local area', as notified by the State Government. However, after the notification dated 19th September 1980 issued by the State Government, all revenue districts in the State ceased to be 'local areas' contemplated by section 2 (23) of the Act and the entire State became the 'local area' notified by the State Government for the public Motor Transport Industry. There is no provision in the Act or the Amending Act providing for a situation resulting from a change in local area. Under the Trade Unions Act 1926, as amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh, a provision has been made to meet a situation resulting from alteration in a local area. Section 28E of the Act reads as under : 28E. Under the Trade Unions Act 1926, as amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh, a provision has been made to meet a situation resulting from alteration in a local area. Section 28E of the Act reads as under : 28E. Approved union to continue to be so for altered local area for sometime; Notwithstanding anything contained in section 28-D if there is any alterati on in the local areas,- (a) an approved union in any industry in the altered local area or areas; or (b) where two or more approved unions exist in any industry in the altered local area or areas, the union having the largest membership, whether by agreement of the other approved unions or as determined by the Registrar after such inquiry as he deems fit: Shall be deemed to be the approved union for the altered local area or areas, as the case may be, for a period of six months from the date on which such alteration is effected or where such approved union or any other union in the altered local area or areas makes an application under section 28-C within such period until the disposal of such application by the Registrar. M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 however, suffers from a lacuna in this respect and in absence of any provision in the Act similar to section 28E of the Trade Unions Act, it must be held that as a result of alteration in any local area, a union recognized as the representative union for a local area before its alteration, would cease to be a representative union, because the local area for which it was recognized as the representative union has ceased to be in existence. Till such union is granted recognition as a representative union for the altered local area, it ceases to function as the representative union in pursuance of the certificate of recognition granted to it for a local area which has ceased to exist. Such a situation would undoubtedly create a void in the field till another union is recognized as a representative union for the altered area but it is for the Legislature to make necessary provisions to remedy this situation. Such a situation would undoubtedly create a void in the field till another union is recognized as a representative union for the altered area but it is for the Legislature to make necessary provisions to remedy this situation. Till such provision is made, it must be held that after the alteration in the local area for which the petitioner union was recognised as a representative union, the petitioner union ceased to be the representative union for the local area, as notified by the State Government under section 2(23) of the Act. The next contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that the enquiry conducted by respondent No. 2 for granting recognition to respondent No. 3 as the representative union for the entire State was vitiated inasmuch as respondent No. 2 had acted contrary to the rules and the principles of natural justice and that on the date the impugned order had been passed, respondent No. 2 had ceased to hold the office of the Registrar under the Act. Dealing first with the question of enquiry for grant of recognition to respondent No. 3, the relevant provisions of law, which deal with application for recognition of a union as a representative union are sections 13 and 14 of the Act, which read as under :- Application for recognition as a representative Union:- (1) Any union may apply in the prescribed form to the Registrar for recognition as a representative Union in respect of any industry in a local area. (2) On receipt of such application and on payment of the prescribed fee, the Registrar shall hold an enquiry in such manner as may be prescribed and if he is satisfied that such union fulfils the conditions necessary for recognition specified in section 14, he shall enter the name of such union in the register maintained under section 15 and shall issue a certificate of recognition in such form as may be prescribed : Provided that:- (i) where two or more unions fulfilling the conditions necessary for recognition apply for recognition in respect of the same industry in any local area the union having the largest membership of employees employed in the industry shall alone be recognised; (ii) the Registrar shall not recognise any union if he is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that the application for recognition is not made bona fide in the interests of employees but is made in the interests of employer; (iii) the Registrar shall not recognise any union if at any time within six months immediately preceding the date of the application for recognition or thereafter the union has instigated, aided or assisted the continuation of a strike or stoppage, which has been held or declared to be illegal. Conditions of recognition : No union shall be recognised as a Representative Union under this Act unless :- (i) membership of the union is open to every employee employed in the industry in the local area; (ii) the union has for the whole of the period of three months immediately preceding the month in which the application for recognition is made under section 13, a membership of not less than twenty five per centum of the total number of employees employed in the industry in such local area." Section 13 of the Act thus contemplates holding of an enquiry in the manner