JUDGMENT U.L. Bhat, J. 1. Petitioner, while she was working as an Extra Departmental Branch Post Master, was put off duty as per memo, dated 31st December 1975 under R.9 of the E.D.A. (Conduct and Service) Rules (for short 'the Rules'). She was later on removed from service with effect from 31st January 1977, without giving her an opportunity to defend herself against the charge of misconduct. In O.P. 4491 of 1977, this court set aside the order of removal on the ground of violation of Art.311, Clause (2) of the Constitution of India. In writ appeal 168 of 1979, the judgment was reversed and the O.P. was dismissed on the ground of delay. In Civil Appeal 3022 of 1980, the Supreme Court set aside the appellate judgment and remanded the appeal for fresh disposal. After remand, under Ext. P-1 judgment the appeal was dismissed and the judgment in O.P. was confirmed. Subsequently, the petitioner had been served with a memo, dated 26th February 1981 calling her for a further enquiry. The order also states that she is deemed to have been put off with effect from the date of earlier removal, 31st January 1977. Ext. P-3 is the charge memo issued to her. In this O.P., the petitioner challenges Exts. P-2 and P-3 and prays for the same being quashed and also for a direction to reinstate her in service and to pay her the arrears of salary and allowances from 31st December 1975 and for a direction to the respondent not to proceed in pursuance of Ext. P-3. The respondent has filed a counter affidavit and has adverted to the various averments in the O.P. 2. It is the contention of the petitioner that the order putting her off has to be treated as something like an order of suspension and that this order has merged with the order of termination of her service and when the latter order was set aside by this court, the order of put off does not get revived and unless she is reinstated in service she cannot be put off again. According to the petitioner law does not permit the department to take the stand that she can be deemed to have been put off since such a contingency is not provided by the rules, though it is provided in the Central Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short 'the 1965 Rules'). Learned Central Government standing counsel rebutted these contentions. According to him, an order of put off cannot be equated with an order of suspension and the general principles governing an order of suspension will not apply to an order of put off and consequently the order of put off did not merge in the termination order and at any rate, it revived when the order of termination was set aside. Learned Counsel further contended that on the analogy of the principles in R.10(4) and (5) of the 1965 Rules, there could be a deeming of the put off action with retrospective effect. 3. It is difficult for the court to accept that an order of put off must be treated differently from an order of suspension. The 1965 Rules do not contemplate a put off action and the Rules do not contemplate an act of suspension. It is not because there is any material or legal distinction between the two courses of action that different phraseologies are used in the two sets of Rules. The reason for using the expression 'suspension' in one set of Rules and the expression 'put off' in the other set of Rules is on account of the nature of the standing of the employees covered by the two sets of Rules. The 1965 Rules apply to regular Central Government employees and the rules apply to extra departmental staff. The extra departmental staff do not enjoy all the rights and privileges which the regular Central Government employees enjoy. It must necessarily be on account of this difference in their legal status and standing that different names are suggested in the two sets of rules, for what is substantially a similar action. Whether an action is called suspension or put off, it has the effect of preventing the incumbent from attending his duties and drawing regular perquisites due to him. He is not out of service; in fact, he is very much in service. At the same time he is rendered inactive and he is deprived of certain privileges. Whether an action is called suspension or put off, it has the effect of preventing the incumbent from attending his duties and drawing regular perquisites due to him. He is not out of service; in fact, he is very much in service. At the same time he is rendered inactive and he is deprived of certain privileges. These are the broad characteristics of the action of suspension and the action of put off. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the general principles of law governing suspension should not be applied to the action of put off. 4. There can be no dispute that an order of suspension merges in the succeeding order of termination of service or dismissal and when the termination or dismissal order is set aside or declared illegal by a competent court, the order of suspension does not automatically got revived, see Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1955 SC 600 ) and H. L. Mehra v. Union of India ( AIR 1974 SC 1281 ). Of course, this general principle will not apply in cases where there are provisions to the contrary, as provided in R.10(4) and (5) of the 1965 Rules - the general principles of law would in my opinion, apply to the action of put off also. I therefore hold that the order of put off passed against the petitioner merged or ceased to exist in law when the termination order was passed and when the termination order was set aside by this court, the order of put off did not get revived automatically. 5. This court had given liberty to the respondent to hold a proper inquiry and take necessary action, if so permitted by law. Subject to this qualification, it is open to the respondent to initiate disciplinary proceedings or if they are already initiated to continue the same. Apparently, the respondent has taken Certain steps in that direction. A charge memo has been served on the petitioner and Ext. P-2 memo has been served on her indicating that an inquiry will be held. In the O.P. a relief has been claimed to quash Ext. P-3. I fail to see how the petitioner can challenge Ext. P-3. Any way, no grounds are urged before me to show that Ext. P-3 is unsustainable. P-2 memo has been served on her indicating that an inquiry will be held. In the O.P. a relief has been claimed to quash Ext. P-3. I fail to see how the petitioner can challenge Ext. P-3. Any way, no grounds are urged before me to show that Ext. P-3 is unsustainable. The challenge is directed mainly against the direction in Ext. P-2 to the effect that petitioner is deemed to have been put off with effect from the date of removal, 31st January 1977. I have indicated that law does not justify such an action. The rules also do not contemplate such a contingency or such an action being taken. It is interesting to note that R.10(4) and 10 (5) of the 1965 Rules do provide for such an