JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C. J. 1. BEING unable to agree with the views expressed by a learned Single Judge in Smt. Jagrani v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U. P., 1972 RD 96= 1972 AWR (J) 3 the learned Judge who heard this writ petition has referred the following question of law for decision by a larger Bench :- "Whether a Sirdar could co-opt a third person as Sirdar with her and, if so, what rights the co-opted person will have during the life time of the Sirdar and thereafter ?" 2. THE co-option is alleged to have been effected in 1953 or 1954, that is to say, after the coming into force of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951. THE law in this respect stood settled by Kalawati v. Consolidation Officer, 1968 AWR 139. In that case one of us (Satish Chandra, J.) held :- "THE position under the Tenancy Act was well settled. A person could become a co-tenant by estoppel or acquiescence. THE reason was that transfer of a tenancy holding was prohibited. Letting was permitted with the consent of the landlord under Sec. 33 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939. Interpreting those provisions, decided cases held that it was not exhaustive and a person could become a co-tenant by acquiescence or estoppel Under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, transfer of a Sirdari holding was prohibited, vide Sec. 153. THE interest of a Sirdar on his executing a transfer becomes extinguished under Sec. 190 (cc). Thus there was an absolute prohibition against transfers. THEre was no exception like Sec. 33 of the Tenancy Act. Hence a Sirdar could not transfer or permit another to be a co-sharer in the sirdari holding directly. He could not do it indirectly by acquiescence or estoppel." Co-option is agreeing to have another person as a co-sharer in the tenancy or sirdari rights. In the present case the petitioners claimed a share in the holding on the ground of express co-option in 1953 or 1954 aswell as by continued co-sharing in cultivation since then. They also claimed to have acquired co-tenancy rights by estoppel and acquiescence. 3. IN view of the above decision, both kinds of claims were invalid and could not be upheld or enforced by any court of law. 4. SMT. They also claimed to have acquired co-tenancy rights by estoppel and acquiescence. 3. IN view of the above decision, both kinds of claims were invalid and could not be upheld or enforced by any court of law. 4. SMT. Jagrani v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, because of which the learned Single Judge felt obliged to refer the case to larger Bench is clearly distinguishable. In that case in proceedings under Sec. 145, CrPC the parties entered into a compromise and agreed to remain in possession over half of the holding each. The learned Single Judge in that case held that the compromise was binding between the parties and both parties became co-tenure holders to the extent of half share. In that case the compromise in proceedings under Sec. 145 CrPC appears to have taken place prior to the abolition of zamindari, i.e., when the U. P. Tenancy Act was in force. This is clear from the observation of the Judge in that case that "the landholder, i. e., the then zamindar, has never challenged the co-option of the respondent no. 4 as a co-tenant by the petitioner". As observed in Kalawati's case, the position under the Tenancy Act was that a person could become a co-tenant by estoppel or acquiescence. There is, however, no way in which a person could become a co-tenant by Co-option or acquiescence or estoppel under the Zamindari Abolition Act in so far as the sirdari holdings are concerned. Smt. Jagrani's case is clearly distinguishable. 5. LEARNED counsel for the petitioners, however, argued several other points which are not strictly within the purview of the question of law referred by the learned Single Judge. Since we have had to hear counsel, we propose to give our opinion on these points. This necessitates a short statement of facts of the case. 6. ONE Brij Lal was the original tenant of the holdings in dispute. He died in 1947. He was succeeded by his only son Jugal Kishore. Subsequently his brother Baura died in 1951 issueless. His holding was also inherited by Jugal Kishore. Jugal Kishore became the sole tenant of both the holdings. Jugal Kishore, however, died on December 29, 1952 leaving behind him his mother Smt. Brij Rani as only heir and legal representative. Smt. Brij Rani appears to have applied for mutation of her name. Subsequently his brother Baura died in 1951 issueless. His holding was also inherited by Jugal Kishore. Jugal Kishore became the sole tenant of both the holdings. Jugal Kishore, however, died