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Allahabad High Court · body

1982 DIGILAW 626 (ALL)

Harbir Singh v. State

1982-05-04

J.M.L.SINHA

body1982
JUDGMENT J. M. L. Sinha, J. 1. THIS is an application under section 482, CrPC filed by Harbir Singh, Katar Singh and Mahabir Singh (hereinafter called the petitioners) praying that the order dated 31st October, 1980 passed by the Magistrate directing reinvestigation and the order dated 13th August, 1981 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Moradabad, be quashed. A relief was also asked for in the petition for staying the execution of the warrant of attachment and arrest passed by the Magistrate. 2. THE facts giving rise to this petition briefly be stated as follows : Harbir Singh petitioner is son-in-law of Chatar Singh, opposite party no. 1. On 12th of February 1980, Chatar Singh lodged a report under section 406, IPC at P. S. Chaprauli, district Meerut, against the petitioners. It is alleged in the report that tractor no. 2615067 had been purchased by him, but it was in the custody of his son Rajendra Singh for purposes of cultivation : that Rajendra Singh died after a protracted illness and the tractor remained with Harbir Singh, petitioner no. 1, that after the death of his daughter, who was married to Harbir Singh, he went to the village of Harbir Singh to ask for the tractor, but the petitioners refused to return the same and thereby misappropriated it. THE police of P. S. Chaprauli made investigation into the report lodged by Chatar Singh, opposite party no. 1 ;and submitted a final report on 4-8-1980. By his order dated 16th of September, 1980, the Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, accepted this final report. THEreafter on 16th of October, 1980, opposite party no. 1 filed an application praying that the order passed by the Judicial . Magistrate Meerut, on 16th of September, 1980 accepting the final report be recalled and the case may be got reinvestigated. On 31st October, 1980 the Magistrate passed an order on that application directing reinvestigation. Aggrieved against the order, the petitioners filed a revision in the court; of sessions. THE learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut, who heard the revision, dismissed it as deviod of substance. Aggrieved against that order the petitioners have filed the present application under section 482, CrPC. I have heard learned counsel on either side and have also perused the record. Aggrieved against the order, the petitioners filed a revision in the court; of sessions. THE learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut, who heard the revision, dismissed it as deviod of substance. Aggrieved against that order the petitioners have filed the present application under section 482, CrPC. I have heard learned counsel on either side and have also perused the record. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged before me that while passing the order accepting the final report the; Magistrate acted as a Court and, consequently, it was not open to the Magistrate to order reinvestigation there under as it amounted to recalling the order accepting the final report. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, while it was open to the Magistrate to take cognisance of the same offence on a complaint, no provision of the Code permitted him to recall the order. 3. AS opposed to the above, the stand taken by the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 is that the Magistrate treated the protest petition dated 16-10-1980 as a complaint and that a Magistrate On receipt of a complaint can direct investigation under sub-section (3) of section 156. According to the learned counsel for the opposite party this power of the Magistrate is subject to only one restriction, namely, that the direction for investigation under sub-section (3) of section 156, if at all, should be passed before taking cognisance of the complaint. Learned counsel for the opposite party urged that there is nothing on the record to show that in the instant case the Magistrate had taken cognisance before directing reinvestigation and, consequently, the order passed by the Magistrate directing reinvestigation should be upheld as an order under sub-section (3) of section 156, CrPC. 4. A copy of the application dated 16-10-1980 is Annexure 'III' to the petition and a perusal thereof shows that it is nothing but a protest petition. It is well settled that a protest petition can be treated as a complaint by the Magistrate and he can act on it even after accepting the final report. 4. A copy of the application dated 16-10-1980 is Annexure 'III' to the petition and a perusal thereof shows that it is nothing but a protest petition. It is well settled that a protest petition can be treated as a complaint by the Magistrate and he can act on it even after accepting the final report. It is also well settled that when a complaint is filed before a Magistrate empowered to take coganizance under Sec. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he has the following courses open to him : (i) He may direct investigation by the police under sub-section (3) of Sec. 156, CrPC without taking cognizance of the complaint. (ii) He may take cognizance of the case, record the statement of the complainant and his witnesses, and may then either issue process against the accused or may postpone the issue of process and direct investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he may think fit, before deciding whether or not there was sufficient ground to proceed on the complaint. Even in case where a Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint, directs investigation under sub-section (3) of Sec. 156, CrPC the complaint pending before him is not totally effaced. The police after making the investigation has to submit a report as provided in Sec. 173, CrPC. Where the police submits a report that a case is made out during investigation the Magistrate can take cognizance under Sec. 190 (b)Even where the police be of opinion that no case was made out during investigation, it is open to the Magistrate to disagree with the opinion of the police and to take cognisance under Sec. 190 (b) In the latter case it is also open to the Magistrate to leave aside the report submitted by the police under Sec. 173 (saying that no offence was made out during investigation) and take cognisance of the complaint under Sec. 202, CrPC, record the statement of the complainant and his witnesses and then decide whether cognisance should be taken or not. While doing so the Magistrate takes cognisance under Sec. 190(a) and not under Sec. 190(b). Support for this proposition can be had form the case of H. S. Bains v. State, 1980 AWC 619 (SC). 5. While doing so the Magistrate takes cognisance under Sec. 190(a) and not under Sec. 190(b). Support for this proposition can be had form the case of H. S. Bains v. State, 1980 AWC 619 (SC). 5. THE question, however; is whether, after receipt of a complaint, the Magistrate can order investigation under Sec. 156 even though an investigation under that section has already taken place and result of the investigation accepted. According to the learned counsel for the opposite party, the power of a Magistrate to direct investigation under Sec. 156, CrPC after a complaint is filed before him, is wholly unfettered and such a direction can be issued despite the fact that an investigation has already taken place and the result of the investigation has been accepted. I have given my very careful thought to this contention raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party, but I regret my inability to accept the same. 6. I have already conceded earlier that when a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, it is open to him to postpone taking cognisance of the complaint and to direct investigation by police under Sec. 156, CrPC. This power can be exercised only where investigation has not already taken place under Sec. 156, CrPC. If it is held that a Court can direct reinvestigation under Sec. 156, after receiving a complaint, even though investigation has already taken place, it would mean repetition of the same process over again. I have no doubt in my mind that this could not be the intention of the legislature. According to my understanding a direction for investigation can be issued by the Magistrate under sub-section (3) of Sec. 156 : (i) in cases where a cognisable report is lodged but no investigation is undertaken, as is often done when the offence is not of a serious nature. (ii) Where the report is not registered for a cognisable offence but a complaint is filed for such an offence. (iii) Where the police has investigated and submitted the report but the Magistrate, after going through the case diary comes to the conclusion that some further investigation is necessary. Sub-section (3) of section 156, in other words, provides a check by the Magistrates on the duties to be performed by the police under. Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of section 156, in other words, provides a check by the Magistrates on the duties to be performed by the police under. Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all or has not done it satisfactorily, it can issue a direction for the police to do it again. That power, however, cannot be exercised by a Magistrate in cases where the police has already performed its duty to investigate the case and has done it satisfactorily, so that the report submitted by them on that investigation is accepted by the Court. Learned counsel for the opposite party vehemently urged that there is no case wherein it may have been held that the Magistrate cannot direct investigation where investigation has already taken place. Assuming that it is so, we should interpret a provision of law in a logical and common sense manner. Learned counsel for the opposite party has not been able to show me any case wherein it may-have been held that even in cases where investigation under section 156, Cr PC has been made by the police and result of investigation accepted, the Magistrate can on receipt of a complaint, direct the police to repeat the process of investigation. 7. AS I have already stated earlier in the instant case the police had investigated into the report lodged by the opposite party on 12th of February, 1980. It submitted its final report which was accepted by the Magistrate on 16th of September, 1980. Consequently, it was not open to the Magistrate, on receipt of the protest petition dated 16th of October, 1980 to direct the police to reinvestigate the matter again under section 156, CrPC. 8. AT this stage the learned counsel for the opposite party urged that the order for reinvestigation passed by the Magistrate is an administrative order and, consequently, section 482 cannot apply to it. Learned counsel stressed that the present application itself is misconceived, and no relief can be granted to the petitioners on that basis. According to the learned counsel for the opposite party, any interference with the order passed by the Magistrate would be an interference with the investigation which is not permissible. Learned counsel stressed that the present application itself is misconceived, and no relief can be granted to the petitioners on that basis. According to the learned counsel for the opposite party, any interference with the order passed by the Magistrate would be an interference with the investigation which is not permissible. Reference for this proposition was made to the case of S. N. Sharma v. B. K. Tawari, 