JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal from a decree for possession over a grove and for recovery of Rs. 300/- as the amount of Sayar due for the year 1959. The grove is situate in Pargana Kaswar Raja of district Varanasi. The appeal had been heard and decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court by the judgment dated 11th May, 1979., but the judgment was recalled on review by judgment dated 23rd January, 1981, on the ground that U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was not applicable to the area while the Court had proceeded on the basis that it was applicable, which was a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The whole judgment having been thus recalled on review by the learned Single Judge and the appeal having been listed for hearing before me rather than before the learned Judge who had heard and decided it earlier, the whole case was heard by me afresh as I was free to arrive at my own conclusions, un-inhibited by anything said in the earlier judgment dated 11th May, 1979 which had been so recalled on review. 2. According to the plaintiff's case the land was in the nature of a grove which had been planted by the plaintiffs and their ancestors. It had a large number of mango and jack-fruit trees. The plaintiffs have been in possession as grove-holders. They had given the grove to the defendant on payment of Rs. 300/- per year as rent by way of sayar, and 600 fruits of mango, besides 1 maund, 10 seers of jack-fruit every year on condition that if the defendant failed to render the same, he would be liable to ejectment. The defendant had no right in the wood of the trees. The above terms were arrived at by way of compromise between the parties on 21st October, 1954 in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The further allegation in the plaint is that the defendant did not pay the amount of sayar for the year 1959 and did not render the 600 fruits o mango and 1 maund, 10 seers of jack fruit valued at Rs. The further allegation in the plaint is that the defendant did not pay the amount of sayar for the year 1959 and did not render the 600 fruits o mango and 1 maund, 10 seers of jack fruit valued at Rs. 140/- and did not also look after the grove property which led to the drying up of four trees of mango and two trees of jack fruit valued at Rs. 400/- and also wrongfully converted into to his own use the wood and the branches of some trees valued at Rs. 200/-. On these grounds, the plaintiffs claimed that they became entitled to recover possession over the grove and to recover the aforesaid amounts and served a notice dated 30th September, 1959 on the defendant demanding the same but the defendant gave a wrong reply dated 10th November, 1959 and even denied the compromise and asserted himself to be the owner of the trees, hence the suit tor recovery of possession and the aforesaid amounts, but instead of claiming the sum of Rs. 1040/- as detailed earlier, they claimed recovery of Rs. 740/-, Rs. 300/- towards sayar for 1959, Rs. 140/- towards the value of 600 fruits of mango and 1 maund, 10 seers of jack fruit and Rs. 300/- towards damages for wrongful conversion of the wood and the trees. The plaintiffs further claimed pendente lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 440/- a year. The suit was filed on 18th May, 1960. 3. The defendant denied the plaintiffs case and asserted that he was admitted as sub-tenant by Bechu Lal, father of plaintiffs nos. 1 to 3 and grand father of plaintiff no. 4. Plaintiff no. 1 is represented by respondents nos. 1 to 8 of whom respondents nos. 3 and 4 having died during the pendency of the second appeal in this Court, by their heirs and legal representatives. Plaintiff no. 2 was respondent no. 9 in this Court. He also died during the pendency of the second appeal in this Court and is represented by his heirs and legal representatives. Plaintiff no. 3 is respondent no. 10 and plaintiff no. 4 is respondent no. 11 in this Court. The defendant who was the appellant in this Court also died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court and is represented by his heirs and legal representatives. Plaintiff no. 3 is respondent no. 10 and plaintiff no. 4 is respondent no. 11 in this Court. The defendant who was the appellant in this Court also died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court and is represented by his heirs and legal representatives. According to the defendant he came in possession over the land some 28 or 30 years ago, that is, in the year 1930 or 1932 under the said settlement and has continued ever since. The trees were planted by him some 15 years ago on the assurance that he would not be ejected. The plaintiffs had later on got the rent increased by undue influence and obtained the thumb impression of the defendant on some document and got it registered telling him it was a document for increasing the rent. About the compromise in the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was said that taking the advantage of the poverty and helplessness of the defendant, the compromise was got executed by undue influence and coercion. It was contended