JUDGMENT M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the revisional judgment dated 12th August, 1981, a true copy of which is Annexure 3 to the petition. A certified copy of the said order is also on the record. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. The petitioner was the tenant of the respondent No. 2. The latter filed a suit for the eviction of the petitioner after determining his tenancy. The other connected reliefs, by way of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation, were also claimed. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court by its judgment dated 20th February 1979, a true copy of which is Annexure 2 to the petition. A revision was filed against the said judgment under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, and the same was allowed by the revisional Court by the aforesaid impugned judgment dated 12.8.1981. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri S.U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, Sri V.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the landlord respondent No. 2 has made his submissions. 4. The controversy between the parties is whether the tenanted accommodation in question is governed by the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The landlord in question stood exempted from the operation of the said Act. This contention was rejected by the trial Court but it has been accepted by the revisional Court. It is not disputed that if the accommodation in question is exempted from the operation of the said Act then the suit for eviction was rightly decreed by the lower revisional Court. However, if it be held otherwise then the suit for eviction must be held to have been rightly dismissed by the trial Court. Section 2(1)(b) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is reproduced below :- "2. Exemptions from operation of Act (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to (b) any building belonging to or vested in a recognised educational institution, the whole of the income from which is utilised for the purposes of such institution". Sri Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance on Arya Kanya Pathshala Association Khurja Bulandshahr v. Girdhari Lal Vaish Halwai, 1980 All. Weekly Cases 443. Sri Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance on Arya Kanya Pathshala Association Khurja Bulandshahr v. Girdhari Lal Vaish Halwai, 1980 All. Weekly Cases 443. In the said case a learned Judge of this Court while interpreting Section 2(1)(b) observed as follows :- "In the present case the statute clearly indicates that the word 'vest' has not been used as vesting in title for that is excluded by the use of the word 'belonging to" which occurs in the earlier part of this sub-section." The learned Judge thereafter went on to lay down as follows :- "There is another question which has vexed me while considering this aspect of the matter, and that is whether the Education Institution claiming such benefit should be a juristic entity, for how can any property vest, even in a limited sense in a body which is not a described as a juristic entity, as it is neither a corporation sole, or aggregate or a constitutional or statutory entity. However, it is not necessary to explore this matter in this case as the claim that the shop in the dispute vests in the college, falls on the considerations already adverted to." 5. It has seemed to me that in view of the aforesaid observation, the learned Judge himself was the view that in the context, in the case of an educational institution lacking juristic personality, the expression 'vest' has to be interpreted in a manner different from the manner in which the said expression is normally construed. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that if I want to differ from the ratio laid down in the said case then on the basis of the well-known judicial etiquette, I should refer the matter to a larger bench. It is undoubtedly well established that if a single Judge chooses to differ from another single Judge then the proper course is that the controversy should be referred to a larger Bench. This has been so laid down in Late Sri Bhagwan and another v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1967 and recently in Smt. Vidyawati v. Ratan Lal and others, All. Rent Cases 665. This has been so laid down in Late Sri Bhagwan and another v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1967 and recently in Smt. Vidyawati v. Ratan Lal and others, All. Rent Cases 665. However, in the instant case, I do not feel the necessity of referring the matter to a larger Bench because I think I am not taking a view which can be said to be necessarily in conflict with the decision of the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid case. It should be seen that in Section 2(1)(b) the expression used as "recognised education institution". In Section 3(q) 'recognised education institution' has been defined as follows :- "Recognised education institution means any institution recognised under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972, or recognised or affiliated under the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973." In Section (b) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, 'institution' has been defined as follows :- "Institution means recognised Intermediate College, Higher Secondary School or High School and includes where the context so requires, a part of an institution, and "Head of Institution" : means the Principal or Head Master, as the case be, of such institution. In Section 2(d) of the said Act 'recognition' has been defined as follows :- "Recognition means recognition for the purpose of preparing candidates for admission to the Board's Examination". Therefore, it is clear that the exemption provided for in Section 2(1)(b) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is for the benefit of the recognised education institutions and such institutions are either recognised Intermediate Colleges, Higher Secondary Schools or High Schools so far as the U.P. Intermediate Education