A. Sirkar v. State of Bihar — 1982 DIGILAW 63 (PAT)

JUDGMENT : S. Narain, J. Both these applications are for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated by the order dated 10.10.1980 by which the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sasaram, has summoned A. Sirkar, sole petitioner in Criminal Miscellaneous 7255 of 1980, and M.P. Jain, sole petitioner, in Criminal Miscellaneous 17 of 1981. By the same order, namely, the order dated 10.10.1980 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Sasaram, they have been asked to stand their trial for an offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Both these applications have been heard together and this order will govern both of them. 2. Admittedly at the relevant time M.P. Jain (hereinafter referred to as 'petitioner Jain) was the President of Ashoka Cement Ltd. and at present is Director of M/s Ashoka Steel Ltd, a sister concern of M/s Rohtas Industies Ltd. of which M/s Ashoka Cement Ltd. now forms a Part. Shri A. Sirkar (hereinafter called 'Sirkar) was at the relevant time Managing Director of M/s Procons Consultant (Pvt.) Ltd., which was at the relevant time a consultant of M/s Ashoka Cement Ltd. On 26.11.1979 Dr. Jagdish Narain Singh, Opposite party no. 2, a retired Chief Medical Officer of Dalmia Nagar Hospital, filed a complaint against the two petitioners before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sasaram. accusing the petitioners of having cheated the complainant and committing offences under sections 418, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The allegations, in the petition of complaint, briefly stated, are as follows: (a) That the complainant was the Chief Medical Officer in Dalmia Nagar, Hospital, which was run and managed by M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. and of the Managing Committee of which Shri Jain was the President. The complainant was also the family physician of Shri Jain and, therefore, there was relationship of trust and confidence between the complainant and Shri Jain. The complainant came to know Shri Sirkar Managing Director of M/s Procons Consultant (Pvt.) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as 'Procons') through Sri Jain and became friendly with him also. (b) That both Shri Jain and Shri Sirkar conspired together in the month of December, 1974 and both of them painted a very rosy and bright prospect to set up a mini steel foundary and persuaded him to enter the business of mini steel foundary. Shri Jain told the complainant that he had placed orders for him and had already advanced a sum of Rs. Shri Jain told the complainant that he had placed orders for him and had already advanced a sum of Rs. 30000/- to Shri Sirkar for supply of a special type of D.C. Arc Furnace for alloy steel melting which Shri Sirkar had manufactured. That furnace was most suitable and further told him that if the complainant entered into that business, in order to help him (the complainant) in his new adventure, he was prepared to give the Arc Furnace to the complainant for the same price without any profit. Later, that both Shri Jain and Shri Sirkar specifically represented to the complainant that the furnace was of a very good quality and was in perfect running condition and acting on this representation the complainant agreed to purchase the same and after receiving the furnace, Shri Jain despatched the same through his own staff to M/s A. K. Steel Foundary, Murli, Banjari, which the complainant as the result of the clear inducement had agreed to set up for the purpose of running a mini steel foundary. Shri Jain has handed to the complainant a copy of the bill of the Furnace sent by Pro cons to M/s Ashoka Cement Ltd. and stated that the complainant may repay Rs. 30000/- the sum advanced, to Shri Jain at his convenience and pay the balance price to Shri Sirkar. Shri Jain had further told the complainant that in case the complainant purchased the furnace and established a foundary he would provide all necessary technical know-how supervision and guidance for the establishment and running of the foundary and also the raw materials needed for running the same and also undertook to purchase the entire product of the foundary for his own concern. (c) That due to the aforesaid indu cement and allurement given by Shri Jain and Shri Sirkar the complainant agreed to buy the furnace and to execute a deed of agreement incorporating substantially the aforesaid terms, the agreement was entered into between M/s A.K. Steel Foundary and M/s Ashoka Cement Ltd. and was signed by the complainant's son Mr. Ajit Kumar Singh and Shri Jain on behalf of two parties respectively. (d) That thereafter the furnace was installed at Murli under the guidance of the accused and their representatives and the complainant paid to Shri Sirkar Rs. 50000/- on 21.2.1975 and Rs. 55000/- on 26.5.1975. A further sum of Rs. Ajit Kumar Singh and Shri Jain on behalf of two parties respectively. (d) That thereafter the furnace was installed at Murli under the guidance of the accused and their representatives and