ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the orders passed by the consolidation authorities, opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3, in proceedings under S. 9-A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that plot No. 961 situate in village Pratappur, Tehsil Bansi, district Basti, was recorded in the name of one Mustari Begum as tenure-holder. She, prior to start of consolidation operations, had transferred the said plot through registered sale deed dated 20-9-1962 to Sri Bechan, opposite party No. 4, for a sale consideration of Rs. 400.00, whose name was mutated in revenue records. Sri Bechan was then minor. His father and natural guardian Durga Prasad for self and as giiardian on behalf of his minor son Bechan, transferred the said -plot to the petitioner, Smt. Sursati Devi, through registered sale deed dated 18-7-1966 and delivered possession to her. In , the meantime the village was brought under consolidation operations and since the name of Bechan stood recorded in the basic year khatauni, the petitioner filed an objection under S. 9-A (2) of the Act claiming mutation of her name on the said plot on the basis of aforesaid sale, deed and possession over it even since then. The case was contested by the opposite party No. 4, Bechan, on the ground that the sale deed was invalid and void as permission was not taken from District Judge to make transfer as was required under S. 8 (2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, (Act No. XXXII of 1956) (hereinafter to be referred to as the H.M. & G. Act), by his father Durga Prasad, who had thus no right to transfer the land to the petitioner. It was asserted that the land in dispute belonged to him and it was not benami in his nae and so it could not be transferred by his father, who was not a tenure-holder. The Consolidation Officer, opposite party No. 3, vide Judgment and order dated 23-5-1977 (Annexure 1) dismissed the objection of the petitioner by holding that Bechan was tenure holder of the land in dispute and it was not recorded in his name as Benamidar. The Consolidation Officer, opposite party No. 3, vide Judgment and order dated 23-5-1977 (Annexure 1) dismissed the objection of the petitioner by holding that Bechan was tenure holder of the land in dispute and it was not recorded in his name as Benamidar. He further held that it was essential for Durga Prasad to have obtained permission of the District Judge under the aforesaid provision of the H.M. & G. Act to make transfer of the land in dispute prior to executing,.sale deed, hence the name of the petitioner cannot be mutated on the basis of said sale deed, which is invalid and void. Against the said order the petitioner filed appeal which was dismissed by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Basti, by order dated 17-2-1979 on the aforesaid grounds. The petitioner thereupon, filed revision which too was dismissed on the aforesaid ground vide order dated 11-10-1979 (Annexure 3) by the Joint Director of Consolidation, Opposite Party No. 1. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Sidheshwari Prasad addressed two main arguments. Firstly he contended that the provisions of S. 8 of the H.M. & G. Act are not applicable in respect of transfers of agricultural land because the Parliament was not competent to enact with respect to any matter in List II in the Seventh Schedule, which is referred to as the State List in the Constitution. Reference was made to Entry 18 of List II and Entry 6 of List III (Concurrent List) to indicate that the State Legislature has got exclusive power to legislate on the subject regarding transfer and alienation of agricultural land and the Parliament could not legislate in respect of such matter by any stretch of imagination because as provided in Entry 6 of List III Parliament cannot legislate on the matter regarding transfer of agricultural land. According to the learned counsel since the Parliament could not legislate on the subject pertaining to transfer and alienation of agricultural land hence the provisions of S. 8 of the H.M. & G. Act cannot be so construed as to apply to agricultural land and the natural guardian would not be required to obtain permission of the District Judge under S. 8 (2) of the H.M. & G. Act for making alienation of agricultural land. The rights of the natural guardian regarding management and alienation of his ward' agricultural land would not be affected by the said provision and his said powers would be continued to be governed by the personal law subject to the provisions contained in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on the matter pertaining to transfer of such agricultural land, if any. His second submission was that even if the impugned sale deed could be held to be voidable perforce of sub-sec. (3) of S. 8 of the H.M. & G. Act, the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of a voidable document of transfer and the same cannot be ignored unless got cancelled by court of competent jurisdiction. In support of this submission he placed reliance on several decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court on the subject, which will be referred to hereinafter. 4. Learned counsel thus contended that the consolidation authorities committed a manifest error of law and jurisdiction in refusing to record the name of the petitioner as Bhumidhar on the land in dispute on the basis of the aforesaid sale deed dated 18-7-1966. 5. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 6, Sri B. L. Yadav, supporting the impugned orders, argued that the H.M. & G. Act would be applicable also to agricultural property. He contended that the Parliament could enact such law, in respect of all matters covering the field on subjects referred to in Entry 5 of List III relating to marriage and divorce, infants and minors, adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of the Constitution subject to their personal law." (Emphasis supplied). He also referred to Entry 32 of List I to draw support to his argument and contended that the Parliament under sub-cl. (4) of Art- 246 has got powers to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State, notwithstanding that such matter is a matter included in the State List. (4) of Art- 246 has got powers to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State, notwithstanding that such matter is a matter included in the State List. Learned "counsel further contended that the Parliament draws general legislative power under Entry 5 of List III to legislate on all matters concerning infants and minors, including transfer of property without any exception to agricultural property of the infants and minors, arid that Entry 6 of List III cannot be so construed as to operate in derogation of that legislative competence which Parliament draws under Entry 5 of List III. Learned counsel thus contended that S. 8 (2) of the H.M. & G. Act would be applicable to transfers by natural guardian in respect of agricultural land as well. In reply to the aforesaid second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner he contended that the opposite party No. 4 had repudiated the sale deed before the Consolidation authorities at once when it was sought to be enforced against him by the petitioner in these proceedings under S. 9-A (2) of the Act, wherein question of title can be gone into by the Consolidation Officer, who would be deemed to be court of competent jurisdiction notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. Learned counsel thus contended that voidable sale deed pertaining to minor's agricultural land can be validly repudiated and challenged by the minor under S. 9-A (2) of the Act and the question can be determined by the consolidation authorities in these proceedings. He thus urged that the impugned orders passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 do not suffer from any error of law and jurisdiction and do not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. Having given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. I propose to deal with these arguments seriatim. 