Act is concerned. Recognition has reference to the right or eligibility of an institution to prepare candidate for admission to the Board's Intermediate or High School Examination. In Section 16(a) of the Intermediate Education Act, there is a provision for the scheme of administration for the recognised institution. Such scheme of administration provides for the constitution of a Committee of Management vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. It should be seen that Section 16(a) clearly lays down that it will have an over-riding effect inasmuch as it will be enforced notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, document, or decree or order of a Court or other instrument. It should be seen that Section 16(a) clearly lays down that it will have an over-riding effect inasmuch as it will be enforced notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, document, or decree or order of a Court or other instrument. It seems to me that the exemption clause in Section 2(1)(b) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 should be interpreted in the light of the aforesaid provisions contained in the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. A recognised educational institution has been given a certain statutory colour or complexion in view of the aforesaid provisions contained in the Intermediate Education Act. It is found to have statutory Committee or managements in accordance with a Statutory scheme of administration. The amendments in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act were substantially made in 1958 by the U.P. Act No. 35 of 1958 and the effort therein was to remove the defect of the private Management in such educational institutions and to regulate their working on a settled pattern. However, it is important to note that the Intermediate Education Act has not endowed such educational institutions with any legal personality. In other words, these recognised educational institutions cannot be said to be legal persons in the manner in which a company incorporated under the Companies Act or other bodies incorporated under other statutory enactments can be said to be legal persons. There is nothing in the Intermediate Education Act laying down that such recognised education institution will have the right to sue or be sued or will have the right to hold property and to act otherwise in the manner in which corporate bodies are entitled to act by virtue of their incorporation. 6. I have discussed above in some detail the legal position vis-a-vis a recognised education institution under the Intermediate Education Act. However, in the instant case the educational institution is a Degree College. This therefore, necessitates that certain provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act 1973, should be considered. In Section 2(2) of the said Act affiliated college' means an institution affiliated to a University in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and Statutes of the University. In Section 2(4) of the Act 'Associate college' has been defined as an institution recognised by the University and authorised under the provisions of the said Act to provide for teaching necessary for admission to a degree of the University. In Section 2(4) of the Act 'Associate college' has been defined as an institution recognised by the University and authorised under the provisions of the said Act to provide for teaching necessary for admission to a degree of the University. Section 2(6) of the Act defines 'constituent college' as in institution maintained by the University or by the State Government and named as such by the Statutes. Under Section 7(2) of the Act, the University has the power to admit any college to the privileges of affiliation or recognition or to enlarge the privileges of any college already affiliated or recognised, as the case may be, or to withdraw or curtail any such privilege and to guide and control the work of affiliated and associated colleges. Chapter VII of this Act containing Section 37 to 44 deals with affiliation of recognition. It is not necessary to advert to the details of the provisions contained in the said Chapter. Broadly speaking, provisions have been made for affiliation and recognition of college to the University and the management of such college has been left to their managing committees or other bodies, charged with managing the affairs of the college and recognised as such by the University. This is clear from the definition of management in Section 2(13) of the Act. However, certain functions of supervisory nature have been vested in the Executive Council of the University concerned. The position remains the same in the case of such a degree college as in the case of a recognised Intermediate College and which has been discussed above. These colleges have their managing committees which manage their affairs but as held above they are not juristic persons or legal personalities capable of suing or being sued or holding property. It is, therefore, clear that even though for certain specific matters recognised educational institutions have been so dealt with under the Intermediate Education Act and under the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 as if they have their own individuality with their own committees of management, still, it will not be correct to consider them as juristic persons having a right to sue or be sued. Even if it be held that with regard to certain actions arising out of the breach of the provisions laid down in the Intermediate Education Act or in the State Universities Act, 1973 it is open to a recognised educational institution itself to the legal action, still, in my opinion, there can be no room for doubt that so far as the field which is not occupied by the said Acts is concerned, such institutions cannot be allowed to sue or be sued in civil Court in their own names. 