JUDGMENT :- This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for recovery of Rs. 1,746.60 p. on the foot of a Hundi for Rs. 1,800, Ext.7, said to have been executed for M/s. Chunni Lal Satyabrat by Satyabrat, defendant No. 1, in favour of Bhagwan Das Puttu Lal for Rs. 1,800 payable on the expiry of 361 days from the date of the Hundi viz, Kuwar Sudi 10 Sambat 2017 equivalent to 30th Sept. 1960. The defence gave rise to a large number of issues. It is not necessary to refer to them all. The Trial Court found in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit for recovery of Rs. 1,746.60 P. with pendente line and future interest at 6 per cent per annum and costs. On appeal by the defendants, the lower Appellate Court has dismissed the suit on the findings that the Hundi was insufficiently stamped and the court could not act upon it and that the Hundi was not executed for consideration. 2. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellants has assailed both the findings or the lower Appellate Court. 3. A perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court shows that the Hundi was admitted in evidence and marked Ext.7 on 26th Nov. 1968, without any objection to its admissibility on the ground of deficiency in stamp being raised by the defendants. The objection was raised later by an amendment of the written statement and gave rise to issue No. 14. The Trial Court relied on S.36 of the Stamp Act and held that the Hundi having been admitted in evidence, its admissibility could not be challenged in the suit. There could be no doubt that the Trial Court is right and the view taken by it is amply supported by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana ( AIR 1961 SC 1655 ). In my view the lower Appellate Court went astray in dealing with this point and came to a wrong conclusion. Learned Counsel for the defendant respondents, however, relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal ( AIR 1978 SC 1393 ). That case is clearly distinguishable on the facts. A perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court shows that when the Hundi was placed before the defendants for endorsing their admission or denial, the Counsel for defendants Nos. That case is clearly distinguishable on the facts. A perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court shows that when the Hundi was placed before the defendants for endorsing their admission or denial, the Counsel for defendants Nos. 1 to 5 including Satyabrat, who had executed the Hundi, made the following endorsement : "Signatures admitted subject to pleas in W.S. Sd/- Illegible, Counsel for defendants Nos. 1 to 5 26-11-62". 4. The Counsel for the guardian ad litem appointed by the court for defendants Nos. 6 to 14 dispensed with the formal proof of the document. The pleas raised in the written statement of defendents Nos. 1 to 5 did not include any plea that the document was inadmissible in evidence on account of deficiency in stamp duty payable thereon. That plea was taken by a subsequent amendment of the written statement of defendant No. 1 only. Under the circumstances the Court was not invited by any of the defendants to decide the question whether the document was inadmissible on account of deficiency in stamp duty and it was accordingly admitted in evidence and given an exhibit mark on 26th Nov. 1962. On the other hand in Ram Ratans case (supra) the objection to the admissibility of the document on the ground of insufficiency of stamp was not decided. Instead the Court made the Note: "Objected. Allowed subject to objection" and proceeded to mark it as Ext.I. That was a case where the Court postponed the decision of the objection. The present case before me is thus not governed by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Ram Ratans case (supra). 5. The substantial point that remains is whether the finding of the lower Appellate Court that the plaintiffs have failed to show that the Hundi in question was executed for consideration or that the evidence on the record and the circumstances showed that the Hundi was not executed for consideration is vitiated in law. 6. The signatures on the Hundi were not denied. What was suggested by the defendants was that Bhagwan Das, father of the first plaintiff and uncle of the second plaintiff, was the uncle (fathers sisters husband) of the first defendant and on 8th Jan. 6. The signatures on the Hundi were not denied. What was suggested by the defendants was that Bhagwan Das, father of the first plaintiff and uncle of the second plaintiff, was the uncle (fathers sisters husband) of the first defendant and on 8th Jan. 1961 Bhagwan Das sent a message through his Munim Surajbali to the first defendant that there was some bungling of some amount in the accounts of their partnership and because the Account Books had to be shown before the Income-tax Authorities, he, the first defendant should sign in back date on a Hundi for Rs. 1,800 and when the Munim of Bhagwan Das gave that message to the first defendant with a slip from him (Bhagwan Das) he, the first defendant, signed the Hundi, on seeing that slip and the message given by Surajbali. The genuines of the slip which is Ext.A-2 on the record was disputed by the plaintiff and the handwriting thereof was compared with the signatures of Bhagwan Das as a witness on a registered document Ext.A-3, by a handwriting expert Mr. A.N. Majumdar. The slip is in Muria. On the basis of a