7. The powers of testamentary and certificated guardians regarding management and alienation of the ward's property were expressly set out in Sections 28 to 31 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (Act No. VIII of 1890). hereinafter referred to as G. & W. Act. I propose to deal with these arguments seriatim. 7. The powers of testamentary and certificated guardians regarding management and alienation of the ward's property were expressly set out in Sections 28 to 31 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (Act No. VIII of 1890). hereinafter referred to as G. & W. Act. This Act left untouched the powers of alienation of natural guardian and those powers continued to be governed by the personal law of minor. Prior to passing of G. & W. Act, the law on the subject was scattered in several Acts and Regulations, some of which related to minors who were European subjects and others to minors who were not European British subjects. The law on the subject was not uniform throughout. None of the earlier Acts and Regulations, to be more precise Act No. 40 of 1958, which was applicable to territories of Punjab, Sindh, etc. purported to operate to alter or affect any provision of Hindu or Mohammedan Law as to right of the natural or de facto guardian to deal with the property of their minor wards. The power of alienation of minor's property by a natural and de facto guardian, even though the guardian had not obtained a certificate under the Act, remained unaffected provided the alienation could be supported under the personal law. All the previous Acts and Regulations were repealed by Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and even under this Act the rights of natural guardian regarding management and alienation of minor's property were not affected and those powers continued to be governed by the personal law of the parties. In fact S. 19 of the G. & W. Act expressly prohibited the appointment of a guardian of a person of minor whose father is living and is not unfit to act as a guardian or a minor who is married female and whose husband is not unfit. Natural guardian was not compelled to obtain a certificate of guardianship from the court before he can deal with the property of his ward and his right to appoint a testamentary guardian was also not interfered with. The natural guardian, namely, father or in the absence of the father the mother, could alienate agricultural property, provided the alienation could be supported under the personal law. The alienation made by the natural guardian was not invalid or void ab initio. The natural guardian, namely, father or in the absence of the father the mother, could alienate agricultural property, provided the alienation could be supported under the personal law. The alienation made by the natural guardian was not invalid or void ab initio. If the guardian exceeded his powers, or otherwise acted improperly in his trusts the alienation so made could be repudiated by the minor within three years from the date of attaining majority as provided under Article 44 of the old Limitation Act, corresponding to new Article 60, provided it was not ratified or acquiesced in by him on attaining majority. 8. The H.M. & G. Act, with which we are concerned in the present case, codifies the law relating to minority and guardianship, which was formerly based on the Hindu texts and usages and judicial decisions. It takes away the right of de facto guardians and disentitle them to alienate the property of a Hindu minor, as is provided under S. 11 of the Act. Under S. 8 of the Act restrictions have been provided regarding alienation of minor's property by the natural and testamentary guardians. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 8, however, provides that : - "Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him." 8-A. Thus it is under this Act, for the first time, the rights of natural guardian to make alienation have been curtailed and statutorily regulated and he cannot make alienation of property of his ward without obtaining permission of the District Judge in that behalf, as is envisaged under S. 8(2) of the Act. The alienation made in violation of the said provision is, however, not to be treated as void alienation but the same is voidable at the instance of minor or any person claiming under him as provided under sub-sec. (3) of S. 8 of the Act. 9. Neither under the G. & W. Act not under the H.M. & G. Act the natural guardian is compelled to obtain certificate of guardianship from court before he can deal with and manage the property of his ward, and his right to appoint a testamentary guardian is not interfered with. (3) of S. 8 of the Act. 9. Neither under the G. & W. Act not under the H.M. & G. Act the natural guardian is compelled to obtain certificate of guardianship from court before he can deal with and manage the property of his ward, and his right to appoint a testamentary guardian is not interfered with. The natural guardian can, however, not make alienation of his ward's property nor have an lease out any property of the minor for a term exceeding five years or a term exceeding one year from the date on which the minor will attain majority without obtaining previous permission of the court in that behalf as is provided under S. 8(2) of the H.M. & G. Act.' 10. No express or implied prohibition was contained in the G. & W. Act prohibiting the natural guardian in .making alienation of his ward's property except with leave of court. The rights of natural guardian of a Hindu minor, were governed under the principles of Hindu law embodied in texts and usages and judicial decisions. The restriction on such right of the natural guardian of a Hindu minor is now provided under S. 8 of the Act. Keeping in view the paramount consideration of safeguarding minor's interest in his property the aforesaid provision cannot be said to be invalid or ultra vires. However, the question which at once crops up for consideration is whether the provision contained in S. 8 of the H.M. & G. Act would apply also to agricultural land, which exclusively falls within the legislative competence of State Legislature under Entry 18 of List II. This is a vexed crucial legal question and needs careful consideration. 