prescribed by the rules. Rule 13 of the rules prescribes that manner, which is as follows :- 13(1) On receipt of an application for recognition from a union under sub-section (1) of section 13 and on payment of a fee of Rs. Rule 13 of the rules prescribes that manner, which is as follows :- 13(1) On receipt of an application for recognition from a union under sub-section (1) of section 13 and on payment of a fee of Rs. 5 prescribed in rule 11, the Registrar shall cause a notice to be put up on the premises of all the undertakings in the industry of the local area concerned at such conspicuous place or places, as he may deem fit inviting objections to the recognition of the union as a representative union within a period to be specified in the notice, which shall not be less than 15 days. (2) If no objection is received within the period specified under sub-rule (1), the Registrar may, before passing any order on the application and taking any action under sub-section (2) of section 13, inquire and call for further information from the union for the purpose of ascertaining whether the union is entitled to recognition under the said sub-section. (3) If any objection is received from any person within the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-rule (1), the Registrar shall fix the date, time and place for hearing the objection and give notice of such date, time and place to the applicant and the objector. On the date so fixed or any other date to which the enquiry may be adjourned, the Registrar shall hear the parties and proceed to enquire into the objections which any person has stated pursuant to the notice given under sub-rule (1) and into the claim of the union for being recognised as a representative union under the Act. (4) On hearing the applicant Union and the objector and if necessary after collecting any relevant information and /or recording any evidence, the Registrar is satisfied that the applicant union fulfils all the conditions necessary for recognition, he shall recognise and register such Union in the manner prescribed in section 15. (5) The result of the enquiry made under sub-rule (2) or (3) shall be communicated to the applicant union as soon as may be practicable. The aforesaid rule requires the Registrar to cause a notice to be put up on the premises of all the undertakings in the industry of the local area at conspicuous places, inviting objections, if any, to the application made by a union for recognition as a representative union. The aforesaid rule requires the Registrar to cause a notice to be put up on the premises of all the undertakings in the industry of the local area at conspicuous places, inviting objections, if any, to the application made by a union for recognition as a representative union. The rule further provides that if objections are received, then the Registrar has to hear objections and the claim of the applicant Union on a date, time and place fixed by him and after hearing the parties, the Registrar has to decide the question of recognition of the applicant union as a representative union. Now the first objection of the petitioners to the enquiry conducted by respondent No. 2 is that the notice contemplated by rule 13 was not put up on the premises of all the undertakings in the Public Motor Transport Industry in the State inviting objections to the recognition of respondent No. 3 Union. Rule 13 requires such a notice to be put up at conspicuous places of the undertakings in the industry in the local area. The notice has to further state the period within which objections, if any to the recognition of the applicant union as a representative union should be filed. In the instant case, it is admitted that though the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation has its depots located throughout the State, only one notice was put up on 2nd January 1981 on the notice board of the head office of the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) situated at Habibganj, Bhopal. The allegation of the petitioners that no such notice was put up at the various depots of the corporation situated in the State has not been controverted by the respondents. We granted respondent No. 2 time to furnish necessary information in that behalf, but no such information was furnished. The record of the proceedings of the enquiry was, however placed before us. The facts which emerged from the record are that respondent No. 3 submitted an application dated 26th November 1980 for recognition as a repsesentative union for the altered local area; that thereafter a notice was put up on the notice board of the head office of the corporation on 2nd January 1981 inviting objections within 15 days and the inquiry commenced on 30th May 1981. It is also evident that after the commencement of the enquiry, a notice was put up on 16-9-1981 on the notice board at the premises of Lucky Bharat Garage, Raipur, inviting objections to the recognition of respondent No. 3 as the representative union for the entire State. Rule 13 does not contemplate piecemeal enquiry by issuing notices to different undertakings in the State at intervals. In the instant case, however, two notices-one on the notice board of the head office of the Corporation at Bhopal on 2nd January 1981 and another on the notice board of the premises of Lucky Bharat Garage at Raipur on 16-9-1981 inviting objections to be lodged to the claim of respondent No. 3 for recognition as a representative union, were put up. The proceedings also disclose that on 2nd June 1981, the petitioner union had appeared and raised a preliminary objection that notices, as required by rule 13, were not issued. The proceedings further disclose that the date, time and place of adjourned hearing were neither mentioned in the proceedings nor intimated to the petitioner union from time to time. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that after the petitioner union had failed to adduce evidence within 15 days in support of its objections, as directed by the order dated 2nd June 1981, passed by the Registrar, it was not necessary to give any notice of further hearings to the petitioner union. But this contention fails to take into account the fact that the enquiry contemplated by the Act and the rules is quasi judicial and till final orders are passed actual or constructive notice of the date, time and place of the first and the adjourned hearings had to be given to all the parties, so that any party could have appeared in the proceedings, if it so desired, till the matter was finally decided by the Registrar. Intimation of the date, time and place of the first and the adjournment hearings to the parties, who have put in appearance, is an essential requisite of any judicial or quasi judicial enquiry to be made, so that such enquiry would be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Intimation of the date, time and place of the first and the adjournment hearings to the parties, who have put in appearance, is an essential requisite of any judicial or quasi judicial enquiry to be made, so that such enquiry would be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. The petitioners have contended that failure to issue notices, as required by rule 13 of the rules, and failure to conduct an enquiry in conformity with the principles of natural justice, have vitiated the impugned order passed by the Registrar. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that notices were not put up on the notice boards of all the depots of the corporation. The rule requires a notice to be put up on conspicuous places of the undertakings in the State to enable anyone to prefer objections to the claim of the applicant union. An 'undertaking', as defined by section 2 (33) of the Act, means a concern in the industry, i.e. an establishment. The various depots of the corporation in the State would, therefore be establishments in the Public Motor Transport Industry, where notices contemplated by rule 13, should have been put up to enable the various unions functioning at different depots in the State to object to the recognition of respondent No. 3 Union as a representative union, if they so desired. There was thus breach of rule 13, committed by respondent No. 2. Similarly the manner of conducting enquiry by respondent No. 2, by not fixing the date, time and place of adjourned hearings to enable the parties, who had put in appearance, to appear and object to the claim of respondent No. 3 at the adjourned hearings, was violative of the principles of natural justice. It was, however, urged on behalf of respondent No. 3 that no prejudice was caused to the petitioners even if there was any violation of the rules or the principles of natural justice. The contention cannot be upheld. If the petitioner union had intimation of the place, time and dates of adjourned hearings, it could have appeared at any of these hearings and objected to the claim of respondent No. 3 for recognition as a representative union by showing that respondent No. 3 did not fulfil the conditions requisite for recognition as a representative union. If the petitioner union had intimation of the place, time and dates of adjourned hearings, it could have appeared at any of these hearings and objected to the claim of respondent No. 3 for recognition as a representative union by showing that respondent No. 3 did not fulfil the conditions requisite for recognition as a representative union. In our opinion, therefore, the enquiry conducted by respondent No. 2 for granting recogntition to respondent No. 3 as a representative union was contrary to rules and the principles of natural justice. In addition to the allegation that the enquiry was defective, it is further alleged by the petitioners that the impugned orders suffer from another serious infirmity inasmuch as, on the dates when those orders were passed, respondent No. 2 had ceased to be the Registrar of representative Unions. It is, therefore, necessary to examine this contention. Section 5 (1) of the Act, which deals with the appointment of the Registrar is as follows :- 5. Appointment of Registrar and Assistant Registrar : (1) The State Government may, by notification, appoint the Commissioner of Labour or any other person to be the Registrar of representative Unions under this Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid provision, respondent No. 2 who was functioning as one of the Deputy Labour Commissioners in the state, was appointed by the State Government as the Registrar, vide Notification dated 10th September, 1980. That notification is as follows :- The question for consideration is whether on ceasing to hold the office of the Dy. Labour Commissioner after retirement, respondent No. 2 could continue to function as the Registrar under the Act. It was not disputed that on reaching the age of superannuation, respondent No. 2 was retired with effect from 31st March 1982 by the following order of the state Government passed on 27-3-1982: By another order dated 10th June 1982, respondent No. 2 was reappointed for a period of one year from the date of taking over charge. It was not disputed that on reaching the age of superannuation, respondent No. 2 was retired with effect from 31st March 1982 by the following order of the state Government passed on 27-3-1982: By another order dated 10th June 1982, respondent No. 2 was reappointed for a period of one year from the date of taking over charge. That order is as follows: On behalf of the respondents, reference was made to a letter dated 30th March 1982 sent by the Under Secretary to Government in the Labour Department, to the Labour Commissioner, directing him to allow respondent No. 2 to continue to function on his post until further orders but the order of the Government in that behalf has not been placed on record. Moreover, the reference in the order dated 10th June 1982 passed by the State Government reappointing respondent No. 2 as Deputy Labour Commissioner for a period of one year from the date of taking over the charge indisputably leads to the