JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Muzaffar Hasan, who was the President of the Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U. P. (hereinafter referred to as the Board) and Abbas Ali, who was the member of the same, challenging the order of the State of U. P. dated 19th Dec., 1981 suspending the Board under sub-s. (1) of S. 44A read with sub-s. (1) of S. 45 of the U. P. Muslim Waqf Act, 1960 (Act No. XVI of 1960) (for short Act) The aforesaid order is quoted below : - "Whereas cases of gross mismanagement and persistent dereliction of duty by the Sunni Central Board, Uttar Pradesh have been brought to the notice of the State Government and the State Government is of the opinion that the Board has so flagrantly abused and exceeded the powers vested in it by law that its continuance is likely to prove detrimental to the public interest : And whereas the State Government is of the opinion that conditions exists where immediate action is necessary; Now therefore the Governor is in exercise of powers under sub-s. (1) of S. 44A of the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 (U. P. Act No. XVI of 1960) as inserted by the Uttar Pradesh Muslim Waqfs (Amendment) Ordinance 1981 (U. P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1981) pleased to suspend the Sunni Central Board Uttar Pradesh Lucknow for a period of six months with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the gazette and in exercise of powers under sub-s. (1) of S. 44A read with sub-s. (1) of S. 45 of the said Act is further pleased to appoint Sri Abdul Qayum, S.A.S. (Beg) (A Sunni Muslim) to be Administrator with effect from the said date and for the said period to carry out the function and duties of the said Board under the provisions of the Act." 2. U. P. Act No. XVI of 1960 had been enacted by the State Legislature to provide for better governance, administration and supervision of certain classes of waqfs in Uttar Pradesh. Chapter II deals with establishment of Boards and their functions. S. 10 provides for the establishment of a Board, known as Sunni Central Board of Waqfs. U. P. Act No. XVI of 1960 had been enacted by the State Legislature to provide for better governance, administration and supervision of certain classes of waqfs in Uttar Pradesh. Chapter II deals with establishment of Boards and their functions. S. 10 provides for the establishment of a Board, known as Sunni Central Board of Waqfs. S. 11 deals with the construction of Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, namely, that there would be twelve members and a President. Under S. 14 of the Act, the term of the members of the Board is five years from the date of notification of its construction. S. 19 lays down the functions of the Board. S. 22A deals with cessation of membership. It provides that a person who is a member of the Board in his capacity as a member of the State Legislature shall cease to be member of the Board on his ceasing to hold that capacity. Chap. V deals with special powers of the State Government. S. 42 of this Chapter confers general supervision over the Board whereas S. 43 empowers the State Government to issue general or special directions to the Board as the State Government may think proper S. 44 and 45 of the Act confer powers upon the State Government to Supersede the Board and to take over functions of the same. S. 44 is as under : - "44. Supersession of the Board. - In case of gross mismanagement and persistent dereliction of duty by the Board or when, in the opinion of the State Government, the Board has so flagrantly abused or exceeded the powers vested in it by law that its continuance is likely to prove detrimental to the public interest, the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, supersede the Board after affording it an opportunity to explain the charges against it and after taking into consideration the explanation, if any, submitted by it." 3. In 1981, the Governor promulgated U. P. Ordinance No. 278 of 1981 known as (sic) the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Amendment Act, 1981 conferring power to suspend the Board on the State Government and appoint an Administrator in accordance with S. 45. Sub-s. (1) of S. 44A is as under : - "44A. In 1981, the Governor promulgated U. P. Ordinance No. 278 of 1981 known as (sic) the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Amendment Act, 1981 conferring power to suspend the Board on the State Government and appoint an Administrator in accordance with S. 45. Sub-s. (1) of S. 44A is as under : - "44A. (1) If, in the circumstances referred to in S. 44, the State Government is of opinion that conditions exist where immediate action is necessary, it may, at any time, by notification, suspend the Board forthwith and appoint an Administrator in accordance with S. 45." (2) to (4)............" 4. In the instant case, in the year 1978, the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs was constituted which consisted of twelve members. Out of these ................... twelve members, the petitioner No. 1 and four others were ................. members of the Legislative Assembly whereas Abbas.............. Ali, petitioner No. 2, was a member of the Legislative Council. These members were elected from amongst themselves by Sunni members of the State Legislature. Muzaffar Hasan was, therefore, elected as President at a meeting of Sunni Central Board of Waqfs held on 2nd Aug. 1978. After the election of the members and the President of the Board, the State Government issued a notification dated 9th Aug., 1978 under S. 80 (2) of the Act notifying the Constitution and the names of the members and the President. After constitution of the said Board, the petitioner and the Board assumed the powers. 