Wimco, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Uttar Pradesh — 1982 DIGILAW 676 (ALL)

JUDGMENT A.N. Verma, J. - By means of this petition the petitioners assailed the validity of two orders, one, dated 25 January 1979, passed by the State of Uttar Pradesh directing the transfer of a reference from the Labour Court, Gorakhpur, to the Labour Court, Bareilly, and the other, dated 28 November 1979, passed by Labour Court of Bareilly disposing of a preliminary issue of jurisdiction raised before it by the petitioners. 2. These are the facts. The petitioners are a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. It is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling match boxes. Its factory is situated at Clutterbuckganj, Bareilly. Sher Singh Bhatia, respondent 2 herein was employed in the aforesaid factory, as a checker in what has been described in the petition as the logyard department. By an order, dated 15 October 1976, the manager of the petitioners' factory terminated the services of the said respondent 2 on grounds of certain alleged acts of misconduct. the termination order gave rise to conciliation proceedings and upon their failure, the State Government, by a notification, dated 24 June 1977, referred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, Gorakhpur, under S. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central). One Sri Ram Surat Singh was the Presiding Officer of that Labour Court at that time. Later Sri Ram Surat Singh was transferred and he was succeeded by Dr. J. N. Singh as the Presiding Officer of that Court. By an order, dated 25 January 1979, the State Government purporting to exercise powers under S. 7 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1978, read with S. 6G transferred the aforesaid reference from the Labour Court, Gorakhpur of which Dr. J. N. Singh was the Presiding Officer at that time to the Labour Court, Bareilly. 3. Before the Labour Court, Bareilly, the petitioners as the employers and respondent 2, the concerned workman, filed their respective written statements and rejoinders. In the rejoinder filed by the petitioners a plea was taken to the effect that the order, dated 25 January 1979, passed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh transferring the case was void and ineffectual in law and consequently the Labour Court at Bareilly, did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the reference. In the rejoinder filed by the petitioners a plea was taken to the effect that the order, dated 25 January 1979, passed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh transferring the case was void and ineffectual in law and consequently the Labour Court at Bareilly, did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the reference. It appears that the petitioners requested the Tribunal to dispose of the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before dealing with the dispute on merits. The Labour Court accepted that request and it has by the impugned order disposed of that issue against the petitioners. It has held that the order passed by the State Government on 25 January 1979, transferring the case from the Labour Court, Gorakhpur, to the Labour Court, Bareilly, was perfectly legal and valid. Aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. The first submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the State Government referred the dispute to Sri Ram Surat Singh by name. It was not referred to the Labour Court, Gorakhpur. The transfer order passed by State Government on 25 January 1979, however, purports to transfer the case from the file of Dr. J. N. Singh to the Labour Court, Bareilly. As Dr. J.N. Singh himself was not competent to deal with the reference, the order of transfer cannot be said to have been validly passed. 5. The submission is completely devoid of any merit. The reference was not made to Sri Ram Surat Singh as an individual. A perusal of the order of reference passed by State Government under S. 10(1)(c) leaves on manner of doubt that the dispute had been referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Gorakhpur, of which Sri Ram Surat Singh was the Presiding Officer. It was not a reference to Sri Ram Surat Singh in his personal or individual capacity. The Labour Court has in the impugned order observed that at the time of transfer Dr. J. N. Singh was the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Gorakhpur. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Dr. J.N. Singh had no power to deal with the reference or that the reference was not legally and properly pending before him. As the successor-in office of Sri Ram Surat Singh Dr. J.N. Singh was fully competent to adjudicate on the reference. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Dr. J.N. Singh had no power to deal with the reference or that the reference was not legally and properly pending before him. As the successor-in office of Sri Ram Surat Singh Dr. J.N. Singh was fully competent to adjudicate on the reference. The order of transfer, therefore, cannot be challenged on the aforesaid ground. 6. It was next urged that Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Bareilly, to whom the case was transferred by the State Government did not have the requisite qualifications which have been prescribed under S. 7 (3) of and Industrial Disputes Act (Central) and consequently the transfer of the case to that Court was void and ineffectual in law. It could not invest the Labour Court, Bareilly, with the powers of a competent Presiding Officer so as to be able to adjudicate upon the dispute referred under S. 10(l)(c) of the Central Act. 7. The above submission too is equally without any merit. In the first place the allegations made in Para. 12 of the writ petition on which the learned counsel for the petitioner mainly relied for the submission, are vague and imprecise. There is just a general assertion that Sri R.G. Mathur, the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Bareilly, does not possess necessary qualifications as laid down in S. 7 (3) of the Central Act. The qualifications of Sri R. G. Mathur have not been specified. However, it is not necessary to dilate further on this aspect of the matter as I have no manner of doubt that even if the Presiding Officer does not have the requisite qualifications as laid down under S. 7 (3) of the Central Act, he would be, in view of the statutory provisions which shall be referred to immediately, fully competent to take cognizance of the case transferred to him. 8. The dispute was referred under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Central Act as it was an individual dispute and not a collective one. 8. The dispute was referred under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Central Act as it was an individual dispute and not a collective one. An individual dispute could be referred by the State Government even without the aid of the present S. 2A in view of S. 12 of the Uttar Pardesh Industrial Disputes Act which provides that unless any order made under that Act makes express provision to the contrary, nothing in that Act shall affect the power of the State Government to refer any industrial dispute or matters connected therewith under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central). The State Government was hence competent to refer the dispute under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Central Act. Indeed the petitioner's counsel did not contend that the dispute was not validly referred to the Labour Court, Gorakhpur. His principal contention was that the Presiding Officer, Labour Court. Bareilly was not competent to adjudicate the reference as he did not possess the requisite minimum qualifications prescribed by the Central Act. As I shall presently demonstrate, there is no merit in the contention. 9. In the year 1978, the Uttar Pradesh Legislature enacted the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1978 (Uttar Pradesh Act 34 of 1978). Under this Act a new provision was inserted as S. 2A in the Uttar Pradesh Act which is substantially in the same terms as the corresponding provision of the Central Act. 10. 9. In the year 1978, the Uttar Pradesh Legislature enacted the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1978 (Uttar Pradesh Act 34 of 1978). Under this Act a new provision was inserted as S. 2A in the Uttar Pradesh Act which is substantially in the same terms as the corresponding provision of the Central Act. 10. Section 7 of the amending Act is important for the discussion of this issue and consequently the same is being extracted here in extenso : "Section 7 Transitory Provisions - A reference made under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act 14 of 1947), arising out of an industrial dispute referred to in S. 2A of that Act and pending on the date of commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be a reference made under S. 4K of the principal Act, arising out of an industrial dispute referred to in S. 2A of the principal Act as inserted by this Act as if the provisions of that section were in force at all material times and any such reference may be withdrawn and transferred under the provisions of the principal Act for disposal by a Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, appointed under the principal Act." It is obvious from a perusal of S. 7 of the amending Act that a reference made by the State Government under section 10 of the Central Act which was pending at the time of the passing of the amending Act is to be deemed to be a reference made under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. It, therefore, follows as necessary corollary that the dispute in question even though referred under S. 10 of the Central Act was to be treated and disposed of as if it was a dispute referred to under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Act. Now it is not disputed by the petitioners that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Bareilly, was competent to take cognizance of a dispute under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Act. 11. Now it is not disputed by the petitioners that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Bareilly, was competent to take cognizance of a dispute under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Act. 11. Even if, therefore, the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Bareilly, was not competent by virtue of his qualifications to be a Presiding Officer for the purposes of the Central Act, he would be in virtue of S. 7 of the amending Act fully competent to take cognizance and adjudicate on the reference transferred to him by the State Government under the impugned order, dated 29 January 1979. The second submission, therefore, also fails. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners next contended, though rather feebly that S. 7 of the aforesaid amending (Act 34 of 1978), was ultra vires. He was, however, unable to elucidate this contention beyond saying that the provisions of the amending Act are retrospective in that it enables a Presiding Officer of the Labour Court who was not qualified to adjudicate on the dispute under the Central Act became competent and qualified to adjudicate on the reference transferred to him in virtue of S. 7 of the amending Act. 13. I am unable to accept this contention. There is no element of retrospectivity in the amending Act which might be said to have affected or abridged any substantive rights of the petitioners. Section 7 of the amending Act deals entirely with matters of procedure and forum. It is settled law that there is no vested right in matters of procedure. Nor is there vested right in any particular forum. All that S. 7 of the amending Act provides is that a reference which was made under S. 10 of the Central Act and pending on the date on which the amending Act came into force would be deemed to be a reference under S. 4K. The net result of such a provision is that the procedure for the adjudication of disputes referable under S. 4K would be adopted in disposing of the reference in question. 1, therefore, find no substance whatsoever in the attack on the vires of the amending Act. 14. Another submission which was faintly made was that the petitioners were entitled to a hearing before the State Government passed the order of transfer. I cannot agree. 1, therefore, find no substance whatsoever in the attack on the vires of the amending Act. 14. Another submission which was faintly made was that the petitioners were entitled to a hearing before the State Government passed the order of transfer. I cannot agree. In my view S. 6B of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act does not contemplate giving of notice before the transfer of proceedings in all circumstances. It may perhaps be possible to take the view that if the proceedings upon a reference have progressed and some rights of the parties have already been adjudicated, the parties may claim the right to be given an opportunity of being heard before the transfer of proceedings. But where, as here, the reference has made no progress and no rights of the parties have been determined or are likely to be affected by the transfer of the case, there is no warrant for implying an obligation on the Government to give notice to the parties before transferring the case. The view that I am taking is fortified by a decision of our own Court in the case of Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, 1978 (II) L.L.N. 54 and two decisions of the other Courts, namely, Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, 1977 (II) L.L.N. 584 and Muthe Steels (India) Ltd. v. Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad, 1979 (II) L.L.N. 35 In all these cases, the view taken is that the Government is not obliged to give a notice or opportunity before transferring the case to the parties, unless the facts of the case require so. In the present case the position is that the cage had made little or no progress at Gorakhpur. The parties had not even filed their written statements or rejoinders, These were filed at Bareilly after the transfer. Under the circumstances, the impugned order cannot be assailed on the mere ground that no notice was given to the petitioner before the transfer of the case. The transfer has been ordered purely on administrative grounds which are, to my mind, perfectly legitimate and proper. The reason given in the order of transfer is that there was a huge backlog of cases pending before the Labour Court, Gorakhpur. Further, both the parties were residing or carrying on business at Bareilly. The transfer has been ordered purely on administrative grounds which are, to my mind, perfectly legitimate and proper. The reason given in the order of transfer is that there was a huge backlog of cases pending before the Labour Court, Gorakhpur. Further, both the parties were residing or carrying on business at Bareilly. It was hence considered expedient and in the interest of both the parties that the case be transferred to Bareilly. These are grounds to which no exception can be taken. Indeed it is very difficult to appreciate the objection of the petitioners against the transfer of the case to Bareilly within the local limits of which the petitioners have their registered office as well as their factory in which respondent 2 was employed. Thus, the last point urged in support of the petition also fails. 15. No other point was urged in support of this petition. 16. In conclusion, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order is hereby vacated.