11. Under sub-cl. (1) of Article 246 of the Constitution the Parliament has got exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Sch. Sub-cl. (2) provides that the Legislature of any State has power to make laws with respect to any obthe matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Sch. notwithstanding anything contained in cl. (3) of Article 246. Sub-cl. (2) provides that the Legislature of any State has power to make laws with respect to any obthe matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Sch. notwithstanding anything contained in cl. (3) of Article 246. In respect of matters enumerated in the 'concurrent list', both the Parliament and the State Legislatures have got power to make laws but in view of Article 251 if any provision of law made by ihe legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament, the law made by Parliament, whether passed &before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State, shall prevail, and the law made by the legislature of the State shall, to the extent of repugnance, be inoperative. However, under sub-cl. (3) of Article 246, the Legislature of State, subject to els. (1) and (2),'has got exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any matter enumerated in' List II in the Seventh Sch. 12. It is well settled that the Parliament cannot transgress its powers and legislate on the matters covered by 'State List', in respect of which Legislatures of States alone have exclusive powers to make laws. Absence of legislation by State Government on the matters enumerated in State List is immaterial and does not confer any power upon the Parliament to make laws on the subject, in respect of which State legislature has exclusive jurisdiction. In respect of matters relating to transfer and alienation of agricultural land the State legislature alone is competent to make laws as it is covered by Entry 18, List II, and it is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament to legislate in respect of agricultural land on the said subject and such a prohibition is specifically contained in Entry 6 of List 111 itself, which provides : - "Transfer of property other than agricultural land, registration of deeds and documents," (Emphasis supplied). 12-A. In Attorney General of Alberta v. Attorney General of Canada AIR 1943 P C 76, their Lordships of the Privy Council, considering the aforesaid question observed : "Legislation coming in pith and substance within one of the classes specially enumerated in the Central List is beyond the legislative competence of the provincial Legislatures. 12-A. In Attorney General of Alberta v. Attorney General of Canada AIR 1943 P C 76, their Lordships of the Privy Council, considering the aforesaid question observed : "Legislation coming in pith and substance within one of the classes specially enumerated in the Central List is beyond the legislative competence of the provincial Legislatures. In such a case it is immaterial whether the Central Legislature has or has not death with the subject by legislation, or to use other well-known words, whether that legislative held has or has not been occupied by the legislation of the Central Assembly. Where the Central Legislature has been given exclusive legislative authority as to 'all matters coming within the classes of subjects, enumerated it cannot be said that, unless and until the Central Assembly legislates on any such matter the Provinces are competent to legislate." 13. The above view will equally hold good in a converse case where Parliament lacks legislative competence to legislate on a matter not covered by List I or by List III of the Seventh Sch. In such case also it would be immaterial whether State Legislature has or has not enacted law on any particular subject enumerated in List II. Parliament cannot assume legislative competence to legislate on the matter which is exclusively covered by State list on the ground that State Legislature has not dealt with the subject by legislation so far. Thus the argument of the learned counsel for the opposite party, Sri B. L. Yadav, cannot prevail that since the State Legislature has not so far enacted any law covering the subject regarding transfer of agricultural land belonging to a minor and as such the provisions of S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act be constrained to apply to agricultural land as well. 14. Sri B. L. Yadav next urged that the words 'immovable property' occurring in S. 8 of the said Act should be taken in widest import so as to include agricultural land also within the ambit of the said provision. I am unable to agree with this contention. 15. A bare reading of List II- 'State-List', would indicate that matters relating to agriculture, including agricultural education etc. I am unable to agree with this contention. 15. A bare reading of List II- 'State-List', would indicate that matters relating to agriculture, including agricultural education etc. (entry 14); land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents, transfer arid alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans, colonisation (Entry 18); land revenue (entry 45); Taxes on agricultural income (Entry 46), Duties in respect of succession to agricultural land (Entry 47); Estate duty in respect of agricultural Land (Entry 48), are within the exclusive legislative competence of State Legislatures. None of the aforesaid matters falls in Lists I and III. Parliament is, therefore, not competent to legislate on the aforesaid matters although the State legislature has not dealt with that subject by legislation and that legislative field has or has not been covered by the legislation of State legislature. 16. Learned counsel for the opposite party, Sri B. L. Yadav, next contended that sub-sec. (2) of S. 8 of H. M. & G. Act, which puts restriction on the natural guardian's powers and provides that he cannot alienate the minor's immovable property without previous permission of the court, would also cover agricultural land as the Parliament could legislate on all matters, concerning infants or minors, under Entry 5 in List III, without any exception to agricultural land. According to him the general legislative power drawn under Entry 5 cannot be curtailed by Entry 6 in List III which no doubt enumerates specific legislative field on the subject 'transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents. I do not find any substance in this argument. 17. In Calcutta Gas Company v. State of West Bengal AIR 1962 SC 1044 , the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for interpreting entries in the lists in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It was observed (Para 8) : - "The power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by Article 246 of the Constitution. The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation, they demarcated the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation, they demarcated the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different lists or in the same list may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of the Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. The underlying principle in such cases is that a general power ought not to be so construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Constitution and operating in the same field, when by reading the former in a more restricted sense effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning. Thus, every attempt should be made to harmonise the apparently conflicting entries not only of different Lists but also of the same list and to reject that construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory." (Emphasis supplied) 18. The maxim 'General specialibus non derogant' means that when there is a conflict between a general and a special provision the latter shall prevail. The rule of construction which is relevant to the present enquiry, is expressed in the aforesaid maxim according to which general power shall yield to the specific power. When specified legislative field on the topic 'transfer of property other than agricultural land' is enumerated in Entry 6 of List III, the general power to make laws concerning 'infants and minors' referred in Entry 5 should not be so construed as to nullify particular power conferred to legislate on specified topic by a subsequent entry in the same list, which specifically excludes 'agricultural land' from the ambit of that legislative field enumerated therein. Thus by reading of former Entry 5 in a more restricted sense effect can be given to latter Entry 6 in its ordinary and natural meaning. 