7. Under the Societies Registration Act even though a society cannot be treated as a corporate body in the manner in which a company incorporated under the Companies Act can be treated to be a Corporate body (See Board of Trustees Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College Delhi State of Delhi and another, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 458, still, there are provisions in the said Act which enable the society to sue or be sued in the name of its office bearers made Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1960. A society can own property vide Section 5 of the Act. Very often, educational institutions are run by the societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. In such cases, the right to sue on the basis of contract will not inhere in the educational institution because the same has no legal personality and the same is in the eye of law a mere name. The society, however, which runs such institution, can undoubtedly sue or be sued on the basis of the contracts, even though such contracts are in relation to the affairs and management of the educational institution run by the society. If a suit were to be filed by an educational institution in its own name, the same will be able to be thrown out on the ground that the educational institution has no existence in law. It cannot enter into a contract and it cannot sue or be sued. Even if a contract is entered into by it, it will be held that the same has been entered into by the society or the corporate body running the educational institution. It cannot enter into a contract and it cannot sue or be sued. Even if a contract is entered into by it, it will be held that the same has been entered into by the society or the corporate body running the educational institution. Legal title in the property and the right to sue or be sued or to enter into contracts vests in the society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, where a Society runs such recognised educational institution. In my view, in the instant case, the respondent No. 2 correctly filed the suit against the petitioner because it was the society registered under the Societies Registration Act and it was running the educational institution known as Dharam Samaj Degree College. If the suit had been filed in the name of the Degree College, it would have been held to be not maintainable because the Degree College as such lacked the status to sue or be sued in law. In this background as I stated above, exemption clause contained in Section 2(1) of the U.P. Act, XIII of 1972 has to be interpreted. I agree with C.S.P. Singh, J. that the expression 'vested' in this clause has to be construed in flexible manner. The said learned Judge himself felt that a property can never vest in a non-juristic body like an educational institution. Therefore, one has to read the expression 'belonging to or vested' used in this clause in such a manner that the same gets some meaning in harmony with the accepted legal position that the property can never vest in a mere educational institution which is neither registered nor incorporated by or under any statute. If this approach were not to be accepted then the exemption granted will be absolutely meaningless in almost 100 per cent cases because it is well known, as I stated above, that educational institutions are by and large run by the societies registered under the Societies Registration Act. The societies themselves cannot be treated to be recognised educational institutions because of several difficulties. It should be seen that the recognition or affiliation in the case of degree colleges is granted to the colleges as such and not to the societies running such colleges. The societies themselves cannot be treated to be recognised educational institutions because of several difficulties. It should be seen that the recognition or affiliation in the case of degree colleges is granted to the colleges as such and not to the societies running such colleges. One can say that the position is somewhat extraordinary in the sense that on the one hand, the law does not clothe any legal personality to the educational institution but in the special enactments governing such institutions they have been given a certain individuality. Though such individuality cannot be treated as equivalent to a legal personality. In interpreting Section 2(b) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 one has to harmonise the canons of general laws with the special provisions contained in the statutes like the U.P. Intermediate Education Act or the U.P.; Basic Education Act 1972 or the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 and this is what I have been endeavouring to do in the aforesaid discussion. 8. Where a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 runs an educational institution and the building of the educational institution is legally owned by such society, what will be the meaning of the expression "belonging to or vested in a recognised education institution". Obviously, it cannot be said that the building is owned by two owners. There is no question of any duality of ownership in such a case. The recognised educational institution is basically a part of the society which owns the property of the college and runs the educational institution. One approach may be that as a part of the society itself the educational institution may be said to own the building. There can be another approach also and as I stated above the interpretation which is being made is in the background of the aforesaid circumstances which have been discussed above. I shall take an example in this connection. A society runs a recognised educational institution and also runs a separate non-recognised educational institution. If a shop is situated in the building of a recognised educational institution, one can say, speaking almost in the language of the layman, that the shop is owned by the recognised educational institution. I shall take an example in this connection. A society runs a recognised educational institution and also runs a separate non-recognised educational institution. If a shop is situated in the building of a recognised educational institution, one can say, speaking almost in the language of the layman, that the shop is