JUDGMENT M. P. Mehrotra, J. 1. THIS petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution arises out of the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The facts, in brief, are these. 2. THE petitioner was issued a notice under Section 6 (2) of the said Act and a true copy of the same is annexure 1 to the petition. THE petitioner filed her objections against the said notice before the Competent Authority, Aligarh, a true copy whereof is annexure 2 to the petition. THE Competent Authority rejected the said objections by his order dated 10-8-81, a true copy whereof is annexure 3 to the petition. THEreafter the petitioner filed an appeal and the same was dismissed by the appellate court by its judgment dated 24-2-82, a true copy of which is annexure 5 to the petition. A certified copy of the said judgment has also been placed on the record. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel contended that the Competent Authority did not have the jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 6 (2) of the Act and, therefore, the same should be treated as without jurisdiction and no further proceedings could be taken in pursuance of the said notice. It was emphasized that in the notice it had been mentioned that certain lands mentioned in the said notice were held by the petitioner or her family and it was stated in the notice that the area of the said lands exceeded the ceiling limit permissible in the case of the petitioner. Learned counsel emphasized that the said land detailed at the foot of the notice was agricultural land and it could not be treated as vacant land under Section 2 (q) of the said Act. Learned counsel further submitted that there was no dispute that the land was agricultural and was being used for agricultural purposes and that the only reason why it was sought to be treated as vacant land was that a Master Plan was alleged to have come into operation in the Aligarh agglomeration with effect from 24-2-80 and that the land mentioned in the notice was included in the said Master Plan. Learned counsel in this connection invited my attention to annexure 3 where the Competent Authority has stated to the said effect. 3. IT was next contended that before the appellate court the learned DGC (Civil), who apppeared on behalf of the State, had taken time to produce the relevant notification whereby the alleged Master Plan was enforced in the Aligarh agglomeration but ultimately no such notification was produced before the court. IT was contended that the basic controversy between the parties was whether there was a valid and good Master Plan in operation in the Aligarh Agglomeration and that controversy would be decided without much of evidence and it was a fit case where the petitioner should not be compelled to pass through the gamut of several proceedings prescribed under the Act. Learned counsel in this connection placed reliance on a Supreme Court pronouncement in Calcutta Discount Co. v. I. T. Officer, AIR 1961 SC 372 . Support was also sought to be drawn from the following observations made in Barium Chemical Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 :- "Therefore, the words, "reason to believe" or "in the opinion of" do not always lead to the construction that the process of entertaining "reason to believe" or "the opinion" is an altogether subjective process not lending itself even to a limited scrutiny by the court that such "a reason to believe" or "opinion" was not formed on relevant facts or within the limits or as Lord Radcliffe and Lord Reld called the restraints of the statute as an alternative safeguard to rules of natural justice where the function is administrative." 4. LASTLY, the learned counsel placed reliance on a Division Bench pronouncement of this Court in Aftab Ahmad v. State, 1979 AWC 644 . In the Division Bench pronouncement it was emphasized that existence of Master Plan alone was not sufficient but that it should satisfy the statutory requirements underlying its preparation and enforcement. I have given my due consideration to these submissions but, in my view, it will not be a proper exercise of my discretion in the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution to admit this petition. I have given my due consideration to these submissions but, in my view, it will not be a proper exercise of my discretion in the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution to admit this petition. It should be seen that the basic proposition is that where the Legislature has prescribed a clear scheme under the statute, including the hierarchy of authorities, both original and appellate for redress to be sought under such statute, this Court will normally not entertain petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution which result in the short circuiting of the normal processes prescribed by the Statute. This is not to suggest that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain petitions despite the existence of alternative statutory remedies. That position is well understood but the point is whether in the facts of a particular case, any deviation from the normal rule is called for. 5. IT should be seen that it necessitates the brief examination of the scheme