19. In J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Thus by reading of former Entry 5 in a more restricted sense effect can be given to latter Entry 6 in its ordinary and natural meaning. 19. In J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P. AIR 1961 SC 1170 , similar question Cropped up for consideration before the Supreme Court and Das Gupta, J. in para 9 of the report observed : "The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is applicable to resolve the conflict between the general provision in one Act and the special provision in another Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between general and special provisions in the same legislative instrument. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives directions to one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards those while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect. In Pretty v. Solly, (1859-53 ER 1032) quoted in Craies on Statute Law at p. 206, 6th Edition) Romily, M. R., mentioned the rule thus - 'The rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply." It was further observed that : - "Applying this rule of construction that in cases of conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the specific provision prevails over the general provision and the general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provision, we must hold that Cl. 5 (a) has no application in a case where the special provisions of cl. 23 are applicable." 20. 5 (a) has no application in a case where the special provisions of cl. 23 are applicable." 20. In Aidal Singh v. Karan Singh, AIR 1957 All 414 (FB), the Full Bench of this Court while considering the question as to how to construe two separate articles of the Constitution dealing with two distinct matters pertaining to exercise of jurisdiction by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, observed that : - "The very fact that the Constitution contains two separate provisions in respect of two powers which are described differently in two separate sections, which stand next door to each other, would indicate that the framers of the Constitution must have contemplated two separate and distinct powers, and that the power to issue writs was considered by them as a power distinct and separate from the' power of superintendence. This conclusion would be supported by the well known rule of construction that an Act should be so construed as to' avoid redundancy or surplusage. This rule is stated in A. S. Chaudhari's book of Constitutional Rights and Limitations, Vol. 1, (1955 Edn.) at page 17, in the following words : "The settled canon of construction is that a statute ought to be so construed that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void insignificant. Courts lean against constructions which make words unnecessary in an Act, and, unless the construction leads to an absurdity, no portion of the statute should be ignored or treated as meaningless or redundant." It is further stated : - "That a section in an Act is a surplusage is a conclusion which should be arrived at with great caution in any case and it falls for still greater caution when we find that the two sections, one of which is said to be a surplusage, are actually contiguous to each other in the Act, and neither could by any possibility have been overlooked when framing the other." (Emphasis provided) 21. In this view of the matter, Entry 6 in List III of the Seventh Sch. In this view of the matter, Entry 6 in List III of the Seventh Sch. providing field of legislation on the matter 'regarding transfer of property other than agricultural land, deeds and documents cannot be treated to be merely a surplusage on the ground that the immediately preceding Entry 5 in List III provides general power to make laws by Parliament as well as by the State Legislature on the matters, amongst other, concerning infants and minors. The legislative field covered by Entry 5, which is in general terms, cannot be construed so as to include the legislative field enumerated in Entry 6 immediately following. It thus cannot be said that the Parliament on the strength of Entry 5 in List III can legislate on the matter in respect of transfer of property with regard to agricultural lands also by ignoring the prohibition specifically provided in Entry 6 of List III, according to which the legislative field on the subject 'transfer of property other than agricultural land' alone is enumerated being topic of a Concurrent list. The Parliament, therefore, cannot legislate on the matter in respect of transfer of agricultural land about which State Legislature alone has got exclusive power to make Laws as is provided in Entry 18 is List II. Parliament has got no power to legislate on the said subject as it does not fall within the legislative competence in any of the entries in List 1 or in List III in the Seventh Sch. 22. Learned counsel Sri Yadav, however, contended that Entry 18 of List II and Entry 5 of List III are the rival entries covering same field of legislation. He contends that although the State Legislature on matters enumerated in Entry 18 can legislate laws regulating transfer of agricultural land belonging to 'infants and minors' but there is nothing in Entry 5 of the 'Concurrent list' curtailing legislative power of Parliament to make laws on matters concerning 'infants and minors' regulating transfer of property including agricultural land belonging to them. Reference was made to Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills v. Broach Borough Municipality, AIR 1968 Guj 124 , wherein it was held that in case there is any conflict in regard to the subject matter of legislation, that is if there are matters which fall in both the Parliamentary and the State fields, then subject to the doctrine of pith and substance, enumerated by courts of law, the State Legislative authority must yield place to the Parliamentary legislative authority. 23. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decision. But it has to be borne in mind that the entries enumerated in the three lists in the Seventh Sch. demarcate the legislative heads or fields of legislation over which the appropriate legislatures can operate without eroding the powers of the other. 'If the entries in the list overlap, an attempt must be made by the Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. 