This Civil Revision is from the order of the Assistant Dist­rict Judge, Goalpara at Dhubri affirming the order of the Munsiff granting mandatory injunction. The plaintiff-opposite party, a tenant of the petitioner filed title Suit No. 608/81 stating that he has been a tenant under the defendent-petitioner who allegedly cut off electric supply to the tenanted room on 15.11.81 and in the suit he prayed for a declaration that the plaintiff as a tenant was entitled to uninterrupted supply of electricity and that the defendant could not cut off the electric connection which was being supplied from his house and for a decree of mandatory injunction dire­cting the defendant-petitioner to restore electric connection. He also filed a petition for grant of mandatory injunction whereupon registering a miscellaneous judicial case being numbered as Misc. (J) case No. 234/81 the learned Munsiff on 18.11.81 ordered restor­ation of the electric connection within twenty-four hours of receipt of the notice and also asked the petitioner to show cause and upon the petitioner's showing cause made the order absolute. The petitioner's appeal therefrom was rejected by the Assistant District Judge on 30.11.81. Hence this petition. 2. Mr. K.P. Sen, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned order of mandatory injunction dated 10.11.81. is without jurisdiction inasmuch as Section 7 of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') excludes civil Court's jurisdiction and that the order of mandatory injunction was passed in violation of the provisions of Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, as the conditions pres­cribed therein were absent. 3. Dr. M.K. Sarma, the learned counsel appearing for the oppo­site party, submits that the suit of the plaintiff-opposite party for declaration being not barred under the provisions of the Act, the petition for injunction in that suit is also not barred and the supply of electricity being essential supply, the learned courts below rightly issued the mandatory injunction, which the defendant-petitioner has not yet complied with. 4. Taking the first question first we may read Section 7 of the Act: "7. 4. Taking the first question first we may read Section 7 of the Act: "7. Notice on landlord to perform duties; (1) If the landlord neglects to make such repairs or to maintain such existing essential supplies and services as he is bound to do under the provisions of Section 6, the Court may, on the application of the tenant, direct the landlord by notice to appear before it and to show cause against the applica­tion of the tenant. (2) If the landlord fails to show sufficient cause, the court may direct him to make such repairs or as the case may be, to take such measures for the restoration of the essential supplies and services as contemplated in section 6 within a period fixed by the Court. (3) If the landlord fails or neglects to make such repairs or take such measures within the period fixed by the Court, the Court may on application of the tenant permit him to make such repairs or take such measures, as the case may be, at a cost not exceeding the amount deter­mined by the court after taking such evidence as it may consider necessary and it shall thereafter be lawful for the tenant to make such repairs or take such measures and to deduct the cost thereof from the rent or to recover the amount from the landlord through the Court by execut­ion, and for the purpose of this sub-section the order of the Court shall be deemed to be decree under the Code of civil Procedure, 1908 and to be capable of execution as such under the provisions of that Code." 5. Section 6 of the Act prescribing the duties of the landlord, provides that every landlord shall be bound to 'maintain the existing essential supplies and service such as sanitary arrange­ment, water supply, supply of electricity or drainage service in respect of the house." There can, therefore, be no doubt that under the provision of Section 7 read with Section 6 of the Act the tenant may file an application for restoration of supply of electri­city and the Court may direct the landlord to restore the supply of electricity. Does the above provision necessarily imply that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to grant a mandatory injunct­ion to restore supply of electricity is excluded, ? Does the above provision necessarily imply that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to grant a mandatory injunct­ion to restore supply of electricity is excluded, ? Does the Act contain any provision excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in matters dealt with by the Act in this regard ? We do not find any such provision in the Act. Mr. Sen contends that such exclusion is the effect of Sec. 4. of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is not tenable, inasmuch as what section 4 C.P.C. provides is that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or other­wise affect any special or local law in force or any special jurisdic­tion or power conferred, or any special form of procedure pres­cribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. On the other hand we find section 9 of the C. P. C. providing that the Courts shall (subject to the provisions contained in that Code) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Is the suit filed by the plaintiff-opposite party a suit of civil nature and, if so, is its cognizance either expressly or impliedly barred under the provisions of the Code ? Mr. Sen refers to the decision of this Court in L. P. A. No. 11 of 1976 (Ramesh Chandra Basak and others vs. Deo Narayan Prasad and others) in which on difference of opinion between Islam, C. J. (Acting) and D. Pathak, J. (as his Lordship then was), Lahiri, J. agreeing with Islam, C. J. (Acting) held that the Second Appeal was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 9 (now Sec. 8) of the Act. The only question decided in the said case was that the Second Appeal was not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 8 of the Act which made the first appellate Court's decision final. 