which has been laid down in the aforesaid Statute. The Act provides for a ceiling on vacant land in Urban agglomerations. In the field of taxation it is well known that a statute has three broad parts firstly, there is the imposition of charge, secondly, there are statutory provisions dealing with quantification of liability, and thirdly, the provisions which deal with enforcement of such liability. In the ceiling statutes similarly one finds that there are substantive provisions which lay down that a person should not be entitled to hold land more than the ceiling limit. One comes across such a provision in the Rural Ceiling Legislation as well as the Urban Ceiling Legislation. Sec. 3 is the section in the aforesaid statute which has laid down that persons are not entitled to hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. This provision is analogous to the charging section in a taxation statute. Thereafter there are provisions in the Act which lay down how the excess vacant land is to be determined. These provisions are analogous to the provisions in the taxation statute which provide for quantification of the liability. Sec. 6 is the provision which has laid down in what manner the ceiling proceedings will be initiated and the following sections deal with the manner in which these proceedings are to be decided and the surplus vacant land is to be determined in the case of various persons. Sec. 6 is the provision which has laid down in what manner the ceiling proceedings will be initiated and the following sections deal with the manner in which these proceedings are to be decided and the surplus vacant land is to be determined in the case of various persons. 6. NOW it Is well known that these provisions, whether in the taxation statute or in the ceiling legislation, are in the nature of machinery sections. They stand apart from the section or sections, which create liability. While interpreting Sec. 6 the said aspect of the matter will be relevant. It Is a machinery provision which has to be interpreted. Under Sec. 6 (1) it is the duty and liability of every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act, to file a statement before the Competent Authority within such period as may be prescribed and in such statement the prescribed particulars and details regarding the vacant land and other held by such a person should be set out. Subsection (2) of Sec. 6 gives the power to the Competent Authority that notwithstanding sub-section fl)of Sec. 6, he may himself call upon a person to file a return under Sec. 6 (1) if the said officer is of the opinion that such person holds excess vacant land. The result is that when such a notice is issued the person concerned has to file a return setting out the particulars and details of the lands, both vacant and otherwise which he holds. However, there is nothing in the Act which suggests that while filing the return under Sec. 6 (1) the person cannot say that he is not admitting that any excess vacant land is held by him. It is well known that returns are being filed under Sec. 6 (1) with the contention that the person concerned does not have any excess vacant land. On the basis of the statement filed under Sec. 6 and after such inquiry as the Competent Authority may deem fit to make, the Competent Authority shall under Sec. 8 (1) prepare a draft statement in respect 'of the person who has filed the statement under Sec. 6. 7. SUB-section (2) of Sec. 8 lays down that every statement prepared under sub-section (1) shall contain particulars set out therein. 7. SUB-section (2) of Sec. 8 lays down that every statement prepared under sub-section (1) shall contain particulars set out therein. SUB-section (3) of Sec. 8 lays down that the draft statement shall be served, in such manner as may be prescribed, on the person concerned together with a notice stating that any objection to the draft statement shall be preferred within 30 days of the service thereof. 8. THEN sub-section (4) of Section 8 lays down that the Competent Authority shall consider any objection received within the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-section (3) or within such further period as may be specified by the Competent Authority for any good and sufficient reason, from the person on whom the copy of the draft statement has been served under that sub-section and the Competent Authority shall, after giving the objector an opportunity of hearing, pass such orders as it deems fit. Section 9 deals with the final statement and it lays down as follows :- "After the disposal of the objection, if any, received under sub-section (4) of Sec. 8 the Competent Authority shall make the necessary alterations in the draft statement in accordance with the orders passed on the objections aforesaid and shall determine the vacant land held by the person concerned in excess of the ceiling limit and cause a copy of the draft statement as so altered to be served in the manner referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 8 on the person concerned and where such vacant land is held under a lease, or a mortgage, or a hire-purchase agreement, or an irrevocable power of attorney, also on the owner of such vacant land." Sec. 10 provides for the acquisition of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. 