the complainant paid to Shri Sirkar Rs. 50000/- on 21.2.1975 and Rs. 55000/- on 26.5.1975. A further sum of Rs. 2000/-, which was sent by the complainant to Shri Sirkar towards price of another article, was also adjusted towards the cost of the furnace. (e) That on 27.11.1975, the date fixed for the inauguration of the furnace, attempts were made to start the furnace but the furnace did not start at all inspite of best efforts. Thereafter both Shri Jain and Shri Sirkar assured the complainant that the defect was of minor nature and would be removed and, though, Shri Sirkar sent his technicians to set right the machine and made some showy efforts, the defect in the furnace could not be remedied. Thereafter on the request of the two accused persons, the transformer of the furnace was sent to the firm of Shri Sirkar in February, 1976/- and it was sent back to the site in May, 1976 after alleged repairs but still the Furnace did not work. Thereafter as Shri Sirkar agreed to get all the defects of the furnace removed if the entire Furnace was sent to Calcutta and relying upon that statement, the complainant sent the Furnace to Calcutta on 8.11.1978 but, though, the Furnace was received there on 14.11.1978 it was never sent back after being duly repaired and when by his letter dated 26.6.1979 the complainant asked Shri Sirkar to supply the furnace duly repaired the said Shri Sirkar sent a letter dated 7.7.1979 denying completely his responsibility in the matter. (f) That the complainant had spent an amount exceeding Rs 5,46,761 towards the cost of machineries and other constructions and charges and finally lost possession of the furnace also. (g) That both Shri Jain and Shri Sirkar knew from the very outset that the furnace had inherent defects and beyond repairs and had made the representation with a fraudulent intention to cheat the complainant. 3. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the criminal proceeding against the petitioners are an abuse of the process of the court and should, therefore be quashed. 3. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the criminal proceeding against the petitioners are an abuse of the process of the court and should, therefore be quashed. In support of the contention that the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the Court, the, sole argument advanced by Shri Roy on behalf of Shri Jain is that the learned Magistrate acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing processes against the petitioner because on the materials on the record no person duly instructed in law could reasonably come to the conclusion that a prima facie case under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code was made out against the petitioner. That it was a lame prosecution the veiled object behind which was to coerce the petitioners to make good the lossess unfortunately suffered by the complainant in his new adventure. Shri Sanyal, who appears for Shri Sirkar while advancing this argument further contended that the prosecution was barred by limitation and that the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety and taken at their face value, did not disclose commission of any offence of cheating, much less an offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code by Shri Sirkar. He also contended that even Procons were not civilly liable for breach of contract regarding sale and purchase of the arc furnace, as the contract was entirely between the complainant and M/s Ashoka Cement Ltd. 4. I must state at the outset that I do not find it possible to accept the contention of Shri Sanyal that if all the averments in the petition of complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in the entirety, no offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is disclosed. It is not disputed that the averments taken at their face value show that both the petitioners got the complainant to believe that the arc furnace obtained from Procons and to be supplied to the complainant by Shri Jain was very good and suitable for the purpose and in perfect running condition and that the complainant was induced to purchase the furnace because these petitioners got him to so believe and that the furnace turned out to be grossly defective. Shri Sanyal, however, argued that the facts alleged did not disclose that any of the petitioners deceived the complainant and had any fraudulent or dishonest intention, or that as a result of the deceit, the complainant was induced to deliver any property to any person within the meaning of the expression used in section 415 of the Indian Penal Code. In my opinion, in view of the specific averments in paragraph l4 of the petition of complaint that the complainant was induced to pay to Shri Sirkar a sum of Rs.50000/- and Rs.55000/-, it is absurd to contend that there is no allegation that the complainant delivered any property to any person. The expression used in section 15 of the Indian Penal Code is "delivered to any person." and not delivered to the person by whom he was deceived' I find nothing in the decision of this Court in 1976 Criminal Law Journal, 1113 to support the contention that the delivery of property must be to the person practicing the deception. 