24. It appears 'to be well settled that where entries enumerate separate legislative fields, a general power ought not to be so construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by separate entry in the same list. .Thus, in my opinion the legislative field covered by Entry 6 of List III regarding 'transfer of property' cannot be construed to be covered by Entry 5 of List III. Parliament, therefore, cannot make laws regarding transfer of property belonging to 'infants and minors' on the strength of Entry 5 of the Concurrent List. Legislative power on the subject, namely, 'transfer of property' is to be found in Entry 6 in List III, which excludes 'agricultural land' from its ambit. Thus the Parliament cannot make laws on matters relating to transfer of agricultural land of minors and others, with reference to legislative power found in Entries 5 and 6 of List III in view of specific prohibition contained in Entry 6 of List III. The State Legislature could also not make law regarding transfer of agricultural land with reference to Entries 5 and 6 of the Concurrent List 111 had there not been such power vested in it in Entry 18 of List II to legislate on the said topic. The legislative power to make law on said matter exclusively rests with the State Legislature in view of sub-cl. The legislative power to make law on said matter exclusively rests with the State Legislature in view of sub-cl. (3) of Article 246 of the Constitution and the Central legislature cannot rob that jurisdiction on the strength of Entries 5 and 6 of List III or Entry 97 of List I of Seventh Sch. 25. Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution are also not applicable because H. M. & G. Act, 1956 was not enacted in the circumstances mentioned therein. 26. An analysis of entries in 'Central List' indicates that the matters relating to 'agricultural land' 'do not fall within the ambit of legislative field of Parliament and its jurisdiction is generally excluded in respect of all matters relating to agricultural land. See Entry 82 of List I- Taxes on income other than agricultural income; Entry 87- Estate duty in respect of property other than agricultural land; Entry 88- Duties in respect of succession to property other than agricultural land. The residuary Entry 97, which provides that any matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists further goes to support the view that Parliament cannot encroach upon the legislative field covered by the State List and it is when any matter has been left out from being specifically covered by List I or II, the Parliament shall exercise exclusive legislative power in respect of that enumerated matter. No such legislative power is envisaged in the Constitution with the State Legislatures. 27. The matters relating to education are enumerated in Entries 63 to 66 of List 1 and also in Entry 25 of List III, which reads : 'Education, including technical education,, medical education and universities, Subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I, vocational and technical training of labour (emphasis provided). It has, however, not been made subject to Entry 14 of List II, which reads: 'Agriculture, including agricultural education and research', protection against pests and prevention of diseases '(Emphasis provided). This indicates that even on matters such as education the specific topic 'agricultural education and research' falls within the exclusive legislative field and it is not subject to any laws made by the Parliament in exercise of legislative power under Entries 63 to 66 of List I, or Entry 25 of List II referred to above. This indicates that even on matters such as education the specific topic 'agricultural education and research' falls within the exclusive legislative field and it is not subject to any laws made by the Parliament in exercise of legislative power under Entries 63 to 66 of List I, or Entry 25 of List II referred to above. Further, the perusal of Entries 14, 18, 45 to 48 of List II, indicates that on all matters relating to agriculture, including agricultural education and research, land and land tenures, collection of rents : transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; land revenue and maintenance of land records etc.; taxes on agricultural income; duties in respect of succession to agricultural land; and Estate duty in respect of agricultural land; fail within the exclusive jurisdiction of legislatures of State to make laws on the matters concerning agriculture and agricultural land and on all allied topics pertaining to it, including transfer and alienation of agricultural land, and thus the Parliament cannot legislate on'all aforesaid matters referred in List II of the Seventh Sch. 28. In view of the aforesaid, one has to make strict interpretation of Entries 5 and 6 of List IH so as to enable those to operate fully in their respective legislative fields. While Entry 5 covers a, very wide field in matters of 'marriage and divorce; infants and minors, adoption, wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal law, Entry 6 of List III covers the legislative field on the topics; 'Transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents.' There appears to be good reason for the authors of the Constitution to exclude agricultural land from the ambit of legislative field on the topic 'transfer of property' enumerated in Entry 6 of List III because such matter has been enumerated . in Entry 18 of List II and the State Legislature has been given exclusive jurisdiction to make laws about transfer and alienation of agricultural land. A harmonious construction is to be made so as to give full effect Jo Entry 18 of List II. in Entry 18 of List II and the State Legislature has been given exclusive jurisdiction to make laws about transfer and alienation of agricultural land. A harmonious construction is to be made so as to give full effect Jo Entry 18 of List II. The exclusion of 'agricultural land' from the ambit of Entry 6 clearly makes out that the Parliament has got no jurisdiction to legislate on the matter regarding transfer and alienation of agricultural land because of specific exception provided in Entry 6 of List III in respect of such land. 29. There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction and that the general words in a Statute are to be construed with reference to the powers of the legislature which enacts it. If Parliament enacts law on the subject enumerated in List II or the State Legislature enacts laws on the subject enumerated in List I, the law so enacted would be ultra vires to that extent and liable to be struck down being enacted beyond the legislative competence envisaged in the Constitution. 30. In this view of the matter, the provisions of S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act have got to be so construed as to bring the said provision with the legislative competence of the Central legislature. Since the Parliament could not make laws regulating transfer of agricultural land, it would be apt to construe the said provision. to be not applicable to agricultural land so as to bring the said provision within its legislative competence. 