JUDGMENT :- This is an appeal preferred by the State of Maharashtra to challenge the judgment dated July 31, 1978 recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Poona Cantonment, Poona, acquitting the accused of the offence under S.7 (i) r/w. S.16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 2. The Magistrate recorded the order of acquittal on a short ground that the prosecution has failed to establish that R. 9 (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules") as it was in existence prior to its amendment dated Feb. 13, 1974 was not complied with. R. 9 (i) of the Rules requires that the Food Inspector shall send a copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the accused after its receipt as soon as possible. In the present case, the sample was taken on Sept. 5, 1973, while it was sent to the Public Analyst on Sept. 7, 1973. The report (Ex. 19) of the Public Analyst was received by the Food Inspector on Nov. 17, 1973. Thereafter, the consent of the Chief Officer was secured on February 28, 1974 and the complaint was launched before the Judicial Magistrate on March 28, 1974. The copy of the report of the Public Analyst was sent to the accused only on April 15, 1974. 3. On these undisputed facts, the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the complainant-Food Inspector has failed to give any explanation as to why a copy of the report was sent to the accused only on April 15, 1974 when it was received by him from the office of the Public Analyst on Nov. 17, 1973. The Magistrate felt that the delay of about five months in sending the copy of the report was fatal to the prosecution and thereupon entered an order of acquittal in favour of the accused. 4. Shri Gangakhedkar, the learned Public Prosecutor, submitted that R. 9 (i) of the Rules merely provides that the copy of the report should be sent as early as possible to the accused and does not prescribe any time limit. It was urged by Shri Gangakhedkar that the time limit was prescribed only after the rule was amended on Feb. 13, 1974 prescribing the time limit of 10 days. It was urged by Shri Gangakhedkar that the time limit was prescribed only after the rule was amended on Feb. 13, 1974 prescribing the time limit of 10 days. Shri Gangakhedkar relied upon the decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1976 decided on October 19, 1977 and reported in 1978 Cri. LJ 811 (State of Maharashtra v. Janardan Ramchandra)) in support of his submission. The reliance upon this decision is not appropriate. The only question which was considered by the learned single Judge in the decision was as to whether handing over copy to the accused personally and not sending it by registered post can be said to be due compliance with the rule. The single Judge held, and with respect correctly, that it would be too technical view to claim that unless the report is sent by registered post, the prosecution is vitiated. In my judgment, the decision relied upon by Shri Gangakhedkar has no application whatsoever to the facts of the present case. Accepting that prior to the amendment, it was open for the Food Inspector to send the report without any bar of limitation, still what was required by the rule was that it should be sent as early as possible. 5. Shri Parekh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, is right in his submission that by no stretch of imagination the period of five months from the date of receipt of the report could be said to be as early as possible. Shri Parekh submitted, and in my judgment correctly, that the report should have been sent forthwith and, in any event, before lodging of the complaint on March 28, 1974. Here the report is sent 17 days after the complaint is lodged and in my judgment, the Magistrate was perfectly justified in holding that failure to comply with R. 9 (i) of the Rules has vitiated the proceedings. The order of acquittal recorded by the Magistrate requires no interference. 6. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.