N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE learned Judge - and I again say quite rightly - has scrutinized the document and held as follows. I quote below his assessment of the document from paragraph 18 of his order. The learned Judge states:-"by reading the document as a whole what emerges is a single transaction arrived at by and between the parties to it. It relates to some attack made or liable to be made by plaintiffs and one Bai Mangu against Bai Nanis will under which defendant no. 1 Chinubhai is the sole legatee. To settle this point that is to say to bury the dispute it appears that the parties arrived at an understanding which is embodied in this document. The essence of the document is that in consequence of the agreealert arrived at the Plaintiffs (and aforesaid Bai Mangu) Will not thereafter raise any dispute or cause obstructions relating to the validity of Bai Nanis will. In consideration of this legatee (the defendant no. 1 Chinubhai) agreed to put the case money of Rs. 33 0 amount) and the property which may be found from the bank locker at the hands of third party Ramchandra such would dispose of the said cash and other movable properties in accordance with the arrangements embodied in the document before use viz. (a) Rs. 5000. 00 to the defrayed for expenses Rs. 9000. 00 for being paid to Bai Mangu balance Rs. 19 0 for being distributed to Ramchandra between the plaintiffs (B) what is found from the bank locker has to be distributed by aforesaid Ramchandra between all the six brothers i. e. plaintiffs and defendant no. 1 Chinubhai in equal share; and (C) defendant no. 1 Chinubhai has foregone his share in his fathers properties";the unequivocal and categorical declaration by deceased Chinubhai that he forsakes ( in present) his right title and interest to or in his fathers property is his solemn declaration that on and from that moment be forgoes his aforesaid claim. The learned Judge in my view therefore was fully justified in treating this part of the document as a document falling under sec. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act and therefore calling for compulsory registration. The learned Judge in my view therefore was fully justified in treating this part of the document as a document falling under sec. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act and therefore calling for compulsory registration. The learned Judge however disposed of the two objections regarding stamp duty and registration as follows:"in this context it appears we should not take into consideration the duty attracting upon the covenant of release which we have held as requiring registration and not admissible in evidence". As far as the non-admissibility of that part requiring registration and duty as a release deed is concerned the plaintiffs were obviously not worried because their suit was based only on two prayers touching the cash and ornaments. The heirs of deceased Chinubhai however wanted to avoid the document as a whole and therefore their contention was that vital part of the document requires registration and as that part was vital and inseparable from the other parts the whole document could not be received in evidence for want of registration. The second contention on behalf on those heirs of deceased Chinubhai was that as the document was unstamped even in respect of a part the whole of the document was inadmissible because sec. 34 of the Bombay Stamp Act lays down that no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence or shall he acted upon registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped. Implosion the phrase for any purpose occurring in sec. 34 of the Bombay Stamp Act it was contended that the whole document was not admissible in evidence. As said by me above while extracting the order portion of the learned trial judge form paragraph 23 of his order the learned Judge totally severed this provision and held that the two other parts namely the promise to pay money and promise to get the share in ornaments could be separately dealt with and that part of the document could be received in evidence on payment of duty and 10 times penalty is noting the third path pertaining to relinquishment or release of Chinubhais share in the ancestral properties of his. This approach of the learned Judge in my view is incorrect and not in accordance with law. This approach of the learned Judge in my view is incorrect and not in accordance with law. Sec. of the Bombay Stamp Act clearly provides that when any instrument comprising or relating to several distinct matters is there duty is to be charged on the aggregate amount of the duties with which separate instruments would be chargeable under the Act. If the part of any document therefore is unstamped the stamp on the document is wholly lacking and so for all practical purposes the document can be said to be partially unstamped even if duty and penalty in respect of the other part is paid. The learned Judge in my view therefore committed a clear error of law in observing in paragraph 23 of his order that that it was open to him not to take into consideration the duty attracting upon the covenant of release. ( 2 ) IF any authority in support of the above proposition of law emerging from the application of the common sense point of view is needed the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ratanji Bhagwanji and Co. v. Prem Shanker A. I. R. 1938 Allahabad 619 can be adverted to. The learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court there observed:"a document must be considered as a whole and if it is an instrument insufficiently stamped as required by the Stamp Act then it should not be admitted in evidence for any purpose". In that case the argument was examined on the basis that there was a promissory note in sufficiently stamped and it was held that the learned Judge was not entitled to split it up and admit in evidence a portion of it as an acknowledgment to save limitation. I therefore lay down as a proposition of law that the learned trial Judge was clearly in the wrong in holding that the portion of the document pertaining to release could be avoided and the rest of the portion can be admitted in evidence for the purpose of dealing with the two suit claims. To this extent the contension of Mr. M. D. Pandya deserves to be upheld as far as the abstract proposition of law is concerned. To this extent the contension of Mr. M. D. Pandya deserves to be upheld as far as the abstract proposition of law is concerned. ( 3 ) THE question however is: Can this court now set aside the order of the learned trial Judge for admitting the document even though it is insufficiently stamped taking the document as one instrument as per sec. 5 of the Bombay Stamp Act? Had it been a matter of simple corollary the question would not have presented any difficulty. However sec. 35 of the Bombay Stamp Act (corresponding to sec. 36 of the Indian Stamp Act) precludes this court from going behind the finding of the learned trial Judge in admitting this insufficiently stamped document except for the purpose of sec. 58 of the Bombay Stamp Act (corresponding to sec. 61 of the Indian Stamp Act ). Once we concede that for the purpose of stamp duty a document is to be taken as a unit it follows a fortiorari that the admission of the document by the trial court is of a document insufficiently stamped or unstamped. Once such document is admitted into evidence by the learned trial Judge rightly or wrongly the question stands unfortunately concluded as per the provisions of law. Even the Allahabad High Court judgment which has been referred to by me above in support of the submission of Mr. Pandya for the heirs of deceased Chinubhai itself provides that