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1982 DIGILAW 634 (ALL)

Bahadur v. Gaya Bux Singh

1982-05-05

MAHAVIR SINGH

body1982
JUDGMENT Mahavir Singh, J. - This is a Second appeal by the plaintiffs-appellants against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court allowing their appeal only in part. 2. The plaintiffs-appellants had filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from preventing them from keeping their Khaliyan, grazing their cattle, taking water from the tank, offering worship of the Deo Sthan and from cremating their deads on the land included in Chak Plot No. 829 of the defendants-respondents. It was mentioned that in the last settlement, Plots Nos. 1007/1 are 2.46 acreas and 1007/2 area 00.60 acres which now form part of chak No. 829 were used by the village people for the above mentioned customary rights, but these plots were illegally included in the chak of the defendants-respondents Nos. 3 and 4 who afterwards transferred the same to defendants-respondents Nos. 1 and 2. 3. The claim of the plaintiff-appellants was contested on the ground that the defendants-respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were sirdar's of these plots prior to the abolition of the zamindari and used to cultivate the same as such. It was allotted to them as part of their chak during consolidation operations and so the plaintiffs-appellants and the other village people had no longer any right in these plots. They had not raised any such claim during consolidation operation and so the suit was barred by S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It was also alleged that actually the plaintiffs-appellants had not perfected any claim with regard to these alleged customary rights. 4. The trial Court upheld the case of the defendants-respondents and so dismissed the suit. 5. On appeal the learned appellate Court appeared to have upheld the plea of the defendants-respondents that the suit was barred by S. 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act only in part and that so far as the offering of worship on the Deo Sthan situate in chak plot No.829 is concerned, the same is not covered by S. 49 of the said Act. He further held that in view of S. 30 of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the customary rights such as claimed by plaintiff-appellant except Deo Sthan stood transferred to other land specified in the consolidation scheme for that purpose. He further held that in view of S. 30 of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the customary rights such as claimed by plaintiff-appellant except Deo Sthan stood transferred to other land specified in the consolidation scheme for that purpose. So he decreed the suit in part and issued injunction against the defendants- respondents from interfering in plaintiffs- appellants' offering prayer over the plots situate in their chak but upheld dismissal of their claim with regard to other customary right. 6. In this second appeal the a plaintiffs- appellants contended that the view of the lower Court is erroneous. It is alleged that the learned lower Court had relied upon S. 30 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by which customary rights of the persons existing on the land which is included in the chak of another would be created in other land earmarked for this purpose in the consolidation Scheme but this provision applies only when the land could be subject to consolidation operations. It is contended that land on which such customary rights and usages i.e. keeping of Khaliyan grazing of cattle and taking of water from tank are exercised, is not included in the term `land defined by the Consolidation of Holdings Act.' 7. S. 3 (5) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act defines land as follows : "3 (5)-Land means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry (including pisciculture and poultry farming) and includes : (i) the sites, being of a holding, of a house or other similar structure; and (ii) trees, wells and other improvements existing on the plots forming the holding". 8. It is alleged that the land in question was not occupied for agriculture or animal husbandry as shown by the Commissioner in his report. It is also contended that it cannot be said to be held for the same purpose but this is incorrect. Exhibit A-5 is khatauni' for the year 1362F. Showing sirdari holding of Ram Nagina defendant- respondent No. 4. Khasara from 1359F to 1368F. also indicates the plots which have been shown in the holding of Ram Nagina in 1326F. In 1359F no doubt plot No. 1007/1 was shown as Banjar but this entry stands superseded by the Khatauni of 1362F. and khasras of later years. The land in question was thus in the holding of the defendants-respondents Nos. Khasara from 1359F to 1368F. also indicates the plots which have been shown in the holding of Ram Nagina in 1326F. In 1359F no doubt plot No. 1007/1 was shown as Banjar but this entry stands superseded by the Khatauni of 1362F. and khasras of later years. The land in question was thus in the holding of the defendants-respondents Nos. 3 and 4. S. 3 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act defines 'consolidation' to mean re- arrangement of holdings. So as the land in question was a part of the holding, it was covered by the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It may be that the land might actually not be used for agriculture but for certain other purposes as mentioned by the plaintiffs-appellants but that will not take away the legal character of the land in question. In any case, the plaintiffs-appellants could raise objection during consolidation operations that the entry of the land in question in the name of defendant-respondent Nos. 3 and 4 was wrong as the land had lost its character as defined in that Act. They had not taken such a plea. Hence in view of these facts, S. 30 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was applicable to the land in question. Hence even if the land in question was used for such customary purposes as alleged by the plaintiffs- appellants, the same ceased on inclusion of the same in the chak of the defendants- respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and stood transferred to the other land allotted by the Consolidation Authorities for that purposes. Actually the grievance of the plaintiffs-appellants was only to the effect that no land had been left for such customary purpose during consolidation but this fact is wrong and it is not disputed now that some land has been earmarked for such purpose vide Exhibit A-6. 9. The appeal has, therefore, no force and it is dismissed with costs.