9. 'THERE is a provision for entertaining claims of the persons interested in the vacant land whose details are to be published in the official gazette. After dealing with the claim of the interested persons the Competent Authority by notification published in the official gazette declares the excess vacant land of the person concerned. 10. SECTION 33 of the Act provides for the right of an appeal against the orders passed by the Competent Authority. After dealing with the claim of the interested persons the Competent Authority by notification published in the official gazette declares the excess vacant land of the person concerned. 10. SECTION 33 of the Act provides for the right of an appeal against the orders passed by the Competent Authority. It is clear that there is a clear scheme provided in the Act where under the excess vacant land is to be determined in the case of a person. It provides for voluntary returns or returns in compliance with a notice issued by the Competent Authority. It seems to me that normally it is not postulated that a person may object to the notice under Sec. 6 (2) calling upon him to file a return of the vacant land and other lands held by him. The Act provides for submission of such a return and thereafter further preparation of draft statement by the Competent Authority and then a provision for objection to the draft statement, to be submitted by the person concerned. Such objections are to be duly considered and decided by the Prescribed Authority after giving the objector a reasonable opportunity of being heard and then a final statement has to be prepared. In this view of the matter, much confusion is likely to be caused if a person, to whom the notice under Sec. 6 (2) is issued, seeks the Competent Authority to consider his objections and grievances at that stage on the ground that issuance of notice itself was without jurisdiction. I may say that this will be the normal position but I do not suggest that it is not possible to think of extreme causes where the notice issued under Sec. 6 (2) can be shown to be ex-facie illegal and without jurisdiction. One can conceive of such cases but the normal position is as I have stated above. Learned counsel greatly emphasized that the expression used in Sec. 6 (2) is 'if the Competent Authority is of opinion' and with the aid of the aforementioned cases it was sought to be contended that such an opinion could never be allowed to be purely subjective. It should be seen that the significance of the expression 'opinion' is to be considered in the light of the scheme of the legislative enactment and the context in which the expression has been used. It should be seen that the significance of the expression 'opinion' is to be considered in the light of the scheme of the legislative enactment and the context in which the expression has been used. In this connection a reference to the provisions of the Income-tax legislation will show how these controversies should be dealt with. In Sec. 139 (2) of the present Income-tax Act, 1961, which is analogous to Sec. 22 (2) of the old repealed Income-tax Act, 1922, it is provided that "in the case of any person, who in the Income-tax Officer's opinion is assessable under this Act." The Income-tax Officer may issue a notice to him and require him to furnish a return of his income. It will be seen that this provision is analogous to the one in Sec. 6 (2) of the Urban Ceiling Act. It is not without significance that no case has been cited where the court could be shown to have interfered with the issuance of such a notice under Sec. 139 (2) on the ground that the Income-tax Officer did not have any material to justify the opinion. Calcutta Discount Company's case is a case under the old Sec. 34 of the Income-Tax Act, 1922, which is corresponding to Sec. 147 in the present Act. The distinction between Sec. 34 and Sec. 22 (2) was well understood under the old Act. 11. IN Chhattoo Ram v. Commissioner of INcome Tax, 15 ITR 302 the Federal Court emphasized that Sec. 22 (2) of the old INcome Tax Act was not a jurisdictional provision but merely a machinery provision. Regarding Section 34, dealing with the assessment of escaped income, it was emphasized in several cases that the said provision was jurisdictional in nature and it laid down certain pre-conditions before recourse could be had to the said provision. As I have emphasized above, the expression 'opinion' used in a statute is to be interpreted in the back ground and the context as provided by the statutory enactment. As I read section 6 (2), in my opinion, the Competent Authority can issue a notice, if he is of opinion that a person holds excess vacant land. Of course, such opinion must be honestly held. As I read section 6 (2), in my opinion, the Competent Authority can issue a notice, if he is of opinion that a person holds excess vacant land. Of course, such opinion must be honestly held. It is a fundamental requirement of law that no officer exercising jurisdiction judicially or quasi-judicially can be allowed to act prejudicially to the rights of the subjects on a malafide basis. IN my view, therefore, this provision should be