owned by the recognised educational institution. On the other, if another shop is situated in a non-recognised educational institution, one can say, again speaking in the same manner, that such shop belongs to or vests in the non-recognised educational institution. As a matter of law, both the shops and, in fact, both the buildings in which such shops are situated, really belong to or vest in the Society registered under the Societies Registration Act which runs the said two institutions. However, for the purpose of giving meaning to the aforesaid exemption clause in Section 2(b) and with a view to effectuate the legislative intention, it seems to me that the aforesaid approach would answer the requirements and needs of the situation. It may be contended that the aforesaid approach is merely pragmatic and lacks the basic ingredients of judicial interpretation. However, I apprehended that even the basis of the rules of statutory interpretation, such meaning has to be given to the exemption clause as will effectuate its purpose and will not condemn it to ineffectiveness. 9. In the facts of the instant case, the revisional Court has found as follows :- "A perusal of paragraph Nos. 1 to 5 the plaint shows that the plaintiff has pleaded that the building belongs to the recognised educational institution i.e. D.S. Degree College, which is run by the plaintiff society. The plaintiff examined P.W. 1 Shri Shanti Swarup Mittal, who has stated that the plaintiff runs the D.S. Degree College and the disputed building and its income is spent for the purposes of education alone. It has, thus, been proved that the building belongs to recognised educational institution called D.S. Degree College. The defendant has himself filed documents including paper No. 61 Ga, which shows that the notice was given on behalf of the Secretary, Dharam Samaj College. He also filed paper No. 68/Ga and proved that this is the copy of notice given by the defendant. This notice was given to the Secretary, Dharam Samaj College, Aligarh. The defendant has himself filed documents including paper No. 61 Ga, which shows that the notice was given on behalf of the Secretary, Dharam Samaj College. He also filed paper No. 68/Ga and proved that this is the copy of notice given by the defendant. This notice was given to the Secretary, Dharam Samaj College, Aligarh. In para 1 of this notice it has been pleaded that the defendant is the tenant of the disputed building on behalf of D.S. College. In the body of the notice also complaint has been made that college is causing inconvenience to the defendant. It has also been mentioned in this notice that there is some dispute about the office bearers of the Committee of the College and therefore, the Secretary should intimate the person to whom the rent should be paid. This notice in unequivocal terms gives the admission of the defendant that he is tenant of the D.S. College. It is admitted that the D.S. Degree College is a recognised educational institution. The plaintiff has also filed various notices given by the plaintiff and the defendant in which the tenancy is said to be of the college. The notice 9 Ga was also given by the Secretary, D.S. College, Aligarh. In the reply (11 Ga) it was admitted that the defendant is tenant of D.S. College. The defendant has also filed paper Nos. 23/Ga, 26/Ga, 35/Ga, 36/Ga, 37/Ga, 39/Ga, 40/Ga, 41/Ga, 42/Ga, 43/Ga, 44/Ga, 45/Ga, 46/Ga and 47/Ga in all of which it was admitted by the defendant that he is tenant on behalf of D.S. College. The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to exemption under Section 2(1)(b) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972." 10. It seems that the accommodations in question are situated in the D.S. Degree College compound. In these circumstances, in my view, the revisional Court did not commit any error of law in holding that the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 was entitled to the benefit of the exemption contained in Section 2(1)(b) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 on the ground that the D.S. Degree College run by the said plaintiff respondent No. 2 was a recognised educational institution and the income from the accommodations in question was being wholly utilised for the purposes of the said educational institution. The said educational institution was being run by the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 society. The said educational institution was being run by the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 society. The accommodations in question, even though in strict law vesting in the registered society or in its governing body, could still, for the purposes of the said exemption clause in Section 2(1)(b) of the Act, be construed to belong to or vest in the said Degree College and there was a clear admission of the petitioner himself that he was a tenant of the said Degree College and the tenanted accommodation in question belonged to the said Degree College. The first contention, therefore, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected. 11. The learned counsel next contended that in the facts of the instant case, it should be held that the plaintiff could not file the instant suit for the eviction of the petitioner tenant because of its conduct. Either the plaintiff society stood estopped from contending that the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was not applicable to the accommodations in question or, in the alternative, it could be held that the benefit of Section 2(1)(b) of the said Act had been waived by the plaintiff-society. This contention was sought to be raised on the ground that the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 at an earlier stage had served a notice dated 8.8.1976 upon the petitioner under Section 9-A of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. By the said notice the rent of the accommodations in question was sought to be doubled. The said allegation is made in para 7 of the writ petition. It is further stated in the said para that after receiving the said notice dated 8.8.1976, the petitioner approached the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 and after mutual discussion the rent was enhanced by 50 per cent, instead of 100 per cent which had been sought in the said notice. It has been further alleged in the said paragraph that the enhanced rent began to be paid from January, 1977. Lastly, it is stated in the said paragraph that the said notice dated 8.8.1976 was filed by the petitioner before the trial Court and the same was admitted by the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 and the document was marked as Ext. A-15. The true copy of the said document is Annexure 4 to the petition. 