that the position of the defendant continued as before as the properly was released in his favour in the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was re-asserted that the defendant was a sub-tenant and the adjudication of rights could be made only by the revenue court for which a reference under Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 was mandatory. It was also contended that the plaintiffs were not grove-holders but were tenants and that issue could also be decided only by the revenue court. Sections 175, 180, 183 and 148 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 were also pleaded as bars to the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit. The rest of the plaintiffs allegations about the damage to the trees etc., were also denied and the defendant expressed his readiness to pay. Rs. 300/- for the year 1959 although he had remitted it by money order and the plaintiffs had refused to accept the same. 4. The following were the issues framed by the trial court: "I. Did the defendant cut trees and branches of some trees and removed the wood ? "2. Did the defendant commit breach of the term of Theka ? "3. Whether the defendant supplied the fruit (mango and Kathal) in 1959 season ? "4. 4. The following were the issues framed by the trial court: "I. Did the defendant cut trees and branches of some trees and removed the wood ? "2. Did the defendant commit breach of the term of Theka ? "3. Whether the defendant supplied the fruit (mango and Kathal) in 1959 season ? "4. To what amount if any are the plaintiff entitled ? "5. To what relief if any are the plaintiff entitled ? "6. Whether the defendant is licensee and is he liable to ejectment ?" On issue no. 6 the trial court held that the defendant was a licensee and would be liable to eviction in case of any breach of the terms of the licence which was contained in the compromise Ext. 8. On issue no. 1 the trial court held that the defendant did not cut any trees or branches, nor did he remove any wood of the trees. On issue no. 3 the trial court found that the mangoes and jack-fruit for the year 1959 had been given by the defendant to the plaintiffs. On issue no. 2, the trial court observed that the defendant did not admittedly pay Rs. 300/- to the plaintiffs in the year 1959, that he alleged that he had tendered Rs. 150/-to various plaintiffs but they refused to accept the money order, but that there was no explanation for not sending orders, but that there was no explanation for not sending the balance of Rs. 150/-. According to the trial court, the defendant had stated under Order 10 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure that Sharda Prasad, one of the plaintiff had agreed to accept his share of Rs. 150/- and, therefore, it was not sent by money order, but there was nothing on the record except the statement of the defendant as D.W. 1 that Sharda Prasad had agreed to accept Rs. 150/-, separately. The said amount had not been paid to Sharda Prasad and there was no evidence that the defendant offered Rs. 150/- to Sharda Prasad, but he refused to accept it, on the other hand Sharda Prasad had joined as a plaintiff in the suit. On these facts the trial court held that the defendant did not pay the amount of Rs. 300/- to the plaintiffs in the year 1959 and thereby committed the breach of the terms contained in the compromise Ext. On these facts the trial court held that the defendant did not pay the amount of Rs. 300/- to the plaintiffs in the year 1959 and thereby committed the breach of the terms contained in the compromise Ext. 8 and was liable to eviction. The plaintiffs allegation that the defendant had not taken proper care of the trees or that the trees had dried up on account of the defendant's negligence was not believed by the trial court. On issue no. 4, the trial court held the plaintiffs entitled to recovery of Rs. 300/-; and on issue no. 5, to recover possession and Rs. 300/- from the defendant, and decreed the suit accordingly for possession over the land and recovery of Rs. 300/-. 5. On appeal by the defendant, the court of III Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi, by judgment dated 20th January, 1964, set aside the trial court's judgment and remanded the suit for a fresh trial after framing issues regarding sub-tenancy rights of the defendant and grove holder rights of the plaintiffs, and referring the same to the revenue court for its findings. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court from the said remand order. That was First Appeal from Order No. 41 of 1964 and was allowed by judgment dated 13th May, 1964. This Court held, relying on Sukhdeo and others v. Ram Nandan, (1957 A.L.J. 809), that the issue whether a party is a grove-holder or not of any land could be decided only by the civil court. It was further held that the conditions necessary to attract the provisions of Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act did not exist in the present case, and therefore, a reference to the Revenue Court could not be made. The court further observed : "Furthermore, there was a compromise between the parties in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the aforesaid compromise was challenged by the defendant. The court below had to determine whether the compromise was binding on the plaintiff and whether it could be given effect to. Under the circumstances, it must be held that the provisions of Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act did not apply to the present case. The court below had to determine whether the compromise was binding on the plaintiff and whether it could be given effect to. Under the circumstances, it must be held that the provisions of Section 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act did not apply to the present case. Consequently, no issues could be referred by the civil court to the revenue court." The judgment under appeal is the judgment given by the court of III Additional Civil Judge after the remand order was set aside as aforesaid. The lower appellate court held that there was no force, fraud or undue influence in the execution of the compromise. Ext. 8 on the record ; that the right granted to the defendant under the compromise was not a mere licence, but" was to a licence coupled with the transfer of property." Having said so much, the lower appellate court took up for consideration the question whether the defendant continues to be a sub-tenant of the land and observed that there was overwhelming evidence on the record to show that the defendant was a subtenant of the land but that "he appears to have given up his subtenancy sometimes in the past" and that was the reason "why he admitted the plaintiffs to be owners of the grove and tenants of the plots in the compromise." According to the lower appellate : "Had it not been so, the defendant would not have agreed to recognise the plaintiffs as tenants and grove-holders of the suit plots. In any case, the defendant gave up his position as a sub-tenant and accepted that of a licensee coupled with transfer of property at the time of the compromise. Therefore, whatever might have been the position, I feel that the sub-tenancy rights of the defendant came to an end at sometimes in the past and he cannot be accepted to be a sub-tenant of the suit plots." 6. The fourth question taken up for consideration by the lower appellate court was, whether "the compromise arrived at in the case under Section 145 Cr.P.C. suffers from want of registration". The fourth question taken up for consideration by the lower appellate court was, whether "the compromise arrived at in the case under Section 145 Cr.P.C. suffers from want of registration". Observing that registration would have been necessary only if the defendant was given the right of lessee over immovable property under the compromise but the nature of the right given being that of a "licence coupled with grant in respect of fruits, that is, movable property only", it did not require registration. There are some further observations of the lower appellate court on this. The ultimate finding is that "the compromise arrived at in criminal case does not suffer for want of registration even then the position remains unaltered." 7. The fifth question raised by the lower appellate court was whether the plaintiffs can evict the defendant from the dispute grove. It observed that "the deed of compromise itself provides for forfeiture of the licence and the grant". Two conditions are given for revoking the conditions of the grant, being ; (1) when the defendant fails to take proper care of the grove the plaintiffs have a right of re-entry ; and (2) when the defendant fails to pay the sum of Rs. 300/- or the fruits onward. On facts the lower appellate court found nothing to differ from the finding of the trial court and held that the defendant having failed to pay Rs. 300/- as the rent for the year 1959, the plaintiffs were entitled to re-enter. In the result the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the trial court's decree. 8. The first point raised by Mr. Sankatha Rai, who appeared for the defendant-appellant in this case was of jurisdiction. He urged that the suit was of the nature of one under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and that only the revenue court had jurisdiction to try the suit. 9. The first case which Mr. Sankatha Rai cited on this point was of Baiju Shambhu Saran, 1963 ALJ 1064. A Division Bench of this Court laid it down in that case that under Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction of the court is determinable on the facts of the case. 9. The first case which Mr. Sankatha Rai cited on this point was of Baiju Shambhu Saran, 1963 ALJ 1064. A Division Bench of this Court laid it down in that case that under Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction of the court is determinable on the facts of the case. If the facts are such that a plaintiff can get relief from a revenue court, he cannot be asserting certain facts and claiming certain relief in the plaint, get the relief from the civil court for the forum is fixed by the law and if on the cause of action for the suit, the plaintiff can get some relief from the revenue court, he must bring the action in the revenue court. The material thing is the nature of the cause of action, that is, the nature of the facts on the basis of which the plaintiff is compelled to go to the revenue court. If the facts are such that he can get a relief from the revenue court, he must seek a relief that can be granted by it and must draft the plaint accordingly. It is not open to a plaintiff to conceal the cause of action or to mis-state it in part to oust the jurisdiction of the revenue court. The rule that jurisdiction is determinable upon the allegations made in the plaint does not give a plaintiff freedom in a case to which Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act applies, to assert any fact or to claim any relief so as to oust the jurisdiction of the revenue court. 