Judgment 1. This appeal by defendant-tenant arises out of a suit for eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground of non-payment of rent and personal necessity, on the suit being decreed, and the appeal, filed by the defendant-appellant, being dismissed holding that the appellant was a defaulter for the months of May, June, July, Oct. and Nov., 1968, and Dec., 1969, to Feb., 1970. 2. The suit relates to a double storied building bearing holding No.11/76, Ward No.2 situate in Mahalla Sadar Bazar Dinapore Cantonent. The arppellant is said to be a tenant in a portion of the said building. The original plaintiff, Smt. Janki Devi, was the purchaser from the original owner, who was the landlord of the appellant before purchase by Janki Devi. There is no dispute about the title of the landlord. After the purchase of the premises in question by Smt. Janki Devi a lease was entered into between her and the appellant tenant for a period of two years and eleven months on a rental of Rs. 32.50 paise per month. Accordingly, a deed of lease was executed on 6-9-1965. After the expiry of the terms of the lease a suit for eviction was filed and arrears of rent and mesne profit from May. 1968 to 6th Aug. 1968 and from 6th Aug., 1968, to 10th Dec., 1968 respectively were claimed. During the pendency of this suit Smt. Janki Devi died and she was substituted by her heirs and legal representatives. The suit was withdrawn by permission of the Court dated 6-11-1976. The plaintiffs were, however permitted to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Subsequently, claim for arrears of rent and mesne profit was decreed by the Additional Munsif, 1st Patna, on 5-12-1973. The suit for arrears of rent was also decreed in S.C.C. Suit No.14/71. During the pendency of the above suits the Act was made applicable to Dinapore Cantonment with effect from 14-2-1970. The learned Munsif on a petition being filed under S.11A of the Act by his order dated 8-1-1971 directed the appellant to deposit arrears of rent from March, 1970, to Dec., 1970, on the monthly rental of Rs. 32.50 Paise and to pay further rent at the same rate. The appellant deposited rent up to Nov. The learned Munsif on a petition being filed under S.11A of the Act by his order dated 8-1-1971 directed the appellant to deposit arrears of rent from March, 1970, to Dec., 1970, on the monthly rental of Rs. 32.50 Paise and to pay further rent at the same rate. The appellant deposited rent up to Nov. 1973, and, thereafter defaulted to take deposit. The ground of personal necessity was also urged. 3. The plea of the defendant-appellant was that no notice under S.106 of the T.P. Act had been tendered. According to him, rent was sent regularly. It was also denied that there was any arrear of rent. According to the appellant, rent was tendered by money order which the respondents refused to accept and even after the introduction of the Act the appellant went on deposting rent in Court and thereafter by money order. The claim of personal necessity was also denied. 4. The question required to be determined in this case is whether non-payment of rent for the period prior to the enforcement of the Act can entitle the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant under S.11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. According to the appellant, the statute not being retrospective in nature would not create a right in favour of the respondents. According to the appellant, since the Act was made applicable to Dinapore Cantonment only in Feb., 1970, as per findings of the courts below he is defaulter for only 14 days in Feb., 1970, which would not justify in law a decree for eviction. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that, the statute cannot be said to be applied retrospectively, simply because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a period prior to its passing or, enforcement. Non-payment of rent for the period prior to enforcement of the Act in Dinapore Cantonment can be taken into account for the purpose of eviction under S.11(1)(d) of the Act. There is no dispute that the Act as such is not operative retrospectively. It has therefore, to be examined whether on the principle enunciated by the learned counsel for the respondents a decree of eviction can be sustained. There is no dispute that the Act as such is not operative retrospectively. It has therefore, to be examined whether on the principle enunciated by the learned counsel for the respondents a decree of eviction can be sustained. There is no dispute and the law in this regard is well settled that all the statutes are prospective, unless it is made expressly, or by necessary implication, operative retrospectively. The statute that creates obligation or imposes duty or brings into operation disability must be presumed to be prospective, unless retrospectively is shown by implication. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision in Girdhar Das Anandji V/s. Jivaraj Madhavji Patel (1971 BLJR 828) paragraph 19 whereof is relevant and it is quoted below - "19. Some of the principles which may be relevant for the present purposes may be, thus, briefly summarised. (a) Statutes taking away, impairing or impairing substantive rights are ordinarily prospective. (b) In order that a statute may be applied retrospectively in the above situation there must be either express provision in the statute or such an intention must be necessarily inferred from the provisions thereof. (c) If it is doubtful whether the statute was intended to be operative retrospectively, the doubt should be resolved against such operation. (d) An enactment which puts a new restriction or puts a more onerous condition on the exercise of substantive right is presumed to be prospective and will be held to be retrospective only if it is so made either expressly or by necessary implication. (e) The law dealing with procedure in the absence of anything to the contrary, is retrospective in operation. (f) The above rules apply even to pending actions" He has fortified his submission by relying on this decision that the Act should not be interpreted to apply retrospectively. Similar is the decision in Gaddam Narsa Reddy V/s. Collector, Adilabad District, (AIR 1982 Andh Pra 1) (FB). There are numerous decisions of the Supreme Court which are obviously the basis of the aforesaid two decisions. 7. Similar is the decision in Gaddam Narsa Reddy V/s. Collector, Adilabad District, (AIR 1982 Andh Pra 1) (FB). There are numerous decisions of the Supreme Court which are obviously the basis of the aforesaid two decisions. 7. The net result is that if the statute does not expressly or impliedly declare its retrospective application, this has to be examined with reference to the dominant intention of the language of the statute and the object and the Scheme of the Act, as well as the nature of the rights affected and the circumstances under which the statute is brought into existence. 