Officers' Association,Bhilai Steel Plant v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.
1982-11-24
FAIZAN UDDIN, G.P.SINGH
body1982
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER C.P. Singh, C.J. The petitioner No. 1 in this petition is the Officers' Association in the Bhilai Steel Plant and petitioners 2 to 6 are officers and members of the first petitioner. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, they challenge the promotion policy of the Steel Authority of India Limited which has been brought into effect from 3rd April 1931. The Bhilai Steel Plant, to begin with, was a departmental undertaking of the Government of India before it became unit of the Hindusthan Steel Limited, a Government Company registered under the Companies Act. The Plant was itself later registered as a Company bearing the name the Bhilai Ispat Limited. By the Public Sector Iron and Steel Companies (Restructuring) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1978 the Bhilai Ispat Limited stood dissolved and the Plant stood transferred to and vested in the Steel Authority of India Limited, also a Government formed and registered under the Companies Act. Like the Bhilai Steel Plant, the Bokaro Steel Plant and Durgapur Steel Plant and four other similar plants which were registered as companies under the Companies Act stood transferred to and vested in the Steel Authority of India Limited. Section 14 of the aforesaid Act continues the employment of officers and other employees of the dissolved companies under the Steel Authority of India Limited on the same tenure and upon the same terms and conditions of service "unless and until such tenure and terms and conditions are duly altered by the Integral Company" i.e. the Steel Authority of India Limited. The new promotion policy which is impugned in this petition was formulated by the Steel Authority of India Limited, hereinafter referred to as the, respondent Company, with the object of "evolving uniform, objective and rational Policies oriented to growth and development" and to ensure "selection of competent personnel by a known, uniform and equitable yardstick to enable the organisation develop high morale in its executive cadre for efficient and productive performance." It appears that the different plan's which came to be vested in the respondent Company had varying practices in the matter of promotion which created disparities. A comprehensive review was, therefore, undertaken of the entire system of promotion and before formulating and adopting the new policy the opinions and comments of the managements of the different units were considered and the issues involved were also discussed with the various executives' associations.
A comprehensive review was, therefore, undertaken of the entire system of promotion and before formulating and adopting the new policy the opinions and comments of the managements of the different units were considered and the issues involved were also discussed with the various executives' associations. The new promotion policy which was thereafter brought into effect is said to represent a fusion of organisational needs and the needs of individuals. This back ground of the new promotion policy is stated in the forwarding note of the Chairman of the respondent Company to all Chief Executives of the different units. The petition challenges the new promotion policy on two grounds : (1) the respondent Company had no jurisdiction to alter the terms and conditions of the employees taken over from the different units as they continued on the same terms and conditions on which they were employed by the different units, and (2) that the policy affects the petitioners' fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, did not press the first ground before us for the obvious reason that the continuance in service of the employees of the defunct companies on the same terms and conditions is until such terms and conditions are duly altered by the respondent Company. As earlier noticed, this is specifically provided for in section 14 of the Act. The respondent Company was, therefore, competent to lay down a new promotion policy even if that affected the chances of promotion of the employees taken over from the dissolved Companies and even assuming that chances of promotion can be said to be included within the expression "terms and conditions of service" as used in section 14. The only question then is whether the new promotion policy affects the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the respondent has disputed the legal position that the respondent Company is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, but in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in R.D. Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Som Prakash v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 212 , it has to be held that the respondent Company is a State as defined in Article 12.