where the trial court admitted an insufficiently stamped document in its entirety but relied only on a portion of it as an acknowledgment to save limitation the appellate court would be precluded from questioning the admissibility of the document even though it had been wrongly admitted by the trial court. This point has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in the case of Javar Chand and Ors. v. Pukhraj Surana A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1655. The Supreme Court observed that -where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped or has not been properly stamped the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the Court. The Supreme Court observed that -where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped or has not been properly stamped the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the Court. The court has to judicial determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case. Once a document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties in examination and cross-examination of their witnesses sec. 36 comes into operation. Once a document has been admitted in evidence as aforesaid it is not open either to the trial court itself or to a court of appeal or revision to go behind that order. Such an order is not liable to be reviewed or revised by the same court or a court of superior jurisdiction. What the Supreme Court lays down is the law of the land as Article 141 of the Constitution of India ordains. Mr. Pandya therefore could not plead with any appreciable vehemence that this document admitted into evidence despite the strong protest raised on behalf of the bears of deceased Chinubhai could be successfully taken out of consideration. He however tried to urge further arguments on the basis of the very judgment of the Supreme Court in Javer Chands case (supra ). The Supreme Court has stated in the course of its judgment as follows :"that section (Sec. 36 of the India Stamp Act) is categorical in its terms that when a document has once been admitted in evidence such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the suit or the proceeding on the ground that the instrument had not been duly stamped. The only exception recognised by the section is the class of cases contemplated by sec. 61 which is not neutral to the present controversy. Sec. 36 does not admit of other exceptions. Where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped or has not been properly stamped it has to be decided then and there when the document is tendered in evidence. 61 which is not neutral to the present controversy. Sec. 36 does not admit of other exceptions. Where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped or has not been properly stamped it has to be decided then and there when the document is tendered in evidence. Once the court rightly or wrongly decides to admit the document in evidence so far as the parties are concerned the matter is closed. (Emphasis supplied by me)". The above quoted exposition of law is too clear to call for any mincing of matters or elaboration Mr. Pandya however wanted to read the judgment of the Supreme Court further where the Supreme Court has in the facts of that case observed as follows :"the record in this case discloses the fact that the Hindus were marked as Exs. P/1 and P/2 and bore the endorsement admitted in evidence under the signature of the court. It is not therefore one of those cases where a document has been inadvertently admitted without the court applying its mind to the question of its admissibility. Once a document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and the trial has proceeded all along on the footing that the document was an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties ill examination and cross-examination of their witnesses sec. 36 of the Stamp act comes in to operation". Mr. Pandya relying on these subsequent words urged that that document went beyond the pale of challenge only if it was utilised by the parties at the subsequent stages for the purpose of examining weightiness but the otherwise. It is difficult to lend any credence to what Mr. Pandya has tried to submit. The above words are referred to by the Supreme Court while dealing with the two specific documents before it. As far as the ratio is concerned it is what is already extracted by me above from the judgment earlier. Subsequent observations of the Supreme Court are therefore not the part of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. They simply brushed aside the contention of the objectors of the document before them on the ground that it did not beloved the contender before the Supreme Court to raise this old bogie and try to open a closed chapter. Subsequent observations of the Supreme Court are therefore not the part of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. They simply brushed aside the contention of the objectors of the document before them on the ground that it did not beloved the contender before the Supreme Court to raise this old bogie and try to open a closed chapter. Reference to cross-examination etc. in the judgment is therefore confined to the facts of that case and they have nothing to do with the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment. As I have said above a court may decide the question of admission of a document rightly or wrongly as laid down by the Supreme Court. The matter of stamp duty is essentially a matter between the State on one hand and the person liable to pay the same on the other. A third party has not much to do with this question. The role of such an objector is more or less of a citizen inviting the attention of the court or the concerned adjudicating authorrity to the provisions of law and that is why once a judicial authorial decides to admit a document though unstamped or insufficient) stamped into evidence the question stands concluded for all time to come between the parties. Mr. Pandyas submission therefore that the document was wrongly admitted in evidence though admittedly unstamped or partially unstamped is difficult to be accepted. I however make it clear that for the purpose of stamp duty the provisions of sec. 58 are there and for the purpose of levying proper duty the authority under sec. 58 of the Act may examine the question afresh or the trial court also may be persuaded to record a declaration to the effect that the document is partially unstamped and may determine the amount of duty with which such an instrument is chargeable and to do the rest of the things thereafter. As far as the present litigation is concerned the admissibility of the document stands concluded though I hold that the learned judge was clearly in error in treating the document pertaining to release as not relevant for the purpose of admitting the whole document. As far as the present litigation is concerned the admissibility of the document stands concluded though I hold that the learned judge was clearly in error in treating the document pertaining to release as not relevant for the purpose of admitting the whole document. What the learned Judge has done is taking the document as one instrument and admitting in evidence without taking into consideration the duty attracting upon the covenant of release which part even for want of registration could not be taken into account in the present litigation. As a matter of fact this part is not at all required to be taken into account as far as the Plaints two prayers are concerned. So the first major objection put forward by Mr. Pandya for the heirs of the original defendant no. 1 though upheld on a point of law is ultimately rejected for the purpose of admissibility of the document. Application dismissed. .