ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against concurrent orders passed by the Courts below decreeing a suit for recovery of certain arrears of rent and damages as well as for ejectment from the premises in dispute. The accommodation in question is a shop of which the petitioner was a tenant and the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 the landlords. The plaintiff-respondents Nos. 3 to 5 brought the suit giving rise to this petition on the assertion that the defendant was in arrears of rent from 1-2-1968 which he did not pay despite the notice of demand dated 8-1-75 which was served on the defendant by refusal on 11-1-1975. The defendant having failed to vacate the shop despite a notice of demand and termination of tenancy, the present suit was brought for the reliefs mentioned above. The suit was contested by the defendants. It has been decreed by both the Courts below. 2. The only point urged in support of this petition by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that on the facts established on the record, the deposit made by the petitioner under section 20 (4) was proper and lawful and the Courts below have committed an error in taking the view to the contrary. 3. The facts relevant for disposing of the above contention are that the suit was filed on 12-2-75. Summonses were issued to the defendant fixing 4-4-1975 for final hearing of the suit. The defendant did not appear on 4-4-1975, with the result that the suit was decreed ex parte. However, upon an application made by the petitioner, the ex parte decree was set aside on 24-3-1977 and on the same day 30th May, 1977 was fixed for final hearing. On 30th of May 1977 the defendant made a deposit of Rs. 2,912/-accompanied by an application stating that 30th May 1977 was in law the first date of hearing and that he was making a deposit of the entire arrears of rent due from him together with other amounts which are required to be deposited under section 20 (4) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The defendant, however, asserted in this application that he was not obliged to deposit the time barred arrears of rent. The defendant, however, asserted in this application that he was not obliged to deposit the time barred arrears of rent. Thereafter, the defendant filed his written statement on 22nd July 1977, 17th Aug., 1977 was, thereafter, fixed for final hearing of the suit which was later adjourned to 30th Aug., 1977. That date was also adjourned upon an application moved by the defendant for amendment of the written statement. The Court allowed the amendment sought by the petitioner on 30th Aug., 1977 and fixed 29th Sept., 1977 for final hearing of the suit. On 29th Sept., 1977, the defendant sought to deposit the time barred arrears also and got a tender passed for this purpose. In pursuance of that tender, the amount was deposited on 1st Oct.. 1977. 4. The learned 1st Additional District Judge has held that 30th Aug., 1977, the date on which the court allowed the amendment application was certainly the date of first hearing in the suit as on that date for the first time, the Court could be said to have applied its mind to the case. Alternatively and revisional Court observed that even if 29th Sept., 1977 is assumed to be the date of first hearing, inasmuch as, the deposit was not made on 29th Sept., 1977. The defendant cannot be said to have complied with S. 20 (4) in any view of the matter. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the courts below have erred in law in treating 30th Aug., 1977 as the date of first hearing in the suit. It is submitted that properly 29th Sept., 1977 ought to be treated as the date fixed for the first hearing of the suit inasmuch as, that was the date which the Court had fixed for final hearing. It is further submitted that, inasmuch as, the tender was got passed on 29th Sept., 1977 the deposit made on 1st Oct., 1977 must be held to relate back to 29th Sept., 1977. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in this petition. By a series of decisions beginning from 1978 All L J 1102 Shri Krishan Lal v. Lala Narendra Kumar, this Court has speed out as to what is the true connotation of the expression "the first hearing" in a suit. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in this petition. By a series of decisions beginning from 1978 All L J 1102 Shri Krishan Lal v. Lala Narendra Kumar, this Court has speed out as to what is the true connotation of the expression "the first hearing" in a suit. These decisions have ruled that the date of first hearing in a suit is that date on which the court applies its mind for the first time to the pleadings of the parties and to the facts of the case. These decisions have been approved by the Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Ved Prakash Wadhwa v. Vishwa Mohan, reported in 1982 All L J 202 : ( AIR 1982 SC 816 ). 7. In my opinion 30th Aug., 1977, the date on which the Court considered the question whether the amendment sought by the defendant in his written statement ought to be allowed or not, was certainly the first date of hearing in the suit. That was the date on which the Court applied its mind to the pleadings of the parties. The Court cannot have allowed the amendment sought by the defendant without applying its mind to the pleadings of the parties. 30th Aug., 1977 was, therefore, certainly the date of first hearing in the suit even if we ignore the earlier dates fixed in the suit. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, relied on Ved Prakash Wadhwa's case (1982 All L J 202) itself for his submission that the date of first hearing must be that on which the Court frames issues. As issues had not been framed on 30th of Aug., 1977 it must follow that the date of first hearing was 29th Sept., 1977 and not earlier. I cannot agree. It is not disputed that the suit giving rise to this petition was of the nature of a small cause. It is also not disputed that the provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act do not contemplate fixation of any date for settlement of issues. O. 50 R. l(ii) of the Civil P. C. expressly says so. It is not disputed that the suit giving rise to this petition was of the nature of a small cause. It is also not disputed that the provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act do not contemplate fixation of any date for settlement of issues. O. 50 R. l(ii) of the Civil P. C. expressly says so. The above cited decision of the Supreme Court as well as the others in which it has been observed that the first date of hearing is the date on which the issues are settled must, therefore, be held to apply to those suits which are tried on the regular side in which the issues are required to be framed. Following the dictum laid down by this court in the case of Shri Krishan Lal (1978 All L J 1102) (supra) therefore, I hold that 30-8-1977 was the date of the first hearing in the suit within the meaning of S. 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, inasmuch as, on that date at least the Court applied its mind to the lis. 9. Now it is not disputed that the time barred arrears claimed by the plaintiff were also required under law to be deposited under section 20 (4). Further, it is not disputed that the time barred arrears were deposited by the petitioner only on 1-10-1977 and not earlier. The admitted position, therefore, is that the entire arrears of rent due which were liable to be deposited under section 20 (4) had not been deposited on or before the date of first hearing. In this view, it is not necessary to go into the further question whether the deposit made by the petitioner on 1st Oct., 1977 ought to have been held to relate back to 29th Sept., 1977. Even if it be assumed that the deposit ought to be treated to have been made on 29th Sept., 1977, the same cannot take the matter further for the petitioner. 10. The result is that the petition is liable to fail. However, in view of the fact that the accommodation in a shop where the petitioner is stated to be carrying on some business, the petitioner may be allowed some time to vacate the same so that he may find out some other accommodation for himself. 11. In conclusion the petition fails and is dismissed. However, in view of the fact that the accommodation in a shop where the petitioner is stated to be carrying on some business, the petitioner may be allowed some time to vacate the same so that he may find out some other accommodation for himself. 11. In conclusion the petition fails and is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs. The petitioner is, however, granted six months time within which he will hand over vacant possession to the respondent-landlords. The petitioner shall hand over possession peacefully and without causing any obstruction whatsoever. The petitioner shall not directly or indirectly induct any other person into the shop. The petitioner shall pay to the landlords or deposit in the trial Court damages calculated at the rate of rent, for this period of six months within the period of one month. In the event of the petitioner's failure to deposit the aforesaid amount within one month, it will be open to the landlords to execute the decree forthwith.