ORDER R.S. Singh, J. - The writ petition is directed against the order of the Board of Revenue dated 25-9-1978 allowing the second appeal filed by plaintiff-respondents. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that Lakhraj, the petitioner, obtained a money decree in his favour against Mewa Lal from the Civil Court. The decree was put in execution and the order for attachment of the land in dispute was passed. In the meanwhile, Mewa Lal sold the land in dispute to his grandson Rambir for Rs. 2,000/- in the month of Oct. 1965 and mutation was also made in his favour on 17-3-1967. However, the property in dispute was attached on 20/21-11-1965. An objection was filed by Rambir under O. 21, R. 58, Civil P C (hereinafter referred to as CPC), which was dismissed by the Civil Court on 26-3-1966 with the finding that the sale deed executed in favour of Rambir by Mewa Lal was a sham transaction. Thereafter, the land in dispute was put to auction which was purchased by the decree holder for Rs. 7,000/-. The auction sale was confirmed on 16-3-1967 and the sale certificate was also issued on 1-8-1967. Lekhraj, the petitioner took possession on the basis of that auction sale through Court on 18-9-1967. Rambir filed an objection under O. 21, R. 100, CPC, on the ground of his dispossession from the land in dispute. This objection was also dismissed by order dated 9-3-1968. After the dismissal of his aforesaid objections from the Civil Court under O. 21, R. 58 and O. 21, R. 100, CPC, Rambir filed the present suit under S. 229B/212-B, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act against Lekhraj, the decree holder arid Mewa, the judgment debtor impleading Gaon Sabha and the State. Claiming declaration of Bhumidhari right in his favour on the basis of the sale deed executed in the month of October 1965 by Mewa and a prayer for restoration of possession was also made. Claiming declaration of Bhumidhari right in his favour on the basis of the sale deed executed in the month of October 1965 by Mewa and a prayer for restoration of possession was also made. The suit was contested by the defendant-petitioner on the ground that the sale deed relied upon by the plaintiff is a sham and fictitious transaction and also on the ground that the plaintiffs objections under O. 21, R. 58, CPC, was dismissed by the Civil Court and no suit was filed within a period of one year as contemplated by O. 21, R. 63, C.P.C. Therefore, the order of the Civil Court passed under O. 21, R. 58, has become final and the defendant is in possession as bhumidhar on the basis of auction sale. The trial court dismissed the suit. The appeal filed by the plaintiff was also dismissed by the Addl. Commissioner. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal against the decree and judgment of the Addl. Commissioner, which was allowed and the case was remanded to the trial court for fresh decision. The petitioner has challenged the order of the Board of Revenue before this Court. 3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that during the pendency of the execution proceeding, Mewa the judgment debtor, executed a sale deed in respect of the land in dispute in favour of his grandson for only Rs. 2,000/-. This sale deed was a farzi transaction executed for inadequate consideration to save the property from being sold in satisfaction of the money decree in favour of the petitioner against Mewa. The question of genuineness and validity of the sale was considered by the Civil Court while deciding the objection of the plaintiff-respondent under O. 21, R. 58, and the Civil Court recorded a definite finding that the sale deed executed by Mewa in favour of Rambir was a sham transaction and ineffective. According to O. 21, R. 63, this order became final as no suit was filed within a period of one year. Therefore, the present suit under S. 229-B, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, is not maintainable. It was further contended that the name of the plaintiff had also been recorded in the revenue papers by order of the revenue courts passed in mutation proceeding and the State and the Gaon Sabha never denied his right. Therefore, the present suit under S. 229-B, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, is not maintainable. It was further contended that the name of the plaintiff had also been recorded in the revenue papers by order of the revenue courts passed in mutation proceeding and the State and the Gaon Sabha never denied his right. Therefore, the suit was not maintainable under S. 229-B, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The learned counsel further contended that the petitioner has purchased land in dispute in an auction, which cannot be challenged unless it is set aside; the plaintiff is not entitled to any declaration and possession from the revenue courts. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on Rameshwar v. Ram Ashrey, (1965 Rev Dec 216) : (1965 All L J 677) and Parsottam v. Narrottam (1970 Rev Dec 216) : (1970 All L J 505) wherein it has been held that : - "...... where a plaintiff has a grievance against the village records which are maintained by the State Government and Gaon Sabha the suit will lie in revenue court under S. 229-B and any other person who disputes the plaintiffs title shall also be impleaded as a defendant but if the village records support the claim of the plaintiff, the suit will not lie under S. 229-B but will be cognizable by a civil court in case the plaintiffs right is disputed by a third person. In the instant case so long as the entries in the revenue papers supported the claim of the plaintiff, and there was no contest from the State Government or the Gaon Sabha the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from cutting the crops standing over the plots in suit, from interfering with the plaintiff in his possession over the plot in suit was cognizable by the civil court which was competent to entertain and to adjudicate upon all the pleas raised including the plea that the land was a joint family property." The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that merely by concealing and twisting the facts in drafting the plaint so as to oust the jurisdiction of civil court, the present suit was not maintainable. He placed reliance on D. N. Rege v. Muhammad Haider Kazi (1946 Rev Dec 149): ( AIR 1946 All 379 ) (FB) wherein it has been held that the civil and revenue courts cannot in any case have concurrent jurisdiction. The jurisdiction depends on the allegations made in the plaint provided those allegations are established to be true. In Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar (1968 Rev Dec 470) : ( AIR 1969 All 526 ) (FB) it has been held that : - " in all cases where on a definite cause of action two reliefs can be claimed is which of the two reliefs is the main relief and which relief or other reliefs are ancillary reliefs. Where from facts and circumstances of the case the relief for demolition and injunction is the main relief there could be no reason why the jurisdiction of the civil court should be barred." It has been further held that : - "The relief of possession will be merely ancillary relief which the civil court could grant after having taken cognizance of the suit for injunction and demolition." According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the plaintiffs remedy was by way of suit contemplated under O. 21, R. 63, and such suit is not contemplated by the 2nd Schedule of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Therefore, on this ground also, the present suit was not maintainable. In this connection, he relied upon Mohd. Akbar Khan v. Mian Musharaf Shah ( AIR 1934 PC 217 ) wherein it has been held that : - "Where the real purpose of a suit is to determine the rights between the attaching decree holder and the transferee of prior mortgage with possession, who objected to the attachment and sale, the Revenue Court is not competent to entertain it under S. 77. O. 21, Rule 63 applied to the case when once the right of the transferee first intervened. The matter could only be determined by a suit under R. 63, O. 21. That suit had to be brought in a Court of competent jurisdiction. O. 21, Rule 63 applied to the case when once the right of the transferee first intervened. The matter could only be determined by a suit under R. 63, O. 21. That suit had to be brought in a Court of competent jurisdiction. The revenue court, the jurisdiction of which is strictly limited, was not such a Court." The learned counsel also relied upon Pyda Ramakrishnayya Guru v. .Kuchipudi Naganna ( AIR 1933 Mad 865 ) in which similar view was taken that revenue court has no jurisdiction to try a suit under O. 21, R. 63, CPC. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that O. 21, R. 63, CPC, gives right to the person, whose objection under O. 21, R. 58, is rejected, to file a suit to establish his title. In case of non-filing of suit under this provision within a period of one year, the order becomes final and operates as res judicata in the subsequent suit. Reliance was placed in Janakamma v. A Govindraj Mudaliar ( AIR 1961 Mad 196 ) wherein it has been held that where the claim of the petitioner is rejected on the ground of belatedness and the suit under O. 21, R. 63, was not filed within one year from the date of order of rejection the order of rejection is conclusive and subsequent suit for declaration of right is barred by principle of constructive res judicata. The similar view was also taken in Kanthammal v. D. Venkatakrishna Reddiar ( AIR 1968 Mad 362 ). 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that O. 21, R. 63. CPC, contemplates filing of a suit to establish right in the property which was subject matter of attachment. Therefore, the suit was rightly filed by the plaintiff in the revenue court under S. 229-B, Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. for declaration of bhumidhari right in the land in dispute. The plaintiff was a bhumidhar on the basis of sale deed executed in his favour by Mewa Lal and the suit for declaration of Bhumidhari right could be filed by him in the revenue court under S. 229-B, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Mt. Aziz Jahan Begam v. Sardar Singh ( AIR 1955 All 241 ) (FB). Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Mt. Aziz Jahan Begam v. Sardar Singh ( AIR 1955 All 241 ) (FB). It relates to the determination of the fact whether the impugned order is passed under O. 21, R. 58, or not. If the order is strictly not governed under O. 21, R. 58, in that case O. 21, R. 58, has got no application. But where the impugned order is governed by O. 21, R. 58, then the order will become final subject to filing a suit under 0.21, R. 63. It has been further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the suit was maintainable in the revenue court under S. 229-B, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The limitation provided in the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was applicable and not as provided under Article 98, Limitation Act. As under S. 229-B, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the limitation is none, therefore, the suit was rightly filed, even if suit was filed after one year. 5. There is no dispute in this case that in execution of the decree passed in favour of Lekhraj against Mewa Lal the property in dispute was auctioned and was purchased by the petitioner. Auction sale was also confirmed. Thereafter, the auction purchaser took possession over the land in dispute. This fact is also not in dispute that Mewa Lal had sold the land in dispute in favour of Rambir, his grandson during the proceeding for execution. The objection filed by Rambir against the attachment order under O. 21, R. 58, CPC, was rejected with the finding that sale in his favour was sham transaction. This order is final if no suit is filed within a period of one year to establish his title in respect of the land in dispute as contemplated by O. 21, R. 63, CPC. Now the question for consideration is whether the suit establishing right in respect of the land in dispute has to be filed under O. 21, R. 63, itself or the same result may be achieved by filing a suit under S. 229-B, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as Act), for which no period is specified under the provisions of the Act. According to the O. 21, R. 63, CPC, the order is conclusive in case no suit is filed to establish right for which one year's time is prescribed by Article 98, Limitation Act. In other words, O. 21, R. 63, attach the finality to the orders passed under O. 21, R. 58, CPC, but it gives right to challenge that order by filing a suit within one year. Where no suit has been filed as contemplated under O. 21, R. 63, within one year, the period prescribed, the order passed under O. 21, R. 58, becomes final. It means that the aggrieved party is not entitled to file a regular suit for declaration for his title in the civil and revenue courts, as the case may be, for which period of limitation longer than one year is provided. Therefore, I am of the view that where the real purpose of suit is to determine the rights regarding attached property between the decree holder and the transferee during the execution proceeding, who objected to the attachment and sale, the revenue court is not contemplated. Under O. 21, R. 63, the matter could only be determined by a suit under O. 21, R. 63. That suit had to be brought in a civil court of competent jurisdiction in this case and the revenue court, which has restrict limited jurisdiction and was not such a court as held in Mohd. Akbar Khan v. Mian Musaraf Shah ( AIR 1934 PC 217 ) and Pyda Ramakrishnayya Guru v. Kuchipudi Naganna ( AIR 1933 Mad 865 ) (supra). The suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent under S. 229-B of the Act was not maintainable in this case on another ground as well. The plaintiff is already recorded in the revenue papers. From the allegations made in the plaint, it appears that no grievance has been-made against the State and the Gaon Sabha. The suit was also not been contested by them at any stage. The dispute is confined between the plaintiff on one hand and the auction purchaser on the other hand. Section 229-B of the Act contemplates a suit by a person claiming bhumidhari, sirdari or asami right primarily against the State,and the Gaon Sabha impleading other persons claiming to hold similar rights. The dispute is confined between the plaintiff on one hand and the auction purchaser on the other hand. Section 229-B of the Act contemplates a suit by a person claiming bhumidhari, sirdari or asami right primarily against the State,and the Gaon Sabha impleading other persons claiming to hold similar rights. Where the plaintiff is not aggrieved by the action of the State or the Gaon Sabha, a suit under this section is not maintainable and such a suit can be cognizable by civil court as held in Rameshwar v. Ram Ashrey (1965 All LJ 677) and Parsottam v. Narrottam (1970 All L J 505) (supra). From the facts of this case, it is quite clear that the plaintiff had no grievance of any kind against the State or the Gaon Sabha. The cause of action for filing the suit was the order passed against him under O. 21, R. 58, CPC. Therefore, on this ground also, the suit under S. 229-B of the Act was not maintainable. 6. Order 21, Rule 63 contemplates a suit by a person against whom order under O. 21, R. 58, CPC, is passed. For such a suit a limitation of one year is provided under Article 98, Limitation Act. The present suit was admittedly filed beyond one year. In other words, no suit was filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent within one year from the date of the order under O. 21, R. 58, CPC. Therefore, the order had become final and the present suit under S. 229-B of the Act was not maintainable at all. The order of the trial court as well as that of the Addl. Commissioner were correct and in accordance with law. 7. In view of my above discussions, the order of the Board of Revenue suffers from manifest error of law and hence cannot be sustained, and deserves to be quashed. 8. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Board of Revenue dated 25-9-1978 is hereby quashed. However, in the circumstance of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.