JUDGMENT George Vadakkel, J. 1. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the defendant is a lessee of the suit property or only a licensee thereof. The answer to the above question would depend upon the construction to be placed on Exts. B1 and A1 and the circumstances revealed by the evidence in this case. The lower courts held that the defendant is only a licensee and therefore decreed the respondents, suit for recovery of possession of the same overruling the contention advanced by the defendant relying on S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. Hence this second appeal by the defendant. 2. The first plaintiff is the husband of the second plaintiff. The defendant and one Divakaran executed in favour of the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, Ext. B1 document dated 3rd July, 1965. Thereafter Divakaran assigned his rights thereunder to the defendant. The defendant thereafter executed Ext. A1 document dated, 8th November, 1971 in favour of plaintiffs 1 and 2. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 have gifted their rights in the property covered by Exts. B1 and A1 to the third plaintiff. The plaintiffs seek recovery of possession of the suit property which is 10 cents in extent. 3. Ext. B1 calls itself a. In that document the defendant and Divakaran say that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 have absolute right over the property mentioned therein. They further say that they have requested for 10 cents towards the north-west of the property for ground rent for the purpose of installing a motor to do some operations with coconut husks The executants of Ext. B1 further say that the plaintiffs have agreed to give the property scheduled thereunder pursuant to the request as aforesaid to them for a ground rent of Rs. 30 per annum. Ext. B1 proceeds to say that pursuant to the said agreement the property scheduled thereunder has been entrusted to them by the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and they (the executants) have taken the same on aground rent of Rs. 30 per annum. The executants of Ext. B1 continue to say in Ext. B1 that they will put up a shed thereon for the purpose of installing a grinder and will do business till the term is over. The term fixed in Ext. B1 is 3 years as is seen from the subsequent portion of the document. 30 per annum. The executants of Ext. B1 continue to say in Ext. B1 that they will put up a shed thereon for the purpose of installing a grinder and will do business till the term is over. The term fixed in Ext. B1 is 3 years as is seen from the subsequent portion of the document. It is not necessary to advert to the provision in Ext. B1 regarding the mode of payment of rent. Ultimately the executants thereof state that they will vacate the property demolishing the shed thereon at their expense on the expiry of the term. 4. Ext. A1 was executed by the defendant with reference to and in continuation of Ext. B1. The nomenclature of that document is also . Ext. A1 speaks of Ext. B1 and the purpose for which Ext. B1 document was executed. Ext. A1 mentions that the property scheduled therein has been given to the defendant, and that he has been doing business in a building constructed thereon. Ext. A1 further says of the assignment of Divakaran's right to the defendant and that the defendant alone is, at the time Ext. A1 was executed, running the business. Stating that for that reason Divakaran has nothing to do with the property, the defendant says that he is executing Ext. A1. By Ext. A1 the ground rent was raised to Rs. 45 from Rs. 30. A term of 3 years has been fixed thereunder. During this term the defendant is to be in possession or occupation and do business thereon agreeing as the case may be, of the property on and do business thereon. agreeing to pay rent in the manner stated in Ext. B1 on due dates and assuring that on the expiry of the term he will demolish the building and give vacant possession of the property, Ext. A1 winds up with a clause making the defendant liable for damages, if any, caused on account of his default to give vacant possession of the property. 5. One of the requisites for creation of a lease under S.107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is that both the lessor and lessee should execute the instrument. This condition is not obtained in the instant case. 5. One of the requisites for creation of a lease under S.107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is that both the lessor and lessee should execute the instrument. This condition is not obtained in the instant case. This aspect has been along with other factors relied on by the lower courts as also by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs to contend that the intention of the parties was not to create a lease, but only a licence. In that connection the lower courts as also the learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied on the decision of this court in Parameswaran Pillai v. Gopinathan Nair ( 1975 KLT 64 ) wherein such a factor was also taken into consideration in deciding the question as to what was the intention of the parties when the transaction was entered into. 6. The lower courts also relied on Ext. C1 and C1(a) to say that in the suit property, the total extent of which is only 10 cents, there are 8 coconut trees, the yield of which is, as spoken to by the defendant as D.W. 1 being taken by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the lower courts came to the conclusion that it cannot be said that the defendant is in exclusive possession of the suit property not that any interest in the suit property has been transferred under Ext. B1 to the defendant and Divakaran, and to the defendant under Ext. A1 so as to constitute the transaction a lease. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Qudrat Ullah v. Bareilly Municipality ( AIR 1974 SC 396 ) and particularly on Para.1023 quoted from Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 23 to contend that the lower courts erred in concluding that no lease was created under Exts. B1 and A1 for the simple reason that the defendant under Ext. A1 and defendant and Divakaran under Ext. B1 could not be said to have exclusive possession of the suit property. The passage from Para.1023 extracted by the Supreme Court from Halsbury's decision on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant runs as follows:- "The grant of an exclusive right to a benefit can, however, be inferred only from language which is clear and explicit. The passage from Para.1023 extracted by the Supreme Court from Halsbury's decision on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant runs as follows:- "The grant of an exclusive right to a benefit can, however, be inferred only from language which is clear and explicit. If an exclusive right of possession is subject to certain reservations or to a restriction of the purposes for which the premises may be used, the reservations or restriction will not necessarily prevent the grant operating as a lease." As against this passage quoted from the Halsbury's Laws of England the learned counsel for the respondents relied on Para.1025 quoted in the very same decision by the Supreme Court from Halsbury's Laws of England. That passage is as follows: " A licence is normally created where a person is granted the right to use premises without becoming entitled to exclusive possession thereof, or the circumstances and conduct of the parties show that all that was intended was that the grantee should be granted a personal privilege with no interest in the land. If the agreement is merely for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms while the property remains in the possession and control of the owner, the agreement will operate as a licence, even though the agreement may employ words appropriate to a lease". I do not think that the case on hand falls within the principles stated by the Halsbury's Laws of England on which reliance has been made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The question that falls to be determined is as to whether exclusive right of possession has been given to the defendant with or without reservation or restriction of the purposes for which the premises may be used. The reservation or restriction spoken of in the above passage is a reservation or restriction upon the grantee as regards the user or enjoyment of the premises. Any such reservation or restriction, no doubt, would not make a lease other than a lease for that reason alone. So far as the case on hand is concerned, there is nothing in the document or in the evidence which will go to show that exclusive right of possession had been given to the defendant and Divakaran under Ext. B1 or to defendant under Ext. A1. So far as the case on hand is concerned, there is nothing in the document or in the evidence which will go to show that exclusive right of possession had been given to the defendant and Divakaran under Ext. B1 or to defendant under Ext. A1. The evidence on the other hand shows that substantial portion of the property is occupied by coconut trees from which the yield is taken by the plaintiffs. This will indicate that neither defendant under Ext. A1 nor the defendant and Divakaran under Ext. B1 had exclusive control of the suit property even after Exts. B1 and A1 transactions. 7. The language of both the documents would indicate that what was intended by the parties is a licence rather than a lease. Taking up Ext. B1 in the first instance, that document reveals that the executants thereof requested to give to them 10 cents of land for installing a motor for the purposes mentioned therein, namely, certain activities in relation to coconut husks. The most substantial clause therein is to the effect that for 3 years they will do business on the said property. I am unable to spell out from Ext. B1 any provision to the effect that any interest in the property mentioned in Ext. B1 has been transferred to the executants thereof. Ext. A1 is also to the same effect. In fact, it is with reference to Ext. B1 and is in continuation thereof. I have already adverted to the statement in Ext. A1 about Ext. B1 that under the latter document the property in question has been given to the executants of Ext. B1 . In Ext. A1 the defendant also says that he will be in possession of the suit property on Xd-hm-SI doing business thereon. In these circumstances it cannot be said that any interest in the suit property was transferred by the plaintiffs to the defendant. The transaction in question falls under the principles stated in Para.1025 in Halsbury's Laws of England which has been approvingly extracted by the Supreme Court in Qudrat Ullah v. Bareilly Municipality ( AIR 1974 SC 396 ). The agreement is only for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms, namely, the terms stated in the document. The property remained in the possession of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and under their control. The agreement is only for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms, namely, the terms stated in the document. The property remained in the possession of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and under their control. The agreement will operate only as a licence. 8. The decision under appeal of both the courts which is concurrent is right and has to be upheld. The second appeal fails and it is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as regards costs.