JUDGMENT :- This is a creditors first appeal from order directed against the order of the Insolvency Judge rejecting his application to declare the deceased respondent Smt. Jawala Devi as an insolvent. 2. The appellant had moved an application under S.9 read with S.13 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the allegation that a loan of Rs. 15,000/- had been advanced to her under a pronote and receipt on 13th April, 1970 but on 21st Oct. l970 she transferred her entire immoveable property in favour of her near relations for a grossly inadequate sum. The purpose of such transfer was to defeat and delay the creditors. It was further alleged that after the date of transfer, the debtor had been secluding herself in such a manner so as to deprive her creditors of the means of communicating with her. This application was moved on 4th Nov. 1970. 3. The debtor contested the petition on several grounds and denied having taken a loan of Rs. 15,000/-. She denied having transferred her immoveable property for inadequate consideration or with any such motive as alleged. She asserted that she had not committed any act of insolvency within the meaning of Sec.6 of the Act. Some other pleas were also taken but we are not concerned with the same in this appeal. 4. During the pendency of this petition, twice the matter was decided ex parte against the debtor but on each occasion applications to set aside the ex parte order were allowed and ultimately the matter was decided on contest between the parties. 5. The sale deeds, which are three in number, were actually executed by the debtor on 21st Oct., 1970. They were, however, registered in the office of the sub-registrar on 21-11-1970. In the intervening period on 4th Nov., 1970 a petition under S.9 read with S.13 (3) of the Act had been moved. The Court below held that since the effective date for any sale-deed is the date of registration, the cause of action for making such an application had not arisen till 21st Nov. 1970, when the three sale deeds were actually registered. The petition having been moved on 4th Nov. 1970, the same was held to be premature. The Court below held that since the effective date for any sale-deed is the date of registration, the cause of action for making such an application had not arisen till 21st Nov. 1970, when the three sale deeds were actually registered. The petition having been moved on 4th Nov. 1970, the same was held to be premature. The court held that up to 4-11-70 no act of insolvency had been committed by the debtor and as such the application was not maintainable. Although it held that a loan of Rs.15,000/- had been advanced to the debtor on 30th April, 1970 yet it went on to hold that the petitioner had failed to prove that the debtor had either absented or secluded herself so as to cut off all means of communication with her. In fact in his statement recorded at the time of hearing the petitioner did not even make a mention to this effect. In view of this the learned Insolvency Judge dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the decision, the creditor, had come up to this court for redress. 6. Shri R.K. Jain, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has very strenuously urged that the statement of the petitioner which was recorded at the time when the ex parte hearing took place should have been looked into by the Insolvency Judge. He urged that when the ex parte proceedings took place for the second time, the petitioner had clearly stated that the respondent had secluded herself and was avoiding communication with her creditors. Relying on this part of the ex parte statement dt. 31st Aug., 1974, it is urged that the Court below had wrongly held trial there was no evidence on the record to prove seclusion by the debtor. He has in this connection referred to a decision of Madras High Court in ( AIR 1956 Mad 633 ). where a Division Bench of that Court was dealing with a defendants appeal against a decree awarded to the plaintiff on the basis of plaintiffs statement recorded at the time of ex parte hearing which was subsequently set aside. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable because after the ex parte decree was set aside and the case cane up for hearing, the defendant absented himself once again. The plaintiff wanted that his earlier statement itself may be relied upon for granting ex parte decree which the Court did. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable because after the ex parte decree was set aside and the case cane up for hearing, the defendant absented himself once again. The plaintiff wanted that his earlier statement itself may be relied upon for granting ex parte decree which the Court did. On appeal, the defendant urged that such a statement had no legal sanctity and as such the decree should be set aside. The court, in these circumstances held (at p. 634) : "The Plaintiff was not prevented from choosing to treat the evidence given by him at the ex parte trial as evidence after the ex parte decree had been set aside and a fresh trial had commenced. Of course the defendant would have a right to cross-examine the witnesses, who had been examined on behalf of the plaintiff, but it would be an idle farce, if it was necessary that the p1aintiff should re-examine, the witness already examined to repeat what they had said already." 7. It is obvious that the circumstances of that case were very much different than what we have in the present case. Here the plaintiff wants to rely upon his statement given during the ex parte proceeding although no request was made by him in this behalf. The debtor was never informed that the petitioner wished to rely upon the earlier statement also. The debtor got no opportunity even to cross-examine the petitioner on that part of his deposition which was recorded at the ex parte hearing. To hold otherwise would be against all principles of natural justice. 