JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C. J. The plaintiff is the applicant. The suit was for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was based on the allegation that the defendant had unlawfully sublet the accommodation and had defaulted in payment of rent. The Court found that the defendants had sublet with plaintiff's consent and that he had defaulted in payment of rent bat since they deposited the entire rent due in terms of Section 20 (4) of the Rent Control Act of 1972, he was relieved of the liability of ejectment. The plaintiff was directed to withdraw the deposits made. Ultimately, the suit was dismissed. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the finding with respect to subletting with consent of the landlord is based on circumstantial evidence. Admittedly, there was no writing of the landlord granting consent or permission to the defendants to sublet the premises. That is apparent from a reading of the judgment. The trial Court has inferred implied consent from the conduct of the landlord, the tenant and the subtenant. Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, by clause (e) permitted institution of a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the ground that the tenant has, on or after October 1. 1946, sublet the whole or any portion of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord. The right conferred by clause (e) of Section 3 is for the benefit of the landlord. He can waive it by deciding not to sue the tenant for ejectment, even though he may have sublet without the landlord's permission. The right can also become barred under the principle of acquiescence by conduct. In Mahabir Singh v. Anant Ram and others(A.I.R. 1966 Alld. 214. 80), it was held that where the landlord admitted that the subtenancy had lasted for four years with his knowledge and the rent has been paid by the subtenant in the presence of the landlord and on several occasions passed on to him by the tenant, a presumption of acquiescence will arise. Such a presumption will be strengthened by the tact that the landlord offered no explanation why he had waited for ('our years before filing the suit for ejectment on the ground of illegal subletting and will not be displaced by a bare denial of the landlord that he had acquiesced. Such a presumption will be strengthened by the tact that the landlord offered no explanation why he had waited for ('our years before filing the suit for ejectment on the ground of illegal subletting and will not be displaced by a bare denial of the landlord that he had acquiesced. In the present case, the finding is that the subtenants were there in the premises s nice before the plaintiff purchased the property and become its landlord. That was very many years back. Ever since she had suffered the existence of the subtenants in the building. The finding is that the plaintiff in 1971 gave notice to the tenant complaining of illegal subletting but thereafter she took no action. She filed the present suit in 1975. The Court below had referred to certain documents showing that the plaintiff's son had been receiving rent from the subtenants. The Court below inferred that the subtenants were in occupation with the consent of the landlord. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the finding that the landlord was barred by the principle of acquiescence was vitiated by any jurisdictional defect or error. The plaintiff was clearly disentitled to the relief of ejectment. Learned counsel for the plaintiff invited my attention to Section 7 (3) of the Rent Control Act of 1947 which provided: "(3) No tenant shall sublet any portion of the accommodation in the tenancy except with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate previously obtained." For the creation of a valid subtenancy permission in writing of the landlord as well as or the District Magistrate previously obtained, is necessary. If this provision is violated the remedy will be elsewhere, i.e. the tenant may be prosecuted and punished as contemplated by Section 8 of that Act. But, the right of the landlord to file a suit for the eviction of the tenant is conferred by clause (e) of Section 3 which right can be waived and which right can also disappear under the doctrine of acquiescence. In this situation Section 7 (3) of the Act cannot be construed to give another right of ejectment to the landlord. Learned counsel referred to Section 20 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, which provides: '20. In this situation Section 7 (3) of the Act cannot be construed to give another right of ejectment to the landlord. Learned counsel referred to Section 20 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, which provides: '20. (1) (2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely, (a)........................ (b)........................ (c)........................ (d)........................ (e) That the tenant has sublet, in contravention of the provisions of Section 25, or as the case may be, of the old Act the whole or any part of the building." This provision gives a right of action if there has been a contravention of Section 25 of the Act or of the provisions of the old Act. The contravention of the provisions of Section 25 of this Act can only take place if subletting is done on or after the commencement of this Act which came into force on July 15, 1972. In the present case the landlord has admitted that the subletting came to her notice in 1971. Obviously, subletting had been done when the old Act was in force. Hence the right to sue for the eviction of the tenant could accrue only if it is established that the provisions of the old Act have been contravened. Under the old Act right to sue for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of illegal subletting was conferred by clause (e) of Section 3 which, as held above, does not ensure to the benefit of the landlord. In the result, the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. The parties may, however bear their own costs.