ORDER S.C. Mathur, J. - This is landlord's petition arising from a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction of opposite parties 3 to 6 (hereinafter called the opposite parties) from a building admittedly governed by the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, (13 of 1972) (hereinafter called the Act). The eviction of the opposite parties was claimed on the ground of default in payment of rent as contemplated by S. 20(2)(a) of the Act. 2. The facts which are either undisputed or have become final at this stage are these: The petitioner is the landlord of the shop in dispute. On 20-12-1972 the petitioner issued a composite notice of demand of rent and termination of tenancy to the opposite parties. This notice was served on 21-12-1972. Through the notice the petitioner demanded payment of rent for the period April 1970 to Nov. 1972 at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month. On 18-1-1973 i.e. within one month of the service of the notice the opposite parties remitted Rs. 395/- calculating rent from April, 1970 to Nov. 1972 at the rate of Rs. 12/- per month, which according to the opposite parties was the agreed rate of monthly rent. On 19-1-1973 postal endorsement of (wapus i.e. returned) was made on the money-order coupon. The money-order coupon contains this endorsement also : "22/1 POSTMAN NE 29-1-73 KO LIKHA HAI KI BAR BAR GAST LAGANE PAR MULAKAT NAHI KARTE HAIN. GHARWALE BATATE HAIN BAHAR GAYE HAIN." Ultimately the money-order was returned to the opposite parties. In the suit the petitioner pleaded that the opposite parties failed to pay the rent within one month from the date of service upon them of the notice of demand and he was therefore entitled to decree for eviction against them under S. 20(2)(a) of the Act. In the written statement the opposite parties denied the petitioner's allegation that they were defaulters in payment of rent. They pleaded that the rate of rent was not Rs. 20/- per month as alleged by the petitioner but was Rs. 12/- per month. They further pleaded that on receipt of notice from the petitioner they tendered the rent and therefore they were not defaulters in payment of rent and could not therefore be evicted from the shop in question. 3. 20/- per month as alleged by the petitioner but was Rs. 12/- per month. They further pleaded that on receipt of notice from the petitioner they tendered the rent and therefore they were not defaulters in payment of rent and could not therefore be evicted from the shop in question. 3. Both the courts below have held that the agreed rate of rent was Rs. 12/- per mensem as pleaded by the opposite parties and not Rs. 20/- as alleged by the petitioner and that on the facts proved in the case the opposite parties did not incur the liability of eviction from the shop. 4. In the present petition the only question pressed on behalf of the petitioner was regarding default in payment of rent. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the postal endorsement on the money-order coupon did not amount to refusal of the money-order by the petitioner and therefore the opposite parties remained defaulters in payment of rent. In support of this assertion reliance was placed on S.A. Alvi v. Azizul Rahman, AIR 1974 All 354 . Secondly, it was pleaded that the remittance of rent through money-order dated 18-1-1973 on the basis of which it has been held that the opposite parties did not commit default in payment of rent had not been pleaded by the opposite parties in their written statement and could not therefore be relied upon for negating the petitioner's claim of default under S. 20(2)(a) of the Act. 5. The finding of the question of rate of rent is one of fact and has therefore rightly been not challenged in the present petition. Once it is established that the rate of rent is Rs. 12/- per month, the opposite parties would incur the liability of eviction if they failed to comply with the requirements of S. 20(2)(a) of the Act which reads as follows : "(2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely - (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand......." In the above clause the expression 'failed' is significant. The word 'fail' has been defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as follows : "20-To neglect to do something : leave something undone, be found wanting, in not doing something..... to leave some possible or expected action unperformed or some condition unachieved..........." In view of the above definition the opposite parties can be said to have failed to pay only if it can be said that they neglected to do something which they were expected to do or they left some possible or expected action unperformed. In the case on hand, on receipt of notice of demand the action expected from the opposite parties was to tender rent to the petitioner either personally or through some agency recognised by law. Post Office is a commonly recognised agency for carrying money from the remitter to the payee. Therefore when on receipt of the notice of demand of rent the opposite parties remitted the rent through money order to the petitioner, they took the action expected of them. They cannot therefore be said to have failed to take action which they were required to take under S. 20(2)(a) of the Act. 6. Now in the above context the meaning assigned to the word `pay' pray be considered. Some of the meanings assigned to the word 'pay' in the above dictionary are : "(2) (a):-To satisfy (someone) for services rendered or property delivered, discharge an obligation to....... : to give offer or make freely or as fitting........" Under the above definition offer to pay is also covered by the word 'pay'. In the case on hand there was not merely on offer to pay but actual tender of the amount which is a step further towards payment than offer. On the facts of the present case therefore it cannot be said that the opposite parties "failed to pay" within the meaning of S. 20(2)(a) of the Act. The petitioner is therefore not entitled to claim their eviction under the provision. It may however be clarified that since the amount remitted did not come in the hands of the petitioner, the opposite parties will not be absolved of the liability to pay the same. The liability to pay is not discharged, only liability to eviction is not incurred. 7. It may however be clarified that since the amount remitted did not come in the hands of the petitioner, the opposite parties will not be absolved of the liability to pay the same. The liability to pay is not discharged, only liability to eviction is not incurred. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner however argued that the postal endorsement did not amount to refusal on the part of the petitioner to receive the money tendered through money-order and therefore the liability of eviction from the shop was incurred by the opposite parties. The postal endorsement may not amount to refusal but if the landlord after issuing a notice of demand makes himself scarce or unavailable for receiving the rent, he cannot invoke S. 20(2)(a) of the Act for claiming the tenant's eviction when after issuing notice to the tenant the landlord goes out of station, it is his duty to make arrangement for the receipt of the rent if the same is tendered within the time allowed by law. He cannot charge the tenant with committing default in payment of rent after making himself scarce rendering it impossible for the tenant to discharge the liability. 8. It was also argued on behalf of the petitioner that the money-order sent on 18-1-1973 could not be taken notice of by the courts below because the same had not been pleaded in the written statement. Averment to this effect has been made in para 8 of the writ petition. The averments made in para 8 of the writ petition have been replied to through para 17 of the written statement. It has not been specifically pleaded on behalf of the opposite parties that the money order dated 18-1-1973 had been pleaded in the written statement. It may therefore be assumed that through the written statement it was not specifically pleaded on behalf of the opposite parties that the rent was tendered to the petitioner through money order sent within one month of the service of the notice of demand. However it has also been stated in para 11 of the counter affidavit that it was specifically pleaded in the written statement that the opposite parties had not committed any default. However it has also been stated in para 11 of the counter affidavit that it was specifically pleaded in the written statement that the opposite parties had not committed any default. It was argued on behalf of the opposite parties that the money-order coupon was placed on record in order to substantiate the pleading that they were not defaulters in payment of rent which had already been raised in the written statement. The documents which have been relied upon for proving tender of rent to the petitioner within time are not private documents but are public documents of unimpeachable character and cannot therefore be directly overlooked. 9. In view of the above, the writ petition is without merit and deserves to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs to the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6.