The case of Som Prakash unequivocally lays down that a Government company registered under the Companies Act may be a State. There are three factors which are important in this context: (1) the Bhilai Steel Plant and other steel manufacturing units now vested in the respondent Company were, to begin with, departmental undertakings of the Government of India; (2) the entire share capital of the respondent Company is owned by the Government of India, and (3) there is deep and pervasive State control of the Government of India in the management of the respondent Company. These three factors leave us in no doubt that having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the two cases mentioned above the respondent Company is a State and it is open to the petitioners to invoke the fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 against the respondent Company. Now we come to the question whether the promotion policy is violative of the petitioners' fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16. For the purpose of promotion and career planning, all executives of the respondent company are classified as under :- Jr. Managerial Cadre Standard Scale of pay E Rs. 750-1335 E-l Rs. 800-1400 E-2 Rs. 1100-1700 E-3 (a) Rs. 1250-1750 E-3 (b) Rs. 1400-1800 Managerial Cadre E-4 Rs. 1650-2210 E-5 Rs. 1900-2500 E-6 (a) Rs. 2250-2650 E-6 (b) Rs. 2350-2750 E-7 Rs. 2750-(Fixed) Top Managerial Cadre E-8 Rs. 2500-3000/2600-3100 The scheme provides for the minimum educational and experience qualifications for promotion from lower to higher grade. All promotions are to be made on selections by a duly constituted Selection Board which assesses the comparative merits of the eligible candidates on the basis of the following factors: Factor Weightage (a) Qualifications 30 points (b) Length of Service in present scale of pay 20 points (c) Appraisal Reports 30 points (d) Interview 30 points The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued before us the following four points in support of the contention that the promotion policy infringes the petitioners' fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16: - (i) The minimum experience qualification for promotion from E-l to E-2 for those who possess B. Sc. Degree or Diploma in Engineering is 41 years but for those who possess lesser educational qualification the minimum experience qualification for promotion is 5i years. (ii) Employees who do not possess B. Sc.
Degree or Diploma in Engineering is 41 years but for those who possess lesser educational qualification the minimum experience qualification for promotion is 5i years. (ii) Employees who do not possess B. Sc. Degree or Diploma in Engineering cannot be promoted beyond E-2 grade. Previously they could go up to E-3 (a). (iii) For promotion from E-3 (a) to E-3 (b) completion of two years' service in E-3 (a) is made an essential requirement. Previously it was only one year. (iv) Reservation of 30% marks for interview is arbitrary and irrational. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners with reference to points (i) and (ii) is that the employees possessing B. Sc. Degree or Diploma in Engineering or higher qualification and other employees possessing lesser qualification who are appointed to E-l grade become integrated into one service and any further discrimination based on educational qualification is violative of Articles 14 and 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1889 Now Roshan Lal's case dealt with a discrimination based on source of recruitment. The ratio of that case is that the direct recruits and promotees when integrated into one class cannot be classified for purposes of promotion on the ground that they were recruited from different sources. The rule laid down in Roshan Lai's case does not prevent classification for purposes of promotion on a basis other than the one that the employees were drawn from different sources provided that the classification made has nexus with the objective sought to be attained. Now the object in making selection for promotion to higher grades is to achieve administrative efficiency. The classification of employees into those who hold B. Sc. degree or Diploma in Engineering and the rest is clearly correlated to the object of administrative efficiency. There is nothing unreasonable in assuming that employees who possess B. Sc. Degree or Diploma in Engineering or other higher qualification will attain the required efficiency for promotion from E-l to E-2 in lesser time than those who are educationally less qualified. Similarly, there is nothing unreasonable in the policy that for administrative efficiency and shouldering higher responsibilities of the E-3 (a) grade B. Sc. Degree or Diploma in Engineering is a must.