10. Mr. Sankatha Rai next relied on Jangi Misra and others v. Muneshar and others, 1969 ALJ 222, for the proposition that the plea of lack of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage, even on second appeal, although it was not raised or pressed at the earlier stages of the trial. 10. Mr. Sankatha Rai next relied on Jangi Misra and others v. Muneshar and others, 1969 ALJ 222, for the proposition that the plea of lack of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage, even on second appeal, although it was not raised or pressed at the earlier stages of the trial. He explained that at the earlier hearing of the second appeal the case proceeded on the footing that U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was applicable and, therefore, although the plea was rejected on a different ground, the fact remained that if the matter was governed by Section 331 (1-A) of that Act, it barred an appellate court from entertaining the plea unless it was taken in the court of the first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement and only if there has been a consequent failure of justice. It has now been found that U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act did not apply and the matter being governed by U.P. Tenancy Act, the ruling in Jangi Misra's case applied in full force and the suit should be dismissed as not entertain able by the civil court. 11. Proceeding further Mr. Sankatha Rai cited the case of Rasul Ahmad v. Beni Prasad, 1965 ALJ 70; Deo Narain v. Board of Revenue, 1974 ALJ 16, and First Appeal from Order No. 205 of 1969 (Mahadeo v. Babu Nandan) decided on 9th January, 1978, to show that a grove-holder, which the plaintiffs claimed to be, could maintain a suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and that on the cause of action pleaded in the plaint the relief of possession was not claimable in a civil court and the plaintiff's ought to have filed a suit in the revenue court under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. One more case cited by Mr. Sankatha Rai in this context was that on Bhinka & Others v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 . One more case cited by Mr. Sankatha Rai in this context was that on Bhinka & Others v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 . By relying on this case learned counsel urged that although the possession of the defendant was recognised in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and he had continued in such possession thereafter, on the case set out by the plaintiffs, and if the defendant's plea of being in lawful possession as a sub-tenant was ignored, the possession of the defendant which had continued under the authority of the order passed in the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had to be regarded as possession otherwise than in accordance with law for the purposes of a suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. 12. Before proceeding further to examine the contentions of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant on this point, it must be observed that the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956, had in the meanwhile come into force in Uttar Pradesh. The Act received the President's assent on 7th March, 1957 and was published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 12th March, 1957 before the institution of the suit giving rise to the present second appeal. Section 1 of the Act reads as under : "Short title, extent and commencement - (1) This Act may be called the Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956. (2) It shall extend to the areas which - (a) in the of the case territory mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) Part A of the Schedule, were on the thirtieth day of June, 1954, included in a municipality, a notified area, a town area, not being a town area situate in Rampur as defined in the Rampur Administration Order, 1949 or a cantonment under the law applicable thereto, and (b) in the case of the rest of Uttar Pradesh, were on the 7th day of July, 1949, included in a municipality, or a notified area under the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, or in a cantonment under the provisions of the Cantonment Act, 1924, or a town area under the provisions of the U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914. (3) It shall come into force at once except in the areas mentioned in the Schedule where it shall come, into force