1970 ACC 210 (S. C). I have given my careful thought to the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel, but I am unable to accept the same. As already stated earlier, the stand of the learned counsel for the opposite party before me was that the protest peition was treated by the Magistrate as a complaint and it was on the basis thereof that he directed reinvestigation. Now, obviously a complaint is presented to a Court and not to a Magistrate in his administrative capacity. The order for reinvestigation having been passed by the Magistrate in view of the protest petition presented before him, it should follow that the order to reinvestigate was passed by him as a court and not in any administrative capacity. The matter can be looked at from another angle as well. The police after completing investigation has to submit a report under section 173, Cr PC even where it is of the opinion that no offence was made out during investigation. The Magistrate on a consideration of that report may direct further investigation or take cognisance of the rase disagreeing with the report of the police. It can effectively be argued that while doing so the Magistrate does not act in an administrative capacity but acts as a court, for sub-section (2) of section 173 clearly states that "the chargesheet is to be submitted to a Magistrate empowered to take cognisance of the offence." The use of these words in sub-section (2) of section 173 makes it abundantly clear that the chargesheet is to be submitted before the Magistrate as a Court and not in his administrative capacity. It may not be out of place to make a reference in this connection to a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Nirmal Singh v. State of U. P. 1979 A WC 16 : A CrR 30. It may not be out of place to make a reference in this connection to a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Nirmal Singh v. State of U. P. 1979 A WC 16 : A CrR 30. One of the questions that came up for consideration before the Division Bench in that case was whether a Magistrate, while accepting a final report under section 173, Cr PC, functions as a court, and this question was answered by the Division Bench in the affirmative. Obviously, if a Magistrate acts as a court, while accepting the final report submitted under section 173, he also acts as a court while ordering further investigation. The first limb of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party, namely, that the impugned order is an administrative order and that section 482, Cr PC will not apply to it is, therefore, rejected. 9. COMING to the second limb of the argument, all that has been asked for by the petitioner is that the order passed by the Magistrate directing reinvestigation be quashed. It is not one of those cases in which the police is investigating the case on its own and a party may apply for the investigation being quashed. I do not think that by quashing the order of the Magistrate directing investigation I would be interfering with the statutory discharge of the duties of a police officer under Chapter XII. If the police wants to investigate the case independently of the order of the Magistrate, the order that I propose to pass cannot stand in its way. If, however, the investigation is being made by the police solely because of the order passed by the Magistrate, the investigation cannot proceed after the order of the Magistrate is quashed. 10. TO sum up, my conclusion is that since investigation under section 156, CrPC had already taken place in the instant case and the result of the investigation had been accepted by the [Magistrate, the order passed by the Magistrate on 31st of October, 1980, directing the police to reinvestigate the matter is invalid and cannot be maintained. 10. TO sum up, my conclusion is that since investigation under section 156, CrPC had already taken place in the instant case and the result of the investigation had been accepted by the [Magistrate, the order passed by the Magistrate on 31st of October, 1980, directing the police to reinvestigate the matter is invalid and cannot be maintained. It is,, however, clarified that, if the police wants to investigate the case further, independently of the order dated 31st October, 1980, it will be open to the police to do so, It can even submit a charge-sheet if after further investigation it comes to the conclusion that some case is made out against the petitioners. The investigation cannot, however, proceed if it is compelled only by the order dated 31st October, 1980, passed by the Magistrate. It is further clarified that even if the order dated 31st October, 1980 is quashed it will be open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the complaint under section 202, CrPC, to record the statement of the complainant and his witnesses and then to direct investigation by the police as provided in that section; the investigation order under section 202, CrPC being wholly distinct and separate from the investigation under section 156, CrPC. The complaint shall remain pending before the Magistrate, even if the order dated 31st October, 1980 passed by him is set aside and he shall have to proceed in accordance with section 202, CrPC to dispose of the complaint. With the aforesaid observation, this petition is allowed and the order dated 31st October, 1980 passed by the Judicial Magistrate and the order dated 13th August, 1981 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge are set aside. The Magistrate may now proceed with the complaint as provided in section 202, CrPC. 11. THE petitioners have also asked for the relief of stay of the execution Of warrant of attachment and arrest passed by the Magistrate in "some unknown case". That relief is wholly vague and is accordingly refused. Petition allowed.