JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE suit, out of which this second appeal has arisen, was instituted by the respondent against the appellant for possession of an accommodation on the grounds that (i) it was in quite a dilapidated condition and old and its reconstruction was necessary in the interest of the respondent which could not be carried out without it being vacated and (ii) the accommodation was required bona fide for the purpose of starting a doctors shop for her son Ashok Kumar for which she and her son did not have any other reasonably suitable accommodation of their own in their occupation in the town concerned. These constitute grounds for ejectment under clauses (h)and (f), respectively, of section 12 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1961. The allegations were refuted by the appellant. The claim for ejectment was decreed by the trial Court (Civil Judge, Class II, Bhind) on 23-8-1975 only on the first ground, i. e. the ground specified in clause (h) and, the appellant having elected under section 18 (I) of the Act to be placed in occupation, the trial Court directed him, in accordance with that section, to deliver possession of the accommodation to the respondent by 31-12-1975 so as to enable her to commence the work of rebuilding. The other ground, i. e. , the ground specified in clause (f) was held to be not proved. First appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed on 14-8-1976 by the Second additional District Judge, Bhind who concurred with the trial Courts finding that the ground specified in clause (h) was available to the respondent. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred this second appeal. ( 2. ) THE first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that ejectment should be held to have been claimed only on the ground specified in clause (f) and, that ground having been negatived, the suit must fail. He has placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Ramniklal pitatnbardas Mehta v. Indradaman amratlal Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1976. and this Courts decision in the case of Nasiruddin v. Hiramal, 1979 MPRCJ Vol. II, Note 141, in which reliance was placed on that decision of the Supreme Court. He has placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Ramniklal pitatnbardas Mehta v. Indradaman amratlal Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1976. and this Courts decision in the case of Nasiruddin v. Hiramal, 1979 MPRCJ Vol. II, Note 141, in which reliance was placed on that decision of the Supreme Court. In the case of Ramniklal (supra), ejectment was claimed under the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging Houses Rates control Act, hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Act, on the ground that the landlord required the entire house, including the portion occupied by the tenant, for his residential purpose. In the plaint he further stated- "the whole suit bungalow is very old-built about 75 years ago and and at present its different parts are likely to give way and collapse. Before sometime, a little portion of an uper balcony has collapsed. In the circumstances, on finding it unsafe to stay in it without making additions, alterations and necessary changes, I, the plaintiff, am obliged to wait till I get possession of the whole bungalow. I, the plaintiff, have got the upper portion of the said suit bungalow vacated at present and only after the whole bungalow got overhauled as stated in para above, I, the plaintiff can utilise it for my personal use," Clauses (g) and (hh) of section 13 (I) of the Bombay Act provided as follows: "13 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of section 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied- (g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust; or (hh) that the premises consist of not more than two floors and are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished. " The sole question for decision before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was whether the Landlords case came within clause (g) or clause (hh) of the said section of the Act. " The sole question for decision before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was whether the Landlords case came within clause (g) or clause (hh) of the said section of the Act. It was proved that the landlord required the premises bona fide for his occupation and their Lordships held that the case came within clause (g ). The following observations made by their Lordships are noteworthy: "we agree with the Courts below that the respondents case falls under clause (g) when he bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he intends to make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, does not affect the question of his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his occupation, when he has proved his need for occupying the house. There is no such prohibition either in the language of clause (g) or in any other provision of the act to the effect that the landlord must occupy the house for residence without making any alterations in it. There could not be any logical reason for such a prohibition. " * * * "we are therefore of opinion that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from tenant in view of the provision of subclause (g) of section 13 (I) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the premises without making any alteration to "them or after making the necessary alterations. " * * * "the provision of clause (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish premises and to erect a new building on them. The provisions of clause (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenant. The provisions of clause (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenant. " In the case of Nasiruddin (Supra), it was held by a single Bench of this Court that clauses (g) and (hh) of section 13 (1) of the Bombay-Act corresponded to clauses (f) and (h) of section 12 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the M. P. Act. In that case, the landlord-plaintiff averred that he would do business of selling shoes in the suit premises and also in the shop adjoining it after reconstructing them. The actual