6. A case is an authority for what it decided and not for what can ba deduced from it, as was held in Dr. (Mrs.) Shashi Choudhury vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1969 U. C. (SC) 241. 6. A case is an authority for what it decided and not for what can ba deduced from it, as was held in Dr. (Mrs.) Shashi Choudhury vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1969 U. C. (SC) 241. Even so, we find an observation in the judgment of Pathak, J. that : "The source of right to lodge a suit for ejectment flow from the provision of the Transfer of Property Act and generally the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction is not ousted unless there is a specific provision made in any special statute making a complete Code, so far as the relationship of landlord and tenants including the right of eviction. It is true that in some of the States, Rent Control Acts have been made a complete Code and the right of eviction has also been conferred by the provisions of those statutes to be entertained by a special Tribu­nal created by them. But I do not find in 'the Act' under consideration any provision being made in regard to eviction. There is also no special forum created by 'the Act' to entertain an eviction suit". The contention that there was a dichotomy of forums for actions under the Rent Control Act and for insti­tution of ejectment suits, was rejected by Lahiri, J. observing that : "I find that there is only one forum. Actions for eject­ment need be presented to the ordinary civil court but it shall be controlled and governed by the provisions of section 6 and the appellate court shall be governed by sections 6 and 9. Coun­sel further submits that the special Act cannot oust the juris­diction of civil court to entertain suits for ejectment. Suffice it to state that the Act has in no way ousted the jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain ejectment suits, it has merely restri­cted the power of such courts to pass orders or decree for eje­ctment. It has not taken away the right of the landlord to eject the tenant as well it has no doubt constricted his right to eject the tenant but at the same time has provided for floot and swift remedy and had done away with the rigour of serving quit notice as well. The submissions of the learned counsel are neither effective nor sound." Thus, the contention of the learned counsel was not included in the aforesaid case. The submissions of the learned counsel are neither effective nor sound." Thus, the contention of the learned counsel was not included in the aforesaid case. 7. Section 4 of the C. P. C. does not mean that the Code does not apply to proceedings under special or local law. It only enacts that where there is an inconsistency, the Rules of the Code do not prevail. The provisions of the Code shall apply in all matters on which special or local law is silent. This was the ratio decidendi in Sailaja Kanti vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 Calcutta 137 and in Sushila vs. Lilavati, AIR 1975 Guj 39 . 8. As was held in Secretary of State vs. Mask & Co., AIR 1940 P. C. 105, it is settled law that exclusion of the jurisdict­ion of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the funda­mental principles of judicial procedure. The question in that case was whether the order of the Collector of Customs dismissing the appeal under Section 188 of the Customs Act, and which was confirmed by the Governor General in Council on an application under section 191 excluded the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain a challenge of the merits of that decision ? Counsel for the petitioner has not shown any provision in the Act which expressly or impliedly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in this regard. In Abdul Waheed Khan vs. Bhawani and others, AIR 1966 S. C. 1718, it has been observed that it is well settled principle that it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of civil Court to establish his contention and that it is also equally well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil Court must be strictly construed. This was reiterated in Shri Vedagiri Lakshmi Karasimha Swami Temple vs. Induru Pattabhtrami Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 781 where the question whether a suit would lie at the instance of the then trustees of a temple for rendition of accounts of the manage­ment of the temple by the ex-trustees, was answered in the affir­mative observing that under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code the courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred, and that it is well settled principle that a party seeking to oust jurisdcition of an ordinary civil court shall establish the right to do so. It was emphasised in Musamia Imam Haider Bux Razvi vs. Rabari Govindbhai Ratanbhai, AIR 1969 S. C. 439 that exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court was not to be easily inferred. The provision ousting the jurisdiction mast be in express terms or necessarily implied. This was also reiterated in Dewaji vs. Ganpatlal, AIR 1969 S. C. 560. 