on such date and subject to such exceptions or modifications not affecting the substance as the State Government may by notification published in the official Gazette appoint in this behalf and different dates may be appointed and different exceptions or modifications made for different areas." A proviso which was added in the section is not material for our present purposes and may, therefore, be omitted from consideration. The land to which the dispute relates is situate in Pargana Kasvvar Raja of Varanasi District. That area is mentioned at Serial No. (2) of Part B of the Schedule to the Act. The Act did not, therefore, come into force at once in the area where the land involved in the suit giving rise to the present second appeal is situated. From Notification No. 1-2 : 22 : 74/Ra/1/74 dated 7th June, 1975 issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh it appears that in the Gangapur Town Area of Pargana Kaswar Raja of District Varanasi, certain areas had been demarcated as agricultural areas and were declared to have vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh with effect from 1st July, 1975, under Section 8 of the Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The exact date on which the Act was enforced in Pargana Kaswar Raja of District Varanasi has not been specified by either of the parties but it does appear from the aforesaid notification and the contents of the affidavit filed along with the review application in this case that the Act must have come into force on some date prior to the said notification, though it does not appear to have come into force in the area before the institution of the suit but some times after the institution of the suit. 13. Two consequences followed upon the enforcement of the Act. The first consequence was the repeal of the U.P. Tenancy Act. 1939, vide Section 84 and the second consequence was stay of certain suits and proceedings under rule 38 of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, after the issue of the notification under Section 8 which, as shown above was dated 7th June, 1975, and became effective from 1st July, 1975. 1939, vide Section 84 and the second consequence was stay of certain suits and proceedings under rule 38 of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, after the issue of the notification under Section 8 which, as shown above was dated 7th June, 1975, and became effective from 1st July, 1975. There is, however, a difference between the scope and operation of these two consequences of the enforcement of the Act. The repeal of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 under Section 84 of the Act, is "with effect from the date of vesting", but in its application to "the urban areas". Urban areas are defined by clause (15) of Section 2 of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as the areas included in the Municipality or a notified areas under the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act or in a cantonment under the provisions of the Cantonment Act, or a town area under the provisions of the U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914. The area where the land in suit is situate is Gangapur Town Area, The date of vesting in this case was 1st July, 1975, according to the said notification under Section 8 of the Act, being the date from which all the agricultural area demarcated under Section 5 of the Act vested in the State Government. While the urban area is the whole of the area of the Municipality or the Town Area as in this case; the agricultural area is only that area which is demarcated as such under Section 5 of the Act. Agricultural area is defined under clause (1) of Section 2 of the Act, and although the land held by a grove holder is included within the meaning of agricultural area and should have been demarcated as such to show that the land involved in the suit giving rise to the present second appeal was in feet demarcated as an agricultural area under Section 5 of the Act, and consequently vested in the State. The fact whether it vested in the State may not have been very material for none of the parties claimed to be Zamindars, but no rights are taken away by the Act and no rights are conferred thereby in any land which has not vested in the State. The fact whether it vested in the State may not have been very material for none of the parties claimed to be Zamindars, but no rights are taken away by the Act and no rights are conferred thereby in any land which has not vested in the State. Consequently Sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Act cannot be applied unless it was shown that the land in suit had been demarcated as an agricultural area. However, since the U.P. Tenancy Act stands repealed with effect from the date of vesting, the protection afforded by that Act to tenants of agricultural land also disappears. Whether the omission of the land in suit from being demarcated as an agricultural area was accidental or deliberate, this Court can do nothing about it, and can only apply the law as it finds it. The plea that the suit was not maintainable in the civil court provisions of Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 