31. The words 'immovable property' have not been defined in Section 4 of the H. M. & G. Act nor under-Sec. 4 of the G. & W. Act. No doubt under S. 3 of the T. P. Act the 'immovable property' would cover 'agricultural land' as well, but since the Parliament, as. already observed above, could not legislate law about transfer and alienation of agricultural land because of Entry 6 of List III and on said matter the State Legislature alone has got legislative power in view of Entry 18 of List II, the word 'immovable property' occurring, in Section 8 of the Act connotes all immovable property of a minor other than his agricultural land. The said provision would n'or apply to agricultural land not it will govern or control alienation made by the natural guardian of the agricultural land of his minor ward and.no permission as is envisaged under sub-sec. (2) of S. 8 of the Act would be required in respect of agricultural land on matters enunciated therein, nor any transfer made by the natural guardian can be said to be voidable on the ground that it was made in contravention of sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) of S. 8 of the Act at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him as provided under sub-sec. (3) of S. 8 of the Act. The minor can, however, repudiate and get the transfer deed set aside either he himself within three years of his attaining majority or even during minority through a next friend, on- the ground that the transfer was neither for the benefit o,f his estate nor was compelled by any pressure on the estate, nor it is such as a prudent owner would reasonably enter into and that he has acted improperly in his trusts. The minor can urge and show that the transfer made by his natural guardian is highly prejudicial to his interest and is absolutely unfair as there was no legal necessity at all for making the transfer or that it was not sold for adequate sale consideration or that it was got executed by practising calculated fraud or misrepresentation on the guardian, himself while getting impugned deed executed. The aforesaid are not all but some of the grounds on which alienation can be questioned. The transfer or alienation by the natural guardian of an immovable property other than agricultural land can no doubt be questioned on the ground that it was made without previous permission of court as required by sub-sec. (2) of S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act but the transfer made in respect of agricultural land cannot be challenged on the aforesaid ground because 'immovable property' referred in S. 8 cannot be construed to cover agricultural land as the Parliament could not make such law pertaining to agricultural land as already observed above. 32. (2) of S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act but the transfer made in respect of agricultural land cannot be challenged on the aforesaid ground because 'immovable property' referred in S. 8 cannot be construed to cover agricultural land as the Parliament could not make such law pertaining to agricultural land as already observed above. 32. It would be fair and proper to presume that the Parliament while passing H. M. & G. Act should not have meant to include within the ambit of S. 8 of the Act the agricultural land of the minor, in respect of which no law regulating its transfer could be passed by the Parliament. 33. Learned counsel for the parties pressed before me two diametrically opposed contentions for construing the term 'immovable property' occurring in S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act. One is that it includes within its ambit agricultural property as well and the other is that it does not include agricultural land. If the former view is adopted the provisions.contained in the aforesaid S. 8 would be void to that extent because the Parliament could not legislate on the topic in respect of agricultural land in view of the exception contained in Entry 6 of List III. It has been held by the Federal Court in Piare Dusadh v. Emperor, AIR 1944 FC 1 that : "When there are two possible constructions one of which will make the enactment void and the other give it some effect the latter may have to be preferred, though it may not wholly achieve the purpose of framers." (Emphasis provided). 34. In an earlier decision reported in re. Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, AIR 1941 FC 72, which was a case on special reference by His Excellency the Governor-General in the matter of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, it was observed by the Federal Court that : "There is a general presumption that a Legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction. Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, AIR 1941 FC 72, which was a case on special reference by His Excellency the Governor-General in the matter of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, it was observed by the Federal Court that : "There is a general presumption that a Legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction. When a Legislature with limited and restricted powers makes use of a word of such wide and general import as property', the presumption must surely be that it is using it with reference to that kind of property with respect to which it is competent to legislate and to no other and unless the Act is to be regarded as wholly, meaningless and ineffective, the word 'property' as used in the Act must be construed as referring only to those forms of property with respect of which the Legislature which enacted the Act was competent to legislate; that is to say, property other than agricultural land. On the true construction of the Act arid especially of the word 'property' as used in it, no part of the. Act is beyond the Legislature's powers." It was further held that : "The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938, do not operate to ' regulate succession to agricultural land in the Governors' Provinces and do operate to lingulate devolution by survivor ship of property other than agricultural land." 35. In State of Bombay v. Heman Santlal, AIR 1952 Bom. 16 the' Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that (at p. 26) : - "There is a very important principle which must be borne in mind in construing a statute. It must always be presumed that a Legislature knows the limits of its competence and that it is acting within the set up by the Constitution and not outside those limits. If possible a construction should be placed upon a statute which would put it within the limits of the competence of the Legislature rather than outside those limits." 36. It must always be presumed that a Legislature knows the limits of its competence and that it is acting within the set up by the Constitution and not outside those limits. If possible a construction should be placed upon a statute which would put it within the limits of the competence of the Legislature rather than outside those limits." 36. In this view of the matter it is legitimate to assume that Parliament well understood its legislative powers and that it would not be correct to presume that it was ignorant of its limitation that it could not legislate on the topic regulating transfers of agricultural land belonging to minors, while enacting H. M. & G. Act in view of exception contained in respect of agricultural land in Entry 6 of List III. Thus, the words 'immovable property', occurring in S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act must be so construed as to bring the said provision in the Act within the limits of the legislative competence of Central Legislature rather than beyond its competence. It, therefore, cannot be said that the words 'immoveable property' referred in S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act "would include agricultural property as well, because if it is construed to include agricultural land as well within its ambit the said provision would be void to the extent it would purport to cover and affect transfers by natural guardians of agricultural land of minors. Such an interpretation should be avoided which would not be in favour of the validity of the Act. Thus, it would be proper to construe the term 'immoveable property' in S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act to connote all the immoveable property of the minor other than agricultural land. 37. It may be mentioned here that after the Federal Court ruled in the decision referred to above that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 and Amending Act of 1938 do not operate to regulate succession to agricultural land in the Governors' Provinces nor do they operate to regulate devolution by survivor ship of agricultural land, the various States in follow up legislation passed adaptation laws making the provisions of the said Central Act also apply to Agricultural land. Some of the Acts are : - 1. Some of the Acts are : - 1. The United Provinces Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act (Extension to Agricultural Land) Act, 1942, (U. P. Act No. XI of 1942). 