9. We have already seen that in the instant case the suit is for declaration and mandatory injunction. The dispute has arisen, as stated in the plaint, out of the defendant-petitioner's refusal to accept rent and his allegedly cutting off electric supply : and the suit is for declaration that the plaintiff as a tenant is entit­led to uniterrupted supply of electricity and form andatory injun­ction directing the defendant-petitioner to restore electric supply to the tenanted room. The right to electric supply undoubtedly a creature of the Act. A right is a legally protected interest. The right legally protected in the instant case is to receive uninterrupted supply of electricity in the tenanted room. Though this right has been created by the statute in the instant case the defendant petitioner having denied that right the plaintiff-opposite party could not have, without reference to the lease agreement, obtained an order of restoration without there being a decision as to whether he was entitled to supply of electricity from the defendant-petitioner. A declaration that he was so entitled under the lease would be necessary. There is no provision in the Act for obtaining such declaration. Under the circumstances the interest, if any, will not be protected if a civil suit is held to be barred. A declaration that he was so entitled under the lease would be necessary. There is no provision in the Act for obtaining such declaration. Under the circumstances the interest, if any, will not be protected if a civil suit is held to be barred. There is no doubt that for deciding whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded, the court has to look into the nature of the suit; and every presumption should be made in favour of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court rather than against it, as was held in Magiti Sasamal vs. Pandab Bissoi, AIR 1962 SC 547 . The subject's recourse to the Court for determination of a civil right is not to be excluded except by clear words. Where under the statute the subject matter falls within exclusive juris­diction of the special tribunal, then, of course, the Civil Court's jurisdiction will be ousted. (See Gundaji Satwaji Shinde vs. Ramchandra Bhikaji Joshi, AIR 1979 SC. 653 ). Raja Jagdish Pratap Sahif vs. State of U. P. AIR 1973 SC 1059 , it was held that a suit by the State of U. P. for recovery of Agricultural Income-Tax due from an assessee under the U. P. Agricultural Income-Tax Act was maintainable. Mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a Tribunal in respect of the said matter does not by itself exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. This applies to the provision of section 7 of the Act. On the other hand, a statute may specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts, even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed. The same principle would apply if the statute had provided for a particular forum in which the remedy could be had. Even in such cases, the civil court's jurisdiction is not completely ousted. A suit in a Civil Court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions (Firm Seth Radha Ktshan vs. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, AIR 1963 SC. 1547 ). 10. 1547 ). 10. Applying the above principle to the facts of the present case we find that though Sec. 7 provides a remedy by an appli­cation and Sec. 6 creates a duty on the part of the landlord to maintain the supply of electricity, the question whether under the particular lease agreement there was such an obligation, has to be decided with reference to the lease agreement itself. In other words, whether supply of electricity formed a stipulated con­dition of the lease, if disputed, to decide that point no forum has been created under the Act. It would depend on constru­ction of the lease. A civil suit, therefore, would not be barred by implication. 11. This revision, again is directed against the order granting mandatory injunction and not against the suit. Whether that suit is maintainable or not will be decided in the suit itself. Once a suit has been instituted, the Court derives jurisdiction from the suit itself to act under Order 39 C.P.C.. Considering the question from that angle, so long the suit continues to exist it may not be reasonable to hold that the Court had no jurisdiction to act under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2. The contention of the learned Counsel regarding lack of jurisdiction has, therefore, to be rejected. 12. Regarding the second contention, Sec. 39 of the Specific Relief Act may be read : "39. Mandatory injunctions-When to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which Court is capable of enforcing, the Court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts." This section in no way bars granting of a mandntory injunction. On the other hand it provides that to prevent the breach of an obligation the court in its discretion may grant an injunction to prevent the breach and also to compel performance of the requisite acts. An obligation may arise from different sources. Obligation may arise out of contract, called obligations ex-contractu, out of delicts, obligations ex delicto, out of statutes, obligations ex legis. When the landlord entered into contract of lease he may have stipulated to supply electricity. After having agreed so to supply, he has allegedly stopped or withdrawn the same. An obligation may arise from different sources. Obligation may arise out of contract, called obligations ex-contractu, out of delicts, obligations ex delicto, out of statutes, obligations ex legis. When the landlord entered into contract of lease he may have stipulated to supply electricity. After having agreed so to supply, he has allegedly stopped or withdrawn the same. There may arise the necessity of compelling the landlord to perform this obligation arising out of the agreement of lease and to compel him to perform the requisite act of maintaining the supply. Obligation may also be created by statutes. Section 6 of the Act prescribes the duties of the landlord towards his tenant including that of supply of electricity. Whether this amounts to an obligation as envisaged in Sec. 39 of the Specific Relief Act has to be seen. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act have not used the expression 'obligation'. The 'obligation', if any, in this case, may be based on the contract between the parties. If that be so, whether a mandatory injunction would be justified or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. Counsel does not deny that the supply of electricity is an essen­tial service. What he submits is that it did not form part of the agreement though he admits that such a supply was in exis­tence before it was cut off on 15.11.81. According to counsel mandatory injunction has to rarely issued and that this is not a fit case for such an injunction. The contention is not tenable. It is common knowledge that in general an injunction forbids a defendant to do certain acts, but sometimes it forbids him to permit the continuance of wrongful state of things that already exists at the time when the injunction is issued, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction. So also when the Court directs a party to do a positive act. It is true that a manda­tory injunction, as Maitland observes, is less easily to be had than a merely prohibitive injunction, in general it will not be granted until the plaintiff has fully proved that the existing state of things is wrongful. A mandatory injunction may be put in the form of direct order to do the act required by the Court. The impugned order of mandatory injunction is in such a form. A mandatory injunction may be put in the form of direct order to do the act required by the Court. The impugned order of mandatory injunction is in such a form. In the words of Fry (Specific Performance of Contract, 3rd Edition, Sections 1155-56) the jurisdiction of the Court in injunction is often ancillary to that in specific performance, for the purpose of preventing the defendant making use of some legal interest or right vested in him in a way inconsistent with the equity claimed by the plaintiff, or, embarrassing the plaintiff by dealing with the property during the pendency of the action, or obstructing the performance of some act incidental to the execution of the con­tract. "The Court will in many cases interfere and preserve property in status quo during the pendency of a suit, in which the rights to it are to be decided, and that without expressing, and often without having the means of forming, any opinion as to such rights". Injunction is therefore granted. Upon interlocutory application and until the trial, on the plaintiff showing & prima facie case for specific performance, it is not necessary that it should be clear that the plaintiff will succeed at the trial, it is sufficient if there is ground for supposing that relief may be given. For on this application the Court will not decide delicate points, nor allow it to be resisted on points, such as delay, which can only be decided at the trial. An injunction may be granted by interlocutory order of the Court in all cases in which it shall appear to the Court to be just or convenient that such order should be made. 13. As Story Writes (Commentories on Equity Jurisprudence, First English Edition, Section 959), granting or refusing of injunctions is a matter resting in the sound discretion of a Court of equity and, consequently, no injunction will be granted whenever it will operate oppressively, or inequitably, or contrary to the real justice of the case; or where it is not the fit and appropriate mode of redress under all the circumstances of the case, or where it will or may work on immediate mischief, or fatal injury. Further Courts of equity consistently decline to ley down any rule, which shall limit their power and discretion, shall be granted or withdrawn. Further Courts of equity consistently decline to ley down any rule, which shall limit their power and discretion, shall be granted or withdrawn. And there is wisdom in this course for it is impo­ssible to foresee all the exigencies of society which may require their aid and assistance to protect rights, or redress wrongs. The jurisdiction to grant injunction "is manifestly indispensable for the purposes of social justice in a great variety of cases, and there­fore should be fostered and upheld by a steady confidence. At the same time it must be admitted, that the exercise of it is attended with no small danger, both from its summary nature and its liability to abuse. It ought therfore, to be guarded with extreme caution, and applied only in very clear cases, otherwise instead of becoming an instrument to promote the public as well as private welfare, it may become a means of extensive, and perhaps of irreparable, injustice". Though stated for the courts of equity, the principles are equally applicable to injunctions under Order 39 C.P.C. We find the above principles embodied in OUF Specific Relief Act. Section 41 thereof enumerates the circumstances when injunction cannot be granted. The present case does not in any way come under S. 41. Order 39 Rule I, C.P.C. describes the cases in which temporary injunction may be granted. The proviso to Rule 3 enables the Court to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, as stated in that Rule. In the impugned order dated 19.11.81 the Court observed that if the order was not passed without giving previous notice, the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury. The essential nature of electricity has been admitted. It has been found that the electric connection was there in the suit premises prior to and until it was disconnected on 15.11.81. Under the circums­tances it cannot be said that the mandatory injunction was not justified. There is no error or intimity in the order. Nor is there any infirmity in the appellate order. 14. In the result this petition is found to be without merit and it is dismissed, but without costs. The Rule is discharged.