8. Contrary to it, there is a Division Bench decision of this Court Mst. Lakshmi Devi v. Roongta and Co. (AIR 1962 All 38l) wherein Srivastava, J. had this to say (at p. 382) : "A decree can be passed against the defendant only on admissible material and any evidence produced in his absence cannot be utilised against him and treated as admissible material. The earlier ex parte decree against the appellant having been set aside they became entitled to be relegated back to the stage at which they were absent and could insist that every thing which had been done in their absence should be done again their presence. The evidence of Goverdhan had been recorded in their absence. They had no opportunity of cross-examining the witness. The evidence of Goverdhan had been recorded in their absence. They had no opportunity of cross-examining the witness. The reason for the absence having been found sufficient, they could say that if the evidence of Goverdhan was to be relied upon against them Goverdhan should be examined again. On the basis of the evidence recorded in their absence, the decree in question could not therefore, be passed against them." 9. This appears to be the correct position of law also. In India we have adversary system of law in which both the parties have to state their respective cases and as far as possible, no proceedings are taken behind the back of any other party. Any statement, therefore, which has hem recorded in the absence of the debtor could not be used against her unless the same had been either specifically tendered in evidence or an opportunity is given to cross-examine the witnesses. In this case, there is no suggestion even that the petitioner ever wanted his earlier statement to be treated as a part of his testimony. At the contesting stage he appeared as a witness again and gave his statement and was cross-examined on those limited points. If he failed to make any mention of the alleged seclusion by the debtor he has himself to blame. The Court below was right in refusing to accept the petitioners version and in rejecting his claim that the debtor had secluded herself from her creditors. 10. The other ground in the petition was that by executing the three saw deeds on 21st Oct. 1970 the debtor had committed an act of insolvency within the meaning of Sec.6 of the Act. The Court below relying upon firm Mukundlal v. Purshottam Singh ( AIR 1968 SC 1182 ) rejected the petition. In order to appreciate the controversy in the case before the Supreme Court it would be proper to have some of its relevant facts: The appellant was a firm in which one Mukund Lal and his son Veer Kumar, were partners. On 31st Oct., 1957 Mukund Lal executed a deed of gift in favour of Veer Kumar but its registration took place only on 11-3-1958. On 31st Oct., 1957 Mukund Lal executed a deed of gift in favour of Veer Kumar but its registration took place only on 11-3-1958. As soon as the registration of the sale deed came to the notice of the creditors, three petitions to declare them insolvent were filed in the months of April and May, 1958 and in the last week of Jan., 1959. From the date of the execution of the gift deed all these petitions were beyond three months and this transfer could not be made basis as an act of insolvency. The Supreme Court, however, held that the relevant date of transfer in such a case must always be the date of registration of the deed, without which the mere execution of sale deed was meaningless. The petitions were, therefore, held to be within time from that date. The relevant portion in the said decision may be quoted as under (at pp. 1184-85) :- It was contended on behalf of the appellants that under S.47 of the Indian Registration Act a registered document operates from the date of its execution even though it may require registration and consequently the registration of the document should be taken to date back to the date of execution by a fiction of law. It was therefore submitted that the starting point of the three months period prescribed under S.9 (1) (c) of the Act should be the date of executions of the deed of gift and not the date of registration. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act states that for the purpose of making a gift of immovable property the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument in the prescribed manner. Under this section therefore a gift of immoveable property is not valid unless it is effected by a registered instrument. It is true that under S.47 of the Indian Registration Act once a document is registered the effect begins to commence from the date of execution, but if the document is not registered it can never have any legal effect as a deed of gift under Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act it is provided that no document required by S.17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered shall affect any immoveable property comprised therein unless it has been registered. The section necessarily implies that such a document by reason of its execution alone cannot have the effect of transferring the property, In the present case, therefore, the deed of gift executed by Mukand Lal in favour of Veer Kumar dated Oct. 31, 1957 cannot be considered to be an act of insolvency unless a valid transfer of property was made by that document and such a valid transfer could be said to have been made only when the document was registered on March, 11, 1958, The question in the present case is not what was the effect of the registration of the deed of gift, but when did the event take place which effectively transferred the property. We are not concerned with the point of time from which the document became operative but with the point of time at which the deed of gift became legally effective. The contrary viewpoint for which the appellant contends would ignore the circumstance that if the registration of the deed of gift was not effected within the period of three months the creditor would he deprived of his remedy of relying upon the Act of transfer as constituting an act of insolvency. Such an interpretation should be avoided as it world nullify the intention of the statute." According to the decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, the relevant date for the purpose of reckoning limitation for filing a petition based on an act of insolvency would be the date of registration of the sale deed. 11. I am, however, faced, here with a situation of a slightly different kind. In this case, the creditors petition was moved subsequent to the execution of the sale deed but prior to its registration. The court below has held that the petitioner had no cause of action at all to file the application as on 4-11-70 as the registration. of the sale deed took place only on 21-11-70. For the appellant. it was urged that as soon as the sale deed is actually registered it relates back to the date of execution and therefore, the sale deed must be deemed to be effective from that date itself. Should the sale-deed be not registered for any reason then, in that event, the petition may fail but this cannot happen when the sale-deed has actually been registered. 