Avadh Behari Lal Saxena v. Janki Prasad Anglo Sanskrit Educational Association
1982-05-24
K.M.DAYAL
body1982
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT K. M. Dayal, J. 1. HEARD the learned counsel for the parties. The present petition arises out of a suit for ejectment filed before the court of Small Causes alleging the defendant to be a tenant. The plaintiff respondent is named Janki Prasad Anglo Sanskrit Educational Association, Khurja. Annexure T to the counter affidavit is the plaint. Paragraph 1 mentions that Janki Prasad Anglo Sanskrit Educational Association was a registered body, which was running an educational institution known as J. A. S. Inter College, Khurja. In paragraph 2 it was mentioned that it was a recognised institution and owned several properties including the disputed one. In paragraph no. 3 it was mentioned that the plaintiff was the owner and landlord of the property in dispute. The suit was filed on the basis that the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were not applicable. The plaintiff had terminated the tenancy of the defendant by giving a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and was entitled to a decree. The written statement is Annexure 2' to the counter affidavit. It was pleaded that the suit was not maintainable and the notice was invalid. The plaintiff had earlier instituted proceedings under section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 which were pending. The defendant was not liable to ejectment. He had not caused any substantial change nor damaged the building nor created any nuisance. 2. THE suit has been decreed by the courts below on, a finding that the plaintiff was covered by section 21 (1) f) of the Act and the disputed premises were consequently exempt from the operation of the Act. THE trial court held that the plaintiff was a registered society of which the whole income was to be spent for the recognised institution. Consequently it was exempted under section 2 (1) f of the Act aforesaid. It did not decide the other questions covered by issues nos. 1 to 7 and decreed the suit. The revisional court also confirmed the decree holding that the plaintiff was covered by section 2 (1) f read with section 3 (q) of the Act and consequently it was entitled to a decree without complying with the provisions of the Act. 3.
1 to 7 and decreed the suit. The revisional court also confirmed the decree holding that the plaintiff was covered by section 2 (1) f read with section 3 (q) of the Act and consequently it was entitled to a decree without complying with the provisions of the Act. 3. I HAVE heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. From the title of the suit it is clear that the property is owned by Janki Prasad Anglo Sanskrit Educational Association, Khurja. From paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the plaint it is apparent that the plaintiff claims the property as belonging to it. In paragraph 1 it has been further mentioned that the plaintiff which was a registered society was running an educational institution known as J. A. S. Inter College, Khurja. From these averments it is evident that the plaintiff is Janki Prasad Anglo Sanskrit Educational Association. The finding of fact recorded by the courts below is that it is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. That finding may be accepted. 4. THE learned counsel for the petitioner argued that if it was society registered under the Societies Registration Act it could have been covered by clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act. THE aforesaid clause runs as under :- "any building built and held by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Act No. LXIII of 1860) or by a cooperative society, company or firm, and intended solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers or servants, whether on rent or free of rent, or as a guest house, by whatever name called, for the occupation of persons having dealings with it in the ordinary course of business". From the aforesaid clause it is apparent that the building to be exempted from the operation of the Act must be built and held by the Society and should be intended solely for its own occupation. The only exception is in respect of the officers and servants of the Society either on payment of rent or free of rent or as a guest house for the occupation of the persons having dealings with it in ordinary course of business. 5. THE learned counsel for the respondent admitted that the defendant petitioner had no business dealings with the plaintiff's society.
5. THE learned counsel for the respondent admitted that the defendant petitioner had no business dealings with the plaintiff's society. He was let out the premises for his own business through the Principal of the College and the Secretary of the Society. I am not prepared to accept the argument of the learned counsel that as occupation of servant or guests is permitted the tenant would also be deemed to be occupying it for the purposes of the society and it must be deemed to be held by the society itself. For a society or firm or company covered by clause f) only two types of users are permitted. One is for its own occupation and secondly for occupation by its own servant or guests. Every guest will also not be covered. Only such guests are covered who stay for the purpose of dealing with the Society in business. If firm 'A' at Allahabad has a building the customers that come for business with that firm may stay and may be called guests for the purposes of the clause. But if certain pilgrims come to Allahabad for having a dip at Sangam and persons not connected with the firm stay in the building it shall not be exempted from the operation of the Act. I am not prepared to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that a defendant who was a tenant was occupying the building for the purposes of the Society. 6. THE argument of the learned counsel in the alternative was that the building was covered by clause (b) of sub section (1) of Section 2. It reads as under :- "any building belonging to or vested in a recognised educational institution, the whole of the income from which is utilised for the purposes of such institution;" From the aforesaid clause it is apparent that only such buildings can be covered by it which belong to and vest in a recognised educational institution. THE learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to argue that the plaintiff society was running a recognised institution and consequently the plaintiff should be deemed to be a recognised institution as contemplated by the Act. For determining the same we have to go to the definition of the recognised institution as given in clause (q) of section 3.
THE learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to argue that the plaintiff society was running a recognised institution and consequently the plaintiff should be deemed to be a recognised institution as contemplated by the Act. For determining the same we have to go to the definition of the recognised institution as given in clause (q) of section 3. It reads as under : "recognised educational institution" means any institution recognised under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972 or recognised or affiliated under the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973." It is, therefore, apparent that the recognised educational institution can only be one which is recognised under the Intermediate Education Act or U. P. Basic Education Act or U. P. State Universities Act. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent that Janki Prasad Anglo Sanskrit Educational Association, Khurja is not recognised under any of the aforesaid enactments. THE institutions that are being run by it may be so recognised but they are neither the plaintiffs nor the owners of the building. Under the circumstances I am not prepared to hold that the plaintiff was a recognised educational institution under the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The last argument of the learned counsel for the respondent was that PW2, whose statement is Annexure 4' to the counter affidavit has stated that the Society has endowed the building to the college and the Society was no more concerned with it. No document in support of the aforesaid endowment has been brought on record. In any case, if such an endowment was there, the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain the suit. It has nothing to do with the building after endowment. The College should have filed the suit. 7. LEARNED counsel for the respondent relied upon paragraph 407 of Hindu Law by Mulla XIIIth Edition. The learned counsel contended that no writing or other document was necessary for an endowment. This argument is misconceived. The endowment was not under the Hindu Law but in favour of an institution by a registered society or trust. Such an endowment could not be exempted by the provisions of Hindu Law and had to be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act and Contract Act. I consequently reject this argument of the learned counsel. 8.
The endowment was not under the Hindu Law but in favour of an institution by a registered society or trust. Such an endowment could not be exempted by the provisions of Hindu Law and had to be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act and Contract Act. I consequently reject this argument of the learned counsel. 8. IN the result, the present petition has to be allowed. The judgment and decree of the courts below is quashed. The trial court is directed to decide the case on merits and in accordance with law. The matter relating to the plaintiff being a recognised educational society shall not be reopened. The parties are directed to bear their own costs of this petition. Petition allowed.