JUDGMENT S. C. Mathur, J. 1. THIS petition was originally directed against the order dated 8-10-77 passed by the Second Addl. District Judge, Pratapgarh, whereby he allowed the revision of the owners of the property in dispute, opposite parties 1 and 2, and cancelled the allotment order dated 16-5-1977 passed by the Prescribed Authority In favour of the petitioner. After setting aside the allotment order made in favour of the petitioner, the learned Addi. Distt. Judge directed the Prescribed Authority for disposing of the allotment matter afresh according to law taking in to account the observations made in the judgment. In pursuance of the direction made by the learned Additional District Judge, the Prescribed Authority, during the pendency of the writ petition, passed Order dated 5-12-77 by which It rejected the petitioner's application for allotment of the property in dispute. Thereafter an order was passed on 24-1-1978 by which the petitioner's revision directed against the order dated 5-12-1977 was rejected by the IV Additional District Judge, Pratapgarh, Opposite Party no. 5. The instant petition is directed against orders dated 8-10-77, 5-12-77 and 24-1-1978. 2. THE dispute in the petition pertains to house no. 10/2 Shanker Sadan, Mohalla Babaganj, district Pratapgarh. This property fell vacant and the vacancy was notified on 30-4-1977. On 16-5-1977 the Prescribed Authority made an order of allotment in favour of the petitioner. On 17-5-1977 the owners moved an application for direction to the petitioner to make payment of presumptive rent. This application was allowed on the same date and one month's presumptive rent was paid by the petitioner to the owners. It appears that the petitioner obtained possession of the property in dispute on 21-5-1977. However, on 25-5-1977, the owners preferred a revision before the learned District Judge which came up for hearing before the Second Additional District Judge, Pratapgarh. Before the learned Additional District Judge an application was moved on behalf of the owners on 11-8-1977 through which it was brought to the notice of the learned Additional Judge that the petitioner had obtained allotment order In his favour by concealing a material fact. This material fact was stated to be the ejectment decree passed against the petitioner's father on 28-8-1976 in respect of an accommodation owned by some other landlord. THE learned Additional District Judge found that the averment made on behalf of the owners was correct. This material fact was stated to be the ejectment decree passed against the petitioner's father on 28-8-1976 in respect of an accommodation owned by some other landlord. THE learned Additional District Judge found that the averment made on behalf of the owners was correct. Observing that the petitioner concealed the disqualification which disentitled him to the order of allotment, the learned Addl. Distt. Judge cancelled the order of allotment made on 16-5-1977. After the remand order, the Prescribed Authority, has also rejected the petitioner's application for allotment on the same ground, namely, that in view of the ejectment decree passed against the petitioner's father, he was not entitled to an order of allotment for a period of two years. THE petitioner has assailed the orders referred to herein. Sri Shafiq Mirza learned counsel for the petitioner had initially argued that the two authorities below had relied upon a provision which was not in existence in the year 1977 when the order of allotment was passed in favour of the petitioner. The two authorities below had referred to Rule 10 (5) (a) in their orders. Rule 10 (5) (a) in its existing form was introduced with effect from 25-5-1977. The Rule in its existing form reads as follows :- "(5) A building shall not ordinarily be allotted to the following persons or for the following purposes- (a) A tenant against whom a decree or order has been passed for ejectment on any ground in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) of section 3 or under section 7-B of the old Act or any ground mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (2) section 20 during the period of two years from the date of such decree or order or any member of his family or any person of whose family he is a member." Sri Pradeep Kant learned counsel for the opposite parties 1 and 2 has conceded that the above rule was introduced with effect from 23-3-1977 but he submitted that the rule in a different form existed even at the time the allotment order was made in favour of the petitioner. The submission of the learned counsel is correct. Earlier the rule existed in the following form :- "(5). The submission of the learned counsel is correct. Earlier the rule existed in the following form :- "(5). No building shall ordinarily be allotted to the following persons or for the following purposes- (a) A tenant against whom a decree or order has been passed for ejectment on any ground mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 or under Section 7-B of the Old Act or any ground mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 during a period of two years from the date of such decree or order or any member of his or any person of whose family he is a member." A comparison of the old rule with the existing rule will indicate that there is no material difference between the two provisions. The prohibition regarding allotment for a period of two years is contained in both the rules in the same set of circumstances. The learned Additional District Judge has reproduced rule 10 (5) (a) and this reproduction is of the rule as enforced from 25-5-1977. This, however, does not vitiate his order because the prohibition contained in the present rule is the same as was contained in the rule in existence at the time of making the allotment order. 3. THE learned counsel for the petitioner, however, argued that the above rule does not contain an absolute prohibition against allotment inasmuch as the word 'ordinarily' has been used. It is true that the word 'ordinarily' has been used which would indicate that the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority to pass an allotment order is not completely barred. However, in view of the use of the word 'ordinarily', the Prescribed Authority will have to indicate some circumstance justifying allotment in favour of a person who comes within the prohibited category. No special circumstance could be pointed out before the Prescribed Authority on behalf of the petitioner. 