on December 29, 1952 leaving behind him his mother Smt. Brij Rani as only heir and legal representative. Smt. Brij Rani appears to have applied for mutation of her name. In the application she stated that she was living with her own nephews who were also sharing in cultivation with her. She prayed that the names of her nephews may also be recorded over the holdings along with her. The revenue court accepted this and mutated the names of all the three persons, namely, Smt. Brij Rani and Budhlal and Ganesh over these holdings. Later on Ganesh died and after him his son Santosh came to be recorded in the revenue papers. Still latter these perosns appear to have started claiming interest in the holdings. Thereupon Smt. Brij Rani on Nov. 29, 1966 instituted a suit for declaration under Sec. 229-B of the Zamindari Abolition A ct for declaration that she was the sole Sirdar in possession over the holdings. Ganesh and Santosh, defendants 1 and 2 to that suit, contested it. The trial court decreed the suit. It was held that the defendants are, in no way, related to the erstwhile sole tenant Jugal Kishore or to Smt. Brij Rani. Smt. Brij Rani was the sole tenant of the holdings. The theory set up by the defendants that the then zamindar had by a written agreement dated July 12, 1946 agreed to the defendants' co-option, was disbelieved as fictitious. It was held that under the Tenancy Act co-tenancy could be created in three ways, i.e., (i) by inception-a person claiming to be a co-tenant from the very inception of the tenancy ; (ii) by succession and (iii) by co-option. 7. THE co-option was dealt with by Sec. 3 5 of the U. P. Tenancy Act under which a written agreement by the zamindar was necessary. No such written agreement has been produced and hence co-option has not been proved and established. It was also held that the fact that Smt. Brij Rani had expressed his consent to the recording of the names of the defendants in the revenue papers, could not, in law, create co-tenancy rights or act as estoppel. No such written agreement has been produced and hence co-option has not been proved and established. It was also held that the fact that Smt. Brij Rani had expressed his consent to the recording of the names of the defendants in the revenue papers, could not, in law, create co-tenancy rights or act as estoppel. By giving her consent Smt. Brij Rani did not admit the defendants' claim to be co-sirdars. It was held that there could be no estoppel against law. It was further held that Smt. Brij Rani was in exclusive possession over the land. THE defendants failed to establish that they perfected any title by adverse possession. On these findings, the suit was decreed on June 16, 1969. 8. THE defendants went up in appeal. During the pendency of the appeal Smt. Brij Rani died on July 9, 1970. However, on September 14, 1971 the appeal was declared to have abated because of the commencement of the consolidation proceedings in the village. In consolidation proceedings Smt. Brij Rani filed an objection that the names of Ganesh and Santosh be expunged form the holdings in dispute because they had no right or interest. She claimed to be the exlcusive sirdar of the holdings. Ganesh and Santosh, however, filed another objection claiming one-third share each in the holdings. THEy claimed to have become co-tenants by estoppel and acquiescence. THE consolidation officer by a detailed judgment, agreed with the findings given in the declaratory suit filed by Smt. Brij Rani. He held that she was the exclusive sirdar. She was not estopped form claiming her rights because she had never agreed to make the defendants co-sirdars with her. Further the alleged compromise was not evidenced by any registered document and so was invalid because the value involved was over Rs. 100/-. THE order of the Nyaya Panchayat in mutation proceedings did not operate as res judicata in regular title proceedings. THE theory that in 1946 the zamindar had given written consent to the defendants' co-option was a concoction because no such written document had been procured. Smt. Brij Rani was in exclusive possession of the land. THE possession of the defendants, if any was permissive and as licensees. THE claim of Smt. Brij Rani was upheld whiie that of Ganesh and Santosh was dismissed. Ganesh and Santosh went up in appeal. Smt. Brij Rani was in exclusive possession of the land. THE possession of the defendants, if any was permissive and as licensees. THE claim of Smt. Brij Rani was upheld whiie that of Ganesh and Santosh was dismissed. Ganesh and Santosh went up in appeal. The Settlement Officer held that these persons were not the heirs of Jugal Kishore and so they could not acquire any rights by succession. The summary proceedings could not confer any rights. They could not acquire any rights by acquiescence or estoppel. The appeal was dismissed. These persons then went up in revision. 