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1982 DIGILAW 7 (KER)

STATE v. RAMAKRISHNAN NAIR

1982-01-07

P.JANAKI AMMA

body1982
Judgment :- 1. The respondent in this case was convicted by the Judicial Magistrate'. First Class, Pathanamthitta, for offences punishable under S.279 and 304 (A) of the Indian Penal Code and also under S.89 (a) and (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court instead of sentencing him released him under S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on his entering a bond for Rs. 1000/- with two sureties for like amounts to appear and receive sentence when called upon during a period of one year from the date of the judgment, and in the meanwhile to be of good behaviour. Under S.17 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act where a person is convicted of an offence under that Act, or of an offence in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used, the Court may in addition to imposing any other punishment authorised by law, declare the person so convicted to be disqualified, for such period as the Court may specify, for holding any driving licence or for holding a driving licence to drive a particular class or description of the vehicle. S.17 (4) of the same Act directs that Court should order the disqualification of an offender convicted of an offence against the provisions of clause (c) of subsection (1) of S.87, or S.89 and that such disqualification should be for a period of not less than one month. The question involved in this revision case is whether the Court having convicted the accused for offences under S.89 (a) and (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act should have disqualified him for holding driving licence as directed in S.17 (4) of that Act, in spite of the fact that he has been released on probation under S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I must state at the outset that no decision directly on the point has been placed before me. 2. Under S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person not being under twenty one years of age, if convicted of an offence punishable with fine only, or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less and no previous conviction is proved against him can be released on probation of good conduct, regard being had to the age, character or antecedents of the offender. 3. The first question that arises for consideration is whether contravention of S.89 would amount to an offence. 3. The first question that arises for consideration is whether contravention of S.89 would amount to an offence. An offence under S.3 (38) of the General Clauses Act means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. S.89 imposes a duty on the driver of the vehicle or other person in charge of the vehicle involved in an accident to secure medical attention to the injured if any and to report the occurrence to the nearest police station. The section does not impose any punishment or penalty for contravention of the duty. No doubt S.17 (4) makes disqualification for holding licence for a minimum period compulsory for contravention of S.89. But the language of S.17(1) makes it clear that ordering such disqualification is in addition to imposing other punishment authorised by law. Therefore, the statute presupposes the imposition of a principal penalty or punishment in addition to which the disqualification is to be ordered. In other words, ordering of disqualification is not the main punishment or penalty for contravention of S.89. This leads to the question whether there is any other punishment or penalty for contravention of S.89 This takes us to S.112 of the Act S.112 of the Act states that persons contravening the provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder shall if no other penalty is provided for the offence, be punishable with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees. Subsequent contraventions would be liable with fine which may extend to three hundred rupees. It follows that contravention of S.89 is punishable with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees. If that be so, contravention of S.89 is an offence which comes under the purview of S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. The further question is whether in a case where an accused is convicted and sentenced under S.89 of the Motor Vehicles Act and a disqualification is ordered under S.17 (1) read with S.17 (4), such disqualification would form part of the punishment or sentence. Going by the language of S.17 (1) with particular reference to the words "any other punishment authorised by law" it would appear that the statute intends that the order of disqualification should be a punishment. Since the punishment has not been defined it must be held that the word is used in the ordinary dictionary meaning. Going by the language of S.17 (1) with particular reference to the words "any other punishment authorised by law" it would appear that the statute intends that the order of disqualification should be a punishment. Since the punishment has not been defined it must be held that the word is used in the ordinary dictionary meaning. The meaning given for the word in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is "inflict penalty on (offender); inflict penalty for (offence)". The word, according to New Webster's Dictionary (College Edition), means "the act of punishing, pain or penalty inflicted on a person for a crime or offence; a penalty imposed in the enforcement of law; general ill treatment". While conviction of an offender is a public condemnation of his conduct, punishment is the consequence of such condemnation. It follows, disqualification for holding a driving licence is a punishment for an offence under S.89 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 5. The next aspect to be considered is whether an order of disqualification under S.17 (1) read with S.17 (4) would form part of the sentencing process for the purpose of S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. "Sentence" in the legal sense is the judicial pronouncement, following the conviction for an offence designating the punishment thereof; it also stands for the punishment so imposed. There is no doubt that the disqualification mentioned in S.17 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a judicial pronouncement following the conviction for an offence. The Court is not competent to disqualify a person unless the offence as such is established and the person concerned is convicted for the offence. Therefore, an order of disqualification passed by a Court under S.17 of the Motor Vehicles Act is part of the sentencing process. 6. I may refer here to two decisions, which though do not deal with the point directly, support the trend of reasoning adopted by me. In Garanand v. Emperor, AIR. 1933 Rangoon 329, the accused was convicted in two cases. For one he was fined Rs. 40/- under S.337 of the Indian Penal Code and in the other he was fined Rs. 60/-, under R.60-A of the Burma Motor Vehicles Rules read with S.16 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the second case his licence was suspended for one year. 1933 Rangoon 329, the accused was convicted in two cases. For one he was fined Rs. 40/- under S.337 of the Indian Penal Code and in the other he was fined Rs. 60/-, under R.60-A of the Burma Motor Vehicles Rules read with S.16 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the second case his licence was suspended for one year. The question arose whether the sentence was appealable so as to bar a revision under S.439 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) If the sentence was fine and the order of suspension of licence was not part of the sentence, the conviction was not appealable and the revision was competent. The Court held that an order of suspension of sentence under the Motor Vehicles Act was a much more serious part of the punishment than a sentence of fine. In Mohammed Sabir v. State of Maharashtra, the accused was convicted for an offence under S.279 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. While dismissing a revision petition preferred against the order the Sessions Judge directed a copy of his judgment to be sent to the Regional Transport Officer for cancellation of the licence of the accused for a period of six months. The accused moved the High Court for quashing the above order on the ground that it amounted to enhancement of the sentence which the Sessions Judge was not competent to do in revision and without notice to the accused. It was held that disqualification being a consequence upon the conclusion of the guilt, the order passed amounted to sentence and addition of the clause regarding disqualification should be looked upon as enhancement of sentence. The result of the discussion is that when an accused is convicted for an offence involving a motor vehicle for which S.17 of the Motor Vehicles Act is applicable and he is released on probation of good conduct, on executing a bond under S, 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it works not only on the main punishment for the offence for which he is convicted but also on the additional penalty under S.17 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, in a case where the Court releases a person on probation of good conduct under S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a separate order under S.17(1) or S.17(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act disqualifying the offender for holding a driving licence need not be passed. 8. I may however state that I have my own reservations on the question whether on the facts and circumstances of the case it was a fit one for application of S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the notice issued to the accused does not include interference with the main order, I do not want to say anything further on that aspect. The revision case is disposed of as stated already.