pleading in that behalf was in the following words- Relying upon the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramniklals case (Supra), the single Bench held that the case fell under clause (f) of section 12 (1) of the M. P. Act. The ground of ejectment specified in that clause- was proved in that case. ( 3. ) THE nature of the plaint-allegations in the present case is different from the nature of the allegations in those cases. In each of those cases, the landlord came with the case that he bona fide required the accommodation for his occupation and he would occupy the same for his use after reconstructing it and he succeeded in proving his alleged bona fide requirement for use. That is not so in the present case. In paragraph No. 3 of the plaint, the respondent-plaintiff pleaded as follows. The plaintiff did not say that the accommodation was to be reconstructed so as to make it suitable for the intended requirement of the sons shop or that the son would start his shop therein after its reconstruction. The averments in the plaint did not contain any connection between the grounds of ejectment stated in paragraph No. 3 of the plaint. The plaint-allegations were to the effect that ejectment was claimed on those grounds independently of each other and, in view of the plaint-averments, it does not seem to be possible to hold that the case falls only under clause (f) of section 12 (I) of the M. P. Act. The plaint-allegations were to the effect that ejectment was claimed on those grounds independently of each other and, in view of the plaint-averments, it does not seem to be possible to hold that the case falls only under clause (f) of section 12 (I) of the M. P. Act. Of course, if the landlord had succeeded in establishing the ground specified in clause (f), the other ground, i. e. , the ground specified in clause (f), success cannot be denied to him if he establishes the alternative ground i. e. the ground specified in clause (h ). The latest case of Hasmat Rai v. Raghu-nath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 716. may also be referred to in that context. In that case also, ejectment was claimed on the grounds specified in clauses (f) and (h) of section 12 (1) of the M. P. Act. The ground under clause (f) was held to be not proved and the case was remanded to the first appellate Court for fresh-examination of the ground specified in clause (h) in the circumstances of the case. Therefrom, it follows that, when ejectment is claimed on the grounds specified in those clauses, the suit need not necessarily fail on the plaintiffs failure to prove the ground specified in clause (f) and the ground specified in clause (h) can still be proved exclusively. It is significant that, in ramniklals case (supra), the landlord proved the alleged bona fide requirement of the premises for his occupation i. e. , the ground specified in clause (g) of section (i. e. , the ground specified in clause (g) of section 13 (1) of the bombay Act) and that, in Nasiruddins case (supra) also, the landlord proved his alleged bona fide requirement under the corresponding provision in clause (f) of the M. P. Act. The position in the present case is just the reverse. Here, the landlord failed to prove the ground specified in clause (f) while he succeeded in proving the ground specified in clause (h ). The position in the present case is just the reverse. Here, the landlord failed to prove the ground specified in clause (f) while he succeeded in proving the ground specified in clause (h ). In view of the said latest reported decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Has mat Rai (supra) it must be held that, when ejectment is claimed on the grounds specified in clauses (f) and (h) of section 12 (1) of the M. P. Act, failure to prove the ground specified in clause (f) need not necessarily bring about dismissal of the claim and that it still remains open to the plaintiff to establish exclusively the ground specified in clause (h ). Thus, the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant fails. ( 4. ) THE only other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that, the ground specified in clause (f) having been negatived; it should have been considered as to whether the respondent would still like to reconstruct the accommodation even though she would be under an obligation to re-induct the appellant after its reconstruction. That having not been done, according to him, the case is liable to be remanded in light of the Supreme court decision in the case of Hasmai Rai {supra ). In that case also, as already mentioned, ejectment was claimed by the landlord on the grounds specified in clauses (f) and (h) of section 12 (I) of the M. P. Act. In paragraph no. 6 of the plaint, the plantiff stated as follows: "the plaintiff intends to start his own business in the said building after the said reconstruction. He intends to open a medicine shop therein. The plaintiff bona fide requires the suit house for the above purpose. He has no other suitable accommodation for the same in the town. " The claim for ejectment was decreed by the trial Court on both the grounds and, for that reason, the benefit of section 18 of the Act was not given to the tenant. The tenants first and second-appeal failed. Then, by special leave, he took the matter to the Supreme Court. ( 5. ) THAT suit was for recovery of possession of a small shop admeasuring 7x 22forming part of a big non-residential building. The tenants first and second-appeal failed. Then, by special leave, he took the matter to the Supreme Court. ( 5. ) THAT suit was for recovery of possession of a small shop admeasuring 7x 22forming part of a big non-residential building. The tenant resisted the suit contending that the landlord was already in possession of a major portion of the building of which he had acquired possession from another tenant, i. e. Firm Goraldas Parmanand, which accommodation was sufficient for starting the intended medicine shop. It was also contended that the building was not in a dilapidated condition and did not need reconstruction and repairs. The landlord had already obtained against that tenant a decree for possession of that major portion of the building on the same ground, namely, that he wanted to start his business