Lala Ishwar Prasad v. Firm Dewan Kirpa Ram Radha Kishan Factory
1982-05-07
DEOKI NANDAN
body1982
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a decree-holders' Second Appeal from an order passed under S. 47 of the Civil P. C. The dispute relates to the recovery of interest which, it was claimed, was allowable on the amount of the decree although it had not been specifically awarded by the trial court while decreeing the suit. 2. The suit giving rise to these proceedings, being Suit No. 37 of 1958, was filed in the court of the Civil Judge, Saharanpur, for recovery of mesne profits for the period 1st May, 1955 to 13th Nov. 1956. The valuation of the suit was placed at Rs. 5,250/-. The precise relief claimed in the suit was for recovery of mesne profits from 1st May, 1955 to 13th Nov. 1956 for use and occupation of the mills, with interest at ten annas per mensem pendente lite and future from the date of the suit to the date of the recovery of the amount with costs, and such other relief as the court may deem just to grant. By judgment dated the 16th Aug. 1962, the suit was decreed in the following terms : - "The suit is partly decreed with proportionate costs ex parte against defendant and after contest against the rest of the defendants in the sum of Rs. 30,555.50 np. (at the rate of Rs. 20,000/-per annum) on account of mesne profits for the period 1-5-1955 to 10-11-1956. The plaintiff has paid court-fee at Rs. 5200/-only; the balance of the court-fee shall be paid by him within a period of one month from the date of this decree. In case the plaintiff fails to make good the deficiency of court-fee within the prescribed period, his suit shall stand decreed, with proportionate costs, in the sum of Rs. 5200/- only." When the decree was put into execution, vice Execution Case No. 9 of 1964, the decree-holders claimed. (11 decretal amount Rs. 30555-50 p., costs of the suit Rs. 2053.75 p. and interest from 19-9-1962 to 11-3-1964 Rs. 2902-25 p. The judgment-' debtors objected to the claim for interest; but, by judgment dated the 17th Sept. 1964, the executing court held that the definition of mesne profits prescribed under S. 2 (12) of the Civil P. C. empowered the executing court to allow interest on the decreed amount of mesne profits and held that the decree-holders were entitled to recover Rs.
1964, the executing court held that the definition of mesne profits prescribed under S. 2 (12) of the Civil P. C. empowered the executing court to allow interest on the decreed amount of mesne profits and held that the decree-holders were entitled to recover Rs. 2902-25 p. on account of interest as claimed. 3. An Execution First Appeal No. 6 of 1965 was preferred in this Court by the judgment-debtors from the said judgment of the executing court dated the 17th Sep. 1964. That appeal as allowed by a Division Bench of this Court, by judgment dated the 23rd May, 1968. This Court held that where a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest, the court shall be deemed to have refused such interest and a separate suit shall not lie. The court further observed that at any rate...... it was not open to the executing court to further inflate the decree by adding pendents lite and future interest with regard to which no relief had been granted to the decree-holder in the decree itself. 4. The decree-holders did not leave the matter at that. They moved an application before the executing court pleading that the judgment of this Court in the said Execution First Appeal was a nullity and that they were entitled to interest under the order dated the 17th Sept. 1964 that had been passed by the executing court. In the meanwhile, all the amount payable under the decree had been paid off by the judgment-debtors and by its judgment dated the 28th Oct. 1969. the executing court dismissed the decree-holders' said application No. 110-C2 and ordered the striking off of the execution proceedings in full satisfaction. 5. The plea put forward by the decree-holders for contending that the judgment of this Court was without jurisdiction and a nullity, was that the original suit was valued at less than Rs. 10,000/- and consequently an appeal did not lie to the High Court from the decree of the trial court or of the executing court in this case. 6.