5. It is equally absurd to contend that there is no allegation of deception or dishonest intention Paragraph 18 of the petition of complaint speaks of "the dishonest and fraudulent intention of the accused person from the very start of the transaction" and in paragraph 19 it is specifically said that "the accused by making fraudulent intention to cheat the complainant and knowing full well that the furnace had inherent defects and beyond repairs induced the complainant and his son to part with an amount exceeding Rs.5,46,761/-......" There can be no doubt that if a person makes a representation known to him to be false with a view to induce another to part with money, he deceives that person and fraudulently and dishonestly induces that person to part with money. Shri Sanyal did not, and could not, contest this proposition. He, however, attempted to argue that the statement that the accused knew full well that the furnace had inherent defects and was beyond repairs did not amount to an averment of fact but it was merely the statement of a legal conclusion. In my opinion, if it is said that a person knew at the very beginning that what he was stating was false and not correct, that is a statement of fact and not mere statement of legal conclusion. In my opinion, if it is said that a person knew at the very beginning that what he was stating was false and not correct, that is a statement of fact and not mere statement of legal conclusion. It may be that the .fact of knowledge may be an inference from other primary facts, but is nevertheless a statement of a fact. It is, therefore, manifest that if the allegations in the petition of complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they disclosed the commission by the petitioners of an offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. 6. And if that is so, it is obvious that the order taking cognizance of the offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not barred by limitation for no period of limitation is prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure for an offence punishable with imprisonment exceeding three years and the offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years. Both the additional contentions of Shri Sanyal must, therefore, fail. 7. In my opinion, however, there is substance in the common contention of Shri Roy and Shri Sanyal. An order under section 204 Cr.P.C. issuing process, like an order framing a charge, affects a person's liberty substantially and, therefore, to use the words of S.K. Das, J, speaking for the Supreme Court in Vadilal Panchal's case. "The Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the materials on which he has to form his judgment", and "The judgment which the Magistrate has to form is whether or not there is sufficient round for proceeding" (at page 1117 of the report). And as pointed out by Chandrachud, C. J., speaking for the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and others. "For the purpose of determing whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to bet possible." The aforesaid observation of Chandrachud, C.J., was made with regard to the expression sufficient ground for proceeding occurring in section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. But the decision with regard to section 204 Cr.P.C. of the Supreme Court in Vadilal Panchal's case (supra) was relied upon in support of the afore said observation. 8. The decision in Ramesh Singh's case does not lay down anything to the contrary. There Supreme Court speaking through Untwalia, J. no doubt laid down in that case that if there is strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. But it also stated "If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged In cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. " 9. I have dealt with the legal position, though it is well settled, in some detail because Shri Garg attempted to argue that even if there is no reasonable possibility of the accused being convicted On the basis of the materials on the record, even if unrebutted, the proceedings could not be quashed because further materials may be available. This contention is contrary to the decision in Muniswami's case (supra). No authority has been cited in support of this proposition. The decision in Chandra Deo Singh's case does not lay down any such proposition. It must, therefore, be regarded as well settled that for issue of processes, the Magistrate has to determine whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. 