was raised in this Court after the repeal of that Act. It is impossible to entertain the plea at this stage after the repeal of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. Even if the plea were entertained on the footing that the suit was not maintainable when filed or on the dates when the decree of the two courts below were passed, the suit if dismissed at that stage would have enabled the plaintiffs to have filed a suit for appropriate relief under the U.P. Tenancy Act, and so far as limitation was concerned Section 14 of the Limitation Act would have come to aid of the plaintiffs, inasmuch as the objection to the civil court's jurisdiction was not raised at the earliest stage, and the plaintiffs could very well claim that they have been bona fide pursuing the matter in the civil court. U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 having been repealed, a suit under its provision can no longer be filed. If the cause of action survives, the plaintiffs should be able to maintain or file a suit in the civil court for the relief claimed by them after the repeal of the U.P. Tenancy Act and consequently the dismissal of the suit after the repeal of the U.P. Tenancy Act on the ground that it was entertain able by a revenue court under its provision is neither feasible or possible. It would be most unjust. It would be most unjust. I accordingly reject the objection to the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit. 14. Mr. Sakatha Rai next contended that the defendant-appellant was a sub-tenant, the compromise in Section 145 proceedings was inadmissible for want of registration and at any rate could not have had the effect of altering the nature of the defendant-appellant's possession over the land which was continuing since before as a sub-tenant thereof. 15. The contention that the defendant continues to be a sub-tenant was again based on the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. That Act has been repealed. The rights conferred thereunder no longer subsist. New rights have been conferred under the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in respect of the land held for agricultural purposes. If the land was held by the defendant-appellant as a sub-tenant under the U.P. Tenancy Act, and by mistake or design the laud was not demarcated as an agricultural area, his remedy lay elsewhere. This Court could not in this case consider the question whether the defendant had acquired any rights either under Section 17 or 18 or 19 of the Act, unless it was established that the land in suit had been demarcated as an agricultural area, and if it were shown that it had been demarcated as an agricultural area, the Court must also consider the question, before proceeding to decide the appeal on the merits, whether it was liable to be stayed and/or abated under rules 38 and 39 of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 16. I may in this context again refer to the judgment dated 13th May, 1974 of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 41 of 1964 setting aside the remand order of the lower appellate court directing the trial court to frame issues relating to sub-tenancy rights claimed by the defendant-appellant and grove-holders right claimed by the plaintiffs and referring them to the revenue court for decision. According to that judgment of this Court the court below had to determine whether the compromise was binding and whether it could be given effect to. Learned counsel for the defendant appellant then urged that the compromise, Ext. According to that judgment of this Court the court below had to determine whether the compromise was binding and whether it could be given effect to. Learned counsel for the defendant appellant then urged that the compromise, Ext. 8, in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was inadmissible for want of registration and the view of the lower appellate court that it amounted to a licence granted by the plaintiffs to the defendant-appellant on surrender of sub-tenancy rights in the land is patently erroneous in law. 17. The question whether the compromise Ext. 8 is admissible in evidence may be examined first. Learned counsel for the parties cited a number of decisions and read out the reasons given by the lower appellate court for its decision on this point, but I think the question is answered simply by a reference to clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act, which lays down :- "(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to - (i)........................................ (ii) ........................................... (iii) ......................................... (iv) .......................................... (v) .......................................... (vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding." 18. The order of the Criminal Court in the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was purely an order of a court within the meaning of the said provision. A reference to the description of the land specified in the compromise Ext. 8 shows that all the six plots of land which are in dispute now were the subject matter of the compromise and also of the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order of the Magistrate is Ext. 9. It reads as under ; "The case is decided in terms of the compromise. The attachment is lifted in favour of the first party". The decision of the Magistrate could be known only by reading the compromise which was, however, not ordered to form part of the order itself. In substance the compromise did form part of the order and had to be read into it. The attachment is lifted in favour of the first party". The decision of the Magistrate could be known only by reading the compromise which was, however, not ordered to form part of the order itself. In substance the compromise did form part of the order and had to be read into it. If that were so and if the compromise did not relate to any land which was not the subject matter of the proceeding, the order was not compulsorily registerable. Even so, assuming that it was not so, the compromise docs not, in my opinion, purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest of the value of Rs. 100/- and upwards to or in immovable property. The compromise related to the preservation and enjoyment of certain fruit trees. It did relate to immovable property. It did not, however, purport, to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in the trees. It only placed a duty on the defendant to protect and preserve the trees and gave him only a right to the fruits. The true nature of the transaction was a right to appropriate the fruits of the trees on payment of a fixed amount of Rs. 300/- per year besides 600 fruits of mango and 1 maund 10 seers of jack fruit, and the labour spent in looking after and preserving the trees throughout the year, with a licence to go on the land and the trees for that purpose. It was a sale of the fruits coupled with the licence to remain on the land and the trees for the purposes of collecting the same. The agreement did not in my opinion create any right, title or interest in the land or the trees. 19. Even if the compromise was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, it could be surely referred to for the collateral purposes of ascertaining the nature of the defendant's possession. That apart, the defendant made the following statement under Order 10 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the trial court on 29th August, 1960. "That defendant states under Order X rule 2 C.P. Code that he had promised to pay Rs. That apart, the defendant made the following statement under Order 10 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the trial court on 29th August, 1960. "That defendant states under Order X rule 2 C.P. Code that he had promised to pay Rs. 300/- cash and 600 mango fruits and one maund 10 seers Kathal to the plaintiffs annually; that this agreement was arrived at in the course of proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. Code; that he did not cut or remove the wood of any tree. He further states that Sharda had agreed to accept his share of Rs. 150/- and therefore it was not sent by money order." Radhey Shyam son of the first plaintiff Gulab Das, who is now first respondent, stated under Order 10 rule 2 that his father's share in the amount was Rs. 150/-. 20. In view of the aforesaid statement under Order 10 rule 2 C.P.C. it is, in my opinion, not open to the defendant to contend that he was not liable to pay Rs. 300/- or that he was not liable to render 600 fruits of mango and 1 maund, 10 seers of jack-fruits every year for his being in possession of the grove and for the right to appropriate the fruits thereof. 21. I need not go further into the question about the admissibility of the compromise Ext. 8, because I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have not been able to establish any such breach of its terms by the defendant as to entitle them to a decree for possession. 22. The plaintiffs' case is that the defendant committed a breach of the terms of the licence and they were as such entitled to and had revoked the same, and were consequently also entitled to recover possession over the grove by evicting the defendant therefrom, the plaintiffs' case that the defendant had cut away any of the trees or had otherwise damaged the grove has been disbelieved by the two courts below. The only ground on which he was held liable to eviction was non-payment of the share of rent amounting to Rs. 150/- to the fourth plaintiff Sharda Prasad. The following is the finding of the lower appellate court on this point : "The learned Munsif has found that the defendant failed to pay a sum of Rs. The only ground on which he was held liable to eviction was non-payment of the share of rent amounting to Rs. 150/- to the fourth plaintiff Sharda Prasad. The following is the finding of the lower appellate court on this point : "The learned Munsif has found that the defendant failed to pay a sum of Rs. 300/- in the year 1959 to the plaintiffs. Asa matter of fact the defendant himself does not claim to have paid the sum of Rs. 300/- to the plaintiffs for the year 1959. As such I find nothing to differ from the learned Munsif that the defendant failed to pay the sum of