5. In Feb. 1980, the U. P. State Assembly was dissolved as a result of which the four Sunni members of the Legislative Assembly and petitioner No. 1 ceased to be the members of the Board. There was, however a conflict between petitioner No. 1 and the State of Uttar Pradesh with regard to the former's cessation of the membership under S. 22A. The State Government tool the view that petitioner No. 1 had ceased to be a member of the Board whereas the Stand of the petitioner was that under the provisions of the Act any outside person could be elected as President, therefore, merely because petitioner No. 1 ceased to be the member of the U. P. Legislative Assembly, he did not cease to be the member of the Board. As the State Government was not prepared to accept petitioner No. 1 Muzaffar Hasan as the President of the Board, petitioner No. 1 filed writ petition No. 7917 of 1980 for Mandamus directing the State Government not to interfere with his working as the President of the Board. The aforesaid writ petition was admitted and the respondents were directed to continue to recognise the petitioner as the President of Sunni Central Board of Waqfs. 6. In place of five Sunni members who had ceased to be members of the Board on the dissolution of the State Legislative Assembly, five members were elected in their place from amongst the Sunni members of the Legislative Assembly of U. P. State. Thereafter, a tussle started between the members relating to the administration of the Central Waqf Board. On 30th Sept. 1981, the petitioner intimated Minister for Waqfs and Industries, Uttar Pradesh that it was not possible for him to convene a meeting of the Board. On 28th Oct., 1981, Abdul Rauf Khan, one of the members, wrote a letter to the State Government complaining against the conduct of petitioner No. 1 Petitioner No. 1 was called upon to file his comments to this letter. The complaint against petitioner No. 1 was that he was not convening the meeting of the Board. To this complaint, petitioner No. 1 replied that the requisition sent for convening the meeting bore forged signatures. Subsequently, on 19th Dec., 1981, the State Government issued a notification in exercise of its power under the newly inserted S. 44A of the Act whereby the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs had been suspended for a period of six months with effect from the publication of the notification in the Gazette and further, one Abdul Qayum, respondent No. 3, ' was appointed as Administrator. Thereafter, this petition has been filed by Muzaffar Hasan, the President and Abbas Ali, petitioner No. 2, who was the member of the legislative Council and by virtue of being a member of the Legislative Council had been elected under S. 11 (1) of the Act as a member of the Sunni Central Board. 7. Thereafter, this petition has been filed by Muzaffar Hasan, the President and Abbas Ali, petitioner No. 2, who was the member of the legislative Council and by virtue of being a member of the Legislative Council had been elected under S. 11 (1) of the Act as a member of the Sunni Central Board. 7. Amongst the various grounds taken and argued before us, the first one was that for action to be taken under S. 44A, an opportunity of being heard was necessary and power conferred by the said provision suspending the Board could be exercised only after compliance of the principles of audi alteram partem. The second argument was that as the impugned order did not contain any reason for suspending the Board, the same was invalid. The third submission made was that as there was no materials on the record to establish the grounds for passing the order under S. 44A, the same was void. 8. As in our opinion, the first point could conclude the writ petition in favour of the petitioner it will not be necessary for us to examine other arguments. 9. Before we take up the first point, we may note that neither the Board nor the petitioners were admittedly heard before passing of the impugned order dated 19th Dec., 1981. The question, therefore, that remains to be examined is about the effect of not giving opportunity to the petitioners or the Board of making its representation against the order of suspension. We have quoted the impugned order suspending the Board which amongst others found that the Board has flagrantly abused and exercised the power vested in it by law. From the above allegation, the conclusion drawn is that the Board's continuance was likely to prove detrimental to the public interest. It is the admitted case that no opportunity was given to the Board to explain any fact or circumstances on the basis of which the action had been taken. The Board was entitled to know the charges which led to the action being taken against it. The submission before us was that non-compliance of natural justice has invalidated the order. 10. The Advocate General appearing for the State of U. P., however, contended that as there was no specific provision for giving of opportunity before an order of suspension was made, the grievance raised by the petitioner is unjustified. The submission before us was that non-compliance of natural justice has invalidated the order. 