JUDGMENT B.S. Sharma, Member - This is a reference made by the Additional Commissioner Moradabad vide his referring order dated May 6, 1978 passed in revision No. 342/96 of 77 arising out of a case No. 386\422 under Section 122-B of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist and the D.G.C. (R) for the Gaon Sabha and the State. 3. The facts of the case are stated in the referring order of the Additional Commissioner and therefore, they need not be reproduced here. The learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that the trial court was not competent to review its own order dated June 29, 1976 whereby the notice in Form 49-A issued under Rule 115-D of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules read with Section 122-B of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act had been discharged on the ground that a question or title in regard to the land in dispute was involved and the Gaon Sabha should seek relief from the competent court. The subsequent order of the trial court dated July 30 1977 is illegal as observed by the learned Additional Commissioner and therefore, this order is liable to be quashed in accordance with the recommendation of the yearned Additional Commissioner. 4. The learned D.C.C. (R.) has stated that the land in dispute had been left out as Parti in the consolidation of holdings proceedings, and the revisionist had earlier trespassed over it and proceedings for his ejectment were taken and he was ejected earlier, but he again trespassed over the land and hence, the order of ejectment passed by the learned trial court on July 30, 1977 is justified and deserves to be upheld. He has argued that the trial court amid review its own order dated April 29, 1976 as that court has inherent powers to-review. Further the trial court's order dated April 29, 1976 is not open for consideration now as no revision was filed against this order by the revisionist. The Board cannot now look into the earlier order which has already been reviewed and revised by the trial court. 5. In this case two important legal points are involved. Further the trial court's order dated April 29, 1976 is not open for consideration now as no revision was filed against this order by the revisionist. The Board cannot now look into the earlier order which has already been reviewed and revised by the trial court. 5. In this case two important legal points are involved. The first point is whether the revisionist can now question the decision of the trial court by which it had allowed the review application filed by the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha and order rehearing of the suit after it had been decided on April 29, 1976. In this context the provisions of Rule 7(1) of Order XLVII, C.P.C., are quite dear. According to these provisions, an order of the court granting an application for review may be objected to at once by an appeal from the order granting die application in an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit. The suit in question was decided by the trial court after review on July 30, 1977. The revisionist could therefore question the validity of the order of the trial court allowing the review application of the Pradhan in the present revision. In fact he has done so in paras 3 and 4 of the memo of grounds of revision filed before the Additional Commissioner. Since the memo of revision was filed within the prescribed time, the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is upheld that the revisionist can question decision of the trial court by which it accepted the review application of the Pradhan and ordered re-hearing of the case. 6. The next question for consideration is whether the trial court could entertain the review application and if so whether it was right in allowing the review application. It is an accepted position now that a court cannot review its own order under exercise of inherent powers, but it can certainly review its order if law specifically empowers the court to undertake such review. Rule 1 of Order XLVII, C.P.C., which is applicable to suits and proceedings under U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act empowers a court to review its own order under certain conditions as laid down in this rule. This provides the obvious answer that the trial court can entertain the review application presented by the Pradhan before it. Rule 1 of Order XLVII, C.P.C., which is applicable to suits and proceedings under U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act empowers a court to review its own order under certain conditions as laid down in this rule. This provides the obvious answer that the trial court can entertain the review application presented by the Pradhan before it. Now the next question that arises for consideration is whether the trial court was justified in allowing the review application and ordering re-hearing of the case. A perusal of the trial court's order dated June 29, 1976 by which it allowed the review application in question shows that two considerations had weighed in its mind in allowing the application - first that full opportunity had not been allowed to the Pradhan to adduce his evidence in the suit decided earlier and secondly that there was no Abadi in the land in dispute - a fact which was wrong on the face of the record relating to the suit. To my mind, these are sufficient reasons for the trial court to accept the review application and to undertake re-hearing of the case on merits. The decision of the trial court in this regard cannot therefore, be held to be illegal or without jurisdiction. 7. In view of the above, the question that remains for consideration is whether there is any justification to question the decision of the trial court dated July 30, 1977. The trial court before passing this order got the land inspected on the spot by the Naib Tahsildar, and it also gave full opportunity to both the parties to adduce their evidence in regard to the issues involved. It is after a proper consideration and appraisal of the evidence of the parties that it has recorded a finding that there is no Abadi on the land in dispute and that it is lying vacant. This finding is supported by the trial court's own inspection of the land on the spot. In view of this positive finding the finding recorded in the earlier order dated May 24, 1976 to the effect that Gher (enclosure) of the revisionist was built on the land in dispute is patently wrong. The trial court has also observed that the revisionist had earlier been ejected from the land in suit', but he had not removed his possession from this land. The trial court has also observed that the revisionist had earlier been ejected from the land in suit', but he had not removed his possession from this land. This finding is supported by the evidence of Pradhan besides documentary evidence on trial court's file. In view of his finding the question of title raised by the revisionist is nothing but a camouflage to prevent proceedings against him under Section 122-B of U.P. Z.A. and L.R Act. 8. In view of the aforesaid reasons, I am unable to agree with the recommendation of the learned Additional Commissioner that the trial court was not competent to review its own earlier order dated May 24, 1976. On merits also I find that the trial court's latter order dated July 30, 1977 is based on a proper appraisal of evidence and facts on record. There is nothing to warrant interference with the order by this court. 9. In view of the above the recommendation of the Additional Commissioner is rejected. In the result the trial court's order dated July 30, 1977 is upheld. The revisionist shall be ejected forthwith from the land in suit in accordance with the said order of the trial court.