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Allahabad High Court · body

1982 DIGILAW 574 (ALL)

Thakur Charanarvindu v. City Board, Mathura

1982-04-22

DEOKI NANDAN

body1982
JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiffs Second Appeal which arises from a rather unusual kind of a suit. The plaintiff-appellant claimed that the respondent Municipal Board had failed to make the necessary arrangements for sanitation and lighting in the area where its property was situate, and that being so, the plaintiff had the arrangements made at its own costs, and claimed recovery of Rs. 1107/- for the period of six years next preceding the date of suit. It may be here stated that the respondent Municipal Board had recovered, by the process of Suit No. 119 of 1964, the sum of Rs. 863-91 p. as tax from the present plaintiff who had not been paying the same on the plea that the respondent Municipal Board was not performing its statutory obligations. The amount of house tax payable by the plaintiff on the property owned by it was Rs. 147-72 p. per year. 2. A notice under section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act appears to have been served before instituting the suit. 3. The following were the issues framed on the pleas raised by the defendant : - "(1) Whether the defdt. has failed to make arrangements for sanitation and light in front of the plaintiffs property?" "(2) Whether the pltff. has made any arrangements to provide light and for sanitation on foot path in front of its property?" "(3) Whether the pltff. is entitled to recover the expenses incurred in providing light and sanitation? If so what amount?" "(4) Is suit within time?" "(5) Whether the pltff. has served any notice upon the defdt.? If not its effect?" "(6) To what relief, if any, is the pltff. entitled?" 4. On issues Nos. 1 and 2, the trial court found that the respondent Municipal had been making arrangements for sanitation, but it failed to make arrangements for lighting, and that the plaintiff had been making its own arrangements for lighting at its own expense. On issue No. 3, it found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover anything for the expenses incurred by it on sanitation and lighting, but, in case it were entitled to the same, the expenditure incurred on lighting was Rs. 13-50 p. per month. On issue No. 3, it found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover anything for the expenses incurred by it on sanitation and lighting, but, in case it were entitled to the same, the expenditure incurred on lighting was Rs. 13-50 p. per month. On issue No. 4, the trial Court held that the suit was not governed by the six months rule of limitation prescribed by section 326 of the Municipalities Act, but was governed by the six years rule of limitation and was within time when filed. On issue No. 5, it found that notice under section 326 had, in fact, been served, and finding on issue No. 6 that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief claimed, it dismissed the suit with costs. The lower appellate Court has, by a delightfully short judgment, dismissed the appeal as misconceived observing that "it is well established law that in the case of public bodies neglecting their statutory duties no action lies unless it is a case of either malfeasance or misfeasance : for mere nonfeasance like the present action will not lie." 5. I have heard Mr. G. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant. His first complaint was that the judgment of the lower appellate Court does not comply with the statutory requirements for a judgment of an appellate Court as prescribed by rule 31 of order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and he was entitled to have the appeal remanded for rehearing by the lower appellate Court. 6. The judgment of the lower appellate Court is undoubtedly too short and too brief to comply with the requirements prescribed by rule 31 of order 41, C.P.C., nevertheless, the matter being rather old, I have looked into the judgment of the trial Court and heard the learned counsel for the appellant on all the points that he wished to raise in the case. 7. Mr. Sharma did not contend that the finding that a sweeper was employed by the Municipal Board for cleaning the road was, in any manner, incorrect. He was content with the finding that the Municipal Board had failed to make lighting arrangements, and that the plaintiff had incurred an expenditure of Rs. 13-50 p. per month on making its own lighting arrangements. He was content with the finding that the Municipal Board had failed to make lighting arrangements, and that the plaintiff had incurred an expenditure of Rs. 13-50 p. per month on making its own lighting arrangements. His contention was that under S. 70 of the Contract Act the respondent Municipal Board was bound to compensate the plaintiff for the expenditure incurred on ' lighting, inasmuch as it was the statutory duty of the Municipal Board to provide street lights and the Municipal Board having admittedly failed to do so the plaintiff provided the necessary lighting and did so lawfully for the Municipal Board and thus the conditions of section 70 of the Contract Act were fully satisfied as the plaintiff had not intended to do so gratuitously, and the Municipal Board must be held to be bound to make compensation for the same. 8. Having heard learned counsel, I find that there is no merit in the submission. 9. It may be that there was nothing illegal in the provision of lighting that was made by the plaintiff on the street in front of its property on the failure of the Municipal Board to provide proper street lighting, but it cannot be said that the plaintiff provided that street lighting for the Municipal Board. The plaintiff provided that street lighting for its own benefit in front of its property. The Municipal Board was, it may be assumed, under a statutory obligation to provide street lighting, but in a case where the local body like a Municipal Board fails to perform such a statutory obligation imposed upon it, a resident of the Municipality cannot take it upon himself to do what the Municipal Board ought to have done. The manner of enforcement of the rights of the residents of the Municipality to the amenities, which the Municipal Board must provide, is not by providing the amenities themselves. They must bring pressure on the Municipal Board either by political means or if they fail or if they do not choose to adopt the political means, it is conceivable that an action may lie against the Municipal Board for a mandamus to compel the performance of its statutory obligations by it if it refuses to do so in spite of demand. But that is about all which the machinery of law can do to help the residents in compelling local authorities like the Municipal Board to perform their statutory obligations. Moreover, when the expenditure on the lighting was incurred in the present case, the liability of the Municipal Board to provide street lighting had not been established, even now, the extent of the liability of the Municipal Board of providing street lighting and the manner of its performance are matters which cannot be said to be determined or even capable of determination by a Court of law. It is for the Municipal Board to decide the extent and the manner in which it will perform its statutory obligations. In matters like providing street lighting or making sanitary arrangements, a Municipal Board has to provide the amenities within the limits of its finances and it is not possible for a Court of law to determine these matters on a suit. The obligation of the Municipal Board to provide street lighting at the points or of the kind which the plaintiff is said to have provided itself is thus not established and that being so it cannot be said that the plaintiff provided the street lighting on which it incurred an expenditure of Rs. 13.50 p. per month lawfully within the meaning of section 70 of the Indian Contract Act. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant had relied upon Mulamchand v. State of M. P., AIR 1968 SC 1218 , to show the scope of section 70 of the Indian Contract Act. As explained above, the provisions of section 70 of the Indian Contract Act were not attracted to the facts of the present case. Mulamchand's case relied upon by the learned counsel is not relevant for deciding the present case. 11. No other point was pressed before me. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.