transliteration of the slip which was passed on to me by the learned Counsel the slip reads as under: MUNIM JI KO MALUM HO KI SATYABRAT SE RS. 1,800 PAR DASTKHAT KARVA LENA, MITI KUAR SUDI 9 SAMBAT 2017." After the Sambai 2017 there are two words which I would read as KO LIKHI although in the transliteration passed on to me they have been read as ME HO. On the left, hand corner of the slip the date 8-1-61 has been written in an altogether different handwriting and ink. The expert Mr. A.N. Majumdar who compared the handwriting on the slip with the signatures of Bhagwan Das on the registered deed Ext.A-3 did not appear to know Muria for, although he said he could read the contents of the slip, he was unsuccessful when asked to do so and pleaded that the handwriting was not good (Ghasit) Another peculiar aspect of the case is that the expert thought vide his report paper No. 71Ga that the signature of Bhagwan Das on paper No. 34-Ka, that is, Ext.A-3 was the disputed signature which he had to compare with the handwriting in Mahajani on paper No. 33-K, that is, the slip Ext.A-2. The slip Ext.A-2 does not contain any signature of Bhagwan Das and I do not think that the expert Mr A.N. Majumdar was right in saying that he could say on a comparison of the handwriting on Ext.A-2 that the signature of Bhagwan Das on Ext.A-3 were written by the same person particularly when both the writings were in Muria, a language with, which the expert was not well-versed, I need not emphasise the fact that even where the disputed signature is sought to be proved by expert evidence on comparison with the admitted signatures of a person that evidence is of very little evidentiary value because the science of judging handwriting by comparison is not very precise, and cannot be relied upon unlike the science of comparing disputed finger prints and thumb impressions with the admitted finger prints and thumb impressions. I have yet to come across an expert who could say merely on comparing a handwriting with a signature, and not two signatures one admitted and the other disputed, that both were written by the same person, particularly when the expert is not acquainted even with the script of the writing and the signatures, as in this case. Mr. A.N. Majumdar was, in my opinion, trying to do or at any rate claimed to have done what would appear to most people to be an impossible thing to do. The lower Appellate Court was in my opinion in error in relying on the opinion evidence of Mr. A.N. Majumdar in this case. 7. Even if the slip was written by Bhagwan Das, the date 8-1-61 written on the left hand corner of it was surely not written by him and if the last two words of the slip after the year 2017 read KO LIKHI as read by me, and not as ME HO, the slip and the Hundi are quite consistent with each other inasmuch as the slip bears the date Kuar Sudi 9 Sambat 2017 and the Hundi bears the date Kuar Sudi 10, Sambat 2017 which means that having advanced the amount of Rs. 1,800 to Satyabrat, Bhagwan Das sent the slip to his munim asking him to obtain the signatures of Satyabrat on Rs. 1,800 which the Munim did by obtaining a Hundi for that amount from Satyabrat, the next day which is quite in accord with the ordinary course of human affairs. 1,800 to Satyabrat, Bhagwan Das sent the slip to his munim asking him to obtain the signatures of Satyabrat on Rs. 1,800 which the Munim did by obtaining a Hundi for that amount from Satyabrat, the next day which is quite in accord with the ordinary course of human affairs. The only evidence in support of the defendants case that the slip was sent by Bhagwan Das on 8th Jan. 1961 for obtaining a Hundi in back date is that of Satyabrat himself. The other witness Gulab Chand DW 2 did not say that the Hundi was executed in a back date. He did prove that the slip was written by Bhagwan Das, and Surajbali got the Hundi executed from Satyabrat but in his statement recorded on 16th Jan. 1963, he said that the Hundi was executed more than 2 years ago and that no money was paid in his presence. Both these facts are consistent with the Hundi having been executed on 30th Sept. 1960 on the basis of the Slip sent by Bhagwan Das. The date 8th Jan, 1961 was specified only in the statement of Satyabrat and it is not possible to accept his uncorroborated testimony that the Hundi was executed because Bhagwan Das had told him that he wanted it to be executed in connection with his income-tax and sales Tax matters. Firstly, Sales Tax is not referred to in the written statement of execution of a Hundi by a businessman in favour of another and having a corresponding debit recorded on its basis in the account-books of another businessman for explaining a fictitious cash credit in his books but it is inconceivable why a man would fictitiously show an advance of money in a back date to another person for the purposes of his income-tax cases. The lower appellate Court has in this connection observed that the plaintiffs did (not ?) produce their account books but the defendants did not also produce their account books. The inference which could be drawn on the basis of non-production of the plaintiffs account-books could have been that the amount is not entered in his account-books, but on the basis of the non-production of the account-books by the defendants, the inference to be drawn would be that it is entered in their account books. The inference which could be drawn on the basis of non-production of the plaintiffs account-books could have been that the amount is not entered in his account-books, but on the basis of the non-production of the account-books by the defendants, the inference to be drawn would be that it is entered in their account books. But the plaintiffs have the presumption of S.