4. SRI Mirza next argued that the owners having got the presumptive rent determinated and having accepted one month's rent and having delivered possession to the petitioner are estopped from challenging the order of allotment passed in favour of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the opposite parties, however, argued that the application for presumptive rent was moved in ignorance of the fact that a decree for ejectment had been passed against the petitioner's father. The learned counsel for the opposite parties, however, argued that the application for presumptive rent was moved in ignorance of the fact that a decree for ejectment had been passed against the petitioner's father. Learned counsel also argued that it was the duty of the petitioner himself to disclose this fact In bis application for allotment. The fact that the information was not given in the application for allotment by the petitioner is apparent from the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge has observed that the petitioner concealed the disqualification before the Prescribed Authority. On behalf of the petitioner a copy of the application for allotment moved by him has not been brought on the record by the learned Additional District Judge regarding concealment of the disqualification is incorrect From the material on record it does appear that initially the owners had no objection to the property in dispute being let out to the petitioner. However, when they acquired information of the fact that a decree for ejectment had been passed against the petitioner's father on the basis of default in payment of rent, they became reluctant to let out the property in favour of the petitioner. Since a statutory provision is there against allotment in favour of a person committing default in payment of rent, the opposite parties cannot be denied the right to place reliance upon the said provision. Sri Mirza next submitted that Rule 10 (5) (a) applies when allotment is sought of the building in respect of which decree or order for ejectment has been made against the applicant for allotment or against a. member of his family as against a person of whose family he is a member and it does not apply when allotment is sought in respect of an altogether different building. The argument is countered by Sri Pradeep Kant, the learned counsel for the landlord opposite parties. According to him the Rule does not prescribe disqualification with reference to the buildings but with reference to "persons" and "purposes". On this basis he argued that the term "building" used in sub-rule (5) cannot be confined to the building in respect of which ejectment decree of the nature specified in clause (a) has been passed. According to him the Rule does not prescribe disqualification with reference to the buildings but with reference to "persons" and "purposes". On this basis he argued that the term "building" used in sub-rule (5) cannot be confined to the building in respect of which ejectment decree of the nature specified in clause (a) has been passed. The learned counsel further argued that the term building will have to be assigned the same meaning in respect of all the clauses of sub-rule (5) but this uniformity cannot be maintained if the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel is accepted. In order to appreciate the argument the other clauses of sub-rule (5) may also be reproduced. They are as follows, as they existed prior to the amendment of 1977 :- "(b) For residential accommodation of employees of business concerns who are allowed by their employers full reimbursement of house rent paid by them ; (c) For residential accommodation of a person already occupying a building governed by the Act or any public premises other than any premises granted to him free of rent in connection with the discharge of any duties of public nature and situated anywhere in the State or any member of the family of such person or any person of whose family he is a member, except where such person will vacate the other building or public premises at the time of allotment ". 5. NOW the opening words of sub-rule (5) are "no building shall ordinarily be allotted." The prohibition is not in respect of a specific type of building. The words "no building" are wide enough to cover also the buildings in respect of which no decree for ejectment has been passed. Further the prohibition is in respect of "following persons" and "following purposes." The "person" and "purposes" to which the prohibition or disqualification attaches are mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of sub-rule (5). Under clause (a) the disqualification is in respect of person, namely the tenant against whom ejectment decree or order of the nature specified in the clause has been passed. In clause (b) the disqualification is with regard to person as well as purpose. The person contemplated by the clause is the employee of a business concern who is allowed by his employer full reimbursement of house rent paid by him. The purpose to which the disqualification attaches is residential. In clause (b) the disqualification is with regard to person as well as purpose. The person contemplated by the clause is the employee of a business concern who is allowed by his employer full reimbursement of house rent paid by him. The purpose to which the disqualification attaches is residential. In clause (c) also the disqualification is with regard to person as well as purpose. The purpose is residential. The person is one already occupying a building governed by the Act, or occupying a public premises. If the argument of Sri Mirza is accepted, after the words "A building" the words "in respect of which a decree for ejectment has been passed" will have to be read and these words will have to be read not only for clause (a) but for clauses (b) and (c) also, because the same term cannot be assigned one meaning in one and another meaning in another clause of the same sub-rule. But these words will not fit into the scheme of clauses (b) and (c). If these words are read with reference to clause (b) it would mean that an employee of a business concern who gets from his employer full re-imbursement of house rent paid by him cannot get allotment of the building in respect of which decree for ejectment has been passed against him or against a member of his family or against a person to whose family he belongs but he can obtain allotment in respect of other buildings. Same would be the position of the person occupying a building governed by the Act or a public premises referred to in clause (c). NOW the purpose behind the enactment of clause (a) is entirely different from the purposes behind the enactment of clauses (b) and (c). The purpose behind clause (a) is ordinarily not to extend the benefit of the Act to those who do not discharge their ordinary obligations as tenant or act in violation of the statutory provisions. This is apparent from the fact that all types of ejectment decrees are not covered by the disqualification prescribed under the clause. The ejectment decrees or orders which attract the disqualification are of the nature specified in the clause. This is apparent from the fact that all types of ejectment decrees are not covered by the disqualification prescribed under the clause. The ejectment decrees or orders which attract the disqualification are of the nature specified in the clause. These decrees are those which are passed on the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 3 of U.P. Act No. Ill of 1947, hereinafter called the old Act, or on the grounds mentioned in the same clauses of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the present Act. Clause (a) in both the Acts refers to non-payment of rent despite service of notice. Clause (b) of both the Acts refers to causing of substantial damage to the building by the tenant or at his instance. Clause (c) of both the Acts refers to making of structural changes by the tenant without the consent of the landlord. Clause (d) in both the Acts deals with doing of an act by the tenant which is inconsistent with the purpose for which the tenant was admitted to tenancy. Clause (e) in both the Acts refers to sub-letting of the building or portion of the building by the tenant without the consent of the landlord or in contravention of the provisions of the Act. And lastly, clause (f) refers to renouncing by the tenant of his character as such or denying the title of the landlord. In both the Acts there is clause (g). Under this clause ejectment can be claimed on the ground that the tenant was allowed to occupy the building as part of his contract of employment under the landlord, and his employment has ceased. The disqualification prescribed under Rule 10 (5) (a) does not attach when a decree for ejectment is passed on ground (g). Under the Old Act, decree for ejectment could be obtained on the basis of permission granted under Section 3(1). In the new Act the equivalent provision is Section 21. The disqualification does not attach to a decree for ejectment based on permission or to an order of release under Section 21. But it attaches to an order of eviction made under Section 7-B of the Old Act. The basis for an order of eviction under Section 7-B is also default in payment of rent within the statutory period. The disqualification does not attach to a decree for ejectment based on permission or to an order of release under Section 21. But it attaches to an order of eviction made under Section 7-B of the Old Act. The basis for an order of eviction under Section 7-B is also default in payment of rent within the statutory period. From the discussion herein it is apparent that the basis for the disqualification prescribed under clause (a) of sub-rule (5) of Rule 10 is blame worthy conduct of the tenant. On the other hand the basis for the disqualifications prescribed by clauses (b) and (c) is entirely different. Clause (b) refers to persons who can afford to pay higher rent and who should not therefore hanker after houses governed by the Act which invariably carry lesser rent. Clause (c) covers persons who have in their occupation an accommodation from which the risk of eviction is not too great. It may be noticed that the disqualification attaches only so long as there is no risk to the occupation of the premises already occupied by them. When the occupation is exposed to risk the disqualification is lifted. This is apparent from the words "except where such persons will vacate the other building or public premises at the time of allotment". "It may be possible to accept Sri Mirza's argument so far as clause (a) is concerned but it cannot be accepted so far as clauses (b) and (c) are concerned. In fact so far as clause (c) is concerned, it cannot be applied at all because this clause refers to persons already occupying a secured accommodation. There is, therefore, no scope for adjusting the phrase "No building in respect of which a decree or order for ejectment has been passed" in the scheme of clause (c). It is physically not possible to do it. Since it is a principle of interpretation that a word occurring in a section or rule should have the same meaning in all its subsections, sub-rules, or clauses, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted and the same is hereby rejected. 6. IT was next argued that Rule 10 (5) (a) was unreasonable and ultra vires and therefore cannot be given effect to. IT was submitted that there was absolutely no basis for prescribing the impugned disqualification. 6. IT was next argued that Rule 10 (5) (a) was unreasonable and ultra vires and therefore cannot be given effect to. IT was submitted that there was absolutely no basis for prescribing the impugned disqualification. In the body of the petition no facts have been given on the basis of which the rule is alleged to be ultra vires. Under the grounds of the petition, the challenge is raised through ground no. 5 in the following manner "5. That Rule 10 is apparently wholly unreasonable and ultra vires. IT is beyond the scope and also beyond the rule making power given under the said Act. On this ground too the said rule is constitutionally invalid also." The learned counsel for the landlord opposite party submitted that there was nothing unreasonable in the provision inasmuch as the delinquent tenant has not been completely excluded from the field of eligibility for allotment which is apparent from the use of the word "ordinarily". According to the learned counsel the petitioner could have placed before the allotting authority relevant facts and then pleaded waiver of the disqualification but instead of doing this he suppressed the relevant fact itself. There is substance in the argument of the learned counsel. However, I express no final opinion on the subject as the challenge made on behalf of the petitioner is too bald and general to be entertained. In view of the above, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The costs of this petition shall be easy. The stay order, if any shall stand discharged. Petition dismissed.