2. Bombay Act No. XVII of 1942. 3. Assam Act No. XIV of 1943. 4. Orissa Act No. V of 1943. 38. In the aims and objects of the U. P. Act No. XI of 1942 it was stated that "The framers of the Act intended that these provisions should apply also to agricultural land but as the Act came into force after the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Federals Court have held that the Act cannot apply to agricultural land which is a provincial subject unless the Provincial Legislature has passed an Act extending its provisions to agricultural land." 39. The said Act was, therefore, passed with retrospective effect, providing in S. 2 of the Act that : "The term 'property' in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938, shall include, and shall be deemed always to have included, agricultural land; Provided.................." 40. The Provincial Legislature has not yet passed any such Act making the provisions of the H. M. & G. Act to cover also agricultural land. In the absence of any such law made by the Provincial Legislature it cannot be said that the provisions of S. 8 of the H. M. &. G. Act 1956 would also apply to agricultural land. 41. In Prema Devi v. Joint Director, 1969 All LJ 253 ( AIR 1970 All 238 ) a Division Bench of this Court while considering the question whether Hindu Succession Act of 1956 would apply to agricultural land or not held that the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, cannot be made applicable to agricultural plots. It was observed (at p. 240 of AIR) : - "This Act was passed by the Central Legislature in 1956 and the only Entry under which the Central Legislature had the jurisdiction to pass the Act was Entry No. 5 in the third list of the Seventh Sch. of the Constitution............. This entry obviously relates only to personal law and laws passed under this entry do no apply to any particular property. They merely determine the personal law." (Emphasis provided). 42. of the Constitution............. This entry obviously relates only to personal law and laws passed under this entry do no apply to any particular property. They merely determine the personal law." (Emphasis provided). 42. Referring to Entry No. 18 of List IT, it was observed that; - "This entry which is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislature is in the widest term. All laws relating to land and land tenures are therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislature. Even personal law can become applicable to land tenures if so provided in the State Law, but it cannot override State legislation. It is noteworthy that in list 3 wherever the entry relates to rights in land; agricultural land has expressly been excluded. For instance, entry No. 6 is as follows : - Transfer of Property other than agricultural land .........' Entry No. 7 is as follows : - 'Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts "of carriage, and other special forms of contracts, but not including contracts relating to agricultural land.'' No' such exception was expressly mentioned in entry No. 5 because this entry relates only to matters personal to individuals and did not relate directly to any property. While legislating in respect of STich general subject the Legislature must be assumed to pass law only affecting property which it had jurisdiction to legislate about." (Emphasis provided) 43. Learned counsel for the opposite party contended that under sub-sec. (2) of S. 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it has been specifically provided that nothing contained in this section will affect the provisions of any Act for the time being in force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holding or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings. Referring to this provision learned counsel contended that since there, is no such provision in the H. M. & G. Act excluding the application of the provisions of he Act to agricultural land hence it cannot be said that the provisions of S. 8 of the said Act would not apply to agricultural land, that the words 'immovable property' used in the section, should be taken in widest import so as to include agricultural land within the ambit of the said provision. I am unable to agree with this contention. 44. I am unable to agree with this contention. 44. In the aforesaid case of Prema Devi ( AIR 1970 All 238 ) (supra) the Division Bench after taking into consideration the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 observed that : "This sub-section indicates that it was only for the removal of doubts that this provision has been included. Even without this provision the Act could not apply to agricultural holdings." (Emphasis provided). 45. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that even in the absence of any provision incorporated in the H. M. & G. Act to the effect that the provisions contained in the Act were not to apply to agricultural land and land holdings it cannot be held that the provisions contained in S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act would apply to agricultural land, because even without such a provision the Act could not apply to agricultural land in view of what has already been said above. 46. Learned counsel for the opposite party in the end referred to a single Judge decision of this Court in M. S. Khun v. Dy. D. of Consolidation, 1970 All L J 288 wherein, while considering the question whether in view of the provisions contained in S. 11 of the H. M. & G. Act a de facto guardian of a Hindu piinor can dispose of agricultural land of the minor or not, it was observed that : - "Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out to me any provision in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or any other State laws relating to agricultural land which provides for the transfer of the share of a minor in agricultural land by a guardian. Had there been such a provision and had that provision been inconsistent with the provisions of Act No. 32 of 1956, a question might have arisen as to which one would prevail. But as it is, there is no provision in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act dealing with the subject with which S. 11 of Act 32 of 1956 deals. That provision would, therefore, prevail. Under the provision a de facto guardian of a Hindu minor is prohibited from disposing of the property of a minor for. any reason whatsoever." 47. That provision would, therefore, prevail. Under the provision a de facto guardian of a Hindu minor is prohibited from disposing of the property of a minor for. any reason whatsoever." 