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in their favour and it was for the defendants to prove that the Hundi was executed without consideration. Munim Surajbali appeared as the only witness for the plaintiffs. The lower Appellate Court has commented that the plaintiff did not appear in the witness-box but Bhagwan Das who had advanced the money was dead. He could not obviously be produced in the witness-box, Surajbali was, according to the defendants themselves the Munim who had obtained the signatures of defendant No. 1 on Hundi Under all these circumstances the lower Appellate Court was in my opinion not justified in law in brushing aside the finding of the Trial Court which is based on an appraisal of the oral evidence. There were no such facts and circumstances as may have entitled the lower Appellate Court to reverse the finding arrived at by the Trial Court on this point. The lower Appellate Court thus contravened the rule of practice laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarju Prasad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jawaleshwari Pratap Narain ( AIR 1951 SC 120 ). 8. Learned Counsel for the defendant-respondents, however, relied on Kundan Lal v. Custodian Evacuee Property, Bom. ( AIR 1961 SC 1316 ). That was a special case in which legality of an order of the Custodian General was before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court found that it was on the basis of relevant legal grounds that the Custodian General had held that the presumption raised under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was rebutted. As observed by the Supreme Court, in this case, the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act" is one of law and thereunder a Court shall presume, inter alia, that the negotiable instrument or the endorsement was made or endorsed for consideration" and that in effect it throws the burden of proof of failure of consideration on the maker of the note or the endorser, as the case may be. The decision of the Privy Council in Murugesam Pillai v. Ganna Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi, (AIR 1917 PC 6) was referred to by the Supreme Court in that case but that was in a different context. This was not a case where the consideration for the Hundi may have been the price of goods sold and the entries relating to the sale of goods existed in the account books. This was a case of a Hundi said to have been executed for cash consideration and when the Munim appeared in the witness-box and said that the amount was so advanced in cash and was entered in the books of account, which were kept at home, he ought to have been believed rather than to infer from the non-production of the books of accounts that it they would have been produced they would not have contained the entry of the advance made on the Hundi. It appears probable that the plaintiffs were advised that it was not necessary to produce the account books in view of the presumption that arose under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The effect of the non-production of the account books or the part of the defendants was on the other hand fatal. It was their case that Hundi was executed fictitiously in order to help Bhagwan Das in his Income-tax cases. It stands to reason that it that was so satyabrat would have been ready to support the Hundi by an entry in his account-books. It is not easily possible to believe that it the account-books of defendants were kept in ordinary course of business an entry dated 30th Sept. 1960 could have been made on 8th Jan, 1961. At any rate non-production of his account books by the defendants led to the presumption being raised against them, that it they had been produced an entry of the loan of Rs. 1,800/- would have been found in those account-books. 9. It further appears to me that no motive has been shown why the plaintiffs would sue on the basis of a fictitious Hundi after the death of Bhagwan Das, particularly when the parties are related as cousins and the defendant Satyabrat was obviously on good term with Bhagwan Das. 10. 1,800/- would have been found in those account-books. 9. It further appears to me that no motive has been shown why the plaintiffs would sue on the basis of a fictitious Hundi after the death of Bhagwan Das, particularly when the parties are related as cousins and the defendant Satyabrat was obviously on good term with Bhagwan Das. 10. Lastly, Learned Counsel for the defendant-respondents urged that the finding arrived at was a finding of fact and could not be interfered with by this Court on second appeal. 11. I have indicated in the reasons for my disagreement with the findings of the lower Appellate Court the errors of law and procedure committed by it. The findings of the lower Appellate Court are vitiated in law in view of those errors. No other point was pressed before me. 12. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the decree of the Trial Court decreeing the plaintiffs suit against the defendants for recovery of Rs. 1,746.60 p. with pendente lite and future interest at 6 per cent per annum is restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.