JUDGMENT 1. - This is a petition of revision under Section 401 Cr. P.C. from on order, dated, October 5, 1981, passed by the Executive Magistrate, Kota, allowing the application of non-petitioner No. 1, under Section 145 Cr. P.C. and consequently declaring that the non-petitioner was in possession of Swimming Pool in dispute with in a period of two months of date of passing of the preliminary order on June 10, 1980 and directing the receiver to restore the possession of this property to the non-petitioner. 2. The petitioner, Maharaja Samudra Singh, who describes him as a journalist, avers that he shifted his office in two rooms attached with the swimming pool "some where in March 1980" and that therefore he was in possession of this property at the material time. He mentioned in this context that the non-petitioner had filed an application under Section 145 Cr.P.C. on June 10, 1980, when the preliminary order was passed by the learned Magistrate stating that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace existed concerning the swimming pool in dispute. The Magistrate directed the parties to attend his court and put in written statements of their respective claims on June 24, 1980. 3. It appears that the parties filed their respective written statements in the Court on the appointed date. They also filed documents and affidavits in support of their respective claims. 4. The learned Magistrate considered the entire evidence before him and came to the conclusion, vide order, dated, October 5, 1981, that the non-petitioner was in possession of the swimming pool in dispute during the period of two months immediately preceding the passing of the preliminary order on June 10, 1980. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has filed this revision petition under Section 401 Cr. P.C. 6. Mr. Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the order, dated, October 5, 1981 pissed by the learned Magistrate on two grounds. First, he contended that the learned Magistrate passed the preliminary order without recording his satisfaction that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning the swimming pool. Second, he argued that assuming such satisfaction was recorded, it was recorded upon the affidavit of the non- petitioner which cannot be treated to be a valid affidavit because it does not bear attestation according to law. 7. Second, he argued that assuming such satisfaction was recorded, it was recorded upon the affidavit of the non- petitioner which cannot be treated to be a valid affidavit because it does not bear attestation according to law. 7. 1 have carefully considered these arguments in the light of the material on record and find that there is no substance in either of them. It will be seen that the preliminary order passed by the learned Magistrate on June 10, 1980 is based upon the material which is adverted to in that document and which was duly considered by the Magistrate. It was on the basis of that material that the learned magistrate seems to have been satisfied, though he did not record such satisfaction in so many words, that there is a dispute likely to cause breach of peace concerning the swimming pool. It is no requirement of law that the preliminary order must mention in so many words that the magistrate is satisfied regarding the existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace. It is enough in my view, if the order passed by the magistrate contains indication that there was material on the record from which he could be satisfied and that he had applied his mind to such material before passing the preliminary order. As already stated there was such material before the magistrate and he had applied his mind to the material before passing the preliminary order in the instant case. The first submission made by Mr. Bhargava therefore fails. 8. Turning now to the second argument that the affidavit of the non- petitioner on which the learned magistrate acted for passing the preliminary order is not attested according to law, it is contended that the affidavit was attested by an oath commissioner instead of a magistrate and that attestation by an oath commissioner is legally unacceptable in respect of an affidavit which is required to be filed in a court of law. Mr. Bhargava has not been able to show any legal rule making an attestation by a magistrate a sine qua non of an affidavit for its valid production in evidence in a court of law. This argument also therefore, fails. 9. Mr. Bhargava has not been able to show any legal rule making an attestation by a magistrate a sine qua non of an affidavit for its valid production in evidence in a court of law. This argument also therefore, fails. 9. Moreover, I find that the impugned order made by the learned magistrate does not call for any interference by this Court in the exercise of its revision jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr. P.C. If the petitioner is genuinely aggrieved by the impugned order, it is always open to him to seek his remedy from a civil court of competent jurisdiction. 10. For all these reasons I do not find any force in this revision petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed summarily. *******