Similarly, there is nothing unreasonable in the policy that for administrative efficiency and shouldering higher responsibilities of the E-3 (a) grade B. Sc. Degree or Diploma in Engineering is a must. In this connection it has to be kept in view that judicial review of the classification made by the respondent Company in laying down its promotion policy can only go the extent of considering whether the classification rests on a reasonable basis and whether it bears nexus with the object in view. The Court cannot sit upon the decision taken by the respondent Company in this matterjhvith a view to find out whtther on a comparative evaluation of rival theories on the question of promotion the policy adopted by the respondent Company is not to be preferred. If the classification is reasonable and bears nexus with the object to be attained, it has to be upheld and cannot be struck down as discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16. This legal position follows from the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Janiinu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and others AIR 1974 SC 1 where the service rules made for promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers from Assistant Engineers which provided that only Degree-holders would be qualified for consideration and not Diploma-holders were upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that the classification of the Assistant Engineers on the basis of educational qualifications had a reasonable nexus with the object of achieving administrative efficiency. Tested in the light of these principles, we have absolutely no doubt that the promotion policy which requires higher experience qualification for those who do not possess B. Sc. Degree or Diploma in Engineering for Promotion from E-l grade to E-2 grade is valid. Similarly, the promotion policy that only holders of B. Sc. Degree or Diploma in Engineering or higher qualification would be eligible for promotion to E-3 (a) grade is also valid. As regards the third point that two years experience in grade E-3 (a) has been made essential for promotion to grade E-3 (b) and this is unreasonable, we again find no valid ground for its acceptance. May be that before the new promotion policy one year's experience was thought sufficient for purposes of promotion but that can hardly be a ground for invalidating the new policy.
May be that before the new promotion policy one year's experience was thought sufficient for purposes of promotion but that can hardly be a ground for invalidating the new policy. The new promotion policy lays down a uniform rule for all the units and has made the changes based upon practical experience gained in the working of the different units. Laying down of two years experience qualification for promotion from grade E-3 (a) to E-3 (b) cannot thus be held to be unreasonable and in any way invalid. Coming to the last point relating to the allocation of 30% marks for interview, the argument of the learned counsel is based upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia v. Klialid Mujib AIR 1981 SC 487 . This case, however, has been explained by the Supreme Court in Lila Diiar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1981 SC 1777 . In Ajay Hasia's case, it was observed that "under the existing circumstances allocation of more than 15% of the total marks for the oral interview would be arbitrary and unreasonable and would be liable to be struck down as constitutionally invalid". As explained in Lila Dhar's case, these observations should be confined to the cases of admission to colleges and are not to be applied in the matter of recruitment to public services. It has further been observed in Lila Dhar's case that there cannot be any rule of thumb regarding the precise weight to be given to the interview test which is a matter for determination by experts and for research and that it is not for Courts to pronounce upon it unless exaggerated weight has been given with proven or obvious oblique motives. In Lila Dhar's case, allocation of 25% marks for interview for selection to the Rajasthan Judicial Service was held to be valid. The petitioners have not been able to make out any case in the petition that by allocating 30% marks for interview any exaggerated weight has been given to interview test or that this provision in the promotion policy has been made with any oblique motive. Apart from qualification and experience, appraisal reports are taken into account in making selection for promotion. Appraisal reports are given by different officers under whom the various employees eligible for promotion serve. There is obvious difficulty in achieving uniformity of judgment in appraisal reports made by different officers.
Apart from qualification and experience, appraisal reports are taken into account in making selection for promotion. Appraisal reports are given by different officers under whom the various employees eligible for promotion serve. There is obvious difficulty in achieving uniformity of judgment in appraisal reports made by different officers. Some superior officers are strict, some are soft. The appraisal reports of subordinates may thus vary according to the temperament of the superior officers. To bring about uniformity and fairness in selection the promotion policy has provided for an interview test which is to be taken by the Selection Board. The provision for interview for selection will eliminate personal prejudices of superiors reflected in the appraisal reports. We are, therefore, not prepared to hold that allocation of 30% marks for interview is in any way unreasonable. Before concluding, we may point out that although educational qualification of B.Sc. Degree or Diploma in Engineering has been made essential for promotion to the grade E-3(a), yet this does not completely debar those who do not possess this qualification for promotion. The respondent Company has introduced a Service Linked Promotion Scheme under which an employee who has completed ten years of service in one grade becomes entitled to be placed in the next higher grade if he is suitable for his normal promotion as per the rules in force, excluding the qualification, trade test or inteniew. In view of this Service Linked Promotion Scheme, the employees in grade E-2, who are not educationally qualified for higher promotion, may also get promotion after ten years of service. The petition fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Security amount be refunded to the petitioners. Petition dismissed