ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of the proceedings under section 21(l)(a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. The respondents, Nos. 3, 4 and 5 moved a release application under section 21(1 )(b) of the Act in respect of the accommodation in dispute. The application was moved against one Sri. Ramanuj who was the then tenant. A true copy of the said application is Annexure 1 to the petition. The said tenant contested the application and the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 23rd April, 1974 rejected the release application. The aforementioned landlords preferred an appeal and the same was allowed by the appellate court and the case was remanded to the Prescribed Authority. No copy of the remand order passed by the appellate court has been placed on the record. When the case was again started before the Prescribed Authority after the aforesaid remand, the respondent No. 5 in this petition, Smt. Janak Nandani, entered into a compromise with the said tenant and moved on application praying that the aforesaid release application should be dismissed in view of her compromise with the tenant. A true copy of the said application dated 12-9-1975 is Annexure 3 to the petition. It is not stated in the petition as to what order was passed by the Prescribed Authority on the said application dated 12-9-1975 of Smt. Janak Nandani. However, from the subsequent developments, it is clear that the prayer in the said application was not allowed. The Prescribed Authority by his order dated 30-8-1976 allowed the said release application of the landlords. A true copy of the said order is Annexure 4, to the petition. Thereafter, the said tenant Sri. Ramanuj filed an appeal and the same was allowed by the appellate court by its judgment dated 7-5-1977, a true copy of which is Annexure 5 to the petition. The short ground on which the appeal was allowed was that after Smt. Janak Nandani, one of the co-landlords, had compromised with the tenant and had clearly moved the court that the release application should be dismissed, it was not open to the remaining two co-landlords to maintain and press the release application. 3. The short ground on which the appeal was allowed was that after Smt. Janak Nandani, one of the co-landlords, had compromised with the tenant and had clearly moved the court that the release application should be dismissed, it was not open to the remaining two co-landlords to maintain and press the release application. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the landlords filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the same was numbered as Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 977 (A) of 1977. During the pendency of the said petition, the said tenant Sri Ramanuj died and on the application of the landlords petitioners in the said petition, Smt. Kunti Devi was brought on record in place of her deceased father, the said Ramanuj. A true copy of the application moved by the landlords to bring on record Smt. Kunti Devi is Annexure 6 to the petition. Ultimately, this Court allowed the said writ petition by its judgment dated 10th Oct, 1979. The aforementioned appellate judgment dated 7-5-1977 was quashed and the case was remanded to the appellate court for a fresh decision of the release application on merits. A true copy of the aforesaid judgment of this Court dated 10-10-1979 is Annexure 7 to the petition. It is stated in para 14 of the petition that an application dated L 15-12-1980 was moved for getting rid of the aforesaid judgment dated 10-10-1979 on the ground that the same was ex parte. It is further stated in the said para that the said application is still pending. After the aforesaid judgment dated 10-10-1979, the p appellate court reheard the tenant's appeal and dismissed the same by its judgment dated 23-3-1981, a true copy of which is 1 Annexure 8 to the petition and certified copy of which is also on the record. In other words, the prescribed Authority's order allowing the release application was affirmed by the appellate court also. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner Smt. Kunti Devi has come up in. tort thereof, I have heard Sri H. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned counsel for the landlords has made his submissions. 5. In other words, the prescribed Authority's order allowing the release application was affirmed by the appellate court also. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner Smt. Kunti Devi has come up in. tort thereof, I have heard Sri H. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned counsel for the landlords has made his submissions. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri H. N. Sharma, contended that the appellate court acted in a contradictory manner, on the one hand, it held that despite the death of the tenant Ramaunj, the petitioner Smt. Kunti Devi was entitled to press the appeal under section 34 (4) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, yet while considering the aspect of the comparative hardship, the said court held that Smt. Kunti Devi was normally residing with her husband. I have taken into consideration the said submission hut in my view, the finding recorded by the appellate court cannot be taken exception to. There is an apparent lack of harmony in ] the two provisions contained in the said Act, one contained under section 34 (4) and the other contained in S. 3- A (1) defining tenant and his heir on tenant's death. In the latter definition, it is clearly laid down that only such heir of the deceased tenant will be treated as tenant who was residing with the deceased at the time of the latter's death. It is important that in this provision the expression used is heir. On the other hand, in S. 34 (4) of the Act, the right to continue and press the appeal is not confined only to the hairs of the landlords or tenant but has been extended to their legal representatives also. It is well known that the expression Legal representative' is much wider than the expression 'heir, The appellate court was right in holding that even if someone was not an heir in accordance with the definition as given in S. 3-A (1) still, in his status as legal representative he has a right to continue and press the appeal. I cannot see why after holding that a legal representative is entitled to continue and press the appeal, a court cannot take into consideration, the manner in which the legal representative is placed while recording the aspect of comparative hardship. I cannot see why after holding that a legal representative is entitled to continue and press the appeal, a court cannot take into consideration, the manner in which the legal representative is placed while recording the aspect of comparative hardship. The