conclusion that respondent No. 2 had, in the meanwhile, on retirement relinquished the charge of his post. It is admitted that subsequent to his reappointment as Deputy Labour Commissioner by order dated 10th June 1982, no order has been passed by the Government appointing respondent No. 2 as the Registrar under section 5 of the Act. On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that respondent No. 2 was appointed as the Registrar by name and hence even after his retirement on 31-3-1982 he continued to function as the Registrar till such time as his appointment as the Registrar was terminated. The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 2 was appointed as the Registrar because he was holding the post of Deputy Labour Commissioner and as soon as he ceased to hold that post on his retirement he automatically ceased to hold the office of the Registrar. It is common ground that after his retirement on 31st March 1982, there was no fresh appointment of respondent No. 2 as the Registrar, though on 10-6-1982 he was reappointed as Deputy Labour Commissioner. It is common ground that after his retirement on 31st March 1982, there was no fresh appointment of respondent No. 2 as the Registrar, though on 10-6-1982 he was reappointed as Deputy Labour Commissioner. The contention of the respondents is that respondent No. 2 was appointed as the Registrar by the State Government by order dated 10th September 1980, not because he was holding the post of Deputy Labour Commissioner but because the Government was empowered to appoint under section 5 of the Act "any other person" and hence the appointment of respondent No. 2 as Registrar had nothing to do with the office of the Deputy Labour Commissioner which respondent No. 2 was holding. It was, therefore, urged that the appointment of respondent No. 2 as the Registrar, continued until termination, irrespective of the question as to whether respondent No. 2 continued to hold or ceased to hold the office of the Deputy Labour Commissioner. That brings us to the consideration of the meaning of the expression 'any other person' occurring in section 5 of the Act. It is significant to note that the order dated 10th September 1980 appointing respondent No. 2 who was then holding the post of one of the Deputy Labour Commissioners in the State, did not lay down any terms or conditions of appointment including emoluments or allowances. The words 'any other person' are preceded by the expression 'the Commissioner of Labour'. Therefore, even though the words 'any other person' are perfectly general they cannot be construed to mean any person. In the matter of Sir Stuart Samual of Parliament (17 CWN 735) the Privy Council had occasion to consider the scope of the expression "any other person or persons whatsoever". The Privy Council held that when a section of an Act after enumerating office holders, proceeds to add the words "any other person or persons whatsoever", the doctrine of ejusdem generis applies and that 'any other person' meant any one, who held an office of a similar kind to those enumerated. Applying the same principle, it must be held that "any other person" means a person holding an office of a kind similar to one described earlier in section 5. The fact that no separate terms or conditions of appointment of respondent No. 2 as the Registrar were fixed lends assurance to the aforesaid construction of section 5 of the Act. Applying the same principle, it must be held that "any other person" means a person holding an office of a kind similar to one described earlier in section 5. The fact that no separate terms or conditions of appointment of respondent No. 2 as the Registrar were fixed lends assurance to the aforesaid construction of section 5 of the Act. In our opinion, respondent No. 2 held the appointment of the Registrar till he held the office of the Deputy Labour Commissioner, i. e. till 31-3-1982 when he was retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation. As there was no fresh appointment of respondent No. 2 as the Registrar, on his reappointment as a Deputy Labour Commissioner by order dated 10th June 1982, he had no jurisdiction to pass any order after 31-3-1982 in the capacity of the Registrar of Representative Unions. On behalf of the respondents, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 1473 and it was contended that even though the continuation of respondent No. 2 as the Registrar might be defective, his orders were valid and binding. The decision in AIR 1981 SC 1473 (supra) is, however, distinguishable on facts. In the instant case, there is no question of any defective appointment of respondent No. 2. The question for consideration is whether after 31-3-1982, when respondent No. 2 had retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation, he ceased to hold the office of the Registrar. Any order passed by a person after ceasing to hold the statutory office, cannot be held to be valid or binding. Moreover, the impugned order as already observed, was also vitiated as there was no proper inquiry. The impugned order, therefore, is vitiated firstly because it was passed by a person, who had ceased to hold the office, which conferred jurisdiction on him to pass such order and secondly, because it was passed in violation of the rules and the principles of natural justice. For all these reasons, the petition is allowed. The order dated 1st July 1982 (Annexure 'G') passed by respondent No. 2 recognising respondent No. 3 as the representative union and that dated 13th July 1982 (Annexure F) addressed to the petitioners, are both quashed. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. For all these reasons, the petition is allowed. The order dated 1st July 1982 (Annexure 'G') passed by respondent No. 2 recognising respondent No. 3 as the representative union and that dated 13th July 1982 (Annexure F) addressed to the petitioners, are both quashed. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, be refunded to the petitioners. Petition allowed