12. Lastly, it is stated in the said paragraph that the said notice dated 8.8.1976 was filed by the petitioner before the trial Court and the same was admitted by the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 and the document was marked as Ext. A-15. The true copy of the said document is Annexure 4 to the petition. 12. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following :- 1 Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition. Pages 328 and 330. 2. Lachoo Mal v. Radhey Sham, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2213. 3. Sarat Chander Dey and others v. Gopal Chander Laha and others, 19 Indian Appeals 203. 4. R.S. Maddanappa v. Chandrama and another, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1812. 5. Smt. Geeta Mishra v. Utkal University, AIR 1971 Orissa 276. 6. Nagubai Ammal and others v. B. Sharma Rao and others, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 593. 7. Pujari Narasappa and another v. Shjaik Hazrat and others, AIR 1960 Mysore 59. 8. Tarinikamal Pandit and others v. Perfulla Kumar Chatterjee, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1165. 13. On the other hand, Sri V.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent contended that the aforesaid pleas of estoppel and waiver could not be raised for the first time in the instant petition because they had not been raised before the Courts below. He placed reliance on Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and others v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 591. 14. It may further be stated that the allegations made in para 7 of the writ petition have been denied in para 8 of the counter affidavit. It has been stated in the counter-affidavit that no notice given by Vijai Dhari as alleged, was not binding on the plaintiff. It was further denied that any settlement between the parties took place in view of the provisions of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 15. It is well-known that the plea of estoppel is not identical with the plea of waiver and ingredients of the two pleas are separate. However, for the purpose of deciding this petition, it is not necessary to emphasise and deal with the distinctive aspects of each of the said two pleas. Both of them can be taken up together and disposed of. 16. I shall now take up the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 1. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (supra). Both of them can be taken up together and disposed of. 16. I shall now take up the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 1. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (supra). On page 328, it is stated as follows : "Waiver Everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. ________________ ________________ On page 330, the Commissioner observed : "Full knowledge of the relevant facts is necessary if there is to be a valid waiver ___________ There can be no waiver of a statutory requirement which is imposed in the public interest". 2. Lachoo Mal (supra). The controversy in the said case was whether the benefit of Section 1-A of the repealed U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 could be waived by the landlord. By the said provision the applicability of the said Act stood confined to the buildings which were constructed prior to January 1, 1951. The landlord in the said case entered into an agreement with his tenant where under the tenant agreed to vacate the shop in his tenancy with a view to enable the landlord to reconstruct the same. The further stipulation was that after reconstruction the shop was to be given back to the tenant and the same amount of rent was to be payable in respect of the constructed shop as was being paid in respect of the old shop as was being paid in respect of the old shop. It was further stipulated that the reconstructed shop was to be subject to the provision of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 and the landlord was not to claim the benefit of the aforementioned provision contained in Section 1-A of the said Act. It was laid down by the Supreme Court that the landlords could waive the benefit of the Section 1-A as it was meant to a benefit on them and there was no question of the infringement of any public right or public policy. It was further emphasised that the aforesaid agreement between the landlord and the tenant could not be said to be unlawful under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. 17. It was further emphasised that the aforesaid agreement between the landlord and the tenant could not be said to be unlawful under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that almost identical is the position under the new U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. According to him, it is open to the landlord to waive the benefit under Section 2(1)(b). He re-enforces his contention by submitting that the said clause was inserted by the amending U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 by which enactments Section 9-A was also added to the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. By Section 9-A as the provision was made for a revision of rent for commercial building let out by public charitable or religious or public institutions. The learned counsel elaborated that the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1972 was undoubtedly applicable to the accommodations in question prior to the aforesaid amending Act, U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. It was virtue of the insertion of Section 2(1)(b) by the said amending Act that the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 could claim that the accommodation in question stood exempted from the applicability of the Act. The learned counsel submitted that the amending Act could not apply to the sitting tenants such as the petitioner in the case. In my view, this contention is wholly devoid of merit. A question of prospectivity or retrospectivity of the applicability of the Amending Act might arise in respect of pending suits i.e. the suits which were pending on the date when the Amending Act came into force. However, to contend that the amending provision would never be applicable even in future to the sitting tenant, will not be a tenable contention. 