construed more in consonance with the approach which is relevant for interpreting Sec. 139 (2) of the INcome Tax Act, 1961 rather than the approach which is brought to bear upon the interpretation of section 147 of the said Act or Section 34 of the old INcome-tax Act. IN my view, no special harassment or detriment is likely to be caused if a return is filed wherein the person concerned sets out his objection and sets out his point of view including the objection that he does not hold any excess vacant land. These objections can be better decided in the regular proceedings which take place under Section 8 of the Act. The necessary evidence can be looked into and examined. There is a clear provision for the filing of objections and after determination of the objections the final statement is prepared. The clear statutory requirement in sub-section (4) of Section 8 is that the objector must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and lastly as already stated, there is a provision for appeal. The Act, therefore, clearly provides for sufficient safeguards for the interest of the persons concerned who contend that they do not hold any excess ceiling land. 12. COMING to facts of the instant case, it should be seen that normally a controversy as to whether some land is agricultural or not, cannot be described as a pure question of law. It may be that in certain cases it may be admitted that the particular piece of land is still being used as agricultural land but in many other cases there may arise a dispute whether the present user is agricultural or not. It has to be shown that the necessary entry is there in the revenue or land records before the appointed date. It has to be shown that the necessary entry is there in the revenue or land records before the appointed date. Further it has also to be investigated as to whether in the Master flan the particular piece of land has been specified for a purpose other than agriculture. The expression 'Master Plan' itself has been defined in Section 2 (h) of the Act as follows :- "2 (h) "master plan" in relation to an area within an urban agglomeration or any part thereof, means the plan (by whatever name called) prepared under any law for the time being in force or in pursuance of an order made by the State Government for the development of such area or part thereof and providing for the stages by which such development shall be carried out." The validity of the Master Plan itself may be open to question as to whether it has legally come into operation or not. I am emphasizing these aspects of the matter, because it seems to me that the relevant exercise cannot be described as a pure legal exercise and such an exercise, in my view, is not contemplated to be done at the stage when the notice under Section 6 (2) has been issued. It should further be seen that when the notice under Section 6 (2) is issued to a person, the Competent Authority cannot be expected to have a full knowledge of the entire lands possessed by the person concerned. That knowledge obviously is in the possession of the person concerned. The position is the same as under Section 139 (2) of the Income Tax Act. When an Income Tax Officer issues a notice calling upon the assessee to file return of his income, obviously the details of such income are not in the possession of the Income-tax Officer. They are in the possession of the assessee himself. In the notice which was issued in the instant case under Sec. 6 (2), the Competent Authority itself observed :- "Aisi Sambhavana ho sakti hai ki aap athwa aapke kutumb duara anya bhumi bhee dharit ki ja rahi ho". 13. THEREFORE, the petitioner was called upon to submit a full return under Section 6(1). The issuance of such a notice under Section 6 (2) calling upon the petitioner to submit his return under Section 6 (1) per se does not cause any detriment to the petitioner. 13. THEREFORE, the petitioner was called upon to submit a full return under Section 6(1). The issuance of such a notice under Section 6 (2) calling upon the petitioner to submit his return under Section 6 (1) per se does not cause any detriment to the petitioner. There was no determination or adjudication of her rights or liabilities under the Act. I do not think that the mere aspect of a certain inconvenience likely to be caused can be so much emphasized that the normal working provided under the Act should be allowed to be short circuited. Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner, himself emphasized that even if the notification regarding the Master Plan was forthcoming, that would not be sufficient and it would still be open to the petitioner to contend that the Master Plan did not validly come into operation in accordance with the statutory requirements bearing on the said aspect of the matter. I do not like to say anything about the correctness or otherwise of the submission because at this stage I should not make any observation regarding the merits of the contentions which may be raised in the ceiling proceedings here-after. I am only emphasizing that the instant case could not be said to be one where it could be said that it could be decided as a pure question of law. 14. ACCORDINGLY, this petition is dismissed in limine.