normal rule of interpretation should be applied in this case and that will be to seek to harmonise both the provisions. In the instant case the finding is that Smt. Kunti Devi, the petitioner was residing with her father for a period, of about 2 years prior to the latter's death. I do not like to express a fully crystallised opinion but I think that it may be possible to consider Smt. Kunti Devi as satisfying the condition laid down in S. 3-A (1). In this provision no length for the normal residence is prescribed. If the daughter was residing for a period of two years with a view to look after the father in his old age. in my view, it cannot be contended that she could not be said to be normally residing with the father because she had not put an end to her normal residence with her husband. I must concede that find force in the contrary contention also that a residence of this type which the daughter had taken up, could not strictly be interpreted as a normal residence because it had its origin and decision in abnormal circumstances which arose as a result of the father's illness. Yet, in my view in an enactment of this kind one must take such a view as will harmonise seemingly inconsistent provisions and further, which is p important will allow the courts to adjudicate on merits after considering rival contentions rather than deciding the case on the basis that after the tenant's death, since strictly there was no heir in terms of S. 3-A (1), therefore, the appeal filed by the alleged heir of the deceased tenant should not be treated as maintainable. There is nothing in law which prevents a person from having more than one normal residence. Very often, persons have residence in more than one city and for part of the year they reside at one place and for another part they reside at another place. There is nothing in law which prevents a person from having more than one normal residence. Very often, persons have residence in more than one city and for part of the year they reside at one place and for another part they reside at another place. It is true that these examples may not be said to be analogous to the kind of circumstances which prevailed in this case, but I am trying to emphasise that a liberal, even if somewhat stretched, interpretation will have to be placed while interpreting the definition of 'tenant' in S. 3-A (1). I certainly feel that it would not have been correct in law to have, denied Smt. Kunti Devi the right to press the appeal on the ground that she was not a tenant after the death of her father as her residence with him, even though stretching for a period of about two years, could not be treated to be a normal residence. If this view were taken then obviously the right given to her under section 34 (4) would be reduced to a mere illusion lacking substance. As I have said above, it is my endeavour to seek to harmonise both the aforesaid provisions. However, even if legally it be held that Smt. Kunti Devi came within the ambit of the definition of 'tenant' inasmuch as she had her normal residence with her father before the latter's death, I cannot understand why on merits it was not open to the appellate court to emphasise that after the death of the father, she was bound to go back to her husband and children who were residing in a different accommodation in the same city. This approach of the appellate court was undoubtedly correct in the factual back-ground, and on its basis, the appellate court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the comparative hardship was likely to be greater in case the release application was rejected rather than if it was allowed. In this view of the matter, therefore, I think that there is no merit in this petition so far as the findings recorded by the two courts are concerned on the question of bona fide need of the landlord and on the controversy regarding comparative hardship likely to be caused by the rejection of the release application rather than by granting it. 6. 6. However, there is yet another point which has to be considered and that is the question of the applicability of R. 16 (1) (d) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Rules 1972. The said provision is as follows : - "In considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the prescribed authority shall, also have regard to such factors as the following : (d) Where the tenant's needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's need's would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building;'' 7. Sri H. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it was incumbent upon the Prescribed Authority and thereafter upon the appellate court to have considered the applicability of the said provision in the facts of this case and a failure on their part to do so necessitates an interference in this petition. He placed reliance on Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand ( AIR 1978 SC 413 ) and Smt. Raj Rani Mehrotra v. 2nd Addl. District Judge (1980 All Rent Cas. 311 (SC). Both these cases undoubtedly support the learned counsel's contention. 8. In Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand ( AIR 1978 SC 413 ) (supra) it was observed as follows (para 2) : - "The only ground which we consider tenable and which has been urged by the appellant before us turns on the failure of the courts of fact in recording a finding as contemplated in the proviso to the Explanation to S. 11 (1) (h) of the Act. Obviously an error has been committed by the High Court in thinking that there is a concurrent finding of fact under the proviso aforesaid. The trial court and the first appellate court have really not considered this question on the merits, indeed evidence itself has not been taken on the score that there has been no specific plea in that , behalf. The trial court and the first appellate court have really not considered this question on the merits, indeed evidence itself has not been taken on the score that there has been no specific plea in that , behalf. We are satisfied that the previse aforesaid mandates the court to consider where partial eviction as contemplate; therein should be ordered or the entire holding should be directed to be evicted This aspect, therefore, requires judicial exploration after giving opportunity to boil sides to lead evidence in this behalf." 