of chemist and druggist (i. e. , medicine-shop) and possession of that portion was also afterwards obtained by him in execution of that decree. The Lordships of Supreme Court negatived the ground specified in clause (f) for the reason that the landlord failed to establish that the major portion, of which possession had already been obtained by him, was not reasonably suitable for starting his business as chemist and druggist. With regard to the ground specified in clause (h) their lordships observed as follows : "two contentions were" urged on behalf of the appellant to negative the case of the landlord in this behalf, one that the building is not in dilapidated condition and secondly it can be repaired without vacating the premises. As all the Courts have concurrently found that the building is in dilapidated condition it is binding on us and is entitled to respect and is hot proper for us to interfere with the same. The question would however be whether the landlord wants to reconstruct the demised portion of the premises even though he is not entitled to acquire possession of the same for his use and that he would be under an obligation to reinduct the tenant after its construction. The further question is whether the landlord is interested in reconstructing the whole building. The further question is whether the landlord is interested in reconstructing the whole building. It was alternatively contended that no attempt is made to find out whether the landlord would be in a position to reconstruct that part of the building which has come in his possession once he is not in a position to acquire possession of the demised premises for his own use. This situation calls for a fresh examination of the case if the landlord is to be awarded possession under section 12 (1) (h) on the footing that, that is the only ground on which he can seek possession, it will have to be found out after giving opportunity to the landlord to prove whether he is interested in re-building that portion of the building which is occupied by the appellant and further the Court should give necessary direction under section 18. In that event the Court will have also to ascertain whether the portion which is now in possession of the landlord and which he may be interested in reconstructing can be reconstructed without the tenant vacating the demised premises. As the whole foundation of the landlords case of composite requirement disappears the matter has to be examined afresh on the footing that the landlord has come to the Court for possession under section 12 (1) (h) only and if he succeeds in his prayer for possession on the ground mentioned in section 12 (1) (h) it would be necessary for the Court to give appropriate direction under section 18 of the Act. As the matter has not been examined from this angle by any court it has become inevitable even though the litigation is pending for a long time, to remit the case for examination of this aspect. " Finally, the ejectment-decree was set aside and the matter was remanded to the first appellate Court for the purpose of ascertaining - " (i) Whether the landlord is interested in reconstructing that portion of the building which is in possession of the tenant as demised premises. (ii) Whether the landlord would be in a position to reconstruct the building in his possession without the tenant being required to vacate the demised premises, and (iii) If the first two queries are answered in favour of the landlord, what should be the appropriate directions to be given in favour of the tenant as enjoined in section 18". (ii) Whether the landlord would be in a position to reconstruct the building in his possession without the tenant being required to vacate the demised premises, and (iii) If the first two queries are answered in favour of the landlord, what should be the appropriate directions to be given in favour of the tenant as enjoined in section 18". The circumstances of the present case are different, as I shall presently show. The respondent-plaintiff is not in possession of any adjoining major portion of a big building. She has not obtained any decree against any one for possession on the ground specified in clause (h) or, for that matter, in any of the clauses to section 12 (1) of the M. P. Act. The claim for ejectment in that case was decreed by the lower Courts on both the grounds, i. e. , under clauses (f) and (h), without considering the ground under clause (h) independently of the ground under clause (f) the benefit of section 18 of the Act was not given by those Courts to the tenant and the ground under clause (f) was, for the first time, negatived by the Supreme Court. That is not so in the present case, wherein, right from the trial Court, the ground specified in clause (h) was considered independently of the ground specified in clause (f) and the benefit of section 18 was also given to the appellant-tenant. From the nature of the evidence on record and facts that, in the notice served by the respondent on the appellant before institution of the suit, possession was demanded only on the ground specified in clause (h), that, in the plaint, the same was mentioned as the first ground for claiming ejectment and that the respondent did not examine her son Ashok Kumar as a witness, it appears that the ground specified in clause (f) was practically not relied upon and ignored by the respondent and evidence was mainly directed by her towards establishing the ground specified in clause (h) independently of the ground specified in clause (f ). " Such circumstance did not exist in the case of. Hasmat rai (supra ). Thus, the decision in that case is not applicable to support the above-mentioned contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and the contention fails. ( 6. ) NO other point has been raised. ( 7. " Such circumstance did not exist in the case of. Hasmat rai (supra ). Thus, the decision in that case is not applicable to support the above-mentioned contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and the contention fails. ( 6. ) NO other point has been raised. ( 7. ) IN the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The appellant shall pay the respondents costs. Counsels fee shall be up Jo Rs. 30 if pre-certified. Appeal dismissed.