VIJAYWARGIYA, J. ( 1 ) - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has assailed the order of detention dated 21-6-1982 passed by the District Magistrate, Indore, respondent No. 2, detaining the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) IN the return it is stated that as the District Magistrate was satisfied that with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order it was necessary to detain him, he was detained by order passed on 21-6-1982 under Section 3 (2) of the Act. The grounds of detention and the documents referred to in the statement of grounds were furnished to the petitioner on the same day. The order of detention was approved of by the State Government on 28-6-1982. The report of the detention was made-to the Central Government on 30-6-1982. The Advisory Board after hearing the petitioner opined on 6-8-1982 that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. After receipt of the report of the Advisory Board the detention of the petitioner was confirmed by the State Government for a period of 12 months from the date of his detention under section 13 of the Act. ( 3 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy Government Advocate for the respondents we have come to the conclusion that this petition deserves to be allowed. ( 4 ) THERE is no substance in the grievance of the petitioner that the grounds of his detention were not furnished to him by respondent No. 2. From the record of the respondent No. 2 it is clear that the grounds of detention were furnished to the petitioner on the same day when he was detained. ( 5 ) THE grounds on the basis of which subjective satisfaction was derived by the respondent No. 2 for passing the order of detention included ground No. 3 which is as follows: - On 21-8-1979 at about 8-45 p. m. you made a fatal assault by a knife on the person of complainant Chhaganlal constable in front of the Yasvant Road City Post Office and interferred with his official duty. On the report at Police Station Sarafa offence No. 418/79 under Section 307/332/341 Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Arms Act was registered which is pending in the court. ( 6 ) NOW in the return it is admitted that the petitioner was acquitted of the said charge by the Criminal Court before passing of the detention order. Thus, the ground that the petitioner committed the said offence on 21-8-1979 which was pending in the court was nonexistent when the respondent No. 2 passed the order of detention. In Dhananjoy Das v. District Magistrate and another1, their Lordships of tile Supreme Court held as follows:- The law is by now well settled that a detenu has two rights under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution: (1) to be informed as soon as may be of the grounds on which the order of detention is made, that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation which on beingconsidered may obtain relief to him. The inclusion of an irrelevant or non-existent ground among other relevant grounds is an infringement of the first of the rights and the inclusion of an obscure or vague ground among other clear and definite grounds is an infringement of the second of the rights. In the present case the grounds of detention included a non-existent ground and there is no knowing as to how the said non-existent ground influenced the subjective satisfaction of the respondent No. 1 that it was necessary to detain the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the Act with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The order passed by the respondent No. 2 detaining the petitioner under section 3 (2) of the Act is, therefore, vitiated. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents contended that even if the petitioner is acquitted of the offences which were the subject matter of ground No. 3 that would not preclude the respondent No. 2 from taking the said ground into consideration while passing the detention order. The contention has no force. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents contended that even if the petitioner is acquitted of the offences which were the subject matter of ground No. 3 that would not preclude the respondent No. 2 from taking the said ground into consideration while passing the detention order. The contention has no force. If the petitioner was acquitted of the offences which were the subject matter of ground No. 3 before the order of detention and the said ground was taken into consideration by the respondent No. 2 in passing the order of detention it might not have effected the order in any manner. However, in the ground of detention it is stated that the offences which are the subject matter of the ground No. 3 were pending trial before a Court at the time of the passing of toe order. This is factually incorrect. The learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the respondents frankly conceded before us that the petitioner was acquitted of the said offences which are the subject matter of the ground No. 3 before the passing of the impugned order. Thus, the said ground was nonexistent when the respondent No. 2 passed the detention order and he took into consideration a ground which was non-existent at the time of the passing of the order. The order passed by the respondent No. 2 detaining the petitioner, therefore, cannot be sustained in law and has to be quashed. ( 8 ) AS a result of the discussion aforesaid this petition is allowed. The order No. Q/ps/nsa/82 dated 21-6-1982 passed by the respondent No. 2 detaining the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the Act is quashed. The petitioner be set at liberty forthwith. Petition allowed. .