8. The question, however, that arises for determination in this case is whether, as submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, without endowing the statute or S.11(1)(d) with retrospectivity, a past act could also be taken into account to enforce a right granted by the relevant provisions of the statute. As far as, this legislation is concerned, I have already said, it is not expressly retrospective and it is not necessary for me to go into the question whether S.11(1)(d) is impliedly retrospective because the point raised by the defendant is on the basis of the assumption that the operation of the provision of the statute is not retrospective. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on a passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, at page 217. The passage cited is from the decision in Master Ladies Tailors Organisation V/s. Minister of Labour ((1950) 2 All ER 525) wherein Somervell L.J. while holding that the provision for accrual of holiday remuneration, before the Wholesale Mantle and Costume Wages Council (Great Britain) Wages Regulation (Holidays) Order, 1949, came into force, was not ultra vires, stated that the fact that prospective benefit is to be measured by antecedent facts does not necessarily make the provision for that benefit retrospective. Lord Denman C.J. in R. V/s. Inhabitants of St. Mary. Whitechapel ((1848) 12 QB 120) at page 127 states "that the statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing." 9. Learned counsel for the respondents has further relied on the decision in Kapur Chand V/s. B.S. Grewal ( AIR 1965 SC 1491 ). Learned counsel for the respondents has further relied on the decision in Kapur Chand V/s. B.S. Grewal ( AIR 1965 SC 1491 ). The Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953). S.9 of that Act contains grounds on which a tenant could be ejected. S.9 of that Act has been cited at page 1493. The portion relevant for our purpose is as follows:- "9 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no landowner shall be competent to eject a tenant except when such tenant- (i) is a tenant on the area reserved under this Act or is a tenant of a small landowner; or (ii) fails to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause; or (iii) is in arrears of rent at the commencement of this Act; or (iv) xx xx". Dealing with S.9 the Court was pleased to hold as follows:- "Mr. Iyengar argues that S.9(1) (ii) applies prospectively and the conduct of the tenant prior to the enactment of S.14-A cannot be taken into account. In our opinion, the conduct of the tenant prior to the coming into force of the new section can be taken into account. No doubt a statute must be applied prospectively. But a statute is not applied retrospectively because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a moment of time prior to its passing. The clause in question makes a particular conduct the ground for an application for eviction. The necessary condition for the application of S.9(1)(ii) may commence even before the Act came into force and past conduct, which is as relevant for the clause as conduct after the coming into force of the Act, cannot be overlooked. The Tribunals were, therefore, right in considering conduct of the appellant prior to the coming into force of S.14-A while determining whether the appellant was irregular in paying the rent." Section 9(1) deals with the failure on the part of the tenant to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause. Irregularity in payment prior to enforcement of the concerned Act has been held to give a valid ground for eviction even if the statute came into existence after the default. 10 In my view, this decision of the Supreme Court and the provision of the concerned enactment apply squarely to the instant case. Irregularity in payment prior to enforcement of the concerned Act has been held to give a valid ground for eviction even if the statute came into existence after the default. 10 In my view, this decision of the Supreme Court and the provision of the concerned enactment apply squarely to the instant case. On the basis of the Kapurs decision ( AIR 1965 SC 1491 ) (supra) and the aforesaid passages from Maxwell on the Interpretation of statutes I have no hesitation in holding that non-payment made by the appellant prior to the enforcement of the Act will render him liable for eviction under S.11(1)(d) of the Act. 11. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that S.9(1)(i) and (ii) of the aforesaid Punjab Act is not similar to S.11(1)(d) of the instant Bihar Act. According to him, in the Punjab Act, use of the word regularly envisages an act of continuous default in a recalcitrant manner while in Sec.11(1)(d) of the Bihar Act non-payment of only two months rent does not envisage a person who does not pay regularly as in the Punjab Act. In my view, there is no ground for such a distinction. It has already been held that default under the Act need not be for two consecutive months. If the default occurs in an irregular manner during any two months, the effect of S.11(1)(d) of the Act will be visited upon the tenant. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a passage in Re. Athlumney ((1898) 2 QB 547) Wright, J., while dealing with the Bankruptcy Act. 1890, was pleased to hold that the Act did not apply to a debt, including interest before the date of the passing of the Act. This decision, in my view, has no application to the facts of the present case. That decision did not deal with the principle as laid down in Maxwell, stated above. The only question to be determined there was whether a provision was retrospective or not. 13. This decision, in my view, has no application to the facts of the present case. That decision did not deal with the principle as laid down in Maxwell, stated above. The only question to be determined there was whether a provision was retrospective or not. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a decision in Mani Subrat Jain V/s. Raja Ram Vohra ( AIR 1980 SC 299 ) and the following observations : "the benefit of interpretative doubt belongs to the potential evictee unless the language is plain and provides for eviction." This decision also, in my view, does not come to the aid of the appellant. The principle of interpretation laid down in this decision cannot be doubted but what has to be determined in the instant case is not the right of a tenant but the extent of his liability under the Act. The earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Kapurs case ( AIR 1965 SC 1491 ) (supra) deals with a matter directly involved in the instant case, while the decision in Mani Subrat Jains case ( AIR 1980 SC 299 ) of the Supreme Court is on a different point altogether. 14. Concluding, therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that non-payment of rent by the appellant prior to the enforcement of the Act in Dinapore Cantonment can be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding whether a tenant is defaulter or not. I, therefore, hold that the appellate Court below was entirely right in treating the appellant as liable for eviction, being defaulter during the period indicated in the judgement. 15. The appeal, therefore, has no merit and, it is, accordingly, dismissed, with costs.