JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The opposite-party Sadanand Misra was working as sectional head clerk in the office of the Zila Parishad Allahabad, the applicant, on 1st December, 1964. By an order passed by the President of the Zila Parishad on that date, the opposite-party was suspended pending inquiry against him of certain charges. Ultimately he was dismissed on 22nd March, 1970. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the opposite-party made a claim before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal in December, 1977. His claim was contested by the Zila Parishad. The Tribunal, however, by its award, dated 15th December, 1979, quashed the order of dismissal of the opposite-party and held that he will be deemed to have continued in service and would be entitled to all benefits of continuous service. The award of the Tribunal having not been implemented, the opposite-party obtained a certificate for the enforcement of the award under section 5 (7) of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act 17 of 1976). On the basis of that certificate the opposite-party made an application for execution with the prayer for his reinstatement and for recovery of Rs. 85,018.63P., as arrears of pay up to 31st May, 1981. The Zila Parishad, however, reinstated the opposite-party on 3rd June, 1981 on the post of office superintendent. The relief for reinstatement, therefore, became infructuous. The claim of the opposite-party for arrears of pay was contested by the Zila Parishad. The objection of the Zila Parishad was however, overruled by the First Additional District Judge, Allahabad by his order dated 10th September, 1981. By that order the execution application was allowed and the Zila Parishad was given two months time to pay Rs. 85,348,76 P., as arrears of pay to the opposite-party and to deposit in his provident fund account a sum of Rs. 9,431.74. It is this order against which the present Civil Revision has been filed by the Zila Parishad. 2. Three points were raised by counsel for the applicant: (1) The award given by the Tribunal was in the nature of a declaratory decree and was incapable of execution. (2) The opposite-party was entitled to the arrears of pay calculated on the basis that he was an accounts clerk only and not on the basis that he was at any time.entitled to the post of sectional head clerk of office superintendent. (2) The opposite-party was entitled to the arrears of pay calculated on the basis that he was an accounts clerk only and not on the basis that he was at any time.entitled to the post of sectional head clerk of office superintendent. (3) The claim for arrears of pay for a period more than three years before was barred by time. 3. In regard to the first point it was urged by counsel for the opposite-party that this point had not been raised by the Zila Parishad before the court below and it was not entitled to raise it for the first time is revision In my opinion, apart from the objection raised by counsel for the opposite-party the application for execution is not liable to be dismissed on the basis of this plea. It is true that the specific amount payable to the opposite-party as arrears of pay consequent upon the order of dismissal being passed, has not been stated in the award but keeping in view the language of the award, there seems to be no doubt that a decree has been passed for arrears of pay also. It was urged by counsel for the applicant that the award only granted a declaration in favour of the opposite-party as a result of which he became entitled to the arrears of pay. According to counsel for the applicant, the opposite-party could not claim the amount of arrears of pay by executing such an award but his only remedy was to file a suit for recovery of arrears of pay on the basis of the award. So far as this submission is concerned suffice it is to point out that in view of section 6 of U.P. Act 17 of 1976 the remedy of a suit is barred. At best, therefore, what can be said on behalf of the applicant is that on the basis of the award in question the opposite-party should make another claim before the same Tribunal with a prayer to pass another award. At best, therefore, what can be said on behalf of the applicant is that on the basis of the award in question the opposite-party should make another claim before the same Tribunal with a prayer to pass another award. In my opinion, in such a matter, particularly when technical rules about pleadings and the provisions of Order 20, Code of Civil Procedure in regard to the mode of writing a judgment of the provisions in regard to preparation of decree have not been made applicable to the Tribunal constituted under U.P. Act 17 of 1976, it is not the form but the substance which matters. In the instant case, as seen above, the opposite-party was suspended about 18 years back on 1st December, 1964. Order of dismissal was also passed on 22nd March, 1970 i.e. more than 12 years back from todays date. In this background accepting the plea raised by counsel for the applicant