12. Should the sale-deed be not registered for any reason then, in that event, the petition may fail but this cannot happen when the sale-deed has actually been registered. 12. Section 6 deals with various acts of insolvency including the case where the debtor transfers his property with a view to delay and defeat the creditors. The use of the pharse "makes a transfer used therein does not mean mere execution but must mean a process by which the property may actually change hands. This process, in view of Ss.17, 47 and 49 of the Registration Act would not be complete before the registration, although once the registration is done the transfer must relate back to the date of the execution. However the above phrase is used in past perfect tense and therefore a debtor can be said to have committed an act of insolvency only when he "makes a transfer" of his property which would not be complete and effective unless the deed is registered It follows as a necessary consequence that there could be no commission of an act of insolvency until transfer takes place so as to entitle a creditor to make an application under Sec.9 of the Act. 13. In Dalip Singh v. Mohd. Usman Khan (1975 All WC 340) a learned single Judge distinguished the above mentioned Supreme Court decision in the following words :- "The simple question for consideration is whether the intention to defraud is to be seen on the date of the execution of the sale-deed or on the date on its registration. Obviously, the intention and object of a transferor must come into existence at the time when he executes the sale deed and it is the same intention which continues till the sale-deed is registered. On the date on which the sale deed was executed the debt had not even come into existence and, therefore, it cannot be said that the transferor had any intention to defeat the creditor. The decision of the Supreme Court is not applicable to this case. It has been held there that for the purposes of calculating the limitation for filing the petition the act of insolvency must be deemed to have taken place on the date of the registration of the sale deed, the date on which the sale deed becomes effective. Here the question is different. It has been held there that for the purposes of calculating the limitation for filing the petition the act of insolvency must be deemed to have taken place on the date of the registration of the sale deed, the date on which the sale deed becomes effective. Here the question is different. The question is whether any act of insolvency was at all committed." 14. This case however has no relevance for resolving the controversy now before me. 15. Maybe, for the purposes of an "act of insolvency" the date of execution of the sale deed is a relevant date provided the document was duly registered and can be taken to be the starting point of the formation of the intention to delay and defraud the creditors, yet this alone cannot nature into an "act of insolvency" within the meaning of Section 6 (a) of the Act until the deed is actually registered. The act of registration of the transfer deed puts a seal on the deed so as to effectively transfer the property and this alone can be the moment when a debtor can be said to have committed an act of insolvency under the Act. For the purposes of computing the limitation for making an application after execution of such a document also limitation will commence from the date of registration of the transfer deed although the property will stand transferred with effect from the date of its execution. In the present case, the petition was made on 4-11-70 by which time no transfer had taken place due to want of registration thereof. Such an application was certainly premature and could not be sustained. 16. In my opinion, therefore, the application was not legally maintainable and has rightly been thrown out by the learned Insolvency Judge on the ground that the registration of the deed had taken place only during the pendency of the petition. 17. The learned Counsel for the respondent also raised an objection that on the death of debtor the petition could not proceed with the aid of S.17 of the Act. According to him, S.17 of the Act is restrictive in nature as would be apparent from the use of words "so far as may be necessary" in the section. 17. The learned Counsel for the respondent also raised an objection that on the death of debtor the petition could not proceed with the aid of S.17 of the Act. According to him, S.17 of the Act is restrictive in nature as would be apparent from the use of words "so far as may be necessary" in the section. Since the scope of the section itself has been restricted to question relating to realisation and distribution of the property of the debtor," it cannot be enlarged for the purposes of holding an inquiry into the alleged act of insolvency said to have been committed by the debtor. Bankruptcy or insolvency is a personal disqualification and on the death of the person it cannot attach to his heirs. The learned Counsel for the appellant however has referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Molhar Singh v. Raghunath ( AIR 1972 All 483 ) in which it has been held that S.17 of the Act cannot be interpreted to mean that on the death of the debtor the right to sue does not survive. Whatever may be the force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent, I am bound by the decision of the Division Bench referred to above. I, therefore, hold that the proceedings would not fail merely on account of the death of the debtor. 18. In the result, the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.