18. Without entering into the controversy as to whether it is open to a landlord to agree with the tenant that he would not raise a contention under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act as against such a tenant, I feel that in the instant case the facts are absolutely dissimilar to those which fell for consideration of the Court in the aforesaid Supreme Court case. In the said case there was a clear written agreement between the landlord and the tenant placing reliance on which the tenant vacated the shop with a view to enable the landlord to reconstruct the same. In the said case there was a clear written agreement between the landlord and the tenant placing reliance on which the tenant vacated the shop with a view to enable the landlord to reconstruct the same. There were clear stipulations in the agreement that the landlord would hand back the possession of the shop to the tenant and the other terms of tenancy would continue to remain the same and the landlord would not be entitled to claim the benefit of the provision contained in Section 1-A of the U.P. Act No. 3 of the 1947. This is not the position here. The plea of waiver is sought to be based on the ground that a notice for enhancement of rent was given under Section 9-A and ultimately some kind of settlement took place between the parties resulting in an enhancement of the rent though not to the extent as it had been demanded by the landlord. It should be seen that no proceedings were taken under Section 9-A of the Act. The said section lays down that the landlord, who wishes to get the rent revised, has to make an application to the District Magistrate for revision of the monthly rent. Admittedly, no such proceedings took place. Therefore, it can be safely taken that the enhancement even if any could not be said to be under the provisions of Section 9-A, of the Act. Even if the alleged notice given by the landlord to the tenant made a reference to Section 9-A the same cannot mean that the enhanced rent, which was agreed to be paid by the tenant, could be said to be under the provisions of Section 9-A of Act. The utmost that can be said is that the landlord threatened the tenant with proceedings under Section 9-A of the Act, but this is not to say that the enhancement of rent, to which the tenant agreed, must be treated as one under Section 9-A of the Act. Under the said provision, the enhancement of rent has to be made under a specific order of the District Magistrate or his delegate. When no proceedings were taken under Section 9-A in the manner as laid down there, the enhancement of rent which a tenant agrees to, will be treated merely as brought about in pursuance of the contractual arrangement between the parties. When no proceedings were taken under Section 9-A in the manner as laid down there, the enhancement of rent which a tenant agrees to, will be treated merely as brought about in pursuance of the contractual arrangement between the parties. I did not think that in such a circumstance, a tenant can successfully set up a plea of waiver or estoppel against the landlord contending that the latter should be held to have waived the benefit of Section 2(1)(b) of the Act. Very often, the parties are not clear about their legal rights and the provisions contained in the enactments governing their rights, are complex and their interpretation is not free from doubt. In such circumstances, they very often act under misconception in respect of the rights and obligations and, in my view, the mere facts that a tenant is threatened with proceedings under the new Act and thereby was induced to agree to an enhancement of the rent, will not enable him to contend that a landlord should be debarred from contending that the Act is not applicable to the building in question. 19. It should further be seen that whatever might be the position in respect of the private individuals, in the case of recognised educational institutions and registered societies running such institutions, a plea of waiver or estoppel cannot be successfully raised against them in view of their peculiar situation and constitution. It is highly doubtful if any office bearer of such institutions can be said to have any authorisation from the society or institution to waive the benefit to which the institution is entitled under the provisions of an enactment. It will be highly unsafe if any other rule were held to be applicable. An institution or a society is not the private affair or property of any office bearer. One would think that before there can be such a waiver on the part of the society, the matter will have to be placed before the society either in its general meeting or, even if for the sake of argument it be accepted, atleast before the governing body of the society or the institution. All these aspects are important before one can accede to the contention which the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised. 20. All these aspects are important before one can accede to the contention which the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised. 20. In my view, in the facts of the instant case there is not the least justification in allowing the petitioner to raise the pleas of estoppel and waiver. These pleas were not raised at the stage when they