The plea put forward by the decree-holders for contending that the judgment of this Court was without jurisdiction and a nullity, was that the original suit was valued at less than Rs. 10,000/- and consequently an appeal did not lie to the High Court from the decree of the trial court or of the executing court in this case. 6. The two courts below have observed that this plea was raised by way of a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Execution First Appeal No. 6 of 1965, before this Court, and the plea having been negatived by this Court, it was not open to the decree-holders to raise it at subsequent stages of the same proceedings. In order to verify, if that were so, I sent for the record of the Execution First Appeal No. 6 of 1965, and, although the judgment of this Court dated the 23rd May, 1968, which is of a Division Bench, does not mention that any such preliminary objection was raised, it appears from a review application dated the 8th July, 1968 for review of the judgment dated the 23rd May. 1968 in the Execution First Appeal No. 6 of 1965, and the orders passed by the Division Bench on that Review application that the decree-holders had raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of that First Appeal in this Court on the ground that the valuation of the original suit was less than Rs. 10,000/-. This Court disposed of the review application by the following order : - "We have heard Mr. J. N. Tiwari in support of this petition. To us, it appears that it is not correct to say that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which would for the purposes of the distribution of work, ordinarily lie in the court of the District Judge. No grounds were shown to us at the time of the hearing of the appeal to establish the contention that this court had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We do not find any ground for the review of the order. The petition is accordingly dismissed." 7. It appears from the above order that the objection to the maintainability of the appeal was raised and negatived by this Court.
We do not find any ground for the review of the order. The petition is accordingly dismissed." 7. It appears from the above order that the objection to the maintainability of the appeal was raised and negatived by this Court. The judgment of this Court holding that it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal was final and could not be assailed at the subsequent stages of the same proceedings. See Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Devi, AIR 1960 SC 941 . It cannot be disputed that the decision of a civil court that it has jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceedings is final and can be questioned only by way of appeal. See Ujjam Bai v. State of U. P. AIR 1962 SC 1621 . The decision of this Court holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain the matter is no less so. Mr. S. N. Agrawal for the appellants referred to Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 , wherein it was observed that it is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of the execution and even in collateral proceedings. It may be that execution of a decree could be resisted on the ground that the court passing it had no jurisdiction. But that is not the case here. The decree that was passed has been satisfied by the judgment-debtor. A point was raised in the execution proceedings that the decree-holders were entitled to interest from a certain date and for a certain period although the decree did not award it. The executing Court decided that the decree-holders could recover a certain sum by way of interest in addition to the decreed amount of mesne profits, but this Court set aside that order of the executing court in the said Execution First Appeal No. 6 of 1965. What was sought to be executed was the order of the executing court allowing interest to the decree-holders, notwithstanding that it had been set aside by this Court. The attempt amounted in substance to treat the executing court as a court of appeal from the judgment of this Court.
What was sought to be executed was the order of the executing court allowing interest to the decree-holders, notwithstanding that it had been set aside by this Court. The attempt amounted in substance to treat the executing court as a court of appeal from the judgment of this Court. A subordinate court cannot after its judgment has been set aside on appeal, ignore the appellate court's judgment and give effect to its own judgment by holding that the judgment of the appellate court was without jurisdiction and a nullity. 8. Learned Counsel then cited a decision of this Court in Lalta Prasad v. Sri , Ganeshji, AIR 1922 All 117 ; to show that where a decree grants mesne profit but says nothing about interest the decree-holder can claim that the simple decree for mesne profits carries interest. He also relied upon Kedarnath v. Bageshwari Prasad, AIR 1937 PC 143 ; but that is a matter relating to the merits and cannot be raised now after judgment of this Court dated the 23rd May, &1968 in Execution First Appeal No. 6 of 1965 wherein it was held that the decree-holders could not claim interest in this Case. 9. The learned counsel for the decree-holder-appellants then contended that the decision of this Court holding that Execution First Appeal No. 6 of 1965 was maintainable in this Court notwithstanding the fact that the valuation of the original suit was less than Rs. 10,000/-, is erroneous. As already observed, the point could only be raised by way of an appeal before the Supreme Court from the judgment of this court in Execution First Appeal No. 6 of 1965 and could not be raised before the executing court or on appeal from the orders of the executing court negativing the contention. 10. The Execution Second Appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed; but, as the respondents are unrepresented, there will be no order as to costs.