10. The Advocate General appearing for the State of U. P., however, contended that as there was no specific provision for giving of opportunity before an order of suspension was made, the grievance raised by the petitioner is unjustified. It is true that there is no specific provision to that effect but there is nothing expressly or impliedly said in the Act which excludes the same. A consideration of the Scheme of the Act does not justify the view submitted by the respondent's learned counsel that as this grievance of opportunity would have been highly detrimental to the public interest, the Legislature has impliedly excluded the same. It is settled law that the rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If an enactment excludes the application of natural justice, then Court can not ignore the said provision. Whether or not application of principles of natural justice have been excluded, depends on the language and Scheme of the Act. 11. In the instant case, the Board had been constituted under S. 11 of the Act for performing of functions laid down in S. 13. It is a body which represents the Sunni Muslims of the State of Uttar Pradesh. This body has to consist of responsible persons. The State Government has been conferred general supervision over the Board and also to issue directions from time to time which it thinks fit in the performance of its functions. The Board is obliged to follow the directions of the State Government. If, however, the Board is found guilty of mismanagement and persistent dereliction of duty, the State Government has the power to supersede it under S. 44. S. 44 requires an opportunity to explain the charges to be given to the Board and taking the same into consideration before any action is taken. S. 44A which was inserted by Ordinance confers powers of suspension which may at the first instance be passed for a period of six months and, thereafter, be extended for a further period of six months which can further be extended from time to time not exceeding three months at a time. However, the total period of suspension cannot exceed one year. However, the total period of suspension cannot exceed one year. It may be noted here that the suspension provided for by S. 44A is not pending any enquiry. It is punitive in nature which is imposed on it on account of abuse of powers. In the absence of anything in S. 44A indicating the intention of the Legislature to do away with the requirement of the principles of natural justice, we are unable to agree with the respondents that no opportunity is required to be given. The suspension of the Board does involve civil consequences. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, ( AIR 1981 SC 136 ), the Lt. Governor in exercise of its powers conferred by S. 238 (1) superseded the New Delhi Municipal Committee with immediate effect. Upholding the argument that supersession of the Committee visited with civil consequences, the Supreme Court observed (Para 9) : "In our opinion the status and office and the rights and responsibilities to which we have referred and the expectation of the Committee to serve its full term of office would certainly create sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee and their loss, if superseded, would entail civil consequences so as to justify an insistence upon the observance of the principles of natural justice before an order of supersession is passed." 12. In that very case, one of the submissions made on behalf of the Lt. Governor was that as S. 238 (1) did not provide for any opportunity so, by necessary implication it must be considered that the principle audi alteram partem was excluded. The Supreme Court repelled the submission and observed (Para 10) : - "It is not always a necessary inference that if opportunity is expressly provided in one provision and not so provided in another, opportunity is to be considered as excluded from that other provision. It may be a weighty consideration to be taken into account but the weightier consideration is whether the administrative action entails civil consequences. This was also the view taken in Mohinder Singh Gill. The Chief Election Commr., New Delhi ( AIR 1978 SC 851 )." 13. The principle laid down in the aforesaid case applies with full force. A Board acting under the Act is a public body and before suspending the same, it was essential to give hearing to the Board. In State of Orissa v. Dr. The Chief Election Commr., New Delhi ( AIR 1978 SC 851 )." 13. The principle laid down in the aforesaid case applies with full force. A Board acting under the Act is a public body and before suspending the same, it was essential to give hearing to the Board. In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ), it was held that even an administrative order or the decision in matters involving civil consequences has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ) it was again reiterated that the rules of natural justice have to be applied to administrative proceedings for the purpose of preventing of miscarriage of justice. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India. ( AIR 1981 SC 818 ), the view taken is that the maxim audi alteram partem has got to apply to cases under S. 18 A A of Industries (Development and Regulations) Act 1951. 