should have been raised to enable the plaintiff respondent No. 2 to meet them. There is a clear controversy between the parties as to whether any settlement regarding enhancement of rent took place or not and if any such settlement had taken place, what was the background or motivation in which such settlement took place. It is not for this Court to make any investigation into such debatable controversy in this petition. It cannot be said that in the facts of the instant case, the pleas of waiver and estoppel can be treated as purely legal pleas. The aforesaid citation from Max-well itself runs against the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned Commissioner emphasised that the full knowledge of the relevant facts is necessary if there is to be any waiver. Accordingly, before the tenant could be allowed to raise and press such a plea, it was necessary for him to have set out the facts before the Courts below to show that the plaintiff society was waiving the benefit of Section 2(1)(b) of the Act with the full knowledge of the relevant facts. It is impossible to say that this was the position in the instant case. 21. In the aforesaid background, it is not really necessary to examine the facts of each and every case on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 3. Sarat Chander Day & others (supra). It deals with Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. The head-note is as follows :- "It is quite unnecessary in order to create estoppel that the person whose acts or declarations induced another to act must have been under no mistake himself, or must have acted with an intention to mislead or deceive. Estoppel mainly results from the fact that another has been induced in reliance upon personal representations, acts, or omissions, to act as he otherwise would not have acted. Estoppel mainly results from the fact that another has been induced in reliance upon personal representations, acts, or omissions, to act as he otherwise would not have acted. Where a son acting as mook-tear for his mother who was be name for his father executed a mortgage on his mother's behalf and in her name, and received the mortgage money, held that he was estopped from disputing his mother's title to mortgage, whether he had been aware of its invalidity or erroneously believed it to be valid." 4. R.S. Maddanappa v. Chandrama and another (supra). This case again deals with the ingredients of Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. 5. Smt. Geeta Mishra v. Utkal University (supra). In this case, it has been laid down that the principle of estoppel applies to a representation made under a mistake, a fraudulent intention is also not necessary to grant an estoppel. 6. Nagubai Ammal and others v. B. Sharma Rao and others (supra). In this case, the Court had to examine the connotation of the expression 'approbate and reprobate'. The Supreme Court laid down as follows :- "It is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a person cannot approbate and reprobate is only one application of the Doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto." 22. In my view, the said doctrine is not at all applicable to the suit which the landlord filed in the instant case of the ejectment of the tenant. There was no question of any election in respect of such suit. 7. Pujari Narasappa and another v. Shaik Hazrat and others (supra). In this case, it was laid down that the parties to whom protection is afforded by an enactment cannot be allowed to question the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that same violates or threatens the right of other person, in other words the rights of non-protected class. The observations were made on the basis of the controversy as to whether the plaintiffs could be said to be the aggrieved parties. I do not think that the facts of the instant case lend the inference sought to be drawn from the said Mysore case. 8. Trinikmal Pandit and another v. Perfulla Kumar Chatterjee (supra). The observations were made on the basis of the controversy as to whether the plaintiffs could be said to be the aggrieved parties. I do not think that the facts of the instant case lend the inference sought to be drawn from the said Mysore case. 8. Trinikmal Pandit and another v. Perfulla Kumar Chatterjee (supra). It was cited to contend that in a writ petition a pure question of law can be raised for the first time. Without entering into the controversy on the said question, I have already pointed out that no pure question of law is involved in the pleas which the learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to raise. It may, however, be pointed out that the Supreme Court was dealing with the controversy in a regular appeal under a certificate granted under Article 133 of the Constitution in respect of the proceedings which had arisen from regular civil suit. I do not think that this decision can be cited for the proposition that even in a writ petition a pure question of law can be raised. However, it may be stated that the said proposition may be supportable with reference to some case law dealing with powers of the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. In Pulayarthj Venkata Subba Rao and others v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao (supra), relied upon by the Learned counsel for the respondent, the Supreme Court laid down as follows :- "There is some evidence to show that the respondents had paid two sums under the consent decree, but the evidence cannot be looked into in the absence of a plea of estoppel by conduct which needed to be raised and tried." 23. In my view, therefore, this petition lacks merits and is hereby dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. The learned counsel for the petitioner prays that some time may be granted to the petitioner to vacate the accommodations in question and to hand over their peaceful possession to the plaintiff respondent No. 2. I grant three months time to the petitioner to vacate the accommodations in question and to hand over their peaceful possession to the plaintiff-respondent No. 2.