9. THE Deputy Director held that the only question to be considered was whether their co-option was valid and what is the consequence thereof. He held that the co-option was not permissible and so invalid. Even if the lady can be said to have agreed to co-opt the defendants that contract or agreement could be enforced only against Smt. Brij Rani in her life time. It came to an end with her death. THE revision was dismissed. Aggrieved, these two gentlemen filed a writ petition in this court. 10. AS already held above, Smt. Brij Rani was the sole Sirdar of the holding. She could not create co-tenancy by co-option. She was not estopped by the doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted that under Section 82 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, the Nyaya Panchayat had jurisdiction to decide all questions including question of title. That may be so, but that does not confer any jurisdiction in the Nyaya Panchayat to change the law. The substantive law governing the rights of parties was that a Sirdar could not transfer even by co-option or create a co- Sirdar under the doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence. The proceedings for mutation even under Section 82 of the Panchayat Raj Act were summary proceedings. They could not declare title of the parties which may be binding in regular title proceedings. The submission is misconceived. Learned counsel then argued that the petitioners had matured rights by adverse possession. The argument has to be stated to be rejected. The petitioners from the very beginning admitted that Smt. Brij Rani had a one third share. They could not hence claim that they had acquired rights by adverse possession in the holdings. The submission is misconceived. Learned counsel then argued that the petitioners had matured rights by adverse possession. The argument has to be stated to be rejected. The petitioners from the very beginning admitted that Smt. Brij Rani had a one third share. They could not hence claim that they had acquired rights by adverse possession in the holdings. On their own case" they had come in possession by consent and permission of Smt. Brij Rani. There is no evidence that at any point of time they declared to the knowledge of Smt. Brij Rani that their possession was adverse. They could not hence turn round and claim title by adverse possession. Learned counsel then fell upon the plea taken in the earlier declaratory suit that the mutation order was as a result of a compromise or family settlement. This plea is as misconceived as the other ones. The findings are that the petitioners are not, in any manner, related either to Jugal Kishore or to Smt. Brij Rani. They were hence not members of the family of Smt. Brij Rani. Further they have not stated as to what was the dispute which required settlement. No such plea was taken at the time when the impugned order was passed by the Deputy Director or the the Settlement Officer. 11. AFTER the arguments were over and the case was reserved for judgment, learned counsel for the petitioners sent a copy of additional written arguments in which he has taken another new point. We do not appreciate the tendency of counsel submitting additional written arguments in respect of points which are not argued at the hearing, without first seeking permission of the Court. 12. IN the Additional written arguments it has been pleaded that Smt. Brij Rani was the full owner and could transfer the land beyond her life time. Reliance was placed upon Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath, 1968 AWR 748 SC. IN this case the question was whether a female Bhumidhar was competent to transfer her interest in the holding. It was held that a female tenant inheriting rights of Bhumidhar acquires entire interest and no residuary interest remains vested in any other person. Her tenure in the holding is not a mere life estate. She, therefore, has a right to make a disposition inter vivos. It was held that a female tenant inheriting rights of Bhumidhar acquires entire interest and no residuary interest remains vested in any other person. Her tenure in the holding is not a mere life estate. She, therefore, has a right to make a disposition inter vivos. The case has no bearing on a sirdari interest wherein the right of transfer has been specifically and categorically taken away. These were the additional points urged at the hearing. Since the various points submitted by the learned counsel in support of the writ petition have no merit, the same is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.