ORDER S.C. Mathur, J. - The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of eviction from building passed against them in proceedings under S. 43 (2) (rr), U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter called the Act). The impugned order has been passed by the learned Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow, exercising jurisdiction as the Prescribed Authority under the Act. 2. Shorn of details of the facts necessary for deciding this petition are these : Opposite party 2 is the landlord of premises 109/18, Model Houses, (Naya Gaon) Lucknow. The said premises was originally in the tenancy of Sri H. B. Joshi. Sri H. B. Joshi has died and Sri B. C. Joshi and Sri M. M. Joshi, the present petitioners, are his heirs and legal representatives. The opposite party 2 filed an application under S. 3, U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act No. 3 of 1947 against Sri H. B. Joshi seeking permission to take ejectment proceedings against Sri Joshi. During the pendency of the proceedings Sri H. B. Joshi died and thereafter the proceedings continued against the present petitioners. The permission prayed for was refused by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but it was granted by the Commissioner by his order dated 13-11-1967. The permission was confirmed by the State Government by order dated 17-7-1968. The State Government, however, allowed six months' time to the petitioners to vacate the accommodation. Thus the right to institute the suit for eviction accrued to opposite party 2 only after the expiry of the period of six months computed from 17-7-1968. This period of six months expired on 17-1-1969. On 16-5-1969 opposite party 2 filed suit for ejectment on the basis of the permission referred to herein which is still pending. During the pendency of the suit, U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 was repealed and was replaced by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. On 29-1-1979 opposite party 2 moved an application before the Prescribed Authority under S. 43 (2) (rr) for eviction of the petitioners from the premises in question. The application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 19-12-1979. Aggrieved by the order the petitioners have approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. In support of the petition I have heard Sri Abdul Mannan. The application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 19-12-1979. Aggrieved by the order the petitioners have approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. In support of the petition I have heard Sri Abdul Mannan. The petition has been opposed on behalf of opposite party 2 by Sri D.C. Sinha. Sri Mannan has raised two grounds. In the first place he argued that the application under S. 43 (2) (rr) was barred by time. Secondly the learned counsel argued that the application could be filed only after the withdrawal of the suit for eviction which was pending at that time and which is still pending. According to the learned counsel two remedies for eviction could not be pursued simultaneously. 4. The U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, as originally enforced, did not contain cl. (rr). Through cl. (r) it was provided that any suit for the eviction of tenant instituted with the permission referred to in S. 3 of the old Act or any proceedings arising out of such suit pending immediately before the commencement of the Act may be continued and concluded as if the Act had not been passed. Thus in spite of the repeal of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 the suit filed by opposite party 2 on 16-5-1969 was saved. Cl. (rr) was introduced through the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act No. 37 of 1972. This clause reads as follows : "(rr) where any permission referred to in S. 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any ground specified in sub-s. (1) or sub-s (2) of S. 21, and has become final, either before the commencement of this Act, or in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section, after the commencement of this Act, and a suit for the eviction of the tenant has not been instituted, the landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under S. 21, and thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy, and it shall not be necessary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and such order shall be final and shall not be open to appeal under S. 22". (emphasis supplied) Under the above provision an application under Cl. (emphasis supplied) Under the above provision an application under Cl. (rr) could be moved only if suit for eviction had not already been instituted. This clause did not prescribe any period of limitation for moving the application. 5. Cl. (rr) was later amended through the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act No. 28 of 1976. Through this amendment the words "and a suit for the eviction of the tenant has not been instituted" were replaced by the words "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted." It was further provided that the words substituted shall be deemed always to have been substituted. The amending Act further added two provisions to the clause. These provisions are as follows : "Provided that no application under this clause shall be maintainable on the basis of a permission granted under S. 3 of the old Act, where such permission became final more than three years before the commencement of this Act: Provided further that in computing the period of three years, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence any civil proceeding whether in a court of first instance or appeal or revision shall be excluded." In respect of the proviso also it was provided that they shall be deemed always to have been inserted. 6. Under the amended Cl. (rr) application is maintainable even though a suit had already been instituted. The amending Act does not provide that the pending suit shall either abate or shall have to be withdrawn by the landlord before he moves an application under the clause. The argument of the learned counsel, therefore, that the application under Cl. (rr) could be moved only after withdrawal of the suit. cannot be accepted. 7. Coming to the question of limitation, the first proviso provides that between the date the permission become final and the date of commencement of the Act, more than three years should not elapse. Since the proviso has been inserted with retrospective effect, the date of commencement of the Act shall be the date on which the Act originally was enforced, which is 15-7-1972. In the present case there was some controversy regarding the date on which the permission became final. There are two dates which may be considered for the purposes of this finality. In the present case there was some controversy regarding the date on which the permission became final. There are two dates which may be considered for the purposes of this finality. The first date is 13-11-1967 when the State Government rejected the representation of the petitioners under S. 7-F, U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 and confirmed the permission granted by the commissioner by his order dated 17-7-1968. If the period is computed from 17-7-1968 the period of three years expired on 17-7-1971 and, therefore, under the first proviso the application would be barred by time. If the limitation is computed from 17-1-1969, when the period of six months granted by the State Government expired, the period of three years would expire on 17-1-1972. This date is also prior to the date of enforcement of the Act and, therefore, under the first proviso the application would be barred even if the period is computed from the later date. The question now arises whether the opposite party can claim any benefit under the second proviso. 8. Under the second proviso the period to be excluded is the time during which the landlord had been prosecuting with due diligence any civil proceeding. This, proviso will obviously cover a case where a civil proceeding had been instituted prior to the expiry of the period mentioned in the proviso. In the case on hand, the said period expired either on 17-7-1971 or on 17-1-1972 as indicated herein. Prior to both these dates the civil proceeding had been instituted by the filing of the suit for eviction on 16-5-1969. Under this proviso the entire period during which the civil proceeding is prosecuted with due diligence is to be excluded. Therefore, the period starting from 16-5-1969 and ending with the termination of the suit is to be excluded Since the suit is still pending, the termination point has not yet been reached. The period of exclusion is, therefore, still running. In the circumstances the application under Cl. (rr) moved by opposite party 2 against the petitioners cannot be said to be barred by time. 9. In view of the above, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. The stay order, if any, shall stand discharged. The eviction order shall, however, not be executed for a period of four months.