Rs. 300/- to the plaintiffs as rent for the year 1959. Therefore, the defendant has failed to perform one of the terms entitling re-entry to the plaintiffs. I, therefore, fee that the plaintiffs do have a right of re-entry over the disputed grove". The finding of the trial court on this point is as follows : "Defendant did not admittedly pay Rs. 300/- to the plaintiffs in 1959. Defendant alleged that he tendered Rs. 150/- to various plaintiffs but they refused to accept the money orders. There is no explanation for not sending the balance of Rs. 150/-. In the statement under Order X rule 2 C.P.C., defendant has however alleged that Sharda Prasad, one of the plaintiff had to accept his share of Rs. 150/- therefore he (defendant) did not send Rs. 150/-. There is nothing on record except the statement of Raja D. W. 1 that Sharda Prasad agreed to accept Rs. 150/- separately. The said Rs. 150/- too was not paid to Sharda Prasad. There is no evidence that defendant offered Rs. 150/- to Sharda Prasad but he refused to accept the same. Sharda Prasad has also joined in the suit. I therefore find that defendant did not pay Rs. 300/- to the plaintiff in 1959 and has thereby committed the breach of the terms contained in compromise Ex. 8 and the defendant is therefore liable to eviction. 23. I have already quoted the entire statement made by the defendant and even by the plaintiffs under Order 10 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sharda Prasad did not appear as a witness in the case. 8 and the defendant is therefore liable to eviction. 23. I have already quoted the entire statement made by the defendant and even by the plaintiffs under Order 10 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sharda Prasad did not appear as a witness in the case. There is nothing on the record to show that he ever demanded his share of the rent from the defendant and that the defendant did not pay the same in spite of the demand. The evidence is that three separate money orders for Rs. 50/- each were sent to plaintiff' Nos. 1, 2 and 3, but were refused by them with the remark that the rent was not acceptable because the defendant had damaged the grove. The plaintiffs case that the defendant had damaged the grove has been found to be wrong. The rent had properly been tendered to them. Sharda Prasad, the fourth plaintiff did not appear as witness and there is nothing on the record to show that he ever demanded his share of Rs. 150/- and on non-payment thereof or because of non-payment thereof he forfeited the defendant's so-called licence or right to the fruits of the grove. Apart from the finding of both the courts below that the defendant did not in any manner damage the grove, it has been found as a fact that 600 fruits of mango and 1 maund, 10 seer of jack-fruit for the year 1959 had duly been rendered by the defendant lo the plaintiffs. In reply to the notice served by the plaintiffs the defendant never refused to pay the amount of Rs. 300/-. So far as plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 are concerned it is proved that they refused to accept their share. There is nothing on the record to show that plaintiff No. 4 ever demanded it and the defendant did not pay inspited of demand. In Paragraph 25 of the written statement also the defendant clearly pleaded that he was prepared and willing to pay the amount of Rs. 300/- for the year 1959 and that too in spite of the wrongful refusal of the amount of Rs. 150/- that was remitted to plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3. It would further appear that the sum of Rs. 300/- for the year 1959 and that too in spite of the wrongful refusal of the amount of Rs. 150/- that was remitted to plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3. It would further appear that the sum of Rs. 900/- was deposited under the trial court's order dated 29th August, 1960 and that was withdrawn by the plaintiffs I do not, therefore, think that non-payment of Rs. 150/- to the fourth plaintiff Sharda Prasad for the year 1959 was adequate ground for forfeiting the defendant's right to the fruits of the grove which he had been enjoying under the terms of the compromise Ext. 8. Indeed the defendant's right to the fruits of the grove was never forfeited on that ground. 24. In the result this appeal must succeed and the decree for recovery of possession over the grove by the eviction of the defendant must be set aside. Even the decree for the recovery of Rs. 300/- that was passed by the trial court has to be set aside inasmuch as the amount of Rs. 150/- had been tendered by the defendant to plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 and had wrongfully been refused by them and there is no evidence to show that Sharda Prasad, the fourth plaintiff ever demanded his share of rent and the defendant did not pay in spite of that demand. At any rate the plaintiffs have already received the amount of Rs. 900/- which was deposited in the trial court. They can appropriate it towards rent. 25. The appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The decree under appeal is set aside. The plaintiffs' suit shall stand dismissed with costs throughout.