14. In our case, submission of the Advocate General was that where the public interest required making of immediate action, pre-decisional hearing has been ruled out. For the said purpose, reliance has been placed on para. 91 and 92 of the aforesaid judgment in Swadeshi Cotton Mills. In para. 91, the Supreme Court has said : - "In sum, for all the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that it is not reasonably possible to construe S. 18AA (1) as Universally excluding, either expressly or by inevitable intendment the application of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-takeover stage, regardless of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In the circumstances of the instant case, in order to ensure fair play in action it was imperative for the Government to comply substantially with this fundamental rule of prior hearing before passing the impugned order. We, therefore, accept the twofold proposition posed and propounded by Shri Nariman." 15. In the circumstances of the instant case, in order to ensure fair play in action it was imperative for the Government to comply substantially with this fundamental rule of prior hearing before passing the impugned order. We, therefore, accept the twofold proposition posed and propounded by Shri Nariman." 15. Para 42 of this very case is material and a portion of the same is quoted below ''In short, the general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely, if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, Courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shore of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage. Unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or, frustrate the need for utmost promptitude." 16. In case of great urgency opportunity may follow the action but present is not a case of that nature. The order under S. 44A could be passed after opportunity being given. The Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India ( AIR 1981 SC 818 ) has considered this aspect of the matter also and has said in this respect in para 39 as under "As pointed out in Mohindar Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., ( AIR 1978 SC 851 ) and in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 ) (ibid) such cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action, no pre-decisional hearing is given but the action is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected, do not, in reality, constitute an 'exception' to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases an 'exception' is a misnomer because they do not exclude 'fairplay in action', but adopt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing." 17. We find no justification for the State Government in suspending the Board without giving of opportunity of hearing to the Board. It has been said time and again that the content of opportunity differs from case to case. What was imperative was only to get a reply of the complaint which had been made against the Board by giving the Board a notice. For this purpose the State Government could have also issued directions to the Board under S. 43 to fix the meeting for consideration ~A the complaint and to submit a reply to it Within a limited period. Neither was it obligatory on the Government to allow the counsel to appear nor to take oral evidence. The meeting of the Board could be summoned by giving reasonable time and a decision could thereafter be taken after the reply was received. 18. The Advocate General contended that the order suspending the Board may not be interfered with and a necessary direction be only issued to the State Government to grant a hearing to the Board. In the circumstances of the present case, we cannot uphold the impugned order having found it invalid on account of non-compliance of principles of natural justice. 19. Counsel for the respondents urged that as the petitioner No. 1 has ceased to be a member of the Legislative Assembly, he under S. 22A of the Act could not function as the President and, as such, has no right to file the appeal. We although find considerable strength in this submission but as there is another petitioner before us, we consider it unnecessary to go into this question in this petition. The Advocate General also urged that since action against the Board had been taken on the letter dated 30th Sept., 1981, written by petitioner No. 1 himself, the complaint made by this petitioner of having not been given opportunity is unjustified. By the said letter, the petitioner No. 1 had pointed out the difficulties for convening a meeting of the Board. This could be said to be compliance with the requirement of giving hearing to the Board. 20. By the said letter, the petitioner No. 1 had pointed out the difficulties for convening a meeting of the Board. This could be said to be compliance with the requirement of giving hearing to the Board. 20. For what we have said above, we must find that the impugned order is void. The order suspending the Board stands set aside. It will be entitled to be reinstated. It will, however, be open to the State Government to take fresh action against the Board which it considers fit and proper in accordance with law. 21. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 19th Dec., 1981 stands set aside. The parties shall bear their own costs.