that the opposite-party should make another claim before the Tribunal would be only causing further harassment to him with no corresponding benefit to the Zila Parishad excepted being successful in delaying payment of the just dues of the opposite-party for a further indefinite period. Such a course I am not inclined to take in a Civil revision under section 115, C.P.C., the grant of relief under which provision is discretionary, 4. Of course so far as the objection of the Zila Parishad in regard to the amount actually payable to the opposite-party is concerned that deals not with the form but the substance of the matter and the correct amount payable to him has certainly to be ascertained This is the subject-matter of the account plea raised by counsel for the applicant. Before coming to that plea, however, I consider it expedient to take up the last plea namely, that the claim of the petitioner for arrears of pay for a period more than three years before, was barred by time. So far as this submission is concerned, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court is Maimoona Khatun v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 1773 . I find no substance. So far as this submission is concerned, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court is Maimoona Khatun v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 1773 . I find no substance. It has been held : "For these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that in cases where an employee is dismissed or removed from service and is reinstated either by the appointing authority or by virtue of the order of dismissal or removal being set aside by a Civil Court, the starting point of limitation, would be not the date of the order of dismissal or removal but the date when the right actually accrues, that is to say, the date of the reinstatement by the appointing authority where no suit is filed or the date of the decree where a Suit is filed and, decreed." 5. In the instant case the date of the award given by the Tribunal is 15th December, 1979. Three years counted from that date hive not expired even till today and it is for this reasons that I am of the view that the plea of the claim of the opposite-party for any portion of the arrears of pay being barred by time is unfounded. 6. Coming to the second and the last point urged by counsel for the applicant it would be seem that the case of the applicant, Zila Parishad is that the opposite-party was entitled to the back pay as accounts clerk only and that he is not entitled to any pay on the basis that he was ever a sectional head clerk to which post appointment is made by promotion from clerks Grade 1 as well as accounts clerk, nor was he entitled to any pay as an office superintendent, as claimed by him with effect from 1-5-1968. 7. In pursuance of an order passed by this court both the parties have filed affidavits attaching, there is relevant material on the basis 'of which the plea raised in this behalf is to be determined. 7. In pursuance of an order passed by this court both the parties have filed affidavits attaching, there is relevant material on the basis 'of which the plea raised in this behalf is to be determined. The such material on which reliance has been placed by counsel for the applicant Zila Parishad is copy of an order dated 8th November, 1960 passed by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, on an appeal filed by the opposite-party against an order dated 5th September, 1969 whereby the Zila Parishad had appointed one Kaushalendra Pratap Singh, as sectional head clerk on the retirement of one Srikrishna Lal. The claim made by the opposite-party in his appeal before the Commissioner was that in preference to Kaushalendra Pratap Singh he was entitled to be appointed as sectional Head Clerk. This appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner by his order dated 8th November, 1960 referred to above. 8. Counsel for the opposite-party has placed reliance on an order dated 18th August, 1966 passed by the Second Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad. The relevant finding given by the Additional Civil Judge has been quoted by the opposite-party in paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit sworn on 9th April, 1982. A copy of this affidavit was served on the counsel for the applicant on 13th April, 1982. An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the applicant today along-with copies of certain documents including the copy of the order of the Commissioner dated 8th November, 1960, referred to above. The fact that the second Additional Civil Judge passed the order dated 19-8-1966, as asserted by the opposite-party, has not been disputed by the applicant. The relevant finding given by the Additional Civil Judge as quoted in paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit of the opposite-party read as follows:- "On the other hand Sri Mohan Srivastava learned counsel of Zila Parishad, judgment-debtor has argued that the decree-holder was not entitled to claim a sum of Rs. 389.12, towards salary at the higher scale of Rs. 150 per month as sectional Head Clerk from 23-9-1963 to 6-5-1964 because he became entitled for the higher scale with an effect from 1-8-64. It is undisputed before me that from 19-9-1961 to 6-5-64 decree-holder deserves a higher grade though the order has been passed on 1-8-64 as shown by Ex. A-3. 150 per month as sectional Head Clerk from 23-9-1963 to 6-5-1964 because he became entitled for the higher scale with an effect from 1-8-64. It is undisputed before me that from 19-9-1961 to 6-5-64 decree-holder deserves a higher grade though the order has been passed on 1-8-64 as shown by Ex. A-3. But for the illegal termination of the service he would have been drawing the said amount, so I over rule the contention of Zila Parishads counsel that the sum of Rs. 389.12 is not admissible to the decree-holder." 9. In view of the order dated 18th August, 1966 passed by the seeded Additional Civil Judge the opposite-party had become entitled to the post and pay of sectional head clerk with effect from 19th September, 1961. This order, inter parties, has become final and is binding on the parties. 10. As regards the claim of the opposite-party that he was entitled to the pay of an office superintendent with effect from 1st May, 1968, the affidavit, which has been filed today by Uma Shanker Seth on behalf of the applicant, Zila Parishad contains a chart as annexure 4 to the said affidavit which gives the list of various employees of the Zila Parishad as also that dates of their appointment in the Zila Parishad, the date of their appointment as sectional Head Clerk as also the date of promotion as office Superintendent. It indicates that one K.P. Singh who has been referred in the order of the Commission dated 8th November, 1960 as Kaushlendra Pratap Singh was appointed in the Zila Parishad on 18th August, 1948 whereas one Radhey Shyam Pandey was appointed on 2nd March, 1950 The opposite-party was appointed both Kaushalendra Pratap Singh and Radhey Shyam Pandey were senior to the opposite-party having been appointed earlier than him. As already seen above, Kaushalendra Pratap Singh was appointed as a Sectional Head Clerk on 3-9-1959; The appeal filed by the opposite-party against that order was dismissed by the Commissioner on 8-11-1960. The Additional Civil Judge in his order dated 18th August 1966 has held on facts not disputed before him that the opposite-party was entitled to the post of sectional Head Clerk with effect from 19th September, 1961. In this view of the matter Kaushalendra Pratap Singh was apparently senior to the opposite-party as a Sectional Head Clerk. The Additional Civil Judge in his order dated 18th August 1966 has held on facts not disputed before him that the opposite-party was entitled to the post of sectional Head Clerk with effect from 19th September, 1961. In this view of the matter Kaushalendra Pratap Singh was apparently senior to the opposite-party as a Sectional Head Clerk. The case of the opposite-party before the court below was that one Sita Ram worked as office Superintendent upto to 10th April, 1968 and that on his retirement he became entitled to be promoted as office Superintendent with effect from 1st May, 1968. It has not been disputed by counsel for the opposite-party that promotion in the post of office Superintendent is made from the incumbents holding the post of sectional head clerk. Kaushalendra Pratap Singh being senior to the opposite-party as a sectional head clerk, as seen above, I failed to see how the opposite-party claims to have become entitled to the post of office Superintendent on the retirement of Sita Ram on 30th April, 1968, it is Kaushendra Pratap Singh who was entitled to this promotion and he was actually promoted as office Superintendent, as is apparent from the chart referred to above, with effect from 1st day, 1970. It is true that the post of Office Superintendent remained vacant between 1st May, 1968 and 1st May, 1970 but that, in my opinion, makes no difference. If the Zila Parishad did not shows to make any appointment to the post office Superintendent between this period the period entitled to promotion, namely, Kaushalendra Pratap Singh can in no manner he held responsible for it ; Kaushalendra Pratap Singh was promoted to the post of Executive Officer and handed over charge as Office Superintendent on 20th April, 1979. The opposite-party was, therefore, not entitled the post of office Superintendent or to the pay of the said post till 20th April, 1979. He became entitled to it only on 21st April, 1979. 11. Counsel for the applicant Zila Parishad has urged that Radhey Shyam Pandey being senior to the opposite party having been initially appointed on 2nd March, 1950 and the date of initial appointment of the opposite-party berg 1st April, 1950, it was Radhey Shyam Pandey and not the opposite-party was entitled to be promoted as office Superintendent on the promotion of Kaushendra Pratap Singh as Executive Officer. It was argued that since Radhey Shyam Pandey had already been promoted as office Superintendent on 9-5-1969, and retired on 28th February, 1981, opposite-party was entitled to the post of the office Superintendent not on the promotion of Kaushalendra Pratap Singh but only on the retirement of Radhey Shyam Pandey on 28-8-1981. I find it difficult to accept this submission. It is true that with reference to the date of his initial appointment Radhey Shyam Pandey was senior to the opposite-party. The chart, referred to above, however, indicates that Radhey Shyam Pandey was appointed as Sectional Head Clerk on 26th January, 1969. As held by the Second Additional Civil Judge in his order dated 18th August, 1966 the opposite-party became entitled to the post of Sectional Head Clerk with effect from 19th September, 1961. Indeed, on the applicants own case the opposite-party had been appointed as Sectional Head Clerk on 1st August, 1964 and had been suspended on 1st December, 1964 while he was holding the post of Sectional Head Clerk. It is, therefore, apparent that as Sectional Head Clerk the opposite-party was senior to Radhey Shyam Pandey and had the opposite-party not been suspended on 1st December, 1964 and subsequently dismissed on 22nd March, 1970, it is the and not Radhey Shyam Pandey who would have been promoted as Office Superintendent on Kaushalendra Pratap Singh being promoted as Executive Officer. The order of dismissal of the opposite-party has been set aside by the Tribunal on 15th December, 1979 i.e. after Radehy Shyam Pandey had already been promoted as office Superintendent, at point of time when the opposite-party was out of the pictures he having been dismissed earlier. On the order of dismissal being quashed and on the finding of the Tribunal that the opposite-party was entire to all the benefits on the basis that he was never dismissed, it is apparent that on Kaushalendra Pratap Singh being promoted as Executive Officer on 20th April, 1979 the opposite-party became entitled to the post of office Superintendent on 21st April, 1979. The claim of the opposite-party that he was entitled to the pay of office Superintendent with effect from 1st May, 1968 was, therefore, not sustainable and has wrongly been accepted by the 1st Additional District Judge. 12. The claim of the opposite-party that he was entitled to the pay of office Superintendent with effect from 1st May, 1968 was, therefore, not sustainable and has wrongly been accepted by the 1st Additional District Judge. 12. In the result this revision succeeds and is allowed and the order of the 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dated 10th September, 1981 is set aside. The 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad will now re-determine the amount of arrears of pay payable to the opposite-party on the basis that he was entitled to the pay of a sectional head clerk with effect from 1st December, 1964, namely, the date on which he was suspended up to 20th April. 1979 and that he was entitled to the pay of office superintendent from 21st April, 1979 on words after deducting the amount already paid to him as suspension allowance. The amount which is to be deposited in the Provident Fund Account of the opposite-party shall also be re-determined accordingly. The first Additional District Judge is directed to decide the execution case afresh in the light of the observational made above expeditiously. 13. The amount directed to be paid to the opposite-party by order dated 10th September, 1981, was attached and has, I am informed, been transferred to the account of the First Additional District Judge, Allahabad. Paragraph 13 of the affidavit of Shanker Seth filed in this court today on behalf of the applicant Zila Parishad, indicates that it is not disputed by the applicant that at least a sum of Rs. 60,511.51 is payable to the opposite-party. From the amount which has been transferred to the account of the 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad, as aforesaid, this admitted sum of Rs. 60,511.51 shall be paid to the opposite-party forthwith. The amount which is to be deposited towards the Provident Fund Account and Pension of the opposite-party may be adjusted after the execution application has been decided afresh in pursuance of this order. If that stage the First Additional District Judge shall direct such amount as may have been determined to be liable to be deposited towards Provident fund and Pension accounts of the opposite-party to be transferred to those accounts. If even after this amount to the sum of Rs. If that stage the First Additional District Judge shall direct such amount as may have been determined to be liable to be deposited towards Provident fund and Pension accounts of the opposite-party to be transferred to those accounts. If even after this amount to the sum of Rs. 60,511.51, already paid to the opposite-party in pursuance of this order, any further amount remains payable to the opposite-party it shall be paid over to him and the balance, if any, shall be refunded to the applicant. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.