9. It may be stated that the provision considered by the Supreme Court under the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Ren Control Act, 1966 is analogous to the provision contained in R. 16 (1) (d) of the Rules framed under the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 10. In Smt. Raj Rani Mehrotra v. 2nd Addl. District Judge (1980 All Rem Cas. 311) (SC) (supra) the following observation was made : - ' We have heard counsel for the parties On going through the judgments of the lower authorities and also of the High Court we are satisfied that the issue arising under R. 16(1) (d) of the rules framed under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, as to whether the landlord's need could have been satisfied by releasing only a part of the premises has not been gone into or considered by any of them. When the plea under the said rule was pressed on behalf oi the tenant in the High Court, the High Court rejected it on the sole ground that no such plea has been raised by the tenant in his written statement and as such it could not be considered. It is clear that under the relevant rule it is a duty of the court to take into account that aspect while considering the requirements of personal occupation of the landlord and therefore, this issue will have to be remanded to the High Court." 11. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents brought to my notice the following three cases : - 1. 1981 All Rent Cas 595 (B. R. Kshetri v. District Judge). 2. 1980 All Rent Cas 89 :(1979 All LJ 1079 (Smt. Hira Rani Seth v. District Judge Kanpur). 3. 1981 All Rent Cas. 561 :(1981 All LJ 922i (Ashgar v. Smt. Zaibunnisa). 12. 1981 All Rent Cas 595 (B. R. Kshetri v. District Judge). 2. 1980 All Rent Cas 89 :(1979 All LJ 1079 (Smt. Hira Rani Seth v. District Judge Kanpur). 3. 1981 All Rent Cas. 561 :(1981 All LJ 922i (Ashgar v. Smt. Zaibunnisa). 12. So far as the aforesaid Division Bench case is concerned, it seems to me that the Division Bench was not apprised of the aforesaid Supreme Court pronouncement and hence there is no reference to the said pronouncement. The Division Bench referring to the plea of R. 16 (1) (d) observed as follows : - "We do not think that the petitioner can be allowed to raise this plea for the first time before us in this writ petition. No such plea was taken by him either before the prescribed Authority or before the appellate court. In a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution what is required to be seen is as to whether on the material on record at the relevant time the impugned order does or does not suffer from any manifest error of law so as to justify an interference by the Court. This plea has not been examined by the authorities below and hence for its non consideration the order of the appellate court cannot be questioned. We, therefore, do not enter into this controversy." 13. In Smt. Hira Rani Seth v. District Judge Kanpur (1979 All LJ 1079) (supra), it has been laid down that in case the appellate court wants to release only a part of the accommodation then it is necessary that an opportunity should be given to the landlady to place her case before the appellate court with a view to establish that the release of the entire accommodation will satisfy her needs. 14. In Mohd. Asghar v. Smt. Zaibunnisa (1981 All LJ 922) (supra), the learned single Judge referred to the aforesaid Supreme Court pronouncement reported in Smt. Raj Rani Mehrotra v. 2nd Addl. District Judge (1980 All Rent Cas 311) (supra) and he went on to examine the evidence on the record with reference to R. 16 (1) (d). He purported to so act in pursuance of the law laid down in Smt. Raj Rani Mehrotra v. 2nd District Judge (supra) 15. District Judge (1980 All Rent Cas 311) (supra) and he went on to examine the evidence on the record with reference to R. 16 (1) (d). He purported to so act in pursuance of the law laid down in Smt. Raj Rani Mehrotra v. 2nd District Judge (supra) 15. The learned counsel for the landlords suggested that in the aforesaid Supreme Court case reported in AIR 1978 SC 413 (Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand,) even if the plea under R. 16 (1) (d) had not been specifically taken in the written statement filed by the tenants, still, the point might have been urged in the courts below. It seems to me that this suggestion is untenable. What the Supreme Court emphasised in the aforesaid two pronouncements was that irrespective of whether the plea had been taken before the courts below by the parties concerned, it was the court's own duty to have examined the applicability of the aforesaid provision, which is contained in R. 16 (l)(d) of the Rules framed under the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and which, in the case of Jammu & Kashmir Act, was contained in the proviso to the Explanation to the S. 11 (1) (h) of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. This position is placed beyond any doubt in the law which has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Smt. Raj Rani Mehrotra v. 2nd Addl. District Judge (1980 All Rent Cas 311) (supra). 16. It was contended that in the instant case, the evidence was sufficient to enable me to decide the controversy regarding the applicability or non-applicability of R. 16 (1) (d) and that accordingly, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid pronouncement reported in Smt. Raj Rani Mehrotra v. 2nd Addl, District Judge, (supra), I should decide the said controversy myself in this petition. In my view this contention cannot be accepted. I have felt that as the material and the evidence as they stand on the record are not sufficient on the said controversy, I should give the same direction as was given in Rehman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand ( AIR 1978 SC 413 ) (supra). 17. In my view this contention cannot be accepted. I have felt that as the material and the evidence as they stand on the record are not sufficient on the said controversy, I should give the same direction as was given in Rehman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand ( AIR 1978 SC 413 ) (supra). 17. Accordingly, I allow this petition and quash the Judgment of the lower appellate court dated 23-3-1981 (Annexure 8) in the manner that while the findings recorded by the said court regarding the bona fide needs of landlords and regarding the comparative hardship shall remain intact and shall not be disturbed, the appellate court below shall go into the question as to whether under R. 16 (1) (d) it would be just and expedient to release only a part of the accommodation in question. The appellate court shall allow both the parties the right to adduce additional evidence on the said limited controversy only. After recording such additional evidence, the appellate court shall decide the appeal in accordance with the law and in the light of the directions given above. The appeal shall be decided within 3 months. The appellate court shall proceed on the footing that the absence of a specific pleading under R. 16 (1) (d) does not stand in the way of the obligation of the court to act in compliance with the mandate of the statute. There will be no order as to costs in this petition.