action. Clause (4) states that where the disciplinary authority decides to hold a further enquiry on the same allegations as contained in the original order, Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appointing authority from the date of the original order of dismissal and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. Clause (5) also contemplates such a deemed suspension. It is not contended for the respondent that the provisions relating to suspension under the 1965 Rules are applicable to the extra departmental employees of the Central Government. However, learned counsel Shri P. V. Madhavan Nambiar contended that the principles underlying the provisions of clauses (4) and (5) of R.10 of the 1965 Rules would be applicable to a person like the petitioner. That is because, according to learned counsel, R.3 relating to application provides for it. R.3 of the 1965 Rules enumerates the categories of person to whom those rules do not apply. Category No. (c) any person for whom special provision is made, in respect of matters covered by those rules by or under any law for the time being in force or under an agreement............ It is argued that provisions like those contained in clauses (4) and (5) of R.19 of the 1965 Rules do not find a place in the rules and therefore the provision is that the rules do not contain a special provision in regard 'deemed suspension' and therefore in regard to that matter the 1965 Rules will apply. I am afraid, such a construction cannot be put on R.3(2) of the 1965 Rules. I am afraid, such a construction cannot be put on R.3(2) of the 1965 Rules. The purport of the rule is that where a person is governed by special provisions in regard to matters covered by the 1965 Rules, he cannot be governed by the 1965 Rules but by the special rules. ' Rules relating to Government employees must necessarily deal with certain broad aspects of their service, for example, classification, penalties and disciplinary action, procedure for imposing penalties, appeals and the like. The 1965 Rules entain provisions dealing with these matters. If the rules deal with disciplinary proceedings and lay down the procedure for such proceedings and the particular provisions contained in the 1965 Rules relating to the disciplinary proceedings absent in the rules, can it be said that in regard to that particular aspect the person is governed by the 1965 Rules? To answer the question in affirmative would be to negate the purport of R.3 of the 1965 Rules. The correct answer would be to say that the rules provide for the disciplinary proceedings and therefore in regard to that matter the provisions in 1965 Rules will not apply. As part of provisions for disciplinary proceedings and penalties, the Rules provide for put off action and do not provide for suspension. I have already indicated the difference between the two categories of employees and the use of different expressions in regard to these action. It cannot be said that the extra departmental employees are burdened with the possibility of being subjected to two types of action namely, suspension as well as put off action, and not to the action of suspension; that is, just as the employees who are governed by the 1965 Rules can be subjected only to suspension and not to put off action. If this be the correct understanding of the application of the two sets of Rules, it cannot be that a particular provision in the 1965 Rules relating to suspension is applicable to extra departmental employees though a parallel provision is not contained in the Rules. I do not think it is possible to accept the submission that clauses (4) and (5) of R.10 of the 1965 Rules or the principles underlying these rules can be rendered applicable to the extra departmental employees. In this view, law does not sanction an action of deeming put off as found in Ext. P-2. 6. I do not think it is possible to accept the submission that clauses (4) and (5) of R.10 of the 1965 Rules or the principles underlying these rules can be rendered applicable to the extra departmental employees. In this view, law does not sanction an action of deeming put off as found in Ext. P-2. 6. This is not to say that the respondent cannot pass a fresh order putting off the petitioner from duty. The respondent or the competent authority has jurisdiction to do so. But that has to be proceeded by an act of reinstatement of the petitioner in service, since as in the case of suspension, it is not covered by the special provisions of 1965 Rules. 7. Learned standing counsel for the Central Government contended that there can be a retrospective put off action taken against the petitioner since such an action is not overruled by R.9 of the Rules. To accept this argument would amount to accept that all authorities would normally have a right to impose a retrospective suspension or put off. The general law does not sanction such a course. There may be special laws or special rules (as in the case of R.10 of the 1965 Rules) which provide for such an action. The rules do not provide for such an action at all; they do not invest the authorities with power of imposing put off with retrospective effect. As long as such a power is not traceable to a specific provision of law or rule, the authorities cannot purpose to exercise such a power. 8. It is further argued that Ext. P-2 can be split up and the direction can be construed as an action of putting off with effect from the date of Ext. P-2. This would have been possible had the authorities reinstated the petitioner. I do not think, keeping the petitioner out of duty she can be put off duty. A person can be put off duty when she is actually on duty. The petitioner is not actually on duty. As long as she is not reinstated I do not think Ext. P-2 can be interpreted to be a valid order putting her off duty with effect from Ext. P-2 date. In the result, Ext. A person can be put off duty when she is actually on duty. The petitioner is not actually on duty. As long as she is not reinstated I do not think Ext. P-2 can be interpreted to be a valid order putting her off duty with effect from Ext. P-2 date. In the result, Ext. P-2 order in so far as it deems the petitioner to have been put off with effect from the date of earlier removal is quashed. Petitioner is not entitled to any relief with reference to Ext. P-3. It is made clear that the petitioner can be put off only on her being reinstated. It is open to the petitioner to put forward a claim regarding the arrears. I am not adverting to the claim put forward by the petitioner to arrears of pay and allowances. It is open to her to claim the same from the concerned authorities and such claim shall be disposed of by the authorities in accordance with law. The observations in this order shall not be taken to mean either that she has a right to claim arrears or she does not have a right to claim arrears. O.P. is allowed in this manner but under the circumstances without costs.