47. Learned.counsel referred to another decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Murari Lal v. Dy. D. Consolidation, 1.978 All W. C. 13, wherein the learned Judge placing reliance upon the decision in M. S. Khan's case (supra) took the sajne view. Learned counsel also referred to a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in R. Singh v. Board of Revenue, 1974 All L J 487, wherein the learned Judge, while considering.the question whether a transfer deed executed by the certificated guardian without obtaining permission o# the District Judge would' be void or voidable, observed that : "S. 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act, however, is clear on the point which makes such a transfer only voidable and not void. Even under the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 a sale deed executed by a natural guardian of a minor without the permission of the District Judge is only voidable in view of sub-sec . (3) of Section 8 of the said Act." 48. In none of these cases this question was raised whether the provisions of S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act would apply to agricultural land or not nor this question was considered. The said decisions, therefore are of no assistance to the learned counsel for the opposite party to meet the aforesaid point. As already observed above since the Parliament could not make law relating to transfer of agricultural land the 'provisions contained in S. 8 of H. M. & G. Act cannot be made applicable to agricultural land merely on the ground that State Legislature had not made any law on the subject. The provisions of S, 8 of the H. M. & G. Act should be so construed as to bring the said Act within the competence of Central Legislature to enact such law. The provisions of S, 8 of the H. M. & G. Act should be so construed as to bring the said Act within the competence of Central Legislature to enact such law. As already observed above, there is a general presumption that a Legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction and when a Legislature with restricted powers makes use of a word of such wide and general import, as referred in S. 8 of the Act, without defining, the term 'immoveable property' mentioned therein, one cannot escape from the conclusion that the term 'immoveable property' used in the section is with reference to that kind of property in respect of which it is competent to legislate and to no other property. In Entry 6 of List 111 agricultural property has been expressl) excluded and as such the Parliament had no jurisdiction to make laws in respect of it. It cannot, therefore, be said that since the State Legislature has not as yet enacted any law on the subject and as such S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act should be made applicable also to agricultural land. 49. Any inconsistency or repugnance between State and Central Legislature is regulated by Article 254 of the Constitution but such a question would only arise when both the Legislatures had made laws on the subject. It is well settled that the absence of legislation by the , appropriate State Legislature on any topic enumerated in List 11 cannot confer any power upon the Central Legislature to enact law on that topic which otherwise does not fast within its legislative competence, (see A. G. Alberta v. A. G. Canada, AIR 1943 PG 76). 50. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the consolidation authorities have legally erred in holding that the impugned transfer was void as no permission was taken by the- natural guardian while making transfer o.f the land in question to the petitioner. 51. It is well settled that the function of the Court is to find out what the law is and not what it" should be. It is for the Legislature and the delegated legislative authority to make the law. It is beyond the jurisdiction of the court to change the law even slightly and even for the better by any process of interpretation. It is for the Legislature and the delegated legislative authority to make the law. It is beyond the jurisdiction of the court to change the law even slightly and even for the better by any process of interpretation. No doubt it is correct to say that it would serve the interest of the minor tenure holder better if the provisions contained in S. 8 of the H.M. & G. Act, which is a Central Act, are made applicable to the agricultural property as well but that will not be a* relevant consideration to interpret and construe the said provision to be applicable to agricultural property, even in ^he absence of similar provision contained in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or in any other enactment of the Provincial Legislation, for the time' being in force covering the said topic. 52. There is yet another ground on which the impugned orders passed by the consolidation authorities cannot be sustained. Even according to the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party the sale deed in question was voidable. The consolidation authorities have ho jurisdiction . to adjudicate upon the said question. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Gorakh Nath v. Hari Narain Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 that (at P. 2453) "The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory. powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but, Where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have ho power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it." 52-A. Similar view was taken by this Court in Shankar v. D.D.C., 19.77 All WC 559, Ghanshyam Dass v. Dr. Shiv Shankar Lal, 1980 All LJ 130, and Rama Shanker Misra v. Kashi Misra, 1981 All LJ 789. 53. The sale deed in question has not been dubbed as a void document. Shiv Shankar Lal, 1980 All LJ 130, and Rama Shanker Misra v. Kashi Misra, 1981 All LJ 789. 53. The sale deed in question has not been dubbed as a void document. Opposite party No. 4 had asserted that since no permission of the District Judge was obtained as was required by S. 8 of Act No. 32 of 1956 while making transfer of the land in question by his father and as such he was not bound by the said transfer being void in law. Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 4, however, conceded that on the aforesaid ground the impugned sale deed cannot be said to be void but he asserted that it-was voidable in view of the provisions contained under Sub-sec. (3) of S. 8 of the H. M. & G. Act. The consolidation authorities, therefore, could not ignore the said document while treating it to be a void document as has been held by them. The impugned orders passed by the consolidation authorities thus suffer from a manifest error of law. 54. In the present case opposite party No. 4 challenged the validity of the sale deed in question merely on the ground that no permission was obtained by his natural guardian-father while executing the sale deed as was required under sub-sec. (2) of S. 8 of the H. M. & G Act. This ground is not available to him, as the said provision does not apply to agricultural land in view of what has been said above. The sale deed in question has not been assailed on any other ground nor its validity could be gone into by the consolidation authorities. The petitioner would, therefore, be entitled to get her name mutated on the basis of sale deed in question. 55. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 11-10-1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed and he is directed to restore the revision and decide it in accordance with law and in the light of observations made above. I, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs.