JUDGMENT A.N. Verma, J. - This petition by the workmen of Arun Metal Industries, Agra, is directed against an award of the Labour Court, Agra, disposing of an industrial dispute in regard to the termination of the services of thirty-five workmen of that industry, without answering the reference on merits. 2. These are the facts : On 29 July 1972, the State Government referred an industrial dispute under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act to the Labour Court. The dispute referred was whether the termination of the services on 16 May 1972, of the thirty-five workmen whose names were mentioned in the list annexed to the order of reference was valid and proper. Hardly had the reference made any progress when the State Government passed another order on 6 October 1972, purporting to act under S. 6G of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, withdrawing this reference. In the order it was stated that the reference, dated 29 July 1972, was being withdrawn with a view to a making a fresh reference which would be more comprehensive and explicit. This order was followed by another order, dated 7 October 1972, passed under S. 4K of the aforesaid Act where by a fresh reference was made. The dispute referred by this second order of reference was whether the services of the same thirty-five workmen whose names were mentioned in the annexed list were rightly terminated on the dates mentioned against their names in that list. From a perusal of the second reference and the annexure thereto it is obvious that most of the workmen had been dismissed on 16 May 1972. However, there were some whose services had been terminated on some other dates in April 1972. It was perhaps this consideration which had impelled the Government to make a fresh reference so as to remove the anomaly in the earlier order in which a single date, namely, 16 May 1972, was mentioned as the date on which the services of these thirty-five workmen had been terminated. Thereafter, there was yet another order passed on 24 October 1972, by which some very minor amendments were sought to be made in the reference, dated 7 October 1972. Thereafter, there was yet another order passed on 24 October 1972, by which some very minor amendments were sought to be made in the reference, dated 7 October 1972. We are, however, not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the subsequent order, dated 24 October 1972, as the dispute giving rise to this petition was confined to the challenge to the validity of the aforesaid orders, dated 6 and 7 October 1972. 3. When the Labour Court proceeded to dispose of the reference, dated 7 October 1972, an objection was raised on behalf of the management to the effect that the withdrawal of the first reference as well as the subsequent order passed by the State Government on 7 October 1972, was completely void and ineffectual in law as the State Government had no power to withdraw the reference, dated 29 July 1972, or, to make the second reference, dated 7 October 1972. The objection found favour with the Labour Court, Agra. The Labour Court having held that the reference, dated 7 October 1972, without jurisdiction, it refused to enter into the merits of the dispute. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Labour Court the workmen have approached this Court. Their contention is that the Labour Court was wrong in taking the view that the orders, dated 6 and 7 October 1972, were void and ineffectual. Alternatively, it was submitted that even if the Labour Court was of the opinion that the withdrawal of the first reference and the consequent second reference was invalid, the first reference, dated 29 July 1972, was still there. The Labour Court was, therefore, bound to dispose of at least the first reference, dated 29 July 1972, on merits as the industrial dispute continued to survive and having been referred to it, the Labour Court was bound to answer the same. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view, that so far as the decision of the Labour Court that the withdrawal of the first reference as well as the order of the State Government, dated 7 October 1972, were invalid, is concerned, the same is correct. However, the Labour Court, in my view, failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law in not answering even the first reference, dated 29 July 1972, on merits. However, the Labour Court, in my view, failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law in not answering even the first reference, dated 29 July 1972, on merits. I now proceed to give my reasons in support of this view. 6. I shall first take up the issue of the validity of the two Government notifications, dated 6 and 7 October 1972. In regard to these notifications, counsel for the petitioners made the following submissions : (1) Inasmuch as, the reference was withdrawn with a view to referring the same industrial dispute which had already been the subject-matter of the earlier reference, dated 27 July 1972, the two notifications referred to above fell clearly within the purview of S. 60 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and the Labour Court was in error in taking the contrary view. (2) The two notifications read together clearly tantamount to amendment of a formal nature of the first order of reference, dated 29 July 1972, as the State Government undoubtedly has the power to make such amendments in a reference under S. 4K, the notification should be treated as having been validly issued and the Labour Court was not right in holding otherwise. 7. Having given the matter a careful consideration, I find myself unable to accept either of these two contentions. 8. So far as the first contention is concerned, the same stands squarely concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in Shree Sitaram Sugar Company Ltd. v. Labour Court, 1973 (II) L.L.N. 193 . In that case, the State Government had purported to withdraw a reference which had been made under S. 4K of the aforesaid Apt without intending to refer the same to another Labour Court. The Supreme Court examined the scope of S. 6G in some depth and after analyzing the entire scheme of the enactment their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus in Para. V, at pages 198 and 199 : " It must be stated that a superficial reading of Sub-sec. The Supreme Court examined the scope of S. 6G in some depth and after analyzing the entire scheme of the enactment their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus in Para. V, at pages 198 and 199 : " It must be stated that a superficial reading of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 6G in isolation will give the impression that the State Government has got two distinct and separate powers, namely - (a) to withdraw any proceeding under the Act pending before a Labour Court or Tribunal ; or (b) to transfer the proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another Labour Court or Tribunal for disposal of the same. . . . " A little later, in Para. 14, at page 199 of the report, their Lordships summed up the law thus : " Section 6G, in our opinion, deals only with the power of the State Government to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another and for purposes of such transfer to withdraw the proceedings from the Labour Court or Tribunal from whom it is being transferred. . having regard to the scheme of S. 6G, read in the light of the other provisions referred to earlier, the section will have to be interpreted as giving to the State Government only a power to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court to another . . :" (Emphasis added.) 9. It, therefore, seems clear that the power of withdrawal exercisable under S. 6G can be invoked only if the proceedings are being transferred from one Labour Court to another. But, where, as here, there is no transfer involved, the State Government cannot claim the power to withdraw as industrial dispute referred by it to a Labour Court, even if the withdrawal may be impelled by a desire to re-refer a dispute after making amendments in the original order of reference. The element of " transfer" is, in my view, an essential part of S. 6G. Consequently, the decision of the Labour Court that the notification, dated 6 October 1972, was void and ineffectual in law cannot be said to be wrong. 10. The element of " transfer" is, in my view, an essential part of S. 6G. Consequently, the decision of the Labour Court that the notification, dated 6 October 1972, was void and ineffectual in law cannot be said to be wrong. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shree Sitaram Sugar Company, Ltd., 1973 (II) L.L.N. 193 (vide supra), was founded on the ratio that when once judicial proceedings have commenced or are set in motion pursuant to a reference made under S. 4K or S. 10 of the Central Act, the same cannot be frustrated by the device of exercise of power under S. 6G (or S. 33B of the Central Act) and as in the present case there is no such possibility, it must be held that the impugned notifications were validly passed. I cannot agree. The law declared by the Supreme Court in regard to S. 6G in Shree Sitaram Sugar Company case (vide supra), is explicit and unambiguous. There cannot be a withdrawal under the said provision unless the proceedings are proposed to be transferred to another Labour Court or Tribunal. I am, hence, unable to accept this contention. 11. The same conclusion also flows from another important decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. D. N. Ganguli, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1018. In that case, the State Government had referred a dispute in regard to the term nation of thirty-one workmen of Bata Shoe Company, Ltd., Dighaghat (Patna), by means of a notification, dated 8 October 1954. By another order of reference, dated 15 January 1955, the Government referred a similar industrial dispute between the same Bata Shoe Company, Ltd. and its twenty-nine other workmen. By a third notification issued on 17 September 1955, the Government purported to supersede the two earlier notifications and combined the said two references into one. Under the third notification, dated 17 September 1955, the dispute referred was whether the dismissal of the sixty workmen was justified. The Patna High Court struck down the last of the notification, dated 17 September 1955, on the ground that the Industrial Disputes Act does not confer any such power on the Government to cancel or supersede a reference validly made. The facts of that case are indistinguishable from those of the present case. The Patna High Court struck down the last of the notification, dated 17 September 1955, on the ground that the Industrial Disputes Act does not confer any such power on the Government to cancel or supersede a reference validly made. The facts of that case are indistinguishable from those of the present case. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Patna High Court that the Government had no power to supersede the first two references, having regard to the scheme of the Act. In that case also an identical submission was raised on behalf of the Government in Para. 16 of the report at page 1024. The Supreme Court repelled that submission. The first submission raised in support of the petition, therefore, fails. 12. Coming to the second submission, while it may be conceded that the Government does have power to make appropriate amendments in an order of reference, where the amendments do not have the effect of revocation or supersession of the reference already made and where the amendments are calculated only to add to or amplify the issues already referred for adjudication, the present is certainly not a case where the Government can be said to have exercised that power of amendment. The first notification, dated 16 September 1972, merely withdraws the earlier reference, dated 21 July 1972, with a promise to refer the dispute again by means of a more comprehensive and explicit order. It is neither more nor less than an order of withdrawal simpliciter of a pending reference simpliceter. So far as the second notification, dated 7 October 1972, is concerned, the same simply purports to be an independent reference with regard to the termination of the services of thirty-five workmen. It is not by any stretch an order purporting to amend any pre-existing reference. Indeed, the question of amendment would have arisen if there had been a reference already pending. As mentioned above, the first reference had already been withdrawn by the notification, dated 6 October 1972. There was hence no occasion for making any amendment by means of the subsequent notification, dated 7 October 1972. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that whether the two notifications are read separately or together, they cannot be said to tantamount to an exercise of the power to amend a reference. There is thus no substance in the second submission either. 13. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that whether the two notifications are read separately or together, they cannot be said to tantamount to an exercise of the power to amend a reference. There is thus no substance in the second submission either. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that even if there was no power to withdraw the reference under S. 6G of the aforesaid Act, the validity of the two notifications could be justified under S. 21 of the General Clauses Act. This submission again is covered directly by the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguli, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1018 (vide supra). In that case also a similar submission was advanced on behalf of the workmen but it was rejected by the Supreme Court with the of the General Clauses Act in so far as it refers to the power of rescinding or cancelling the original order cannot following observations : "We have no hesitation in holding that the rule of construction enunciated by S. 21 be invoked in respect of the provisions of S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act." The decision of the Labour Court that the notifications, dated 6 and 7 October 1972, are void and ineffectual is thus correct and being in consonance with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court referred to above, which, in my opinion, conclude the controversy, the same is affirmed. 14. The petitioner is, however, in my opinion certainly entitled to the third relief claimed by him, namely, a writ of mandamus directing the Labour Court to hear and decide the dispute in Adjudication Case No. 176 of 1972, on merits. The result of the notifications, dated 6 and 7 October 1972, being adjudged void is that the first reference, dated 29 July 1972, giving rise to Adjudication Case No. 176 of 1972, becomes alive. The Labour Court is, therefore, bound to adjudicate that dispute. It was in error in not disposing of that adjudication case on merits. In the case of State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguli, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1018 (vide supra), also the Labour Court was directed to dispose of the first two adjudication cases on merits, as a result of the finding that the third order passed by the Government revoking the first two references was invalid. 15. In the case of State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguli, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1018 (vide supra), also the Labour Court was directed to dispose of the first two adjudication cases on merits, as a result of the finding that the third order passed by the Government revoking the first two references was invalid. 15. In the result, this petition succeeds in part and is allowed. The Labour Court, Agra, is directed to dispose of the Adjudication Case No. 176 of 1972, on merits. The Labour Court will try and dispose of the case expeditiously. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.