10. It is true, as pointed out by Shri Garg, appearing on behalf of the complainant opposite party that under section 204 of the Code, the Magistrate has the discretion whether to issue process or not and the Code has conferred the discretion on the Magistrate and not on the superior Courts and the exercise of the discretion may not be lightly interfered with. But the exercise of the jurisdiction cannot be immune from scrutiny by the High Court. Sections 203 and 204 of the Code are similar to sections 227 and 228. In State of Karnataka Vs. But the exercise of the jurisdiction cannot be immune from scrutiny by the High Court. Sections 203 and 204 of the Code are similar to sections 227 and 228. In State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy the order of the High Court setting aside the order of the Court of Session framing the charges and discharging the accused after assessing the weight of the materials on the record was impugned on the ground that the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or examining the weight of the material on the record in order to find whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the accused. The Supreme Court, speaking through Chandrachud, C.J., negatived the argument in these words :- "The High Court, therefore, is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case." On a parity of reasoning-as pointed by Chandrachud, C.J., in Muniswami's case I (supra) the powers under sections 203, 204 are analogous to those under sections 226 and 227 of the Code - the High Court is entitled to examine the materials to find out whether the order under section 204 of the Code issuing summons is justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that it is not and that allowing the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the Court. At any rate, it can examine the materials to find out whether any person instructed in the law, could, after applying its mind to the facts and the materials on the record, have reasonably come to the conclusion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioners. I have, therefore, to determine whether the materials on record disclose a prima facie case of cheating by the petitioners, or in other words whether the materials on the record, if unrebutted, are such on the basis of which a conviction of the petitioners for cheating can reasonably be held to be possible. 11. I have, therefore, to determine whether the materials on record disclose a prima facie case of cheating by the petitioners, or in other words whether the materials on the record, if unrebutted, are such on the basis of which a conviction of the petitioners for cheating can reasonably be held to be possible. 11. The offence alleged is one of cheating as defined in section 415 of the I.P.C. It is well settled that an error of judgment or breach of performance of duty inter se cannot be equated with dishonest intention' (per Goswami, J., in Anil Kumar Bose's case which is one of the essential ingredients of offence of cheating under section 420 I.P.C., ‘If the person making the representation honestly believed the representation to be true, there can be no question of cheating. But if he knew that tile representation was false and he made it with a view that the other person should act upon it, then that would amount to cheating."- per Harries, C.J., in Motilal Chakravarty Vs. The king. The crucial question for determination, therefore, is if there is material on which, if unrebutted, any Court could reasonably come to the conclusion that Shri Jain or Shri Sirkar knew, at the time they made the representation regarding the excellent quality of the furnace or its being in perfect running condition, that the representation was false, that is to say, both or either of them knew at the very inception that the furnace was inherently defective. If there is no such material, then there is no reasonable possibility of a conviction of the petitioners for cheating. 12. While proceeding to consider the materials which, according to the prosecution, show that the accused knew at the very outset that their representation that the furnace was free from infirmities and was in running condition was false, we have to bear in-mind that the "Judge," to use the words of Fazal Ali, J., in Union of India Vs. Prafulla Knmar Samal and another, cannot act merely as a Post-Office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on......" 13. Prafulla Knmar Samal and another, cannot act merely as a Post-Office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on......" 13. The materials before the learned Magistrate were the petition of complaint, the examination of the complainant on solemn affirmation, the deposition of four witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant and various documents. After setting out the allegations in the petition of complaint and the deposition of four P.Ws. 1 to 4 which showed that both the accused persons had persuaded the complainant to purchase the furnace and that the furnace could not be started, the learned Magistrate referred specifically only to one of the documents, viz, the letter dated 7.7.1979 by which Shri Sirkar had told the complainant and his firm that be had not supplied the said furnace to him and he had not received the same from him for repairs. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate, after referring to the arguments on behalf of the complainant, concluded as follows :- "It appears from the perusal of the complaint recorded on S.A. on 26.11.79, evidence of all the four P.Ws. and the documents filed on behalf of the complainant on 8.4.80 that acutually the complainant has succeded to establish a prima facie case u/s 420 I.P.C. against both the accused persons of this case." The learned Magistrate has not recorded any finding that the materials on the record showed prima facie that the two accused or any of them knew that the representation that they were making about the furnace being in perfect condition and free from any inherent defect, was false. Of course, he has not specified those materials. I asked Shri Garg, the learned counsel appearing for the complainant, to specify the material. The only material so far as petitioner Shri Jain is concerned, showing the knowledge of petitioner Jain, which was pointed out to me, is that Shri Jain who had placed orders and obtained a furnace, which he needed for his own business had not only offered the same to the complainant at cost price but he induced him to purchase that furnace and to enter the business of ministeel foundary. It is urged that from this circumstance an inference can reasonably be drawn that Shri Jain knew that the furnace was inherently defective and, therefore, having made the initial mistake of buying it for his concern wanted to get rid of it and save his concern from the loss, which would be caused by the purchase of a completely defective furnace. It was vehemently urged that no businessman can part with a plant which he requires for his business at cost price to anyone unless the plant or machinery was not useful for him. 14. Now, the determination whether from the aforesaid circumstance, a conclusion can reasonably be drawn that Shri Jain knew that the furnace had inherent defects must be made after taking into account other facts and circumstances of the case and broad probabilities. Undoubtedly, Shri Jain was the President of Ashoka cement Ltd., a reputed industrial concern, and there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and the complainant. In view of the agreement which was arrived at between the complainant's firm and the Company headed by Shri Jain .... the agreement in original was produced in Court below,-it is clear that the agreement between the parties was that the foundry set up by the complainant in pursuance of the agreement was to be a captive foundry of the company inasmuch as the entire products of that foundry were to be sold to Ashoka Cement Ltd., and that as per the agreement Ashoka Cement Company would oay a price for the product of the foundry which would be 3/4th of the cost of production X 12. As it is conceded that the plant set up was a captive plant of Ashoka. Cement Ltd. I need not set out the terms of the agreement in detail. Thus, it is obvious, that though, the Ashoka Cement Ltd. parted with the furnace and thus could not set up its own plant immediately, it nevertheless obtained several advantages of setting up a foundry and the foundry set up by the complainant was expected to serve the main purpose of setting up a foundry by Ashoka Cement Company itself. It is, therefore, by no means improbable that Shri Jain let the complainant have the furnace at cost price even though he knew that the furnace was of good quality and in running condition. 15. It is, therefore, by no means improbable that Shri Jain let the complainant have the furnace at cost price even though he knew that the furnace was of good quality and in running condition. 15. We must also remember that Shri Jain offered to the complainant the facility of refunding at his convenience the advance of Rs. 30000/- which he had made on account of the furnace to Procons. A person who knew the furnace was defective would try to realise the price for it as soon as possible. What is more significant is the subsequent conduct of the agents of Shri Jain obviously acting with his consent and on his authority. It appears from the record of discussion, held on 25th September, 1978 in which besides the complainant's son the representative of M/s A.K. Steel Industries and Shri Sirkar the Works Manager, and Secretary of Ashoka Steel, the Company of which Shri Jain was a Director, - a document produced by the complainant himself that Ashoka Steel had supplied materials or made an advance amounting to Rs. 1 lac and it also agreed upon Peocons providing a bank guarantee regarding that amount, to advance a further sum of Rs.50000/- the estimated cost of rectification and modification of furnace. Paragraph 11 of the record of discussion which is Annexure-4 to the revision petition flied by Shri A. Sirkar shows that it was agreed that after the modification, rectification and its successful commissioning, the furnace would be sold and out of its proceeds of which Rs. 1 lac 50 thousand including Rs. 50000/- the cost of the modification and rectification of the plant, was to be paid to M/s Ashoka Steel. It is inconceivable that Ashoka Steel in the management of which Shri Jain was an active participant would supply materials or make advance of the value of Rs. 1 lac 50 thousand if Shri Jain knew that the furnace was inherently defective and therefore, the foundry was not likely to go into production. Any prudent businessman would not merely for the sake of continuing the deception make so large an advance. 1 lac 50 thousand if Shri Jain knew that the furnace was inherently defective and therefore, the foundry was not likely to go into production. Any prudent businessman would not merely for the sake of continuing the deception make so large an advance. If these further facts which appear from the documents produced by the complainant himself, are taken, as they must be taken, into consideration, the conclusion is inescapable that there is no reasonable possibility of any Court holding on the basis of the materials, even if unrebutted, that Shri Jain at the time he made the representation knew that the furnace was inherently defective. 16. The fact that on 21.8.1978 Shri Jain wrote to the complainant to wait before coming to certain conclusions is also in the facts and circumstances of the cases not at all such as to show that Shri Jain knew that the furnace was inherently defective. It is, therefore, manifest that if the learned Magistrate had applied his mind to the materials on the record and Considered the necessary ingredients of section 420 I.P.C. he could not reasonably have come to the conclusion that there was material showing a prima facie commission of an offence of section 420 I.P.C. or any offence of cheating by Shri Jain. The learned Magistrate, therefore, acted arbitrarily and capriciously in passing the impugned order issuing process against him and it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to permit the criminal proceedings against petitioner Shri Jain to continue. 17. As against Shri Sirkar, the main material relied upon to show his knowledge from the very beginning of the inherently defective character of the are furnace is his letter dated 7.7.79 addressed to M/s A.K. Steel Industries in which Shri Sirkar stated that (a) I, Shri A. Sirkar, have not supplied any furnace to your company (b) I, Shri A. Sirkar, have not received any furnace from your company for repairs. This letter must be considered in the light of and with the reference to the other letter of the same date addressed by Shri Sirkar to complainant, Dr. J. Singh, which also was produced by the complainant. This letter must be considered in the light of and with the reference to the other letter of the same date addressed by Shri Sirkar to complainant, Dr. J. Singh, which also was produced by the complainant. In that letter Shri A. Sirkar stated, Your Company M/s A.K. Steel Industries may have carried out certain transactions with M/s Procons Consultant (Pvt.) Ltd. I have not entered into personal arrangement, agreement or transactions with you or the said company.' It is, therefore, manifest that what Shri A. Sirkar had stated was that he personally had nothing to do with the transaction of the supply of the furnace. He was not repudiating his part in the transaction, or the receipt of the furnace by Procons. He was only pointing out that the contracting party was Procons and not he himself personally. Such a statement, which was perfectly true, cannot show his dishonest intention. The fact that ultimately, it was found that there were certain defects in the furnace manufactured by Procons of which he was the Managing Director is no basis on which a conclusion can be reasonably arrived at that he knew from the very beginning that the furnace was defective. In the absence of any material showing that the complainant wanted back from Procons the furnace sent to them, without rectification or modification, the failure of Procons to return the furnace cannot show the dishonest intention of Sri Sirkar. Nor can the said conclusion be drawn from the circumstance that the value of modified furnace first estimated at Rs. 4 lakhs was subsequently estimated by Procons at one and a half lakhs. I may mention in passing that Shri Sanyal on behalf of Sri Sirkar offered to buy the furnace for Rs. l,070000/- the price paid by the complainant. Thus, if all the circumstances are taken into consideration, it cannot be reasonably said that there were materials on the basis of which any Court could hold that Shri A. Sirkar knew when he had made the representation about the furnace being in perfect running condition that it was false and thus committed the offence of cheating. Issuance of process in his case also is arbitrary and capricious and continuance of the proceedings against him also is an abuse of the process of the Court. Issuance of process in his case also is arbitrary and capricious and continuance of the proceedings against him also is an abuse of the process of the Court. As both the applications succeed on this ground it is not necessary to consider whether Procons is civilly liable. 18. I would, accordingly, allow both these applications, set aside the impugned order dated 10.10.1980 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sasaram and quash the criminal proceedings initiated against both the petitioners. Applications allowed.